1. This is a rough-and-ready way of summarising the technical distinction between criminal and civil contempt. For extended discussion, see e.g. the judgments of the High Court of Australia in Holloway, Witham v. (1995) 183 C.L.R. 525, 530–534, 538–549Google Scholar; Lowe, N. and Sufrin, B., Borne and Lowe: The Law of Contempt (3rd edn, 1996), pp.2–4Google Scholar; Miller, C. J., Contempt of Court (2nd edn, 1989), chap.2.Google Scholar

2. Zweigert, K. and Kotz, H., An Introduction to Comparative Law (2nd revised edn, 1992), chap.3.Google Scholar

3. For discussion of these offences and their relationship to the law of criminal contempt, see e.g. Australian Law Reform Commission, Report No.35, Contempt (1987) (hereafter “ALRC 35”), paras.34–36, 144–232.Google Scholar

4. The “strict liability” principle introduced by s.1 of this Act has radically altered the sub judice principle. But except for introducing a general upper limit of two years for any prison sentence imposed for contempt and establishing a statutory version of contempt in the face of a magistrate's court, the Act does not affect the other three areas of contempt specifically dealt with in this article.

5. For general discussion, see e.g. Smith, A. T. H., “Judicial Lawmaking in the Criminal Law” (1984) 100 L.Q.R. 46, 69–73.Google Scholar In international treaties this notion finds expression in phrases such as “provided by law” (see International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), Art.19) or “prescribed by law” (see European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), Art.10(2) and the discussion of this phrase by the European Court of Human Rights in Sunday Times v. United Kingdom [1979] 2 E.H.H.R. 245, para.49).Google Scholar

6. The classic instance of judicial creation of a common law criminal offence, in violation of the normal rule, is probably the House of Lords decision in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Shaw [1962] 2 A.C. 220 (the “ladies' directory” case) that an offence of “conspiring to corrupt public morals” existed.

7. See e.g. Borrie and Lowe, op. cit. supra n.1, at pp.1–2Google Scholar; Miller, , op. cit. supra n.1, at pp.1–2Google Scholar; Attorney-General v. Times Newspapers Ltd [1974] A.C. 273, 307–309 (per Lord Diplock).Google Scholar

8. Idem, p.302 (per Lord Morris).

9. In the UK a gaol sentence for any species of contempt cannot exceed two years: Contempt of Court Act 1981, s.14(1). Frequently, fines and gaol sentences for contempt in the face of the court (or its statutory equivalent) in an inferior court have a statutory maximum: see e.g. idem, s.12; District Courts Act 1967 (Queensland), s.105.

10. In the absence of explicit statutory power, these are the only forms of sentence available to the court: Morris v. Crown Office [1970] 2 Q.B. 114.Google Scholar

11. Attorney-General v. James [1962] 2 Q.B. 637.Google Scholar

12. Though contempt procedures are sometimes criticised for insufficiently maintaining the principle, as internationally set out in the ICCPR, Art.14(5), that everyone convicted of a criminal offence should have a right to appellate review of the conviction and sentence. See e.g. ALRC 35, supra n.3, at para.159. In the UK rights of appeal are conferred by the Administration of Justice Act 1960, s.13: see Miller, , op. cit. supra n.1, at pp.82–86.Google Scholar

13. Fraser v. R. (1984) 3 N.S.W.L.R. 212Google Scholar; European Asian Bank AG v. Wentworth (1986) 5 N.S.W.L.R. 445.Google Scholar For the competing view that any conduct which directly jeopardises a court hearing, even if it takes place outside the judge's “sight or hearing”, may constitute contempt in the face of the court, see Balogh v. St Albans Crown Court [1975] Q.B. 73Google Scholar; Registrar, Court of Appeal v. Collins (1982) 1 N.S.W.L.R. 682.Google Scholar

14. For elaboration, see e.g. Borrie and Lowe, op. cit. supra n.1, at pp.518–524Google Scholar; Miller, , op. cit. supra n.1, at pp.56–62Google Scholar; ALRC 35, supra n.3, at paras.74–85.

