Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-99c86f546-vl2kb Total loading time: 0.388 Render date: 2021-11-29T07:04:21.672Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "metricsAbstractViews": false, "figures": true, "newCiteModal": false, "newCitedByModal": true, "newEcommerce": true, "newUsageEvents": true }

Spinoza, Kant and the Transition to Hegel’s Subjective Logic: Arguing For and Against Philosophical Systems

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 April 2018

James Kreines*
Affiliation:
Claremont McKenna College, USAjkreines@cmc.edu
Get access

Abstract

Hegel’s Logic argues in a manner that is supposed to support a systematic philosophy. But it is difficult to explain how such a systematic argument is supposed to work. For answers, I look to the key transition from the Doctrine of Essence to the Doctrine of the Concept. Here we find discussions of both Spinozist and Kantian systems of philosophy: both are supposed to be helpful, and yet also to be lacking in instructive ways. So the initial hope is that these comparisons can help us to understand Hegel’s own systematic argument, and what it means to transition from an objective to a ‘Subjective Logic’. But the comparisons bring additional difficulties. First, to defend a comprehensive system involves refuting rivals, and the discussion of Spinoza demonstrates that refutation is difficult. Second, it is hard to see how any argument for Hegel’s system could be akin to those in Spinoza and Kant given the extent of the differences between them. I argue that the best way to deal with these difficulties is to explain the systematic argument of the Logic as modelled on the Transcendental Dialectic of Kant’s first Critique.

Type
Articles
Copyright
© The Hegel Society of Great Britain 2018 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Ameriks, K. (1990), ‘Kant, Fichte, and Short Arguments to Idealism’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 72: 6385.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gabriel, M. (2016), ‘What Kind of Idealist (if Any) is Hegel?Hegel Bulletin 37:2: 181208.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bowman, B., Kreines, J., Pinkard, T., Tolley, C. (2017), ‘The Metaphysics of Reason and Hegel’s Logic. A Book Symposium on James Kreines’ Reason in the World. Hegel’s Metaphysics and its Philosophical Appeal ’, Hegel-Studien 50: 129173.Google Scholar
Brandom, R. (2002), Tales of the Mighty Dead. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Grier, M. (2001), Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kant, I. (1902), Gesammelte Schriften. Berlin: de Gruyter.Google Scholar
Kant, I. (1998), Critique of Pure Reason, trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Knappik, F. (2016), ‘And Yet He is a Monist: Comments on James Kreines, Reason in the World ’, Hegel Bulletin 117.Google Scholar
Kreines, J. (2006), ‘Hegel’s Metaphysics: Changing the Debate’, Philosophy Compass 1:5: 466480.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kreines, J. (2012), ‘Learning from Hegel What Philosophy Is All About: For the Metaphysics of Reason; Against the Priority of Meaning’, Verifiche: Rivista di Scienze Umane 41: 1–3: 129173.Google Scholar
Kreines, J. (2015), Reason in the World: Hegel’s Metaphysics and its Philosophical Appeal. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moyar, D. (2018), ‘Die Lehre vom Begriff. Zweiter Abschnitt. Die Objektivität’, Hegel-Studien Beiheft 67: 555646.Google Scholar
Pippin, R. (1987), ‘Kant on the Spontaneity of Mind’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17: 449476.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pippin, R. (1989), Hegel’s Idealism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pippin, R. (1993), ‘Hegel’s Original Insight,’ International Philosophical Quarterly XXXIII:3: 285295.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Proops, I. (2010), ‘Kant’s First Paralogism’, Philosophical Review 119:4: 449495.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Redding, P. (2007), Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Redding, P. (2016), ‘If Reason is “in the World”, Where Exactly is it Located?European Journal of Philosophy 24:3: 712724.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rorty, R. (1967), ‘Metaphilosophical Difficulties of Linguistic Philosophy’, in R. Rorty (ed.), The Linguistic Turn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Spinoza, B. (1994), A Spinoza Reader, trans. E. Curley. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
1
Cited by

Send article to Kindle

To send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Spinoza, Kant and the Transition to Hegel’s Subjective Logic: Arguing For and Against Philosophical Systems
Available formats
×

Send article to Dropbox

To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

Spinoza, Kant and the Transition to Hegel’s Subjective Logic: Arguing For and Against Philosophical Systems
Available formats
×

Send article to Google Drive

To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

Spinoza, Kant and the Transition to Hegel’s Subjective Logic: Arguing For and Against Philosophical Systems
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response

Please enter your response.

Your details

Please enter a valid email address.

Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *