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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 April 2014

Anca D Chiriţă*
Dr iur (Europa-Institut der Universität des Saarlandes), lecturer in law, Durham Law School, Co-Director Durham European Law Institute, UK and DAAD visiting fellow, Europa-Kolleg and Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, Hamburg,


This article aims to review EU competition rules by undertaking a historical purposive interpretation of the drafting process of the Treaty of Rome. It reveals new insights based on a consideration of several historical archives starting with the Schuman plan, the Founding Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community and the negotiations of the Treaty of Rome. Questions of contemporary relevance are explored, relating to the goals of competition law, the historical distinction between ‘object’ and ‘effect’ under Article 101 TFEU, the possibility of an enforcement gap under Article 102 TFEU, the relationship between unfair competition and the prohibition of discrimination and, finally, the broader meaning of competitive distortions.

Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2014 

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1 Hegel, GWF, The Philosophy of History (Kitchener 2001) 22Google Scholar; Gans, DE (ed), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte (Duncker & Humblot 1837) 48Google Scholar; see eg Lucy, WN, ‘The Common Law According to Hegel’ (1997) 17 OJLS 701CrossRefGoogle Scholar, with the perception that Hegel's history is ‘driven by the desire to reveal reason independent of the actions of particular, historically situated agents’. This sense of reason, ie objective evaluation of historical facts and correlations, is indispensable in understanding the drafting history of this article.

2 For a critical commentary on Hegel see eg Kaufmann, W, ‘The Hegel Myth and its Method’ in From Shakespeare to Existentialism: Studies in Poetry, Religion and Philosophy (Beacon Press 1959) 88Google Scholar; Steward, J (ed) The Hegel Myths and Legends (North-Western University Press 1996)Google Scholar.

3 See eg the contribution of the ASCOLA (Academic Society for Competition Law) in Zimmer, D (ed), Goals of Competition Law (Elgar 2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 See eg Gormsen, L Lovdahl, ‘The Conflict between Economic Freedom and Consumer Welfare in the Modernization of Article 82 EC’ (2007) 3 European Competition J 329CrossRefGoogle Scholar, where economic freedom and consumer welfare are mutually exclusive. It is argued that for ordo-liberals economic freedom is the primary goal of competition law, economic efficiency being merely derived from the free interaction of individuals in the market place which is well known as ‘freedom of action’. Similarly, Akman attempted to prove that Art 82 EC is not ordo-liberal; if it were, it would not be able to accommodate efficiency, see Akman, P, ‘Searching for the Long Lost Soul of Article 82 EC’ (2009) 29 OJLS 269CrossRefGoogle Scholar. By contrast, German economists support economic efficiency as the primary goal of competition, see Neumann, M, ‘Wettbewerbspolitik’ in Albach, H (ed), Die Wirtschaftswissenschaften (Gabbler 2000) 1Google Scholar; Schmidt, I, Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht eine interdisziplinäre Einführung (Lucius & Lucius 2005) 178Google Scholar; Herdzina, K, Wettbewerbspolitik (Lucius & Lucius 1999) 125Google Scholar; Knieps, G, Wettbewerbsökonomie (Heidelberg 2005)Google Scholar.

5 See eg EJ Mestmäcker, ‘Wettbewerbsfreiheit und Wohlfahrt’ Max Planck Hamburg Private Law Research Paper no 12/2 (2012).

6 See the ORDO Yearbook of Economic and Social Order (Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft) first published in 1948 by Böhm and Eucken. This publication established a long-standing tradition of excellence in competition law from a broader economic, sociological, philosophical and political perspective, having as contributors Nobel laureates such as Buchanan, Friedman, von Hayek or Stigler.

7 Schröter, H, ‘Institutioneller Rahmen’ in Schröter, H, Jakob, T and Mederer, W (eds), Kommentar zum Europäischen Wettbewerbsrecht (Nomos 2003) 66Google Scholar; Eucken, W, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (Mohr 1952) 292Google Scholar; for institutional economics, see Wohlgemuth, M, ‘The Present Relevance of Ordnungstheorie for the Politics and the Economics of the Social Order’ in Labrousse, A and Weisz, JD (eds), Institutional Economics in France and Germany: German Ordoliberalism versus the French Regulation School (Springer 2001)Google Scholar.

8 Akman (n 4) 269. On neo-liberalism see F Maier-Rigaud, ‘On the Normative Foundations of Competition Law–Efficiency, Political Freedom and the Freedom to Compete’ in Zimmer (n 3) 151; doubtful U Adolfson, ‘Article 102, Aimed at Serving the Ordoliberal Agenda or European Consumers?’ 21. On history as a heuristic tool by non-historians see L Warlouzet, ‘The Rise of European Competition Policy, 1950–1991: A Cross-Disciplinary Survey of a Contested Policy Sphere’ EUI Working Papers RCAS 2010/80, 2.

9 Forrester, I, ‘The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy: Compatibility, Efficiency, Legal Security’ in Ehlermann, CD and Atanasiu, I (eds), European Competition Law Annual: Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy (Hart 2000) 75Google Scholar. Elsewhere, the objective of market integration (la fusion des marchés) has been translated as: ‘To achieve these aims, the markets should be merged’ see Akman (n 4) 279. For a similar claim with regard to the difference in translations by Akman of ‘exploitation’ instead of ‘abuse’, see the insightful contribution of Nazzini, R, The Foundations of European Union Competition Law: The Objective and Principles of Article 102 (OUP 2011) 21CrossRefGoogle Scholar, note 91.

10 In this vein see Adolfson (n 8) 22.

11 D Gerber, ‘The Goals of European Competition Law: Some Distortions in the Literature – Comment on Parret’ in Zimmer (n 3) 86. Previously, Gerber suggested that the ORDO ideology had influenced EU competition law, eg Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe Protecting Prometheus (OUP 2001)Google Scholar. Thus, Gerber is not the only leading author arguing that German competition law has strongly influenced EU competition law, see eg Maher, I, ‘Competition Law Modernization: An Evolutionary Tale?’ in Craig, P and De Búrca, G (eds) The Evolution of EU Law (2nd edn, CUP 2011) 725Google Scholar; Kerber, W and Schwalbe, U, ‘Economic Principles of Competition Law’ in Hirsch, G, Montag, F and Säcker, FJ (eds), Competition Law: European Community Practice and Procedure (Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 211Google Scholar; Kokkoris, I and Olivares-Caminal, R, Antitrust Law amidst Financial Crisis (CUP 2012) 26Google Scholar.

12 ECSC was established by the Treaty of Paris and signed in 1951; it came into force on 23 July 1952, but expired on 23 July 2002.

13 See Chalmers, D, Davies, G and Monti, G, European Union Law (2nd edn, CUP 2010) 10CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Craig, P and de Búrca, G, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (4th edn, OUP 2008) 5Google Scholar; Goyder, J and Albors-Llorens, A, Goyder's EC Competition Law (5th edn, OUP 2009) 26Google Scholar.