15. In the theory of contempt law the administration of justice as a whole, never the dignity or other concerns of an individual court or judge, is the “victim” of a contempt; see e.g. Attorney-General v. Leveller Magazine Ltd [1979] A.C. 440, 449 (per Lord Diplock); R. v. Dunbabin, ex p. Williams (1935) 53 C.L.R. 434, 442 (per Rich J). But in some instances of contempt in the face of the court—e.g. when a missile is hurled at the bench—the judge for all practical purposes plays the role of victim.Google Scholar

16. See e.g. Keeley v. Brooking (1979) 143 C.L.R. 162, 186Google Scholar (per Murphy J); Chester-man, M., “Disorder in the Court: The Judge's Response” (1987) 10(1) U. New South Wales L.J. 32.Google Scholar

17. For general elaboration, including some historical background, see ALRC 35, supra n.3, at paras.28–36, 147–151, 465–466, 507, 562–567Google Scholar; Borrie and Lowe, op. cit. supra n.1, at pp.465–507Google Scholar; Miller, , op. cit. supra n.1, at pp.62–73.Google Scholar

18. For notorious instances in recent years, see Enfield London Borough Council v. Mahoney [1983] 1 W.L.R. 749 (coercive imprisonment)Google Scholar; Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v. Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd (1986) 161 C.L.R. 98 (coercive accruing fine).Google Scholar

19. For general discussions of contempt in the face of the court, see e.g. Phillipps, R., Improper Behaviour in Court, Australian Law Reform Commission, Contempt Research Paper No.2 (1984)Google Scholar; Borrie and Lowe, op. ciL supra n.1, at chap.2, pp.507–524Google Scholar; Miller, op. cit. supra n.1, at chap.4; Chesterman, op. cit. supra n.16.

20. See e.g. Ex p. Tuckerman, Re Nash [1970] 3 N.S.W.R. 23.Google Scholar

21. The last two of these examples are illustrated by Dow v. Attorney-General [1980] Qd.R. 58 and Mc Keown v. R. (1971) 16 D.L.R. (3d) 390 respectively.Google Scholar

22. See e.g. Weston v.Courts Administrator of the Central Criminal Court [1977] Q.B. 32, 43 (mens rea required); Tuckerman, supra n.20, at p.28 (mens rea not required).Google Scholar

23. Coward v. Stapleton (1953) 90 C.L.R. 573Google Scholar; R. v. Hill [1986] Crim.L.R. 457.Google Scholar

24. See text accompanying supra nn.14, 18.

25. See generally Guth, J. M., “Tribunaux correctionnels: publicité et police des audiences”, Juris-classeur procédure pénale (1990), p.3.Google Scholar

26. Code of Criminal Procedure, Arts.321, 404.

27. Code of Civil Procedure, Arts.24, 439.

28. Supra n.26.

29. See generally Vitu, A., Traité de droit criminel: droit pénal spécial (1982), paras.414–442.Google Scholar

30. See Dalloz, , Nouveau code pénal, 1993–1994, Commentary to Art.434–24.Google Scholar

31. Infra Section II.B.2(b).

32. See generally Stefani, G., Levasseur, G. and Bouloc, B., Procédure pénale (Précis Dal-loz, 40th edn, 1990), para.662.Google Scholar

33. See Gonnard, J.-M., “Jugement des infractions commises à l'audience des cours et tribunaux”, Juris-classeur procédure pénale (1990), with Supplément (1994).Google Scholar

34. Criminal Code, Art.434–24.

35. Cordiner v. Cordiner 1973 S.L.T. 125.Google Scholar

36. As indicated supra n.9, a prison sentence for contempt in the UK may not exceed two years, and in all common law jurisdictions the sentences for contempt in the face of the court in a number of specified courts (mostly lower courts) are subject to statutory upper limits.

