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‘UNITING AGAINST IMPUNITY: THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY AS A CATALYST FOR ACTION AT THE ICC’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 September 2017

Michael Ramsden  and
Tomas Hamilton
Michael Ramsden
Affiliation:
Associate Professor, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, michaelramsden@cuhk.edu.hk.
Tomas Hamilton
Affiliation:
Senior Legal Consultant, United Nations Assistance to the Khmer Rouge Trials, tfbhamilton@gmail.com
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Abstract

This article evaluates the role of the UN General Assembly (‘UNGA’) and its subsidiary organs in acting as a catalyst for action at the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’). The power of the UN Security Council (‘UNSC’) to make a referral to the ICC has been increasingly challenged in recent years, due to the perceived misuse of the veto by permanent members and general failings to enforce international criminal law in the face of documented atrocities. Meanwhile, the UNGA and its subsidiary organs have exerted meaningful pressure on the UNSC through the creation of commissions of inquiry and country-specific resolutions. There is the possibility for the UNGA to engage in dialogue with the ICC through ‘quasi-judicial’ resolutions, in coordinating collective responses to a recalcitrant State and individual perpetrators and also through the possible assumption of a referral power. This analysis reveals that the UNGA has become increasingly active in international justice and holds the potential for an enhanced role in addressing the failings of the current UNSC-dominated paradigm governing UN–ICC relations, thereby facilitating States in ‘uniting against impunity’.

Keywords

international criminal lawimpunity gappowers of UN organsuniversal jurisdictionUniting for Peace resolution
Type
Articles
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 66 , Issue 4 , October 2017 , pp. 893 - 921
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2017 

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References

1 Space precludes evaluation of the claim that the UNSC (specifically, its permanent members) has impeded the ICC's mandate. There is important literature in this respect, which underpins the major assumptions of this article on the deficit within the UNSC to address impunity, of which see: Forsythe, DP, ‘The UN Security Council and Response to Atrocities: The P-5 and International Criminal Law’ (2012) 34 HumRtsQ 840 Google Scholar; Jain, N, ‘A Separate Law for Peacekeepers: The Clash between the Security Council and the International Criminal Court’ (2005) 16 EJIL 239 Google Scholar; Weller, M, ‘Undoing the Global Constitution: UN Security Action and the International Criminal Court’ (2002) 78(4) International Affairs 693 Google Scholar.

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3 UNGA Res 377 A(V) (3 November 1950); UNHRC, ‘Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’, UN Doc A/HRC/12/48 (25 September 2009) at para 197; UNHRC, ‘Report of the Detailed Findings of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea’, UN Doc A/HRC/25/CRP.1 (7 February 2014) at para 1201.

4 As to relevant Charter powers, see arts 1, 13(1), 55 and 60. This article focuses on how the UNGA is able to complement the ICC's functions, although it is arguable that the UNGA may also establish its own ad hoc international criminal tribunals or investigatory mechanisms under UN auspices, as indeed it recently did with respect to the ‘International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism’ established to investigate crimes in Syria. This analysis is beyond the scope of this article although it has been considered elsewhere: M Ramsden, ‘Uniting for MH17’ (2017 forthcoming) AsianJIL; cf Lemnitzer, JM, ‘International Commissions of Inquiry and the North Sea Incident: A Model for an MH17 Tribunal?’ (2016) 27(4) EJIL 923 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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7 UNGA Res 71/248 (2016), 21 December 2016. The HRC has also passed resolutions calling on States to establish transitional justice mechanisms to ‘combat impunity’: HRC Res 33/L.10 (2016).

8 Art 13, Rome Statute.

9 Art 12(1), UN Charter; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports (2004) 136, at 149–50. Indeed, when considering Syrian objections to the establishment of the ‘International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism’, the UNGA President noted that Article 12 of the UN Charter does not prevent it from considering items on the UNSC agenda. Rather, the words that the UNSC ‘is exercising’ in Article 12 has been interpreted to mean as ‘exercising at this moment’. See further: UNGA, 71st Session, 66th Meeting, ‘Resolution Establishing International Mechanism Concerning Syria Passed in Direct Plenary Action’ (21 December 2016) available at <http://www.un.org/press/en/2016/ga11880.doc.htm>.