14 Notably, historians have written extensively on possible US inspirational sources during its drafting. See Freyer, TA, Antitrust and Global Capitalism 1930–2004 (CUP 2006) 275CrossRefGoogle Scholar, confirmed by Djelic, ML, ‘Does Europe Mean Americanization? The Case of Competition’ (2002) 6 Competition & Change 245CrossRefGoogle Scholar, including the key role of McCloy; Bossuat, G and Wilkens, A (eds), Jean Monnet, l'Europe et les chemins de la Paix (Publications de la Sorbonne 1999)Google Scholar; Fransen, FJ, ‘Monnet's Europe, 1943–1954’ in The Supranational Politics of Jean Monnet: Ideas and Origins of the European Community (Greenwood Press 2001) 82Google Scholar. Fransen mentioned that Bowie inspired Monnet but the text was reworked; see also McGowan, L, The Antitrust Revolution in Europe: Exploring the European Commission's Cartel Policy (Edward Elgar 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15 Schulze, R and Hoeren, TDokumente zum Europäischen Recht: Kartellrecht (bis 1957) (Springer 2000)Google Scholar vol 3. Professor Reiner Schulze is Director of the Institute for the History of Law – German and EU History of Private Law, Münster University; Thomas Hoeren is Professor of Civil and Economic Law at the Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster in Germany.

16 This volume covers material from the following archives: the Federal Archive Koblenz, including the Federal Ministry of Economics, the Political Archive Bonn, the National Archive Paris, the state archive Rome (Archivo Centrale dello Stato), the archive of the Foreign Ministry of Luxemburg, the historical archive Florence (on the Treaty of Rome), the historical archive of the European Parliament (Luxemburg) and of the European Commission (Brussels) and the archive of the Foundation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe in Lausanne (for the ECSC treaty).

17 This does not exclude beneficial US influences during the various drafting stages see eg Leucht, B, ‘Transatlantic Policy Networks in the Creation of the First European Anti-Trust Law: Mediating between American Anti-Trust and German Ordo-Liberalism’ in Kaiser, W, Leucht, B and Rasmussen, M (eds), The History of the European Union. Origins of a Trans-and Supranational Polity, 1950–72 (Routledge 2009) 56Google Scholar; more recently see Kaiser, W, Leucht, B and Gehler, M (eds), Transnational Networks in Regional Integration: Governing Europe, 1945–83 (Macmillan 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18 Leucht (n 17).

19 Schulze and Hoeren (n 15) 1: Robert Schuman Declaration, 9 May 1950, Fondation J Monnet pour l'Europe Lausanne (Fondation Monnet) AMG 17/8/61; ibid 130 on a future ‘European political community’ (Europäische Politische Gemeinschaft): ‘Arbeitsunterlage über die Faktoren, die geeignet sind, den Wettbewerb zu beeinflussen’ Brussels 2 August 1955, private archive of Groeben MAE 139 d/55 ell/ip; 139 d/55 sell/lg; 139 d/55 hr; Conseil des Communautés européennes, Archives Historiques, Commission du Marché Commun des Investissements et des problemes sociaux CM3 no 36 MAE f/55 oc; 139 f/55 mw. See also Rasmussen, M, ‘Constructing and Deconstructing ‘‘Constitutional’’ European Law: Some Reflections on How to Study the History of European Law’ in Koch, H, Hagel-Sorensen, K, Haltern, U and Weiler, J (eds), Europe. The New Legal Realism (DJØF Publishing 2010)Google Scholar.

20 Schuman (n 19) 2: ‘l'application d'un plan de production et d'investissements, l'institution de mécanismes de péréquation des prix, la création d'un fonds de reconversion facilitant la rationalisation de la production (du charbon et de l'acier)’.

21 In the original the word used is ‘fusion’.

22 Schulze and Hoeren (n 15) 5: ‘Note de reflexion de Jean Monnet’ 28 April 1950, Fondation Monnet AMG 5/1/3; ibid 21: ‘Observations sur le Mémorandum du 28 Septembre 1950’, National Archives Paris AJ 81/132, where the fight against cartels and the emerging competition is said to benefit consumers (utilisateurs) of coal and steel. ibid 99 for how the fight against cartels in the Schuman Plan would affect previously approved mergers under German Law no 27/1952: ‘Vermerk zum Verhältnis Schumanplan und Entflechtung nach Gesetz Nr 27’ Bonn 1 February 1952, Bundesarchiv Koblenz B 102 60650.

23 ibid 5: ‘Progressivement se dégageront les conditions assurant spontanément la répartition la plus rationnelle de la production au niveau de productivité le plus élévé.’ So as to compare this, see the near identical art 2(2) ECSC: ‘The Community shall progressively bring about conditions which will of themselves ensure the most rational distribution of production at the highest possible level of productivity’.

24 In the original the word used is ‘élargissement’.

25 ibid 3: ‘Note anti-cartel, jointe à la déclaration du 9 May 1950’, Fondation Monnet AMG 17/8/62.

26 ibid.

27 ibid: ‘En termes économiques au rebours d'un cartel elle tend à faire prévaloir les effets mêmes qui résulteraient d'une parfaite concurrence, mais en ménageant les étapes nécessaires, faute desquelles l’établissement de cette concurrence se heurterait à des résistances insurmontables’. A contemporary translation of this historical recognition reads as follows: ‘In contrast to international cartels, which tend to impose restrictive practices on distribution and the exploitation of national markets, and to maintain high profits, the organization will ensure the fusion of markets and the expansion of production’ (July 2013) <>.

28 Schulze and Hoeren (n 15) 150: ‘Das Kartellproblem in internationaler Beleuchtung’ Bonn 19 July 1956 (sent to Professor Erhard and state secretary Dr Westrick), Bundesarchiv Koblenz B 102 22118. The fight against cartels is by no means unknown in the UK. On the cartelization of British industry see Atiyah, P and Smith, S, Atiyah's Introduction to the Law of Contract (6th edn, Clarendon Press 2005) 12Google Scholar: ‘between 1870 and 1950 the British economy became a network of restrictive practices (ie cartels and monopolies), including the history of price-fixing agreements, lack of consumer choice and standardized contracts. Therefore, the aversion to cartels cannot be simplistically synthesized as solely a German problem. On the US fight against ‘loose networks and agreements in the form of cartels, pools, or trusts’ between the 1870s and 1880s, see Djelic (n 14) 239–41 where the original intent of the US Sherman Act was to prohibit drastically all inter-firm collaboration.

29 ibid. It is worth mentioning that the UN also provided a forum for discussion when drafting an international agreement to control international trade restrictive practices (1953) but later ECOSOC (1955) postponed discussions sine die.

30 See eg Roebling, ‘International Aspects’ in Hirsch, Montag and Säcker (n 11) 123.

31 Previous unfortunate attempts to establish an international competition agreement were made in Singapore (1986) with a Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy (WGTCP), Seattle (1999), Doha (2001) with a Working Group on hardcore cartels, procedural fairness and non-discrimination. On Hard Core Cartels see WTO-Secretariat, Provisions on Hard Core Cartels 2002 (WT/WGTCP/W/191) Cancun (2003). Finally the July Decision of 2004 WT/L/579, adopted on 1 August 2004, closed the door to any further negotiations. A more recent revival of international competition law is made by Gerber (n 11).

32 Schulze and Hoeren (n 15) 155.

33 ibid 18: ‘Rôle de la Haute Autorité en matière de prix pendant la période permanente’ 2 October 1950, Fondation Monnet AMG 17/8/57 para 2, 2/3. Comparatively art 3(a)–(g) ECSC maintains a heavily modified version of (a), (c) and (i).

34 ibid: ‘protéger les producteurs contre les pratiques de concurrences dèloyales ou artificielles’.

35 ibid: ‘veiller à ce que le méchanisme normaux de la concurrence ne soit pas faussés par les discriminations susceptibles d’être exercées à l’égard des producteurs par certain acheteurs ou groupement d'acheteurs’.

36 ibid 19; see also Ch IV Production, art 57 ECSC on indirect means of action.

37 ibid.

38 On the role of the High Authority as a price regulator see art 61 ECSC.

39 Schulze and Hoeren (n 15) 46: ‘Note sur les dispositions proposées en ce qui concerne les concentrations industrielles’ (art 42) December 1950, Fondation Monnet AMG 17/8/81.

40 ibid.

41 ibid 41: Mémorandum (on meeting the goals of the Schuman Plan) 7 December 1950, Bundesarchiv Koblenz B 102 3235.

42 ibid: ‘Le moyen d'y parvenir est de développer la concurrence’.

43 ibid 134: ‘Arbeitsunterlage über die Faktoren, die geeignet sind, den Wettbewerb zu beeinflussen’ Brussels 2 August 1955 MAE/CIG 97, ‘Ausschuss für den Gemeinsamen Markt für Investitionen und Sozialfragen’: ‘Die Verwirklichung und das ordungsgemässe Funktionieren des gemeinsamen Marktes erfordern die Ausschaltung solcher Massnahmen und Praktiken, die den Wettbewerb verfälschen oder unlauter sind’; ibid 136: ‘Arbeitsunterlage über das Problem des Wettbewerbs, Vorlage des Sekretariates’ Brussels 5 August 1955 MAE/CIG 134, ‘Ausschuss für den Gemeinsamen Markt für Investitionen und Sozialfragen’, private archive Groeben MAE 182 d/55 arz/mw.

44 Schulze and Hoeren (n 15) 135.

45 ibid 49.

46 ibid: ‘domination des marchés’.

47 ibid 49.

48 ibid 51: ‘industries consommatrices’; see art 61(2) ECSC.

49 ibid 147.

50 ibid 138: ‘Commission du Marché Commun des investissements et des problèmes sociaux document de travail’ Brussels 3 October 1955 MAE/CIG 301. By contrast, it was said that competition could be distorted through state intervention having as an objective the influence of competition through discriminatory or restrictive practices by undertakings and subsequently through differences among existing or recently introduced general provisions, taxation and social laws, 139.

51 ibid.

52 Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council 23 and 23 March 2000. Unfortunately, the 2010 target was not realistic.

53 See Röller, LH, ‘Challenges in EU Competition Policy’ (2011) 38 Empirica Journal of European Economics 289Google Scholar : ‘most economists agree that investment, innovation and more generally dynamic efficiencies are most important for Europe's economy, and ultimately Europe's welfare’.

54 Commissioner Almunia refers to the social market economy as ‘mission accomplished’ see European Commission, Complete speech, plenary session of the EECS, 23 February 2012: statement by Joaquin Almunia, Ref I-072443-INT-1.

56 On goals of competition after Lisbon see AD Chiriţă, ‘Undistorted, (Un)fair Competition, Consumer Welfare and the Interpretation of Article 102 TFEU’ (2010) 33 World Competition Law and Economics Review 415.

57 The distinction between object and effect has been questioned by looking at Professor Whish's famous ‘object box’ see Whish, R and Bailey, D, Competition Law (7th edn, OUP 2012) 124Google Scholar and for past case law see King, S, ‘The Object Box: Law, Policy or Myth?’ (2011) 7 European Competition J 269CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for possible legal presumptions see Mahtani, MR, ‘Thinking outside the Object Box: An EU and UK Perspective’ (2012) 8 European Competition Journal 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an attempt to seek some clarity in ‘object’ restrictions in cartel cases see Bailey, D, ‘Restrictions of Competition by Object under Article 101 TFEU’ (2012) 49 CMLR 559Google Scholar; Jones, A, ‘Left Behind by Modernisation? Restrictions by Object under Article 101(1)’ (2010) 6 European Competition Journal 658CrossRefGoogle Scholar; on object as subjective intention see Odudu, O, ‘Interpreting Article 81(1): Object as Subjective Intention’ (2001) 26 ELRev 379Google Scholar; for the economic context of ‘object’ restrictions see Jones, A and Turati, A, ‘The UK Tobacco Case: Restrictions by Object in Vertical Agreements’ (2012) Jornal of European Competition Law & PracticeCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

58 Schulze and Hoeren (n 15) 21.

59 ibid. An Advisory Committee was said to include producers, trade unions’ representatives and consumers.

60 The reference to contracts in the context of restraints of competition is more clearly explained in Schulze and Hoeren (n 15) 101: ‘Memorandum der deutschen Delegation über die Ausschaltung wettbewerbsbeschränkender privater Praktiken’ (Memorandum) Paris 10 February 1954, Bundesarchiv Koblenz B 102 12608.

61 ibid 23: ‘Bestimmungen zum Schumanplan’ Bonn 21 October 1950, Bundesarchiv Koblenz B 102 3235: ‘Beschlüsse von Vereinigungen von Unternehmen und Verträge, die Unternehmen in Verfolgung eines gemeinsamen Zweckes schliessen, die die Erzeugung oder die Marktverhältnisse für den Verkehr mit Waren durch Beschränkung des Wettbewerbs beeinflussen.’

62 Note that the word efficiency (Effizienz) does not occur in the original, but it is logically implied from ‘Wirtschaftlichkeit’.

63 In the original the word used is ‘betriebswirtschaftlich’.

64 Schulze and Hoeren (n 15) 23. In the original the wording is:

solche Verträge oder Beschlüsse … , wenn sie geeignet sind, die Leistungsfähigkeit und Wirtschaftlichkeit der beteiligten Unternehmen in technischer, betriebswirtschaftlicher oder organisatorischer Beziehung zu heben und dadurch die Befriedigung des Bedarfs zu verbessern und Preise und Geschäftsbedingungen im Verkehr mit den von der Regelung betroffenen Gütern oder gewerblichen Leistungen nicht ungerechtfertigt verändert.