37. See sources cited in and text accompanying supra n.16.

38. Stefani et al., loc. cit. supra n.32.

39. See e.g. Spencer, J. R., “French and English Criminal Procedure”, in Markesinis, B. (Ed.), The Gradual Convergence (1994), p.33Google Scholar; Vogler, R., A Guide to the French Criminal Justice System (1989).Google Scholar

40. Infra Section II.C.3.

41. The ensuing outline is an updated and revised version of the Summary set out in M. Chesterman, Public Criticism of Judges, Australian Law Reform Commission, Contempt Research Paper No.5 (1984).Google Scholar See too Borrie and Lowe, op. cit. supra n.1, at pp.335–364; Miller, op. cit supra n.1, at chap.12.Google Scholar

42. Ambard v. Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago [1936] A.C. 322, 325.Google Scholar

43. Nationwide News Ltd v. Wills (1992) 177 C.L.R. 1.Google Scholar

44. In Victoria only the A-G, or the court acting of its own motion, may commence proceedings to punish criminal contempt: see Public Prosecutions Act 1994, s.46.

45. In Australia the High Court so held in Dunbabin, supra n.15, at p.445.Google Scholar

46. The last recorded conviction was in R. v. Colsey, The Times, 9 May 1931. The last recorded prosecution was in R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex p. Blackburn (No.2) [1968] 2 All E.R. 319.Google Scholar

47. In New Zealand see e.g. Solicitor-General v. Radio Avon Ltd [1978] 1 N.Z.L.R. 225Google Scholar; Re Henderson and Verdon (unrep., High Court, Christchurch, 29 Nov. 1985), cited in Burrows, J. F., News Media Law in New Zealand (1990), p.251. For recent cases in Singapore, see Borrie and Lowe, op. cit. supra n.1, at pp.355–356.Google Scholar

48. Gallagher v. Durack (1983) 152 C.L.R. 238.Google Scholar

49. In the Marriage of Schwartzkopff (1992) 16 Fam.L.R. 539.Google Scholar

50. R. v. Kopyto (1987) 47 D.L.R. (4th) 213.Google Scholar

51. Supra Section II.B.1(b).

52. See generally Vitu, A., “Discrédit sur une décision jurisprudentielle—Article 434–25”, Juris-classeur pénal (1994), p.5 and op. cit. supra n.29, at paras.595–596Google Scholar; Auby, J.-M. and Ducos-Ader, R., Droit de l'information (Précis Dalloz, 2nd edn, 1982), paras.148–149.Google Scholar

53. Wade v. Gilroy (1986) 10 Fam.L.R. 793.Google Scholar

54. Crim. 27 Feb. 1964, D. 1964, 623.Google Scholar

55. See e.g. the discussion in Errera, R., “Press Law in France”, in Lahav, P. (Ed.), Press Law in Modem Democracies (1985), p.137, at pp.167–168, referring to a prosecution of Le Monde under Art.226 (as it then was) for criticism contained in five articles published between 1977 and 1980. Eventually, an amnesty law was passed in 1981.Google Scholar

56. R. v. Gray [1900] 2 Q.B. 36.Google Scholar

57. Supra Section II.B.1(b).

58. Privas, T. corr., 8 Dec. 1950, Gaz.Pal. 1951, 1, 180.Google Scholar

59. Charleville, T. corr., 8 Feb. 1952, D. 1952, 481; J.C.P. 1952, II, 6987.Google Scholar

60. Ex p. Attorney-General; Re Goodwin (1969) 70 S.R. (NSW) 413.Google Scholar

61. See Vitu, A., “Outrage envers un dépositaire de l'autorité publique”, Juris-classeur pénal (1994).Google Scholar

62. See generally Voisin, R., Droit pénal spécial (Précis Dalloz, 5th edn, 1983), paras.234–237Google Scholar; Vitu, , op. cit. supra n.29, at paras.1527–1539, 1947–1961.Google Scholar

63. See e.g. idem, paras.443–444; Dalloz, Code pénal (1993–4), Commentary to Arts.222, 223 (these were the predecessors to Art.434–24).

