¹ Gooch, G. P. and Temperley, H. (eds.), British documents on the origins of the war, 1898–1914 (London, 1926–1938).Google Scholar

² The series was published in 1922–7 and edited by J. Lepsius, A. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy and F. Thimme. See on it Koch, H. (ed.), The origins of the First World War (London, 1972), pp. 1–13.Google Scholar

³ The introductions to the series Documents on British foreign policy 1919–1939 are very laconic on the subject. The reviews of the series are likewise devoid of any information on it. See, for example, ‘The secrets of diplomacy’, The Times Literary Supplement, 12 April 1947; Medlicott's, W. review in the English Historical Review, LXIII (1948), 120–5CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Read's, C. reviews in the American Historical Review, LVIII (1948–9), 307–14, 854–6; and Woodward's replies to his critics in the Times Literary Supplement, 26 April 1947, and in the American Historical Review, LVIII (1948–9), 782–4.Google Scholar

⁴ Foreign Office Records, Public Record Office, Kew (hereafter F.O.) 371/22987, C/20648/G, is the source of the following excerpts until otherwise indicated.

⁵ Sir Ernest Llewellyn Woodward (1890–1971) was born into a middle class London family and was educated at Corpus Christi College, Oxford. After completing his studies in 1913, he became a senior scholar at St John's. During the First World War he served in France and Salonika. Returning to Oxford he became a regular fellow of All Souls, a status he was to hold until 1944. In that year he became Montague Burton professor of international relations at Oxford, a chair that he held until 1947, when he changed it for the Regius chair in modern history. In 1951 he accepted a call to the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University, where he remained until his retirement. His writings include Christianity and nationalism in the later Roman Empire (London, 1916)Google Scholar; Three studies in European conservatism (London, 1930)Google Scholar; War and peace in Europe, 1818–1870 (London, 1931)Google Scholar; French revolutions (Oxford, 1934)Google Scholar; Great Britain and the German navy(Oxford, 1935)Google Scholar; The age of reform, 1815–1870 (Oxford, 1938)Google Scholar; British foreign policy in the Second World War(London, 1962) (4 vols., London 1970–75)Google Scholar; and as editor with Butler, R., Documents on British foreign policy 1919–1939 (London, 1947–1955)Google Scholar. On Woodward, see R. Butler's perceptive description in the Proceedings of the British Academy, LVII (1971), 497–511. His private papers, which are deposited at Worcester College, Oxford, are inaccessible for research; however, Woodward did leave a subtly reflective autobiography, Short journey (London, 1942).Google Scholar

⁶ F.O. 371/22987, C/20489/15/18, is the source of the following excerpts until otherwise indicated.

⁷ It is interesting to note that his ideas concerning German guilt in instigating the First World War notwithstanding, Woodward did not regard other countries, including his own, as free from responsibility for that catastrophic event. In a revealing memorandum, written while he was doing his preliminary research at the Foreign Office, he claimed that although Germany was to blame for ‘taking the lead’ in the wild quest for power, ‘the independent sovereign states of Europe… tended without exception to look to the increase or maintenance of state power as their main end.’ That, according to him, created the ‘ European Anarchy’. ‘ Independent sovereign states in Europe,’ 24 October 1939, F.O. 800/325.

⁸ Woodward, Great Britain. It should be noted that Woodward was invited by the Foreign Office in the spring of 1936 to write an analysis of the phiolosphy of Mein Kampf. That had been done in order to both understand and exploit the autobiography of Germany's head of state. See Barnes, J. and Barnes, P., Hitter's Mein Kampf in Britain and America; a publishing history, 1930–39 (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 41–2.Google Scholar

⁹ 4 December 1941. F.O. 371/26579, C/13417 is the basis for the following account until otherwise indicated.

