1. See inter alia the famous discussion between Sir Hersch, Lauterpacht, “Some Observations on the Prohibition of ‘Non liquet’ and the Completeness of the Law”, in Simbolœ Verzijl (1958), pp.196–221Google Scholar, and Julius, Stone, “Non liquet and the Function of Law in the International Community” (1959) 35 B.Y.I.L. 124–161.Google Scholar See also Siorat, L., Le problème des lacunes en droit international (1959)Google Scholar; Salmon, J., “Quelques observations sur les lacunes du droit international public” (1967/2) R.B.D.I. 440–458;Google Scholar and Fitzmaurice, G., “The Problem on Non-Liquet: Prolegomena to a Restatement”, in Mélanges offerts à Charles Rousseau (1974), pp.89–112.Google Scholar To these, logically, can be added the doctrinal postures maintained, among others, by authors like Verdross, Charles de Visscher, Anzilotti, Rousseau, Guggenheim, Basdevant, Bourquin, Reuter or Sørensen.

2. An academic debate which has its basis in the philosophical discussion over the integrity of all legal orders and which confronts the theorists of “empty legal space” with those of the “exclusive general rule”. See in this sense, in order to analyse the “limits of the law”, the work of Bobbio, N., Teoria generate del diritto (rev. edn, 1993).Google Scholar We have used the Spanish version, Teorrta general del derecho (1991), in particular pp.221–252.Google Scholar

3. I.C.J. Rep. 1996, 226.Google Scholar We will discuss in this article only this opinion and not the other of the same date in response to a question submitted by the World Health Organisation Assembly (I.C.J. Rep. 1996, 6).Google Scholar

4. Dissenting opinion, I.C.J. Rep. 1996, 226, 583, para.2.Google Scholar To a certain degree, both Judge Schwebel (in his dissenting opinion) as well as Judge Vereschetin (in his brief declaration) admit the existence of a non liquet in the opinion of the Court, though the Russian judge links the possibility of non liquet only with contentious procedure.

5. See also Judge Schwebel's dissenting opinion, idem, particularly pp.322 and 323.

6. Logically, this discussion is not posed with the same virulence in legal orders inspired by common law.

7. Weil, P., “Le droit international en quéte de son identité. Cours général de droit international public” (1992) 237 R.C.A.D.I. 212.Google Scholar

8. See other cases in Bin, Cheng, General Principles of Law (1953) pp.400–408.Google Scholar

9. An English translation may be: “Judges and Courts have the unavoidable duty to issue a judgment in those cases which they hear without exception, according to the established system of legal sources”. See also Art.11.3 of the Organic Law of Judicial Power, Art.361 of the Law of Criminal Indictment and Art.448 of the Penal Code.

10. See e.g. the judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht of 12 Nov. 1958, 8 BVerfGE, 174.Google Scholar

11. See also Art.31 of the ECSC Treaty and 146 of the Euratom Treaty. See generally Pierre, Pescatore, “La interpretación del Derecho communitario por el juez national” (1996) 3 Revista de Institucions europeas 7–31.Google Scholar

12. Art.85 of the Rules of the Court of First Instance refers only to the costs.

13. See recently Joined Cases C–46/93 and C–48/93, Brasserie du pêcheur SA v Federal Republic of Germany and The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex p. Factortame Ltd et al. [1996] E.C.R. I–1144, paras.27–28.Google Scholar

14. Joined Cases 7/56 and 3–7/57, Algera v. Common Assembly (1957) Rec. 114–115.Google Scholar

15. Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Duttermittel (1970) Rec. 1135, para.4.Google Scholar

16. Case 4/73, J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroβhandlung v. Commission des Communautès europèennes (1974) Rec. 508, para. 13.Google Scholar

17. “The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community Law”. Thus after a long jurisprudential tradition Community law has assumed these constitutional traditions as its own law”.