64. Though Vitu, op. cit. supra n.29, at paras.501–502, argues that there is greater emphasis on protecting the courts specifically than the text suggests.

65. For an Australian example of a court explicitly reducing the penalty because the convicted offender apologised, see Re Goodwin, supra n.60.

66. This point is made, with reference to the significance of retraction in defamation law, in ALRC 35, supra n.3, at para.448.

67. See e.g. Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (1994) 120 D.L.R. (4th) 12.Google Scholar In Australia the High Court's discernment, in two landmark cases in 1992, of a constitutional implication of “freedom of political discussion” has not impaired the rule in its essential aspects, but may give grounds for narrowing its scope. See further infra n.71.

68. See generally ALRC 35, supra n.3, at chaps.5, 6, 8, 9; Freckelton, I., Prejudicial Publicity and the Courts, Australian Law Reform Commission, Contempt Research Paper No.4 (1986)Google Scholar; Borrie and Lowe, op. cit. supra n.1, at pp.67–95Google Scholar; Miller, op. cit. supra n.1, at chaps.5–9 (discussing also the impact of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 (UK)). For a recent reaffirma-tion of the rule in New Zealand, see Gisborne Herald Co. Ltd v. Solicitor-General [1995] 3 N.Z.L.R. 563.Google Scholar

69. Times Newspapers Ltd, supra n.7.

70. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, supra n.5.

71. In Australia it is supported in a High Court dictum in Hinch v. Attorney-General for Victoria (1987) 164 C.L.R. 15, 54–55Google Scholar (per Deane J). But recent case law contains suggestions that it should be significantly restricted in scope (see e.g. Attorney-General for NSW v. TCN Channel Nine Pry Ltd (1990)Google Scholar 5 B.R. 10) or indeed that it should be abolished out of concern for freedom of political discussion (see the judgment of Kirby P in Civil Aviation Authority v. Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1995) 39 N.S.W.L.R. 540.Google Scholar

72. See discussion in Borrie and Lowe, op. cit. supra n.1, at pp.117–121, 227Google Scholar; Miller, , op. cit. supra n.1, at pp.148–150, 242–245Google Scholar; Re Lonhro plc [1990] 2 A.C. 154, 208–210.Google Scholar

73. In the UK the Contempt of Court Act 1981, s.7, requires that all proceedings for breach of the statutory sub judice rule (the so-called “strict liability rule”) must be instigated by or with the consent of the A-G or on the motion of a court having jurisdiction to deal with it. The position is similar in Victoria: see supra, n.44.

74. This was the remedy obtained by the A-G in Times Newspapers Ltd, supra n.69.

75. See e.g. United Telecasters Ltd v. Hardy (1991) 23 N.S.W.L.R. 323, 334.Google Scholar

76. See Vitu, A., “Publication en vue d'influencer les témoins ou une décision judiciaire”, Juris-classeur pénal (1994), p.5.Google Scholar

77. See generally Vitu, , op. cit. supra n.29, at paras.537–539; Auby and Ducos-Ader, loc. cit. supra n.52.Google Scholar

78. See e.g. Errera, op. cit. supra n.55, at pp.168–169.Google Scholar

79. See e.g. Dalloz, , Code civil (1996), Commentary to Art.9Google Scholar; Dickson, B., Introduction to French Law (1994), p.120.Google Scholar

80. See generally Juris-classeur procédure pénale (1986), Commentary on Art.11.Google Scholar

81. Some of the implications of these differences between common la w and civil law forms of jury trial (though not their relevance for the issue of prejudicial publicity) are discussed in Spencer, op. cit. supra n.39; Van Kessel, G., “Adversary Excesses in the Criminal Trial” (1992) 67 Notre Dame L.Rev. 403Google Scholar; Moskovits, M., “The O.J. Inquisition: A United States Encounter with Continental Criminal Justice” (1995) 28 Vand.J.Trans.L. 1121.Google Scholar

