¹ For a bibliography of English language translations of Troeltsch, see Klapwijk, Jacob, “English Translations of Troeltsch's Work.” in Clayton, John Powell, ed., Ernst Troeltsch and the Future of Theology (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1976) 197–200.Google Scholar For a bibliography of recent publications on Troeltsch, see Rendtorff, Trutz and Graf, Friedrich Wilhelm, “Bibliographical Essay: Ernst Troeltsch,” in Smart, Ninian, Clayton, John, Katz, Steven and Sherry, Patrick, eds., Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 3. 328–32.Google Scholar In addition, note the article by James Luther Adams, “Why the Troeltsch Revival?” The Unitarian Universalist Christian 29 (1974) 4–15.

² Walter Wyman develops a convincing case for interpreting Troeltsch in terms of a “fundamental theology” which provides the basis for a second-level ecclesial, practical theology (“Glaubenslehre”). Wyman, Walter E. Jr, The Concept of Glaubenslehre (Chico: Scholars Press. 1983).Google Scholar

³ The several essays by Michael Pye and Robert Morgan suggest a variety of ways in which Troeltsch provides a role model for the study of theology and religion in our own time. “Introduction: Ernst Troeltsch on Theology and Religion,” “Troeltsch and Christian Theology,” “Troeltsch and the Science of Religion,” in Pye, Michael and Morgan, Robert, eds., Ernst Troeltsch: Writings on Theology and Religion (Atlanta: John Knox, 1977)Google Scholar; subsequently abbreviated: Troeltsch Writings.

⁴ While there are many examples, Paul Knitter's recent publication No Other Name (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1985) offers a long discussion of Troeltsch that is, in many ways, typical. At the outset of his chapter on Troeltsch, Knitter writes: “In following [Troeltsch] through these struggles, we not only grasp more fully the content of historical relativism; we can better understand our own struggles. Much of what we feel concerning religious pluralism is mirrored in Ernst Troeltsch” (23). As will become apparent, I find Troeltsch too preoccupied with the nineteenth-century problem of grounding personal piety in philosophical idealism to provide a fruitful model for “our own struggles” of interreligious relations.

⁵ New Testament scholars exploring the social origins of Christianity provide a striking exception to this generalization. Troeltsch's first chapter of vol. 1, The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, introduces the social context for both the Palestinian origins of “The Gospel” and “Paul.” However, in the recent literature on this subject, his early work evokes only an occasional appreciative nod (Theissen, Gerd. The Social Setting of the Pauline Community [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982] 107, 118Google Scholar) or critique (Gager, John, Kingdom and Community [Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice-Hall, 1975] 96).Google Scholar

⁶ Troeltsch describes the religious dichotomy of his age in several essays: e.g.,”The Significance of the Historical Jesus for Faith” (Troeltsch Writings. 182–207). He here speaks of the “secret religion of the modern educated man in so far as he asserts an inner relationship to Christianity” (ibid., 185). These are the same people belonging to the “wide circles [of believers who] are fully removed from the church's dogma” (ibid., 186). In brief, they are the educated “who recognize modern thought and at the same time see in Christianity religious powers which should not be given up. The writer of these lines gladly and resolutely includes himself in this group” (ibid., 191). In this same essay, Troeltsch deplores the gap between the individualism of modern religiosity and the social sources of religion: “Almost all forms of contemporary religiosity are variations of what was nurtured in the churches”; “all hope of a non-cultic purely personal and individual religion of conviction and knowledge is mere illusion” (ibid., 193, 197).