65 In the original the word used is Ziel.

66 In the original the word used is Ergebnis.

67 In the original the word used is verhindern, which also means ‘to hinder’.

68 See the French proposal on the entry into force of the Schuman plan with regard to agreements and practices having a restrictive nature or which aim to establish monopolies, eg Schulze and Hoeren (n 15) 26: ‘Vorschläge über die Inkraftsetzung des Schuman-Plans in Hinblick auf Vereinbarungen und Praktiken, die einschränkender Natur sind oder die zur Errichtung von Monopolen tendieren (Vorschlag der französischer Delegation)’ 27 October 1950 Bundesarchiv Koblenz B 102 3235:

zu verbieten, daß irgendein … unterliegendes Unternehmen nur gemeinsam mit einem anderen Unternehmen handeln kann, oder irgendeine Vereinbarung schließen kann, deren Ziel, oder deren direktes oder indirektes Ergebnis auf dem gemeinsamen Markte darin bestehen würde:

  1. (a)

    (a) auf irgend Weise den freien Wettbewerb zu verhindern, zu beschränken oder zu verändern und insbesondere die Preise festzusetzen;

  2. (b)

    (b) auf irgendeine Weise die Produktion zu beschränken oder zu kontrollieren;

  3. (c)

    (c) die Märkte, Erzeugnisse, Kunden oder Materialquellen aufzuteilen.

69 In the French the words used are acts juridiques.

70 In the original, the words used are effet utile. This means an agreement in the sense of an ‘accord de principe’ which is not yet a contract. The remaining issues to be negotiated are not essential, but purely formalities. See below Beale (n 74) 359 ‘An agreement under which the parties would qualify as essential certain elements of the contract and would put aside, as ancillary, all other elements, including those traditionally qualified as essential, cannot amount to the conclusion of the final contract’.

71 See Beatson, J, Burrows, A and Cartwright, J, Anson's Law of Contract (29th edn, OUP 2010) 70CrossRefGoogle Scholar; on letters of intent or comfort, see Peel, E, Treitel on the Law of Contract (13th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011) 179Google Scholar; Cauffman, C, ‘The Impact of Voidness for Infringement of Article 101 TFEU on Related Contracts’ (2012) 8 European Competition Journal 104CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

72 McKendrick, E, Contract Law Text, Cases and Materials (4th edn, OUP 2010) 287Google Scholar; for commercial agreements, see Andrews, N, Contract Law (1st edn, CUP 2011) 179CrossRefGoogle Scholar, where there is a very interesting discussion about a long-term supply agreement abruptly terminated by a trading partner enjoying considerable economic power. In this case no written contract had been put into place; there were simply existing long-standing business relations, 181 in Baird Textile Holdings Ltd v Marks and Spencer plc (2001) Civ 274 (EWCA); (2002) 1 All ER (Comm) 737. In contrast, see Joint Cases C-468/06 to C-478/06 Sot Lelos kai Sia EE and Others v GlaxoSmithKline (2008) ECR I-7139, on a refusal by a dominant undertaking to meet the orders of an existing customer.

73 See arts 1126–30 French Civil Code; this prohibits with absolute nullity any involvement, convention or contractual clause. See art L420-3 Code de commerce: ‘Est nul tout engagement, convention ou clause contractuelle se rapportant à une pratique prohibée par les articles L 420-1 et L 420’, which prohibit cartels and abuse of a dominant position.

74 See Malaurie, P, Aynès, L and Stoffel-Munck, P, Les obligations (4th edn, Paris Répertoire Defrénois 2009)Google Scholar para 692; Beale, H, Fauvarque-Cosson, B, Rutgers, J, Tallon, D and Vogenauer, S (eds) Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law (2nd edn, Hart 2010) 171Google Scholar; Simler, P, Terré, F and Lequette, Y, Les obligations (10th edn, Dalloz 2009)Google Scholar para 312. An illegitimate cause may lead to unjustified enrichment.

75 This shift from ‘contracts’ to ‘agreements’ is also incorporated in subsequent German drafts: irgendeine Vereinbarung.

76 For commentary on various forms of agreements in the US and Germany see Djelic (n 14) 240.

77 See the disclosure of confidential information by five Dutch mobile operators at a single meeting on a highly concentrated oligopolistic market in Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands and Others (2009) ECR I-9291 para 31; European Commission, Horizontal Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 TFEU to horizontal co-operation agreements (2001) OJ C11 para 61; specifically on information exchanges see eg Odudu, O, ‘Indirect Information Exchange: The Constituent Elements of Hub and Spoke Collusion’ (2011) 7 European Competition Journal 205CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

78 Schulze and Hoeren (n 15) 29: French Proposal of Article 41, 9 November 1950, Fondation Monnet AMG 17/8/66:

Aucune entreprise … ne peut agir de concert avec une autre entreprise, conclure aucun accord, dont le but ou le résultat direct ou indirect serait dans le marché commun: a) d'empêcher; restreindre ou altérer de quelque manière que ce soit le jeu normal de la concurrence et notamment de fixer le prix; b) de restreindre ou contrôler la production de quelque manière que ce soit; c) de répartir les marchés, produits, clients ou sources d'approvisionnement.

79 In the original the words used are but and résultat respectively.

80 In the original the word used is ‘Leistungswettbewerb’. This has been translated variously as ‘efficiency contest’ in van Bernem, T, Wirtschaftsenglisch Wörterbuch (6th edn, Oldenburg 2001) 76Google Scholar; as ‘the only road to business success is through the narrow gate of better performance in service of the consumer’. See Röpke, W, A Humane Economy – The Social Framework of the Free Market (Chicago 1960) 31Google Scholar; as ‘competition based on performance’ in H Wagenaar (ed) Government Institutions: Effects, Changes and Normative Foundations (Kluwer 2000) 139.

81 Schulze and Hoeren (n 15) 31: Memorandum to the Proposals on the coming into force of the Schuman-Plan with regard to agreements and practices of a restrictive nature or which aim to establish monopolies (German delegation) Paris 10 November 1950, Bundesarchiv Koblenz B 102 3235. This proposal is in accordance with the principles of Ch 5 Havana Charter 24 March 1948.

82 ibid:

Marktabreden … wenn die geeignet sind a) die Funktionsfähigkeit des gemeinsamen Marktes zu verbessern, oder b) zu einer Erhöhung der Leistungsfähigkeit und Wirtschaftlichkeit der beteiligten Unternehmen in technischer, betriebswirtschaftlicher oder organisatorischer Beziehung und dadurch zu einer Besserung der Befriedigung des Bedarfs an Kohle and Stahl zu führen.

83 ibid 33: Proposal of art 41 19 November 1950, Fondation Monnet AMG 17/8/71.

84 ibid. See also Ch VI art 65(2) (a)–(b) ECSC on joint-buying or joint-selling agreements.

85 In the original the wording is:

autoriser les entreprises à conclure des accords ayant pour objet la spécialisation de chacune de ces entreprises dans la production de produits déterminés, soit l'achat ou la vente en commun de produits déterminés, si la Haute Autorité reconnait:

  1. a)

    a) que cette spécialisation ou ces achats ou ces ventes en commun accroîtront d'une manière substantielle l'efficience de la production ou de la distribution en ce qui concerne les produits visés; et

  2. b)

    b) que l'accord en cause est essentiel pour obtenir ce résultat et ne restreint pas l'initiative des entreprises au-delà de ce qui est nécessaire pour l'atteindre;

  3. c)

    c) que les entreprises visées par l'accord ne sont pas susceptibles d'avoir la possibilité de contrôler ou de limiter la production d'une partie substantielle de produits visés dans le marché commun; et

  4. d)

    d) que l'accord en cause et qu'une telle spécialisation ou que de tels achats ou ventes en commun ne tendront pas à empêcher ou à entraver la concurrence effective sur le marché commun en qui concerne les produits visés. (Emphasis added.)