82. This point is elaborated (as the title to the article suggests) in Chesterman, M., “Contempt by the Media: How the Courts Define It” (1986) 58 Australian Q. 388.Google Scholar

83. See e.g. dicta of Brennan J in R. v. Glennon (1992) 173 C.L.R. 592, 614Google Scholar and of Lord, Diplock in Times Newspapers, supra n.7, at pp.311, 313.Google Scholar

84. For an eloquent elaboration of this point of division between common law and civil law systems, see Cremonini, C., “An Italian Lawyer Looks at Civil Contempt—From Rome to Glastonbury” (1984) 3 Civil Justice Q. 133.Google Scholar The reference to Glastonbury in this title is explained infra n.96.

85. See generally Kearney, P., Non-Compliance with Court Orders and Undertakings, Australian Law Reform Commission, Contempt Research Paper No.6 (1986)Google Scholar; Borrie and Lowe and Miller, both op. cit. supra n.1, both at chap.14.

86. In Fairclough & Sons v. Manchester Ship Canal Co. (No.2) (1897) 41 Sol.Jo. 225Google Scholar it was said that if the disobeying party is to escape liability, the disobedience must have been “casual or accidental and unintentional”. For a summary of the subsequent distortions and mis-readings of this phrase in later cases, see ALRC 35, supra n.3, at para.502.

87. Until relatively recently, a court could not impose a penalty by way of punishment for past disobedience unless the contemnor had acted “contumaciously”, i.e. with “rebellious stubbornness”. But this extra requirement no longer applies. See ALRC 35, idem, paras. 515–517.

88. See e.g. Poje v. Attorney-General for British Columbia [1953] D.L.R. 785Google Scholar; Heatons Transport (St Helens) Ltd v. Transport and General Workers Union [1972] I.C.R. 285 (the court)Google Scholar; Matthews v. Seamens Union of Australia (1957) 1 F.L.R. 185Google Scholar (a member of the public). Significantly, these are all cases of non-compliance by trade unions.

89. Jacob, J., “General Report including Regional Report from Great Britain”, in U. Jacobsson and J. Jacob, Trends in the Enforcement of Non-Money Judgments and Orders: The First International Colloquium on the Law of Civil Procedure (1985), p.3, at p.18.Google Scholar

90. Witham v. Holloway, supra n.1; Re Bramblevale Ltd [1970] Ch. 128.Google Scholar

91. See Miller, , op. cit. supra n.1, at pp.27–29.Google Scholar

92. See idem, pp.32–33; ALRC 35, supra n.3, at para.506.

93. This was suggested in Astro Exito Navegacion SA v. WT Hsu, The “Messiani Tolmi” [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 666, 671.Google Scholar

94. The use of fines in this way was endorsed by the High Court of Australia in Australasian Meat Industry, supra n.18.

95. This term, significant for its religious overtones, was used by Windeyer J in Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v. Morgan (1965) 112 C.L.R. 483, 499.Google Scholar

96. For a striking example, involving the refusal by an amateur archaeologist over many months to deliver up to a local authority an object believed to be the original Glastonbury Cross, see Enfield LBC, supra n.18. The prison sentence initially imposed was two years, but when the review process brought the matter before the Court of Appeal it ordered his release after a period of coercive imprisonment of about one year.

97. Further relevant laws are those of 9 July 1991, Arts.33–37, and 31 July 1992, Arts.51–53. See generally Kahn-Freund, O., Levy, C. and Rudden, B., A Source-Book on French Law (3rd, revd edn, 1991, by B. Rudden), pp.506–515Google Scholar; Vincent, J. and Guinchard, J. J., Procédure civile (Précis Dalloz, 21st edn, 1987), para.388Google Scholar; Bloch, M., “France”, in Kaye, P., Methods of Execution of Judgments and Orders in Europe (1996), chap.6, pp.100, 104Google Scholar; Catala, N., “Astreintes in French Law” [1959] Juridical Rev. (N.S.) 163Google Scholar; Denti, V. and Silves-tri, E., “Regional Report from Continental Western Europe”, in Jacobsson and Jacob, op. cit supra n.89, p.157, at pp.161–163.Google Scholar

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99. See e.g. Vincent and Guinchard, op. cit. supra n.97, at para.389.