⁷ Troeltsch's response to James appears in a book review, monograph, and three articles during the years 1904 through 1912. Of these, the 1905 monograph and the 1912 article are the primary sources for this essay. Book Review, Deutsche Literaturzeitung, 25 (1904) 3021–29; subsequently abbreviated: “1904 Review”; “Main Problems of the Philosophy of Religion: Psychology and Theory of Knowledge in the Science of Religion,” Congress of Arts and Sciences (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1905) 275–88Google Scholar; Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1905).Google Scholar Both the English language article and the German monograph of 1905 had their origins in Troeltsch's lectures at the St. Louis International Congress of Arts and Sciences. The German monograph is significantly longer than the English version and the latter (a translation) adds considerable confusion to an already murky subject. “Wesen der Religion und der Religionswissenschaft,” Gesammelte Schriften 2. 452–99; ET: “Religion and the Science of Religion,” Troeltsch Writings. 82–123. Of Troeltsch's writings available in English, this essay most clearly expresses the synthesis of critical idealism and radical empiricism first articulated in the 1905 publications cited above. While the name of James is mentioned only in passing, his methods and findings are repeatedly cited. “Empiricism and Platonism in the Philosophy of Religion: In Memory of William James.” HTR 5 (1912) 401–22. The same in German: Gesammelte Schriften, 2. 364–85.

⁸ “Die Stellung des Christentums unter den Weltreligionen,” Der Historismus und Seine Überwindung (1924; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1979); ET: von Hügel, Friedrich. ed., Christian Thought: Its History and Application (New York: Meridian, 1957).Google Scholar

⁹ Troeltsch's discussion of empiricism and psychology before his reading of James appears in the following sources: “Die christliche Weltanschauung und ihre Gegenströmungen,” ZThK 3–4 (1893–94) = Gesammelte Schrifien, 2. 227–327; “Die Selbstständigkeit der Religion,” ZThK 5–6 (1895–96); “Christentum und Religionsgeschichte,” Gesammelte Schriften, 2. 328–63; “Geschichte und Metaphysik,” ZThK 8 (1898); “Historische und dogmatische Methode in der Theologie,” (1902) = Gesammelte Schriften, 2. 729–53; Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Religionsgeschichte (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1898)Google Scholar; ET: Reid, David, trans., The Absoluteness of Christianity and the History of Religions (Richmond:John Knox, 1971)Google Scholar; “Was heißt ‘Wesen des Christentums'?” (1903) = Gesammelte Schriften, 2. 386–451; ET: Troeltsch Writings, 124–81.

¹⁰ Protestantism and Progress (Boston: Beacon, 1958) 162–63Google Scholar; reissued under same title (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985).

¹¹ As early as 1898, Troeltsch was speaking of his indebtedness to Schleiermacher in approaching religion by way of psychology: “So I began, like Schleiermacher, by establishing the peculiar independence of religion by means of the psychology of religion, by showing that every attempt to derive religion from other basic activities [of human consciousness] had failed. Only I did this on the basis of a psychology which is different from Schleiermacher's and in the front against different opponents—not moralists and rationalists, but modem positivists and those who see religion as an illusion” (“Geschichte und Metaphysik,” as cited in Troeltsch Writings, 4).

¹² “The neglect of this presupposition [that psychology is the basis of all epistemological investigation] was one of the weaknesses of Kant's theory of religion, and even Schleiermacher for all his refined psychological observation introduced ontological and epistemological propositions much too quickly into it” (“Religion and the Science of Religion,” Troeltsch Writings, 114).

¹³ In “Meiner Bücher” (1922), Troeltsch described his turn from the psychology of Dilthey and Eucken towards a new understanding of value and validity as developed in the work of Rickert and Windelband. He reported that this “new direction” first found expression in his St. Louis lectures and the 1905 monograph. No mention was made of James (Gesammelte Schriften, 4. 9).

¹⁴ Numbers within parentheses in this section refer to pages from Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1905).Google Scholar

¹⁵ Troeltsch also does not cite James by name in describing these same methods in “Religion and the Study of Religion” (Troeltsch Writings, 91, 115).

¹⁶ In this monograph, Troeltsch notes two deficiencies in James's psychology of religion: its bias towards mysticism and its failure to take account of the role of religious ideas in the transmission of religious experience (Psychologie, 17). He dismisses these as “biases and omissions,” easily corrected and not of serious consequence. Later he strongly endorses James's understanding of mysticism over against Kant (Psychologie, 46–48).