86 In the original the wording is: ‘l'efficience de la production’.

87 Schulze and Hoeren (n 15) 34: the German proposal of 20 November 1950, Bundesarchiv Koblenz B102 3235.

88 Memorandum (n 60) 102, which refers to the free game of competition on the common market (‘das freie Spiel des Wettbewerbs’).

89 ibid 38: Project of a new draft of art 41, 21 November 1950 ‘Rédaction tout à fait personnelle de M. Suetens’ sent to Mr Hallstein, Fondation Monnet AMG 17/8/72: ‘une mention explicite que les accords de spécialisation, de vente ou d'achat en commun, s'ils n'ont pas d'effets restrictifs, ne tombent pas sous le coup de l'interdiction des accords de pratiques restrictifs’.

90 ibid.

91 ibid 158: ‘Regierungskonferenz für den Gemeinsamen Markt und Euratom, Arbeitsgruppe für den Gemeinsamen Markt’ Brussels 4 September 1956, private archive Groeben MAE 233 d/56 mp; 233 d/56 arz/hn; 233 d/56 arz/aw.

92 ibid 40: ‘Caractéristiques de la nouvelle rédaction proposée pour l'article 41’ 24 February 1950, Fondation Monnet AMG 17/8/74.

93 ibid 78 for different drafts of Art 60, ‘Verschiedene Fassungen’ 17 February, 1 and 3 March 1951, Fondation Monnet AMG 17/8/98; ibid 87 Annex to arts 60, 61, 73 bis, 73rd and 73th, 14 March 1951, Fondation Monnet AMG 17/8/101 a), b) and c); ibid 97 Art 60, 14 March 1951, Fondation Monnet AMG 17/8/101a annexes.

94 In the original the wording is ‘accords strictement analogues’.

95 ibid 88: ‘notable’.

96 ibid 55 on amending proposals: ‘Änderungsvorschläge zu Art 60’ 13 February 1951, Fondation Monnet AMG 17/8/84.

97 See art 60(2)(b): ‘the concerned agreement is essential to attain the above result and does not restrict the undertakings’ initiative more than is necessary to attain that result’.

98 ibid.

99 ibid 89: Art 60(2)(c): ‘undertakings are not likely to control or limit production or a substantial part of the products in question within the common market, or be able to eliminate effective competition: ‘ni de le soustraire à une concurrence effective d'autres entreprises dans le marché commun’.

100 In original: ‘la nature de l'objet’, ie irrespective of its type/category.

101 ibid 67: art 61 20 February 1951, Fondation Monnet AMG 17/8/89.

102 ibid 75.

103 ibid 56–9: ‘Änderungsvorschläge der Delegationschefs zu Art 60’ 13 April 1951, Fondation Monnet AMG 17/8/85.

104 See art 60(d): the agreement and specialization or joint purchase/sale does not prevent effective competition on the common market in respect of the products in question. This in French is expressed as follows: ‘qu'il n'a pas pour effet net une réduction de la concurrence dans le marché commun’; ibid 63: ‘Art 60 révisé: modifications proposées’ 15 February 1951, Fondation Monnet AMG 17/8/86.

105 Schulze and Hoeren (n 15) 74 and 90: art 60 25 February 1951, Fondation Monnet AMG 17/8/93.

106 ibid 90: ‘au moyen d'informations fausses ou déformées’.

107 Djelic (n 14) 245 who also speaks of a ‘transfer’ of provisions from ECSC to the Treaty of Rome.

108 Schulze and Hoeren (n 15) 107: ‘Regelung des Wettbewerbs im Gemeinsamen Markt für Kohle und Stahl, Regierungsausschuss eingesetzt von der Messina-Konferenz’ Brussels 29 August 1955.

109 In German the word used is ‘Abmachung’.

110 ibid: Absprachen.

111 ibid 159: ‘Regierungskonferenz für den Gemeinsamen Markt und Euratom, Auszug aus dem Dekret vom 9 August 1953, von der französischen Delegation vorgelegten Unterlage’ Brussels 6 September 1956, private archive of Groeben, MAE 244 d/56 ann/hn; 244 d/56 ann/cm.

112 ibid 165: ‘Zweiter Entwurf zu Art 42, 42 a-c’ 7 September 1956, private archive of Groeben.

113 ibid 199: ‘Entwurf einer Fassung für die Wettbewerbsregeln von einer Expertengruppe’ Brussels 8 November 1956.

114 ibid 175.

115 Professor Korah acknowledged that German ordo-liberals were distrustful of IPRs and restrictive licensing agreements, allegedly influencing the Commission's officials thinking in the 1970s. See Korah, V, Intellectual Property Rights and the EC Competition Rules (Hart Publishing 2006) 1Google Scholar.

116 Schulze and Hoeren (n 15) 210: ‘Entwurf einer Fassung für die Wettbewerbsregeln von einer Expertengruppe am 7. und 12.11.1956 für die Arbeitsgruppe für den Gemeinsamen Markt ausgearbeitet’ Brussels 12 November 1956, Bundesarchiv Koblenz B 102 22117 MAE 527 d/56 ann/hn; 527 d/56 ann/eg: ‘die mit den Zielen dieses Vertrages nicht unvereinbar sind, insbesondere deswegen, weil sie die Verbesserung … bewirken … jedoch mit der Massgabe, dass sie den beteiligten Unternehmen nur diejenigen Beschränkung auferlegen, die für die Verwirklichung der vorgenannten Ziele unerlässlich sind’. The Treaties’ goals orientation is maintained by the Dutch delegation, ibid 221: ‘Arbeitsgruppe für den Gemeinsamen Markt, Entwurf einer Fassung für die Wettbewerbsregeln’ Brussels 15 November 1956, Bundesarchiv B 102 22117 MAE 547 d/56 ann/msr, but it is replaced with technological and economic progress, ibid 239: ‘Billigung der Wettbewerbsregeln durch die Delegationsleiter’ 6 December 1956, private archive of Groeben MAE 262 d/57 eg; 262 d/57 vr; 262 f/57 vr; 262 d/57 ip. For an even closer interpretation to the one made nowadays see ibid 242: ‘Ausschuss der Delegationsleiter Fassung der Artikel betreffend Titel II–Kapitel 1: Die Wettbewerbsregeln’ Brussels 10 December 1956, Bundesarchiv Koblenz B 102 22117 MAE 788 d/56 msr.

