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Freedom of Political Communication in Australia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2008

Timothy H. Jones
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Extract

In three important decisions,1 handed down on the same day in October 1994, the Australian High Court continued its exploration of the implied constitutional guarantee of freedom of political communication. Two years previously, in the judgments in Nationwide News Pty Ltd v. Wills2 and Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v. The Commonwealth,3 a majority of the High Court had distilled an implication of freedom of political communication from the provisions and structure of the Australian Constitution.4 This was not an implication of freedom of expression generally, since it was derived from the concept of representative government which the majority considered to be enshrined in the Constitution: “not all speech can claim the protection of the constitutional implication of freedom … identified in order to ensure the efficacious working of representative democracy and government”.5 The extent of this implied constitutional guarantee was left rather unclear, since a number of different views were expressed. As Justice Toohey has now explained,6 there were two possibilities. The first was a more limited “implied freedom on the part of the people of the Commonwealth to communicate information, opinions and ideas relating to the system of representative government”. The second was a rather more expansive “freedom to communicate in relation to public affairs and political matters generally”. In the recent trilogy of cases a majority of the High Court was prepared to endorse the second of these alternatives.7 In Cunliffe v. The Commonwealth Chief Justice Mason concluded that it would be too restrictive to limit the implied freedom to “communications for the purposes of the political processes in a representative democracy”.8

Type
Shorter Articles, Comments and Notes
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 45 , Issue 2 , April 1996 , pp. 392 - 401
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 1996

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References

1. Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 68 A.L.J.R. 713; Stephens v. West Australian Newspapers Ltd (1994) 68 A.L.J.R. 765; Cunliffe v. The Commonwealth (1994) 68 A.L.J.R. 791.

2. (1992) 177 C.L.R. 1.

3. (1992) 177 C.L.R. 106.

4. The burgeoning literature includes: Kennett, G., “Individual Rights, the High Court and the Constitution” (1994) 19 Melbourne U.L.Rev. 581Google Scholar; McDonald, L.. “The Denizens of Democracy: The High Court and the ‘Free Speech’ Cases” (1994) 5 Public L.Rev. 160Google Scholar; Williams, G., “Civil Liberties and the Constitution—A Question of Interpretation” (1994) 5 Public L.Rev. 82Google Scholar; Symposium. “Constitutional Rights for Australia” (1994) 16 Sydney L.Rev. 145Google Scholar; Hughes, A., “The High Court and Implied Constitutional Rights: Exploring Freedom of Communication” (1994) 1 Deakin L.Rev. 173Google Scholar; Cass, D. Z., “Through the Looking Glass: The High Court and the Right to Speech” (1993) 4 Public L.Rev. 229Google Scholar; Lee, H. P., “The Australian High Court and Implied Fundamental Guarantees” [1993] Public Law 606.Google Scholar

5. Theophanous, supra n.1, at p.718 [per Toohey, Mason CJ. and Gaudron, JJ).Google Scholar

6. Cunliffe, supra n.1, at p.843.

7. Recent changes in the composition of the High Court—the departures of Chief Justice Mason and Justice Deane—have left the prospect for future developments unclear.

8. Cunliffe, supra n.1, at p.799.

9. Ibid.

10. Migration Act 1958 (Cth.).

11. Cunliffe, supra n.1, at p.819.

12. Idem, p.824.

13. Idem, p.822.

14. Ibid.

15. This decision was followed in Stephens, supra n.1.

16. Theophanous, supra n.1, at p.762 (per McHugh, J).Google Scholar

17. Idem, p.725. See also Idem, p.720: “the effect of the common law and statute law as it now stands is to interfere unduly with the relevant freedom of communication”.

18. Cf. the opinion of Justice Brennan expressed in Stephens, supra n.1, at p.782: “The common law is not only consistent with the system of representative government prescribed by the Constitutions of the Commonwealth and of the States; it also provides the flexibility of application which is essential to balance important interests of personal reputation and free speech and which the necessary rigidity of constitutional formulae cannot provide. A constitutional formula based on the text of a Constitution … could release the media from restraint, but … it could not preserve free speech in a society which values also the right to personal reputation.”

19. Theophanous, supra n.1, at p.722.

20. Idem, p.723.

21. Idem, p.725.

22. Idem, p.727.

23. Idem, p.752 (emphasis added).

24. Ibid.

25. Idem, p 749.

26. Ibid.

27. Idem, pp.751–752.

28. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

29. Theophanous, supra n.1, at pp.750–751.

30. Adam v. Ward [1917] A.C. 309.

31. Supra n.1.

32. Idem, p.787. Brennan J was also prepared to widen the scope of the qualified privilege.

33. Theophanous, supra n.1, at pp. 727–728. Deane J concurred.

34. Idem, p. 727.

35. See Jones, T. H., “Legal Protection for Fundamental Rights and Freedoms: European Lessons for Australia?” (1994) 22 Federal L.Rev. 57, 79.Google Scholar

36. (1992) 177 C.L.R. 106, 150.

37. Theophanous, supra n.1, at p.730.

38. Idem, p.757.

39. Idem, p.731.

40. Idem, pp.728–729.

41. Cunliffe, supra n.1, at p.815.

42. Theophanous, supra n.1, at p.719.

43. Cunliffe, supra n.1, at p.799.

44. Theophanous, supra n.1, at p.761.

45. Ibid.

46. Idem, p.759.

47. Idem, p.758.

48. [1992] 3 W.L.R. 28 (CA); [1993] A.C. 534 (HL).

49. Oberschlick v. Austria (1995) 19 E.H.R.R. 389, 421.

50. Ibid. See also Thorgeirson v. Iceland (1992) 14 E.H.R.R. 843; Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (1979–80) 2 E.H.R.R. 245.

51. Castells v. Spain (1992) 14 E.H.RR. 445, 476.

52. Oberschlick, supra n.49; Lingens v. Austria (1986) 8 E.H.R.R. 103.

53. Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd [1992] 3 W.L.R. 28, 64 (per Butler-Sloss, LJ).Google Scholar

54. Bognor Regis UDC v. Campion [1972] 2 Q.B. 169.

55. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

56. [1993] A.C. 534, 547.

57. City of Chicago v. Tribune Co. 307 III. 595, 607–608 (1929) (per Thompson, CJ).Google Scholar

58. [1993] A.C. 534, 549.

59. See, in particular, Ansett Australian Industries (Operations) Ply Ltd v. The Commonwealth (1979) 139 C.L.R. 54, 88.

60. Seamen's Union of Australia v. Utah Development Co. (1978) 144 C.L.R. 120, 157.

61. Cunliffe. supra n.1. at p.834.

62. Theophanous, supra n.1, at p.744.

63. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (63 & 64 Vict. c.12).

64. I explore this situation in detail in Jones, op. cit. supra n.35.

65. [1993] A.C. 534.

66. Cf. Lord, Lester, “Defaming Politicians and Public Officials” [1995] Public Law 1.Google Scholar

67. Theophanous, supra n.1, at p.718 (per Toohey, Mason CJ and Gaudron, JJ).Google Scholar

68. This observation is made notwithstanding Lord Keith's attempt to maintain the fiction that the protection provided to freedom of expression by the common law is coextensive with Art.10 of the European Convention: [1993] A.C. 534, 551.

69. Cf. Loveland, I., “Defamation of ‘Government’: Taking Lessons from America?” (1994) 14 Legal Studies 206.CrossRefGoogle Scholar