10 eg UNSC Res 365 (1974); UNSC Res 1998 (2011); UNSC Res 2282 (2016).

11 UNSC Res 1373 (2001).

12 UNSC Res 1343 (2001).

13 UNGA Res 70/14 (17 December 2015) at para 12; UNGA Res 69/122 (10 December 2014).

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21 UNGA Res 52/135 (12 December 1997); UNGA Res 55/95 (28 February 2001). However, the role of the UN and UNGA in establishing this tribunal has been criticized, see Hamilton, T and Ramsden, M, ‘The Politicalisation of Hybrid Courts: Observations from the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’ (2014) 14(1) International Criminal Law Review 115 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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25 HRC Res S-17/17 (2011) at para 1.

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27 Indeed, the HRC recognizes the important plenary function of the UNGA in making recommendations to the UNSC in the field of international criminal justice. For example, the HRC implored the UNGA to recommend the UNSC to refer the Gaza situation to the ICC: HRC Res 16/32 (2011) at para 8.

28 UNGA Res 69/188 (18 December 2014) at para 6; UNGA Res 69/189 (n 16) at preamble; UNGA Res 68/182 (18 December 2013).

29 See eg UNGA Res 68/183 (18 December 2013) at para 1.

30 UNGA Res 69/248 (29 December 2014) at paras 5 and 6.

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32 UNGA Res 71/248 (2016) (n 7).

33 UNSC Res1970 (2011) at preamble and para 5. Also, UNSC Res 2040 (2012) at preamble; UNSC Res 2000 (2011) at preamble.

34 Compare eg HRC Res 24/22 (2013) and UNSC Res 2118 (2013); HRC 19/22 (2012) and UNSC Res 2043 (2012); HRC Res 18/19 (2011) and UNSC Res 2040 (2012).

35 UNSC Res 2014 (2011) at preamble.

36 UNSC Res 2226 (2015) at para 17.

37 UNSC Res 1975 (2011) at para 8; UNSC Res 2134 (2014) at para 19.

38 UNSC Res 2140 (2014) at para 6.

39 UNSC, Record of the 7180th Meeting of the Security Council, UN Doc No S/PV.7180 (2 May 2014); UNGA Res 69/189 (n 16).

40 See eg UNSC Res 2270 (2016); Schmidt (n 6) 27–80.

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51 eg HRC, ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya’, UN Doc A/HRC/17/44 (1 June 2011) para 78.

52 Request for an authorization of an investigation pursuant to Article 15, Côte d'Ivoire, ICC-02/11-3-OTP, Pre-Trial Chamber III (23 June 2011) sections 20, 28, 63, 82 and 152.

53 Öberg, MD, ‘The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ’ (2005) 16 EJIL 879, at 896CrossRefGoogle Scholar (authorities cited there).

54 A World Courts database search returned 795 international decisions citing UNGA resolutions: <http://www.worldcourts.com/index.htm> (accessed 6 April 2017).

55 eg UNGA Res 95(I) (11 December 1946); UNGA Res 44/39 (4 December 1989); UNGA Res 96(1) (11 December 1946).

56 UNGA Res 71/144 (2016), 20 December 2016, at preamble.

57 UNGA Res 66/140 (19 December 2011); HRC Res 24/23 (2013). Recently, the PTC confirmed charges on forced marriage, citing UNGA Res 217(III)A, (10 December 1948) (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art 16 (freedom of marriage)): Decision on the confirmation of charges, Ongwen (ICC-02/04-01/15) Pre-Trial Chamber II (23 March 2016) section 94.

58 UNGA Res 3314 (XXVIII) (14 December 1974).

59 eg Decision on victims’ participation, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119) Trial Chamber I (18 January 2008) section 35.

60 See generally Sluiter, G, ‘Using the Genocide Convention to Strengthen Cooperation with the ICC in the Al Bashir Case’ (2010) 8(2) JICJ 365 Google Scholar.

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64 UNGA Res 70/88 (9 December 2015).

65 eg UNGA Res 1761(XVII) (6 November 1962); UNGA Res 1103(XI) (18 December 1956); UNGA Res ES-8/2 (14 September 1981); UNGA Res 2145(XXI) (27 October 1966).

66 eg UNGA Res 67/25 (30 November 2012).