117 On balancing efficiencies considering a wider scope than the strict letter of the law see Townley, C, Article 81 EC and Public Policy (Hart Publishing 2010)Google Scholar. However, while this could be beneficial for consolidating an EU social feature, human health as public policy would fall under EU consumer law rather than competition, and not even EU unfair competition. Public health reminds me of the GATT Chapeau (art XX)'s protection of the environment and its exceptional measures to protect human, animal or plant life or health, eg to reduce tobacco consumption, risks caused by asbestos, protect dolphins, etc. For an excellent review of his book see Odudu, O, ‘The Wider Concerns of Competition Law’ (2010) 30 OJLS 599CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

118 Memorandum (n 60) 102. See art 67 ECSC on harmful effects.

119 ibid 101; for the different views of the German and Belgian delegations regarding the clause ‘trade between Member States’, which should be seriously affected: ‘ernstlich behidern’ see ibid 104: ‘Grundsätze für das freie Spiel des Wettbewerbs’, Bundesarchiv Koblenz B 102 12608 MAE 213 d/54 mj. See the French version of art 42 a, ibid 269: ‘Gemeinsamer Markt Artikel 42 sprachlich überarbeitet, Projet de rédaction’ Brussels 14 February 1957 MAE 262 f/57 gd, private archive of Groeben MAE 262 d/57 msr: Art 4(1)

Sont incompatible avec le marché commun, interdits et nuls de plein droit, tous accords entre entreprises, toutes décisions d'association d'entreprises, et toutes pratiques concertées qui sont susceptibles d'affecter le commerce entre les États membres et qui ont pour objet ou pour effet d'empêcher de restreindre ou de fausser le jeu de la concurrence à l'intérieur du marché commun.

See the split between art 101(1), (2) and (3) during the reading ibid 277: ‘Redaktionsgruppe, Erste Lesung’ Brussels 23 February 1957, private archive of Groeben MAE 648 d/57; ibid 283: ‘Neue Fassung der Art 42-44 c’ Brussels 28 February 1957, ‘Conseil des Communautés européennes, Archives Historiques, Négotiations des traités instituant la CEE et la CEEA’ CM3 no 265 MAE 262 d/57 msr.

120 ibid 295: ‘Die Gemeinsamen Regeln (Art 85-91)’ 6 March 1957, private archive of Groeben MAE 776 d/57 arz/eg; 776 d/57 X/eg; 776 d/57 X/arz/eg; 776 d/57 x/hk; 776 d/57 X/arz/ls; 776 d/57 x/hn 776 d/57 x/ls.

121 Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline v Commission ECR II-2981.

122 ibid [13].

123 ibid [91].

124 ibid [147] and [216].

125 Joined Cases C-501, 513, 515 & 519/06 P GlaxoSmithKline v Commission ECR I-9291 [63]; SB Völcker (2011) 48 CMLR 175.

126 This was recently confirmed in Case T-111/08 MasterCard, Inc, Master Card International and MasterCard Europe v Commission 24 May 2012 [139]; on appeal Case C-382/12 P. Previously, the Commission found that the arrangement in Visa International Interchange Fee (2002) OJ L318/17 did not have as an object the restriction of competition, even if it restricted the freedom of banks to decide their own pricing policies. See AG Kokott's Opinion Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands BV and Others ECR I-04529 [42–45].

127 ibid [120].

128 ibid [27].

129 para [29].

130 para [35].

131 para [108].

132 paras [77–78]; Case T-112/99 M6 and Others v Commission (2001) ECR II-2459 [104].

133 Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National plc (2008) EWHC 875 (Comm); (2009) EWCA Civ 116; (2009) 2WLR 1286; (2009) UKSC 6; (2009) 3 WLR 1215; Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc (2001) UKHL 52, (2001) 1 AC 481.

134 See (n 126) [138].

135 ibid [80].

136 For an overview of the German unfair competition law, parallel imports and marketing methods see Säcker, ‘The Relationship between Competition Law and Unfair Competition Law’ in Hirsch (n 11) 15; more specifically, see H Köhler and Bornkamm, J, Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (29th edn, CH Beck 2011)Google Scholar; for commentary on intentional hindrance and boycotts 494; on intentional predatory pricing 561; on discrimination, including price discrimination 565; for a more integrated approach of both competition and unfair competition see Rittner, F and Kulka, M, Wettbewerbs-und Kartellrecht (7th edn, CF Müller 2008) 109Google Scholar; Pichler, PD, Das Verhälnis von Kartell-und Lauterkeitsrecht: eine Standortbestimmung nach den Novellen von GWB und UWG (Nomos 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

137 Schulze and Hoeren (n 15) 106: ‘Es bleibt aber noch festzustellen, in welchem Masse die durch gewisse nationale Gesetzte gegen ‘‘unlauteren Wettbewerb’’ geregelten Materien auf supranationalem Gebiet geregelt werden sollen’.

138 ibid 73: ‘Note sur l'article 61 et la déconcentration de la Ruhr’ 25 February 1951.

139 ibid 107: ‘Regelung des Wettbewerbs im Gemeinsamen Markt für Kohle und Stahl, Regierungsausschuss eingesetzt von der Messina-Konferenz’ Brussels 29 August 1955.

140 ibid 129: ‘Arbeitsunterlage über die Faktoren, die geeignet sind, den Wettbewerb zu beeinflussen’ Brussels 2 August 1955 MAE/CIG, ‘Ausschuss für den Gemeinsamen Markt für Investitionen und Sozialfragen’.

141 In the synopsis of competition rules see ibid 182: ‘Synoptische Darstellung der Artikelentwürfe über die Wettbewerbsregeln für die Unternehmen’ Brussels 9 October 1956, private archive of Groeben MAE 377 d/56.

142 Schulze and Hoeren (n 15) 133. It was imperatively required that competition be fair and the provisions relating to unfair competition of the Member States be harmonized; ibid 135 the excerpts of the Report of the Commission for the European Political Community to the Foreign Ministers, Annex 1, ‘Auszüge aus dem Bericht an die Aussenminister’, private archive of Groeben MAE 139 d/55 ell/ip; 139 d/55 sell/lg; 139 d/55 hr; ‘Conseil des Communautés européennes, Archives Historiques, Commission du Marché Commun des Investissements et des problemes sociaux’ CM3 no 36 MAE f/55 oc; 139 f/55 mw; ibid 143 on the need to harmonize the national provisions against unfair competition (‘concurrence déloyale’).

143 ibid 206: ‘Protokollentwurf über die Sitzungen der Arbeitsgruppe vom 5-7.11.1956’ Brussels 9 November 1956, Bundesarchiv Koblenz B 102 22106 MAE 525 d/56 arz/msr; ibid 207: ‘Groupe du Marché Commun, Projet de proces-verbal des réunions du Groupe tenues à Bruxelles les 5, 6 et 7 nov. 1956 (Examen en seconde lecture des projets d'articles relatifs aux règles de concurrence (Discriminations–ententes et monopoles)’ Brussels 9 November 1956 Bundesarchiv Koblenz B 102 22106 MAE 525 f/56 mp.

144 ibid 103:

Sehr eng mit der Betrachtung der Ausnutzung der Marktstellung zur Verfälschung des Wettbewerbs ist das Problem der Diskriminierung verbunden. Hierbei wird under Diskriminierung im wirtschaftlichen Sinne die nicht durch Kostenunterschiede gerechtfertigte unterschiedliche Behandlung gleicher Lieferer- oder Abnehmerkategorien verstanden.

Since the US experience of enforcing the Robinson-Patman Act was not particularly encouraging, it was decided that discrimination should be prohibited only with regard to cartels and monopolies.