¹⁰ 8 August 1942. Webster papers, London School of Economics 1/23. That letter includes a revealing confession by Woodward on his feelings during the early stages of war which is worth quoting: ‘It is a queer thing that, in the last war [when] we were young, we saw the ablest and best of our contemporaries killed as junior officers when they should have been singled out for high military responsibilities, and in this war when we have behind us years of experience and of the exercise of judgement and authority, we cannot get into the key positions controlling policy and executive action within the sphere of our special competence.’ Webster actually did take an active part in formulating some crucial decisions during the war; see Hughes, E. and Reynolds, P., The historian as diplomat (London, 1976)Google Scholar. On historians in war, see Watt, D. C., ‘Every war must end; War time planning for post-war security in Britain and America in the wars of 1914 -18 and 1939–45, the roles of historical examples and professional historians’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, xxvii (1978), 159–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹ F.O. 371/22987, C/20489/15/18 and F.O. 371/24403, C/273/88/18, are the basis and source of the following account and excerpts until otherwise indicated.

¹² F.O. 371/24403, C/1527/88/18, is the basis and source of the following account and excerpts until otherwise indicated.

¹³ See Woodward, British Foreign policy, 1, 155–64.

¹⁴ F.O. 371/26579 is the basis and source of the following account and excerpts until otherwise indicated.

¹⁵ 30 May 1941. F.O. 371/26579, C/7366/7366/18 is the basis and source of the following account and excerpts until otherwise indicated. On Vansittart, see Rose, N., Vansittart (London, 1978).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Entry in diary on 15 September 1941, in Harvey, J. (ed.), The war diaries of Oliver Harvey, 1941–45 (London, 1978), p. 43.Google Scholar

¹⁷ F.O. 371/26579, C/9416/7366/18, is the basis and source of the following account and excerpts until otherwise indicated.

¹⁸ 5 October 1941. F.O. 371/26579, C/11032/7366/18.

¹⁹ See F.O. 371/26579, C/10407/7366/18, C/13145/7366/18, and Harvey's entry in his diary on 19 September 1941, Harvey, Diaries, p. 61.

²⁰ F.O. 371/26579, C/11032/7366/18.

²¹ Entry in diary, 8 November 1941, Harvey, Diaries, p. 61. At least one high ranking official at the office did not regard these fears as groundless. Thus, three weeks later, in deploring the idea of publication Cadogan wrote ‘ Does A. [Anthony Eden] realise that he is responsible for the great and tragic appeasement - not reacting to German occupation of the Rhineland in 1936? How lucky he is-no one has ever mentioned that! And that was the turning point.’ Entry in diary on 1 December 1941 in Dilks, D. (ed.), The diaries of Alexander Cadogan, 1938–1941 (London 1971), P. 415.Google Scholar

²² 31 October 1941. F.O. 371/26579, C/12127/7366/18.

²³ Makins' notes on 24 November. F.O. 371/26579, C/13145/7366/18.

²⁴ 7 November 1941, in Ibid.

²⁵ See Harvey's entry in his diary on 6 October 1941 in Harvey, Diaries, p. 48.

²⁶ F.O. 371/25579, C/13362/7366/18 and C/13417/7366/18, are the basis and source of the following account and excerpts until otherwise indicated.

²⁷ Entry in his diary on 29 November 1941, which must have been written on 1 December following the cabinet decision of that date. Harvey, Diaries, p. 67.

²⁸ Roberts' minutes on 5 March 1942, in F.O. 371/30945, C/3622/2165/18; this is the basis and source of the following account and excerpts until otherwise indicated.

²⁹ F.O. 371/30945, 0/4932/2165/18, is the basis and source of the following account and excerpts until otherwise indicated.

³⁰ See, inter alia, his correspondence with Lord Strabolgi in June 1940, with C. E. Roberts in November 1940, and with F. Archer in November 1943; Simon papers, Bodleian library, Oxford.

³¹ Letter to G. H. Cuming Bulter, 24 July 1942, Simon papers.

³² War paper 364 (1942), F.O. 371/30945, C/8072/2165/18, is the basis and source of the following account and excerpts. See also, Harvey, Diaries, p. 153.

³³ 31 March 1943, Cab. 103/218. On Woodward's futile efforts to persuade Simon to change his mind, see also his letter on 7 October 1942, Simon papers.

³⁴ F.O. 371/34477, C/5025/1558/18, is the basis and source of the following account and excerpts until otherwise indicated.

³⁵ F.O. 371/34477, C/7383/1558/18 is the basis and source of the following account and excerpts until otherwise indicated.