67 Treaty of Peace with Italy 1947, UNTS 747, Annex XI; UNGA Res 289 (IV) (21 November 1949).

68 Appl No 13216/05, Judgment of 16 June 2015, section 195.

69 Art 12, Rome Statute.

70 Bassiouni (n 15) 718.

71 ICC OTP, ‘Situation in Palestine’ (3 April 2012) available at <https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C6162BBF-FEB9-4FAF-AFA9-836106D2694A/284387/SituationinPalestine030412ENG.pdf>.

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75 ICC, ‘Ukraine accepts ICC jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed between 21 November 2013 and 22 February 2014’, Press Release (17 April 2015).

76 UNGA Res 68/262 (27 March 2014) at para 6.

77 Situation in Palestine (n 71).

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97 UNGA Res 60/1 (24 October 2005) at para 117; UNGA Res 53/162 (25 February 1999) at paras 13 and 14; HRC Res 34/L.8 (2017), 22 March 2017, at para 17; HRC Res 34/L.23 (2017), 20 March 2017, at preamble.

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100 UNGA Res 65/265 (1 March 2011) (suspending Libya's HRC membership); Moffett (n 83) 307.

101 Forsythe (n 1) 859; Moffett (n 83) 307.

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110 See arts 57(3) and 93(1)(k), Rome Statute. In the context of the ICTY sanctions regime, see Scharf (n 92) at 945 (and citations there).

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121 UNGA Res 376(V) (7 October 1950) (seeking ‘a unified, independent and democratic government of Korea’).

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126 Art 34, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).

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128 UNSC, Record of the 7337th Meeting, UN Doc No S/PV.7337 (12 December 2014) 12 (United States), 13 (Lithuania), 15 (France). The UNGA has also called on States to implement UNSC decisions: UNGA Res 65/105 (10 December 2010) at preamble.

129 UNGA Res 1761 (XVII) (n 65) at para 1.

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135 Art 13(b), Rome Statute.

136 Compare arts 10–14, 18, UN Charter. ICC–GA dialogue is also recognized in: ‘Relationship Agreement’, Doc ICC-ASP/3/Res1 (7 September 2004) arts 4(2), 7; approved by UNGA Res 58/318 (13 September 2004).

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145 The constitutional possibility of pooling universal jurisdiction was recognized in the DPRK Report (n 3) at 362.

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152 Art 86, Rome Statute.

153 Sloan, B, ‘The Binding Force of a ‘‘Recommendation’’ of the General Assembly of the United Nations’ (1948) 25 BYBIL 1, 7, 16Google Scholar.

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155 Conforti, B, The Law and Practice of the United Nations (Brill 2010) 365 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Namibia (n 63) 50.

156 Art 109(2), UN Charter.

157 Expenses (n 124).

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159 Sloan (n 153) at 24 (and citations there).

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162 Nouwen and Werner (n 140) 951.

163 Schabas (n 161) 550.

164 Peterson, MJ, The UN General Assembly (Psychology Press 2006) 103–31Google Scholar.

165 ICC, ‘Proposed amendment to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Report of the Working Group on the Review Conference’, Appendix VI, Official Records of the Assembly of States Parties, Doc ICC-ASP/8/20 Annex II (November 2009).

166 See generally Ford, S, ‘The ICC and the Security Council: How Much Support Is There for Ending Impunity?’ (2016) 26 Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 33 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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169 UNGA Res 69/189 (n 16) (127 in favour, 13 against, with 48 abstentions: of those, 27 African States voted yes, 21 abstained, and only one voted against (Zimbabwe); UNGA Res 70/172, 17 December 2015 (DPRK) (119 yes, 19 no, 48 abstentions: of those, 22 African States voted yes, 7 no, 21 abstentions).

170 UNGA Res 66(11) (18 November 2011). But see some criticisms of commission impartiality: Stewart, JG, ‘The UN Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon: A Legal Appraisal’ (2007) 5(5) JICJ 1039 Google Scholar.

171 Yihdego (n 31) 20.

172 See (n 1).

173 Imoedemhe, O, ‘Unpacking the Tension between the African Union and the International Criminal Court: The Way Forward’ (2015) 23(1) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 74 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

174 UNGA Res 69/248 (n 30).

175 Henderson (n 44) 307.