18. Case 13/60, Comptoirs de vente du charbon de la Ruhr “Gritling”, “Mausegatt” et “Präsident” v. Haute Autorité de la Communausé européenne du charbon et de l'acier (1962) Rec. 201.Google Scholar

19. Case 266/82, Mariette Krecké v. Commission [1984] E.C.R. 11, para.5.Google Scholar

20. Case 328/85, Deutsche Babcock Handel GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] E.C.R. 5140, esp. para.13.Google Scholar

21. Case 239/84, Gerlach économiques [1985] E.C.R. 3517, paras.9–11.Google Scholar

22. Case 294/83, Parti écologiste “Les Verts” v. European Parliament [1986] E.C.R. 1365, esp. para.23Google Scholar; see more recently the opinion of 14 Dec. 1991, Opinion 1/91, Opinion on the Draft Agreement Relating to the Creation of an European Economic Area [1991] E.C.R. 1–6079, para.21.Google Scholar

23. Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] E.C.R. 4231, paras. 15–17Google Scholar; and Case C–221/88, E.C.S.C. v. Fallimento Acciaierie e ferreri Busseni SpA [1990] E.C.R. para. 16.Google Scholar

24. Case 66/80, SpA International Chemical Corporation v. Amministrazione delle finaze dello Stato [1981] E.C.R. para.11.Google Scholar

25. Fitzmaurice, , op. cit supra n.1, at p.93.Google Scholar By non liquet it has been generally understood that “an international tribunal should decline to decide a case where rules are not available for its determination because of gaps or lacunae in international law” (Parry, and Grant, , Encyclopaedic Dictionary of International Law (1986), p.259).Google Scholar

26. Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, Advisory Opinion (1923) P.C.I.J., Ser.B, No.4, 24.Google Scholar

27. Sørensen, M., Les sources du Droit international (1946), p.199.Google Scholar

28. Guggenheim, P., Traité de Droit international public, Vol.I (1967), p.264.Google Scholar

29. “Lotus”, Judgement No.9 (1927) P.C.I J., Ser.A, No.10, 18–19.Google Scholar

30. Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), judgment of 20 Nov. 1950, I.C.J. Rep. 1950, 274–275.Google Scholar

31. “[T]here is no rule of customary international law to prevent a State from choosing and conducting a foreign policy in co-ordination with that of another State” (Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (merits), I.C.J. Rep. 1986, 133, para.265).Google Scholar

32. “[I]n international law there are no rules, other than such rules as may be accepted by the State concerned, by treaty or otherwise, whereby the level of armaments of a sovereign State can be limited, and this principle is valid for all States without exception” (idem, p. 135, para.269).

33. Weil, op. cit supra n.7, at p.211.Google Scholar A posture open to criticism by those who do not participate in this almost absolute voluntarism: “L'expression me˚me de ‘domaine réservé’”—notes Michel Virally—“est contestable: le fait qué sur un point déterminé quelconque n'cxiste aucune obligation juridique ne signifie pas que le droit international ‘réservé’ cette question è la compétence discrétionnaire de l'Etat, mais seulement que, en fait, aucune obligation juridique internationale n'a encore été créée à son sujet. Or cette situation peut changer à tout moment. II n'est pas de domaine où le droit international (droit coutumier ou droit conventionnel) ne puisse pénétrer pour des raisons de principe. Il ne s'agit jamais que d' un stade dans le développement du droit. La seule question pratique est done celle de l'existence, ou de l'inexistence, à un moment donné et dans un cas déterminé de règles et d'obligations intemationales” (Virally, M., “Panorama du Droit international contemporain. Cours général de droit international public” (1983) 183 R.C.A.D.I. 82).Google Scholar

34. For the French judge: “In operative paragraph 2E the Court decided in fact that it could not in those extreme circumstances conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful. In other words, it concluded that in such circumstances the law provided no guide for States. But if the law is silent in this case. States remain free to act as they intend” (Individual opinion, I.C.J. Rep. 1996, 291, para.9).Google Scholar

35. Art.7 of Convention XII of The Hague of 18 Oct 1907 establishes that “if recognized general norms did not exist, the court would fail according to general principles of law and equity”. The 1928 Act for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, revised in 1949 and in force since 1950, assumes the “sources” summarised in Art.38.1 of the ICJ Statute and, failing that, to the jurisdiction ex aequo et bono foreseen in para.2 of the same Art.38. Art.42.2 of the Convention of 18 Mar. 1965 on the Solution of Differences Related to Inversions between States and Nationals of other States anticipates that the arbitration court of the CIADI cannot refuse to resolve a dispute under the pretext of silence or obscurity of the law.