145 On the future role of the High Authority see point 6.

146 ibid 113: Annex II b, Art 60 section 1: ‘die Praktiken unlauteren Wettbewerbs, vor allem die nur vorübergehenden oder örtlichen Preissenkungen, die auf Erlangung einer Monopolstellung innerhalb des gemeinsamen Marktes gerichtet sind.’ The German text makes it clear that these are practices against fair competition.

147 ibid 51: Proposal of art 56 9 December 1950, Fondation Monnet AMG 17/8/59: ‘les pratiques déloyales ou artificielles de concurrence et en particulier les baisses de prix purement temporaires ou purement locales ayant pour but d'acquérir une position de monopol’; ibid 114 for commentary on the possibility of making recommendations to the undertaking concerned if pricing exceeded the list price or to follow those of another supplier offering buyers the most advantageous terms and conditions.

148 See art 4(b) ECSC which is almost identical; art 63(1) ECSC which prohibits systematic discrimination practised by purchasers, in particular in public procurement contracts.

149 AD Chiriţă, The EU Control of Unfair Competition Practices: The Interpretation of Unfair Pricing (Nomos 2011) 346.

150 See art 42(1) and 42(a) respectively ibid 224: ‘Arbeitsgruppe für den Gemeinsamen Markt, Entwurf einer Fassung für die Wettbewerbsregeln von einer Expertengruppe am 20. Nov. ausgearbeitet unter Berücksichtigung des Meinungsaustausches innerhalb der engeren Gruppe’ Brussels 19 November 1956, private archive of Groeben MAE 602 d/56 eg.

151 Schulze and Hoeren (n 15) 111: Annex II b, ‘Auszug aus dem Vertrag über die Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl’ 16 April 1951 art 4: ‘Massnahmen oder Praktiken, die eine Diskriminierung zwischen Erzeugern oder Käufern oder Verbrauchern herbeiführen, insbesondere hinsichtlich der Preis- und Lieferbedingungen und der Beförderungstarife, sowie Massnahmen oder Praktiken, die den Käufer an der freien Wahl seines Lieferanten hindern’.

152 ibid 108: ‘Kunden’. ibid 107: ‘Regelung des Wettbewerbs im Gemeinsamen Markt für Kohle und Stahl’ 29 July 1955, private archive of Groeben MAE 139 d/55 mw; 13/d/55 hr; 139 d/55 sel/mw; 139 d/55 ell/ip.

153 ibid: ‘Verbrauchers’.

154 ibid 108.

155 ibid [6].

156 ibid [8].

157 ibid 109.

158 ibid 77: ‘Mémorandum’ 1 March 1951, Fondation Monnet AMG 17/8/95: ‘le principe de la non-discrimination tend seulement à ne pas imposer un désavantage aux entreprises qui ne sont pas concentrées avant l'entrées en vigueur du Traité’.

159 ibid 82: art 61 (modified) 6 March 1951, Bundesarchiv Koblenz B 102 60721; Mémorandum (n 158).

160 Memorandum (n 60) 104: ‘underschiedliche Behandlung von Verkäufern oder Käufern durch Anwendung ungleicher Bedingungen auf vergleichbare Geschäfte oder durch Lieferungsverweigerung’.

161 ibid 105 for the suggestion of the French delegation.

162 Schulze and Hoeren (n 15) 135.

163 ibid 140: ‘Commission du Marché Commun des investissements et des problèmes sociaux document de travail’ Brussels 3 October 1955 MAE/CIG 301, Conseil des Communautés européennes CM3 no 38 MAE 404 f/55 jt; 404 f/55 mv; 404 f/55 oc.

164 ibid [6–7].

165 ibid 141.

166 ibid: ‘Application de conditions plus avantageuses à la fois que celles qui résultent de conditions de vente du fournisseur en cause et que celles qui résultent au lieu de livraison d'alignement sur les conditions de vente d'un autre fournisseur’; another French proposal defined dumping as applying differential pricing to buyers in a similar position ibid 249: ‘Vorschlag der französischen Delegation zu dem Dumping innerhalb des Gemeinsamen Marktes’ 17 January 1957, private archive of Groeben MAE 141 d/57 eg.

167 In original: ‘double prix’.

168 ibid.

169 ibid 145: ‘Projet de rapport aux Ministres des Affaires Etrangères, Tome I, Titre II une politique du marché commun’ Brussels 8 April 1955, ‘Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères’ Paris MAEF 305 no 28 MAE 80 f/56 yd; ibid 146 for a further suggestion being made on the drafting of discrimination to be possibly inspired by the US legislation and jurisprudence: ‘qui pourront utilement s'inspirer de la législation et de la jurisprudence américaines’.

170 ibid 141–5.

171 ibid 142: ‘l'abus de positions monopolistiques’.

172 ibid: ‘fournisseurs ou des consommateurs’.

173 ibid 142.

174 ibid 146.

175 ibid 166: ‘Zweiter Entwurf zu Art 42, 42 a-c’ 7 September 1956, private archive of Groeben.

176 ibid 167: ‘Darlegungen des Sprechers der deutschen Delegation zu den Entwürfen der Art 40 bis 43 im Ausschuss Gemeinsamer Markt (Sitzungsperiode vom 3.-5. Sep)’ Bonn 8 September 1956, Bundesarchiv Koblenz B 102 22118; Annex sent by the Ministry of Economics B 141 11047. This document was sent for consent to Professor Müller-Armack.

177 ibid.

178 ibid 171 for the prejudice or disadvantage to an economic agent in relation to discrimination, ‘Arbeitsgruppe für den Gemeinsamen Markt, Entwurf eines Protokolls über die Sitzungen der Arbeitsgruppe am 3., 4. und 5. Sep. 1956’ Brussels 10 September 1956, private archive of Groeben MAE 252 d/56 arz/aw; 252 d/56 ann/hn Political Archive of the Foreign Office Bonn, Dep 2, Referat 200 vol 3 MAE 252 f/56 mv.

179 ibid 187 ‘Regierungskonferenz für den Gemeinsamen Markt und Euratom, Aufzeichnung über die Wettbewerbsregeln im Vertrag über den gemeinsamen europäischen Markt’ Brussels 20 September 1956, Bundesarchive Koblenz B 141 11047.

180 ibid.

181 ibid 188.

182 ibid.

183 ibid 49.

184 ibid 147.

185 ibid 168: ‘Entscheidungsinstanz v Gericht’.

186 ibid.

187 Kokkoris, I, A Gap in the Enforcement of Article 82 (BIICL 2009)Google Scholar; previously for mergers see Kokkoris, I, The Gap in the ECMR and National Merger Legislations (Routledge 2010)Google Scholar; Kokkoris and R Olivares-Caminal (n 11) 27 on dominance including both oligopolistic and monopolistic market structures; on the inability to apply art 102 to non-dominant firms 51. Interestingly Djelic (n 14) 242 pointed out that an ‘institutional context against cartels may be a fertile ground for oligopolies’.

188 Study on the impact of national rules on unilateral conduct that diverge from art 102 TFEU, COMP/2009/A4/021, not released for publication.

