The distinguishing trait of twentieth-century intellectual life is emergence and proliferation of the “meta-disciplines” (or “metasciences”): e.g., meta-mathematics, meta-logic, meta-ethics, meta-jurisprudence, meta-politics, meta-theater, meta-language (hermeneutics and linguistic analysis), meta-sociology (sociology of knowledge), etc. The emergence of these meta-disciplines signifies a fundamental change in human orientation. We may compare this contemporary movement with the development in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of the special sciences as self-contained disciplines: chemistry, biology, botany, geology, history, psychology, etc. Whereas this earlier period proliferated special sciences through the application of rigorous techniques which critically reduced (and therefore multiplied) the objects of science per se, the characteristic of contemporary intellectual life is the proliferation of meta-disciplines through the critical analysis of the methods and the presuppositions of the special sciences themselves. I believe this peculiar intellectual activity, which underlies the emergence of all contemporary meta-disciplines, is the major clue to understanding the fundamental reorientation of personal and social consciousness which is going on today. Moreover, this change is rich with possibilities for new ways of dealing with the technological and institutional impasse which is the fruit of the development of the special sciences.

The positions of George Santayana and Paul Tillich disclose remarkable strands of congruent concern and approach. In spite of obvious differences in temperament and philosophical heritage, both thinkers see their philosophies as the culmination of traditional perspectives in Western thought and also as modern criticisms of them. Neither thinker is interested in a radical originality of thought severed from its roots in the past. Both rather want to formulate a general philosophy of culture that is eclectic in the best sense of that abused word.

Working independently of each other, both finally focus their attention on a similar concern that they see operating in the tradition and which is considered by them to have a continuing importance in the present. This is the problem of power and the appropriate human response to its manifestations. The intriguing features of agreement and disagreement in this common exploration are examined in the present essay.

The first historical record of the Men of the Great Synagogue (or Assembly) appears in Tannaitic lierature. In the list of the chain of tradition, they are placed between the prophets and the Zugot (that is, the Pharisaic leaders after the Maccabean victory). The Talmud ascribes to the Men of the Great Synagogue a threefold achievement. (1) They canonized certain Scriptural books, as Ezekiel, the Minor Prophets, Daniel, and, according to some versions, also Esther, Proverbs, Canticles and Ecclesiastes. (2) They instituted prayers and benedictions, including Kiddush and Habedallah (at the entrance and exit of Sabbaths and festivals, respectively). (3) They classified the Oral Law into Midrash, Halakah and Haggadah. These activities go a long way toward making the Men of the Great Synagogue the Fathers of Pharisaic Judaism.

Scholars have explained a series of supplements in Paraleipomena B′ (hereafter Par) containing material not in the Massoretic Text of Chronicles by one of the following alternatives: (a) the translator of Chronicles had a Hebrew text expanded with passages from 2 Kings; or (b) Greek passages related in some undefinable fashion to 4 Reigns were added to Par. The supplements in Par do, in fact, bear a tantalizing resemblance to Reigns, but they also differ considerably in vocabulary, grammatical forms, and length; and they presuppose independent contact with a Hebrew text distinct from the Massoretic Text of Kings. The debate still stands at this impasse.

The student of IV Ezra is in the happy position of having a variety of versions at his disposal. The book exists in Latin, Syriac, Ethiopic, a number of complete and some fragmentary Arabic versions, Armenian, Georgian and even a fragmentary Coptic text. Yet, in spite of the number of versions, or perhaps because of it, the text of the book has remained the subject of considerable scholarly discussion. A critical review of the most recent theories has become necessary and in particular of observations made about the Armenian version.

It is some years since Professor R. M. Grant published in this review an article on the above topic [46(1953), 99ff.]. In it he advanced an attractively neat and confident case for solving the long-debated question of the dating of Tatian's Oration. It was written, he concludes, “after the year 176, perhaps in 177 or 178,” and this conclusion he draws from straightforward internal evidence: Or. 23.2 alludes to events of 172/3, 19.1 to those of 176, and 6.2 probably to those of 177. The purpose of this note is plainly negative; it is merely to introduce a note of hesitant scepticism into Professor Grant's confident claim.