36. In the Norwegian Shipowners' Claims case the agreement obliged the arbitrators to judge “in accordance with the principles of law and equity” (1 R.I.A.A. 310)Google Scholar; in the Trail Smelter case the parties invited the arbitrators to reach a solution “just to all parties” (3 R.I.A.A. 1908)Google Scholar; in the Cayuga Indians case the arbitration agreement included the possible remission to “general considerations of justice and right dealing, guided by legal analogies and by the spirit and received principles of international law” (6 R.I.A.A. 180)Google Scholar; or in the Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Switzerland of 3 Dec. 1921, Art.5, para.2, provided that “if, in a particular case, the legal basis mentioned [treaties, custom and general principles of law] are inadequate, the Tribunal shall give an award in accordance with the principles of law which, in its opinion, should govern international law. For this purpose it shall be guided by decisions sanctioned by legal authorities and by jurisprudence” (League of Nations, 12 Treaty Series 281–293).

Several cases could be added in which the parties to the dispute asked the tribunal not only to solve the disputes but to give legal indications or suggestions for the future as well. See e.g., in a numerous list, the Bering Sea Fisheries case (“compromis” of 29 Feb. 1899, see the judgment in Moore, International Arbitrations, p.4761)Google Scholar or the Trail Smelter case of 1941 (“compromis” of 15 Apr. 1935, see the judgment in 3 R.I.A.A. 1905).Google Scholar

37. Art.11 of the Model Rules of Arbitration Procedure, approved provisionally by the International Law Commission in 1958, provided that “the tribunal may not bring in a finding of non liquet on the grounds of the silence or the obscurity of international law or the compromise”: (1958) 2 Y.B.I.L.C 83.Google Scholar

The Institut de Droit International had occasion to pronounce in particular over the non liquet in its sessions in Geneva and The Hague of 1874 and 1875, adopting in the last, on 28 Aug., a “Projet de règlement pour la procédure arbitrale internationale” whose Art.19 indicated that “[l]e tribunal arbitral ne peut refuser de prononcer sous prétexte qu'il n'est pas suffisamment éclairé soit sur les faits, soil sur les principes juridiques qu'il doit appliquer”, and Art.22 warned that “[S]i le tribunal arbitral ne trouve fondées les prétentions d'aucune des parties, il doit le déclarer, et, s'il n'est limité sous ce rapport par le compromis, établir l'état réel du droit relatif aux parties en litige”: (1873–1892) Y.B.I.D.I., Tableau général, 129–130.Google Scholar

38. 2 R.I.A.A. 869.Google Scholar

39. Annual Digest, 2 (1923–4), Case no.225.Google Scholar

40. 2 R.I.A.A. 1016.Google Scholar

41. In the drafting of Art.38 of the PCIJ Statute the inclusion of “general principles of law recognized by civilised nations”—in the words of the President of the Consulting Committee of Jurists—was intended to avoid “specially the blind alley of non liquet” (Procés-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee, 16 June–24 July 1920, p 332).Google Scholar

42. Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (second phase, Advisory Opinion of 18 July 1950, I.C.J. Rep. 1950, 229.Google Scholar

43. Case of the Free Zones of the Upper Savoy and the District ofCex (Second Phase), Order of December 6th, 1930 (1930) P.C.I.J., Ser.A, No.24, 15Google Scholar; and Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Rep. 1988, 29, para.40.Google Scholar

44. South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 1966, 36, para.37, and 48, para.89.Google Scholar

45. Fisheries Jurisdiction, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 1974Google Scholar (United Kingdom v. Iceland: 23–24, para.53Google Scholar; Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland: 192, para.45).Google Scholar

46. Not subtracting with that all the value of jurisprudence in the determination and development of the law. See especially G. Abi-Saab, “De la jurisprudence. Quelques reflexions sur son rôle dans le développement du droit international”, in Hacia un Nuevo Orden Internacionaly Europeo. Homenaje al Profesor M. Dlez de Velasco (1993), pp.19–26.Google Scholar

47. Case Concerning Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 1997, paras.130–131.Google Scholar

48. Reparations for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Rep. 1949, 185–186.Google Scholar

49. Haya de la Torre Case, judgment of 13 June 1951, I.C.J. Rep. 1951, 80–81.Google Scholar

50. North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 1969, 46–47, paras.83 et seq.Google Scholar The Court continued, saying: “Equally, it is not the case that if the equidistance principle is not a rule of law, there has to be as an alternative some other equivalent rule” (para.83 in fine).

51. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 1970, 47, para.89.Google Scholar

52. Idem, p.48, para.94.

53. Even in its judicial function, faced with instances where the Statute was silent, the Court had settled the possible legal vacuum with reference to, e.g., procedural principles applied ex novo. Hence, reasoning from Art.26.2 of the Statute, it understood that “it is for the tribunal seized with a principal issue to deal also with any issue subsidiary thereto; whereas a chamber formed to deal with a particular case therefore deals not only with the merits of the case, but also with incidental proceedings arising in that case” (Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras), Application to Intervene, order of 28 Feb. 1990, I.C.J. Rep. 1990, 4)Google Scholar, although perhaps Art.100.1 of the Rules of the Court might provide a legal basis to justify, by analogy, the affirmation of the chamber in this order. This Art states: “If the judgment to be revised or to be interpreted was given by the Court, the request for its revision or interpretation shall be dealt with by the Court. If the judgment was given by a Chamber, the request for its revision or interpretation shall be dealt with by the Chamber”.

54. In a similar sense, see the Restatement of the Law of the US: “International law does not address all conduct of states or international organisations, or all of their relations. International law does not address some matters because they are not of sufficient international concern, and it is accepted that they are and should remain essentially ‘domestic’. Some matters clearly of international concern are not regulated because the international community has not addressed them or has not been able to agree on how to deal with them” (American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Third, The Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987), p.20).Google Scholar

55. I.C.J. Rep. 1996, 226, 237, para. 18.Google Scholar

56. This emerges from the tone of the wording of the Court, which in its French version also indicates this understanding: “L'argument selon lequel la Cour, pour répondre ée, serait obligée de légiférer, se fonde sur la supposition que le corpus juris existant ne comporterait pas de règle pertinente en la matière. La Cour ne saurait souscrire è cet argument; elle dit le droit existant et ne légifere point. Cela est vrai me˚me si la Cour, en dissant et en applicant le droit, doit nécessairement en préciser la portée et, parfois, en constater l'évolution”.

57. I.C.J. Rep. 1996, 226, 235, para.14.Google Scholar It is true that the Court held, ibid: “When considering each request, it is mindful that it should not, in principle, refuse to give an advisory opinion. In accordance with the consistent jurisprudence of the Court, only ‘compelling reasons’ could lead it to such a refusal”; but here no reference is made to the heart of the matter—the object of the non liquet—but to the admissibility of the matter, once it established its competence.

58. idem, p.239, para.23.

59. Paras.A and B, respectively, of the operative part of the advisory opinion.

60. Not with standing, for Bobbio the Court would be affirming the “non-integrity” of our legal order the “non-integrity consists of the fact that the system does not have a rule which prohibits a determined behaviour nor one which permits it. To that effect, if it can be demonstrated that neither the prohibition nor the permission of a certain behaviour is produced by the system, then it can be said that the system is incomplete, that the legal order has a lacuna” (Bobbio, , op. cit supra n.2, at p.221Google Scholar, we translate). However, this does not imply the erroneous valorisation of possible permissive or prohibitive rules and its balance. What Bobbio seems to demand is the existence of a “precise” rule which settles the dilemma.

61. The wording of the question posed by the General Assembly was: “Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?” (A/Res/49/75, 14 Dec. 1994.) It has been said that, “in making this request for an advisory opinion, the General Assembly had put the Court in a difficult position. It had asked a question that could not effectively be answered in the abstract, and that was replete with serious political implications and pitfalls” (Matheson, M. J., “The Opinions of the International Court of Justice on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons” (1997) 91 A.J.I.L. 435).Google Scholar

62. Or that the possible applicable rule is obscure or leads to a manifestly absurd result.

63. Distinct as such from the non volumus and the non decel.

64. And in this sense it is worth not forgetting the wording of Art.38.2 of the ICJ Statute.

65. Arranging the legal framework of the international judge in the agreement by which they submit to his jurisdiction; or, in another set of ideas, giving him the very rules to apply, exactly as occurred e.g. with Art.6 of the Charter concerning the International Military Court (the Nuremberg Court) annex to the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (London, 8 Aug. 1945).

66. E.g. lacunae detected by the ICJ in the Reparations Case or in the Haya de la Torre Case, supra nn.48, 49.

67. Which would decide in the absence of legal title or when this was unable to show in a precise manner the best right. See Frontier Dispute Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 1986, 554, esp. para.63.Google Scholar

68. This perhaps is the most controversial criterion. It would require the evolutionary sense of international law, recalled by the arbitration court in 1928 and by the present Court in its advisory opinion of 1996. It would establish an insurmountable limit—that of the essential respect for human beings. It would be implicit in para.E of the operative part of the opinion when the Court indicated that “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law”. Nonetheless, the Court—and this is the part of the opinion subject to our criticism—was unable to conclude “definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of selfdefence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake”. Between both interests Present, the Court did not save the apparent lacunae choosing to prioritise one interest or the other It chose in our understanding a non decet as a false non liquet. Anyway, as it was clearly stated by Sir General Filzmaurice, this lension bet ween arguments that leads to a “false” non liquet does not mean the existence of a gap. “It is problem of the formulation, elucidation or adaptation (or else of the appraisal, evaluation or assessment) or yet again of grading, ranking or balancing and counterbalancing of rules and principles that are known, or are capable of adumbration, or have at least an inchoate existence” (op. cit. supra n.1 at p.98)Google Scholar

69. Perhaps this could be to a certain extent in the Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras) case, supra n.67.

70. This would be the case in the North Sea Continental Shelf case, supra n.50.

71. The UN Charter did not foresee, e.g., the necessity of ensuring functional protection for UN personnel, of carrying out the supervision of territories under mandate not subject to the system of fiduciary administration, of establishing an administrative court within the organisation, of providing certain expenses not explicìtly foreseen, or of terminating a mandate for violation of international law. In all these cases, the ICJ found an absence of express rule but affirmed nonetheless the existence of implied powers to cover these necessities. See the jurisprudence cited in our work “La determinación de los hechos por el Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas en el ámbito del mantenimiento de la paz y seguridad intemacionales (1945–1995)” (1996) 48 R.E.D.I. 71, esp.75.Google Scholar

72. In the Barcelona Traction case the Court indicated: “There is no obligation upon the possessors of rights to exercise them. Sometimes no remedy is sought, though rights are infringed. To equate this with the creation of a vacuum would be to equate a right with an obligation” (I.C.J. Rep. 1970, 44–45, para.80).Google Scholar

73. In this sense it would be linked to the idea of a real lacuna: non liquet means a non possumus issued by a competent court, over an admissible question due to the absence of an applicable rule that impedes the judge or arbitrator in solving the dispute (unless parties to the dispute indicated otherwise). It is possible then to distinguish a “false” non liquet: e.g. that produced because of the incompetence of the court, or due to the inadmissibility of the instant case, or those cases of non decet, non licet or non volumus. In the Case Concerning Boundary Markers in Taba (Egypt v. Israel) the arbitrators had the opportunity to discuss the differences between a non liquet and a non licet (20 R.I.A.A. 65, paras.238–244).Google Scholar

Nevertheless, in the Lockerbie case. Judge Oda gave a different sense to non possumus when he understood that it is also implied when the pre-eminence of a rule (i.e. a Security Council resolution) over another rule (i.e. the aut dedere autjudicare customary rule) makes the latter inapplicable (I.C.J. Rep. 1992, 17, declaration of Acting President Oda).Google Scholar

74. In our understanding this is the case of the 1996 advisory opinion.

75. See the affirmation of this principle in the matters already cited concerning the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases (I.C.J. Rep. 1974, 9, para.17 and 181, para.18, respectively).Google Scholar See also Lotus case, supra, n.29 and Nicaragua case, supra, n.30.