189 Carlton, DW and Perloff, JM, Modern Industrial Organization (4th edn, Boston 2005)Google Scholar. The paradigm of perfect competition and monopoly is completed by oligopoly models of game theory which address the strategic interactions between firms see Bishop, S and Walker, M, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and Measurement (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2010) 33Google Scholar.

190 Carlton and Perloff (n 189) 157.

191 ibid 192.

192 See CFI Case T-193/02 Laurent Piau v Commission (2005) ECR II-209, 111.

193 Memorandum (n 60) 101.

194 ibid 101: ‘Machtposition or Marktpositionen’.

195 ibid 135: ‘Missbrauch marktbeherrschender Stellungen’.

196 ibid 163: ‘Vermerk über die Sitzung der Arbeitsgruppe ‘Gemeisamer Markt’’ Brussels 3–5 September 1956, Political Archive of the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt) Bonn 401 vol 24: ‘Monopole und Oligopole sind in dem Vertrag auch formell von den Kartellen zu trennen und sollen nach dem Mißbrauchsprinzip behandelt werden. Dies soll auch für Staatsmonopole gültig sein.’

197 ibid 187.

198 ibid 162: ‘sogar ein Zuviel an solchen Regeln ein Zuwenig an Wettbewerb schaffe’.

199 See the Minute of the consultations on the drafting of competition rules of the Common Market Bonn 5 November 1956 (December 2010) <>, Federal archive Koblenz B 141 11047, previously cited in Chiriţă (n 149) 353; MinRat Dr Meyer-Cording reporting to his state secretaries his ‘brilliant’ solution, namely, to ‘give up superfluous provisions on cartels and monopolies’! see Schulze and Hoeren (n 15) 195: ‘Vorschriften des Vertragsentwurfs über Wettbewerbsregeln’ Bonn 5 November 1956, Bundesarchiv Koblenz B 141 11047. Further monitoring is proved by a telex sent to the Foreign Office in Bonn which confirmed that the treaty would follow the German abuse principle see ibid 232: ‘Fernschreiben no 498 an das Auswärtige Amt Bonn betreffend Fragen der Wettbewerbsordnung’ 20 November 1956, Bundesarchiv Koblenz B 141 11050.

200 Schulze and Hoeren (n 15) 205: ‘Vermerk betreffend die Konferenz über den Gemeinsamen Markt vom 5.11-7.11.1956’ Bonn 8 November 1956, Bundesarchiv Koblenz B 141 11049.

201 ibid 228: ‘Examen en second lecture des règles de concurrence’, Common Market Group Brussels 20 November 1956, ‘Conseil des Communautés européenes Bruxelles, Archives Historiques, Négociations des traités instituant la CEE et de la CEEA’ CM 3 no 145 MAE/ sec 70 mp.

202 Later inserted in the draft see ibid 233: ‘Ausschuss der Delegationsleiter, Entwurf von Artikeln der von der Arbeitsgruppe für den Gemeinsamen Markt in ihrer Sitzung vom 28. Nov. 1956 ausgearbeitet betreffend Titel II–Kapitel 1’; Die Wettbewerbsregeln, Bundesarchiv Koblenz B 102 22117 MAE 657 d/56 eg; 657 d/56 ann/eg; 657 d/56 ann/hn; 657 d/56 ann/msr; 657 d/56 mp (Corr). Please also note that original drafts in German had to be translated into French, 236.

203 ibid 229.

204 ibid 105.

205 ibid 102: ‘In Ergänzung zu diesen Vorschlägen der Behandlung vertraglicher Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen wird, wie dargelegt, das Problem der Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen durch marktbeherrschende Unternehmen (Monopole, Oligopole) der Erörterung bedürfen.’

206 ibid 122; ibid 118 see excerpts of the above charter, ‘Auszüge aus der Havana Charta über die Gründung einer internationalen Handelsorganisation (24.03.1948) und dem Allgemeinen Zoll- und Handelsabkommen (1947)’, Annex IV, mostly anti-dumping, customs and international trade; Roebling in Hirsch (n 11) 121. Another inspirational source was the European Council's excerpt Draft of a European Convention to Control International Cartels, Annex V Europarat, ibid 122: ‘Auszug aus dem Entwurf einer Europäischen Konvention zur Kontrolle der internationalen Kartelle’, private archive of Groeben MAE 139 d/55 mv; 13/d/55 hr; 139 d/55 sel/mw; 139 d/55 ell/ip. The latter also referred to restrictive practices such as price-fixing, terms and conditions which must be observed when buying, selling or borrowing, decisions by undertakings over a trade zone, business subsidiary, division or subdivision, etc, discrimination of individual undertakings, division of production or the setting of production contingencies, agreements to prevent the development or application of patent or non-patent procedures or inventions, etc. On the history of the Havana charter see Gerber (n 11) 43.

207 ibid: ‘betriebswirtschaftlichen Gründen’.

208 ibid 110.

209 ibid 103.

210 ibid 111: Annex II b; Art 4 (1951) prohibited discrimination, state aids, and restrictive practices having as purpose the division and exploitation of markets.

211 ibid 148: ‘Vorschläge von Herrn von der Groeben zum Entwurf für die Abfassung von Artikeln betreffend den Gemeinsamen Markt MAE 131/56 – beschränkte Verteilung’, private archive of Groeben MAE 144 d/56 hn. His proposal was very similar to the wording of the German Act against Restraints of Competition (GWB) Section 19(2) first para. Extremely interesting is his procedural proposal, namely, settlements before the European Commission ibid 149, 189. The expert group for the Common Market maintained his proposal slightly amended to ‘one or more’ undertakings that are not exposed to the above ibid 211; ibid 218: ‘Vorschlag des Präsidenten für die Fassung der Vorschriften über Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen’ Brussels 14 November 1956, art 42a, Bundesarchiv Koblenz B 102 22117 MAE 541 d/56 mp; 541 d/56 hs; 541 d/56 msr.

212 ibid 221.

213 ibid 171. Thus, the German delegation considered that monopolies and oligopolies should be dealt with separately from cartels: ‘Oligopolstellung’.

214 Weissman, J, ‘Is Oligopoly Illegal? A Jurisprudential Approach’ (1960) 74 Quarterly Journal of Economics 437CrossRefGoogle Scholar, see eg ‘The Revolt against Formalism: Oligopoly Recognized’ 453. In the UK, Lord Diplock and Kessler suggested unfair terms to be the result of ‘oligopolistic exploitation’ see Beale, H, ‘Inequality of Bargaining Power’ (1986) 6 OJLS 131CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

215 Chiriţă (n 56).

216 See Title VII Art 116 and 117 TFEU respectively require the elimination of distortions resulting from different national administrative provisions, regulations or laws.

217 See Title VIII on Economic and Monetary Policies of our current treaty.

218 Schulze and Hoeren (n 15) 109.

219 ibid.

220 ibid 113; art 60 ECSC.

221 ibid 109.

222 ibid 134. See ibid 155 with France's desire to pursue distortions of competition through differential employment conditions, salaries, social security, taxation systems and other differential legal and administrative provisions.

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