100. This same point is made about similar provisions in Italian law, when compared with civil contempt, in Cremonini, op. cit. supra n.84, at pp.149–151.Google Scholar

101. See e.g. Perrot, , op. cit. supra n.98, at p.118Google Scholar; Jacob, , op. cit. supra n.89, at p.39Google Scholar; Jacobs-son, U, in “Colloquium”, op. cit. supra n.98, at pp.218–219Google Scholar; Dawson, J. P., “Specific Performance in France and Germany” (1959) 57 Mich.L.Rev. 493Google Scholar; David, R. and Brierley, J. E. C., Major Legal Systems in the World Today (3rd edn, 1985), para.319.Google Scholar

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103. ALRC 35, idem, para.89.

104. On the relevant French law, see e.g. Vitu, op. cit. supra n.29, at paras.542, 544.

105. See Dumont, J., “Audition des témoins”, Juris-classeur procédure pénale (1995), paras.72–75, 108–109.Google Scholar

106. Code of Criminal Procedure, Arts.109, 326, 438, 536.

107. Code of Civil Procedure, Art.207.

108. J. Dumont, “Refus de déposer”, Juris-classeur pénal (1995).

109. As already indicated, it is not for the courts alone to determine this—the principal prosecution authority is generally the A-G—but subject to statutory intervention the courts enjoy concurrent powers of prosecution.

110. R. v. Mullen, Guardian, 4 July 1981, noted in Miller, op. cit. supra n.1, at p.105.Google Scholar

111. [1992] 1 A.C. 191. The preceding House of Lords case with the same name established the “prejudgment principle”: see supra Section II.B.3(a).

112. In the particular circumstances of the case, which formed part of the long saga of litigation around the book Spycatcher, the “subject-matter of the litigation” was the UK government's right to preserve confidentiality in parts of the book, in support of which it had obtained an interlocutory injunction in proceedings for breach of confidence against certain newspaper proprietors, though not against the contempt defendant, Times Newspapers Ltd. For critical comment see e.g. Stewart, A. and Chesterman, M., “Confidential Material; The Position of the Media” (1992) 14 Adelaide L.Rev. 1, 22–34.Google Scholar

113. The main authority for this earlier principle is Seaward v. Paterson [1897] 1 Ch. 545.Google Scholar See generally Borrie and Lowe, op. cit. supra n.1, at pp.211–220, 573–578Google Scholar; Miller, , op. cit. supra n.1, at pp.430–434.Google Scholar

114. [1992] 1 A.C. 191, 225 (per Lord Oliver); see too 215 (per Lord Ackner).Google Scholar

115. Text accompanying supra nn.4, 67.

116. Hammond v. Commonwealth (1982) 152 C.L.R. 188, 206.Google Scholar The dictum is discussed in Sorby v. Commonwealth (1983) 152 C.L.R. 281, 306–308.Google Scholar

117. See e.g. R. v. Taylor, ex p. Roach (1951) 82 C.L.R. 587.Google Scholar In the UK, where there is no written constitution and no formal separation of powers, the closest one gets to this idea is the principle of common law that only courts and other bodies which exercise “judicial power” have the protection of contempt law: see Attorney-General v. BBC [1981] A.C. 303Google Scholar; Borrie and Lowe, op. cit. supra n.1, at pp.487–491Google Scholar; Miller, , op. cit. supra n.1, at pp.50–56.Google Scholar

118. See the discussion of the Commonwealth Parliament's power to reform contempt law in ALRC 35, supra n3, at paras. 48–57.