76. In the Spanish literature, Pastor-Ridruejo, J. A. has maintained, however, the “principle of prohibition of the non liquet” although he has moderated the affirmation of the completeness of the legal order (Curso de Derecho international público y Organizaciones internaaonales (5th edn, 1994), p.190Google Scholar, we translate). For his part, González-Campos, J. maintains similarly the completeness of our legal order starting from “a conception of international public law as a coherent entirety of legal responses. These considerations allow us to affirm that any relation or situation encounters regulation in the system” (Curso de Derecho international público (4th edn, 1990) p.56Google Scholar, we translate). Nevertheless, he does not affirm the prohibition of a non liquet. Finally, Diez de, M. Velasco affirms the character of supplementary source of the general principles of international law in order to fill in the gaps and avoid the non liquet (Instituciones de Derecho international público (11th edn, 1997), pp.104–105).Google Scholar

For Stone, nonetheless, the prohibition of the non liquet “may not be fully sustained by any evidence yet offered” (op. tit supra n.1, at p.145Google Scholar) and for Siorat the non liquet seems at times inevitable (op. cit supra n. 1, at p.189). Kohen, M. G.Google Scholar, in a very interesting commentary on the 1996 opinion, affirms: “Il est d'ailleurs inutile de chercher une règie coutumière ètablissant l'interdiction pour le juge d'un non liquet. Une telle règie ne saurait exister. Il s'avère en effet impossible de trouver des règles coutumières là où la pratique est inexistante” (“L'avis consultatif de la CIJ sur la Liceitè de la menace ou de l'emploi d'armes nuclèaires et la fonction judiciaire” (1997) 8 E.J.I.L. 336, 347).Google Scholar

77. Rousseau, Ch., Droit international public, Vol.1 (2nd edn, 1970), p.53.Google Scholar

78. Reuter, P., “Principes de Droit international public” (1961) 103 R.C.A.D.I. 489.Google Scholar

79. Thus, Sir Hersch, Lauterpacht could affirm: “The principle of the completeness of the international legal order is a general principle of law. It is one of the most fundamental legal principles”: International Law. Collected Papers, Vol.1 (1970), p.69.Google Scholar

80. Bobbio, , op. cit. supra n.2, at p.240, we translate.Google Scholar

81. Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Rep. 1980, 76, para.10.Google Scholar

82. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine, Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 1984, 299, para.111.Google Scholar

83. Kohen, , op. cit. supra n.76, at p.345Google Scholar, warns: “C'est une banalité de dire que le droit international (comme n'importe quel autre système juridique) ne comporte pas des règles particulières pour régir ses sujets. Les règles juridiques sont censèes ètre constmites de manière abstraite et il s'agira tout simplemenl de classifier un fait, acte ou situation dans telle catègoric juridique ou telle autre”.

84. Abi-Saab, G., “Cours général de droit international public” (1987) 207 R.C.A.D.I. 202–203.Google Scholar

85. Kohen, , op. cit. supra n.76, at p.345.Google Scholar

86. See all the precedents to that effect cited supra and the declaration of Judge Bedjaoui to the advisory opinion of 1996 (esp. pp.269–270, paras.7 and 9 in fine).Google Scholar

87. Particularly in an advisory opinion, which obliges the court to outline the “state of the law” regarding the question submitted, and fulfil “the requirements of its judicial character even in giving advisory opinions” (Western Sahara occidental, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Rep. 1975, 21, para.23).Google Scholar In his declaration attached to the advisory opinion of 1996, Judge Vereschetin, understanding that the “indecisiveness of the Court… indirectly admits the existence of a ‘grey area’ in the present regulation of the matter”, recalls: “In advisory procedure, where the Courtfindsa lacuna in the law orfindsthe law to be imperfect, it ought merely to state this without trying to fill the lacuna or improve the law by way of judicial legislation. The Court cannot be blamed for indecisiveness or evasiveness where the law, upon which it is called to pronounce, is itself inconclusive” (Declaration, I.C.J. Rep. 1996, 279).Google Scholar

In the opinion of Kohen, , op. cit. supra n.76, at p.360Google Scholar, the tendency of the Court towards an economy of means could “tomber dans des situations où on ne prend pas en considérations tous les élements que le droit international met à la disposition des juges”. See in this respect the dissenting opinion of Judge Oda, esp. p.36, para.53.Google Scholar

88. Avoiding the situation that, as occurred after the advisory opinion of 1996, a single legal solution gave grounds to so many interpretations. The very opinions and declarations of the judges are a good demonstration of this.

89. Condorelli, L., “La Cour international de justice: 50 ans et (pour l'heure) pas une ride” (1995) 6 E.J.I.L. 388.Google Scholar