³⁶ See F.O. 371/34477, C/9260/1558/18. It should be noted that as early as February 1940, the Foreign Office was debating the question of whether to include in their Germany prints for departmental use the documents relating to the African issue. The fact that it was then decided not to print them, even for internal use, stands in a marked contrast to the strong backing that the Foreign Office gave Woodward three years later to secure their publication. It is a distinct proof not only of Woodward's status, but also of the Foreign Office's integrity; see F.O. 371/24403, C/3547/88/I8.

³⁷ F.O. 371/34478/A, C/12405/1558/18, is the basis and source of the following account and excerpts until otherwise indicated.

³⁸ See Hancock, W., Smuts: the field of force, 1919–1950 (London, 1968), p. 7Google Scholar. In a telegram to Roosevelt on 24 October 1942, Churchill described Smuts as ‘one of the finest men in the world’, Churchill papers. I am grateful to Mr Martin Gilbert for bringing this information to my attention. On Churchill's relations with Smuts, see also Lord Moran (Charles Wilson), Winston Churchill: struggle for survival (London, 1966), pp. 146–7, 317.Google Scholar

³⁹ F.O. 371/34478A, C/13904/1558/18, is the basis and source of the following account and excerpts until otherwise indicated.

⁴⁰ F.O. 371/34478A, C/14000/1558/18, is the basis and source of the following account and excerpts until otherwise indicated.

⁴¹ F.O. 371/39084, C/1311/G.

⁴² F.O. 371/39084, C/4162/G.

⁴³ F.O. 370/1801, L/6495/1744/402, is the basis and source of the following account and excerpts until otherwise indicated.

⁴⁴ F.O. 370/1704.

⁴⁵ Cab. 128/12.

⁴⁶ The broad subject of publicity versus secrecy in British foreign policy in the era of the two world wars could be fully analysed only by a comparative research dealing with other major decisions taken by the British government, such as the establishment of the Fifty Year Rule concerning access to government documents (see on this Watt, D. C., ‘Foreign affairs, the public interest and the right to know’, Political Quarterly, xxxiv, 2 April 1963), its replacement in 1967 by the Thirty Year Rule and the decision concerning publication of the diplomatic papers of the period preceding the First World War.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ It should be noted in this context, however, that the Foreign Office banned publication by Woodward during the war on the diplomatice origins of the war. In November 1943, the ministry of information suggested that Woodward write a book for them on the diplomatic origins of the war. The book would be commissioned by the ministry, but published under the imprint of a private publisher for distribution in newly liberated Europe. Eden decided in December to defer a decision until Woodward prepared a test chapter. When the historian had done so by March 1944, the Foreign Office was reluctant to authorize publication of the book. Eden also had reservations about assuming even indirect responsibility for a work dealing with the very controversial issues surrounding diplomatic events before the outbreak of the war, e.g. judgements on Neville Chamberlain's policy and motives and on the views of those who criticized him. The decision to regularly publish a comprehensive collection of the inter-war documents also seemed to officials to render superfluous any special accounts of the pre-war period; as Harvey put it, ‘ they are, in fact, what historians and publicists want to see rather than an official write-up’. Much to Woodward's regret, the decision was finally made to drop the idea of writing the book. (The above account is based on and the excerpt is taken from F.O. 371/39084, C/3357, and F.O. 370/1082). During his service with the Foreign Office, Woodward had worked on a diplomatic history of the immediate origins of the war. This was undertaken on the secretary of state's instruction, but for internal use, not designated for publication. (See F.O. 370/1808, F.O. 371/30894, C/4308/4308/18, and Cab. 103/317–8 and Woodward's letter to Halifax on 11 November 1943, Halifax papers, King's College, Cambridge, 410/3/10,11.) The final work of 346 pages was never published, nor was it used in the introduction to Woodward's first volume of British foreign policy in the Second World War (see F.O. 370/1808 and Sargent's letter to Sir Norman Brook on 21 April 1948 in F.O. 370/1704). The present writer failed to trace it at the Public Record Office.

⁴⁸ See Williams, T. Desmond, ‘The historiography of World War II’ in Robertson, E. M. (ed.), The origins of the Second World War (London, 1971), p. 46.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ A very frank, though not unique, expression of this is given in H. Grey's private letter to Sargent on 12 December 1947 in F.O. 370/1808, L/6495/1744/402.