119. For further discussion of the historical and present-day role of the theory of separation of powers in French law see text accompanying infra nn.138 et seq.

120. See sources cited supra n.97.

121. Text accompanying supra nn. 99–100.

122. For recent emphatic statements to this effect, see witham v. Holloway, supra n.1 at pp.532–533, 539.Google Scholar

123. See text accompanying supra nn.87, 88.

124. See supra Section II.B.1.

125. See supra Section II.B.2.

126. (1765) Wilm. 243, 270.Google Scholar

127. See supra Section II.C.3.

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136. See e.g. Cappelletti, idem, pp. 126–129, 142–146.

137. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803).Google Scholar

138. On historical aspects of the ensuing material, see e.g. Perrot, R., Institutions judiciaires (2nd edn, 1986), pp.13–37, 64–66Google Scholar; Foyer, J., “La justice: histoire d'un pouvoir refuse” (1981) 16 Pouvoirs 17Google Scholar; Raz, A., Courts and Tribunals: A Comparative Study (1980), pp.15–21, 210–215Google Scholar; Dawson, , op. cit. supra n.128, at chap.5; Damaska, op. cit. supra n.128, at pp.32–38Google Scholar; Cappelletti, , op. cit. supra n.135, at pp.124–126.Google Scholar

139. On relevant aspects of the judiciary in France at the present day, see e.g. idem pp.47–53, 137–138, 142–146, 153–161, 190–197; Perrot, Idem, pp.37–59; Shapiro, , op. cit. supra n.128, at pp.148–156Google Scholar; Radamaker, D., “The Courts in France”, in Waltman and Holland, op. cit. supra n.131, p.129, at pp.139–146Google Scholar; Zweigert, and , Kotz, op. cit. supra n.2, at pp.123–130Google Scholar; Davis, M. H., “The Law/Politics Distinction, the French Conseil Constitutionnel, and the U.S. Supreme Court” (1986) 34 A.J.Comp.L. 45, 45–52Google Scholar; Bodiguel, J.-L., “Qui sont les magistrals français? Esquisse d'une sociologie” (1981) 16 Pouvoirs 31Google Scholar; Bancaud, A., La haute magistra-ture judiciaire entre politique et sacerdote ou le culte des vertus moyennes (1993), chaps. 1, 2, 6–8Google Scholar; Stone, A., The Birth of Judicial Politics in France (1992).Google Scholar

140. For discussions of the foregoing issues which specifically focus on common law-civil law comparisons, see e.g. Van Caenegem, R. C., Judges, Legislators and Professors: Chapters in Medieval Legal History (1987)Google Scholar; , Legrand, op. cit. supra n.133, at pp.71–75.Google Scholar

141. Legrand, idem, p.75. See too Jacob, H. I., “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court” (1970) 23 C.L.P. 22Google Scholar; Dockray, M., “The Inherent Jurisdiction to Regulate Civil Proceedings” (1997) 113 L.Q.R. 120.Google Scholar

142. See text accompanying supra nn. 69–72.

143. See sources cited supra n. 101.

144. In the writer's view these should not include any substitute for contempt by scandalising: see Chesterman, op. cit. supra n.41, at paras.137, 143. Contrast the recommendation in ALRC 35, supra n.3, at para.460, for a narrowly drawn statutory offence, covering the public imputing of misconduct to a judge where serious harm to his/her official reputation is likely to result and the imputation is neither true nor honestly and reasonably believed to be true. See too the decision of the High Court of Ontario in Kopyto, supra n.50, outlined in the accompanying text.

145. E.g. ALRC 35, idem; see para.44 and Summary of Recommendations, para.1.

146. In 1984 the Canadian Parliament debated a bill (Bill C–19) which abolished the law of criminal contempt and substituted new provisions in the Criminal Code. But the bill lapsed with the fall of the then government.

147. E.g. Lord, Devlin (in 1968) and Lord Scarman (in 1980): see ALRC 35, supra n.3, at para. 12.Google Scholar