¹⁷ In the concluding paragraph of his 1904 review of James, Troeltsch does note the lack of any psychology of religious community in James (“1904 Review,” 3027). In that same review, he also remarks that James pays no attention to “objective religion as expressed in dogma, cult and organization of the church which he regards as second-hand religion” (ibid., 3033). In his several writings on James, these are the only hints of a sociological critique of James's psychological methods. Both of these comments are mentioned in his first book review and never picked up in later discussion of James. In contrast, Troeltsch's 1911 essay, “The Significance of the Historical Existence of Jesus for Faith,” offers an extensive discussion of the “laws of social psychology” (Troeltsch Writings, 193ff.). While Troeltsch is obviously familiar with a psychological understanding of religion oriented towards community and cult, to the best of my knowledge, he never did integrate the social psychology of this 1911 essay with the individualistic psychology appropriated from James.

¹⁸ In the course of several publications discussing William James, Troeltsch's attention to James's philosophy varies considerably. In his initial review, he describes Varieties as a book of two parts: the first, psychological and descriptive, the second, philosophical (epistemological) and normative (“1904 Review,” 3025). While most of this initial review is devoted to an exposition of Varieties as a new philosophy of religion, there is little attention to its philosophical deficiencies. Similarly, in this 1905 monograph, James's philosophical flaws merit only a page or two. In contrast, his 1912 essay on James will be wholly devoted to philosophical issues, with a strong critique of James's mixture of “radical empiricism” and “pragmatism.” James would have been the first to recognize the limits of his philosophical treatment of religion in Varieties: “In his Summer School of Theology lectures in July, 1902 on ‘Intellect and Feeling in Religion,’ James treats questions that would have belonged to the metaphysical second course [of Gifford Lectures]. But on the cover of his lecture notes James has written: ‘Trash never to be printed’” (“Notes” to the Edition, Harvard, The Varieties of Religious Experience, [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985] 428).Google Scholar

¹⁹ In other writings, Troeltsch identifies this position with both Marburg neo-Kantianism (Wilhelm Herrmann) and Ritschl and his school (Absoluteness, 32).

²⁰ This criticism is often repeated by Troeltsch: see, e.g., his 1915 ssay on “Kant,” ERE, 7. 657.

²¹ “This already implies that the religious a priori is dependent upon its relationship with the other a prioris and itself gives the firm substantial basis of their inner unity”(“Religion and the Science of Religion,” Troeltsch Writings, 116).

²² Numbers within parentheses in this section refer to pages of “Empiricism and Platonism in the Philosophy of Religion: To the Memory of William James,” HTR 5 (1912)Google Scholar; later published in German: Gesammelte Schriften, 2.365–85.

²³ By “European philosophy” or “philosophy of religion,” Troeltsch means that unified and continuing tradition which appeared first in the Enlightenment and later came to fruition in German idealism. He does not so define his terms in this essay, but it is apparent that the Locke-Hume tradition of British philosophy would not fit within the confines of his characterization of “European philosophy,” nor does he attempt to include any French thinkers. In other contexts, he has developed at some length his reasons for holding together, in one historical movement, the Enlightenment and German idealism. The conviction that religion must be grounded in a rational absolute, in contrast with contingent historical traditions, is essential to the Enlightenment-idealist philosophy of religion.

²⁴ Troeltsch obviously uses the term Platonism or Platonic with a much more comprehensive meaning than would be warranted by any technical historical use of the category. For him, “Platonic” designates any philosophical orientation whose “consistent aim is to transcend the merely actual through the demonstration that, seething and developing within it, is a rationally necessary conceptual element” (“Empiricism and Platonism,” 404).

²⁵ The validity of Troeltsch's synoptic sketch of European philosophy of religion is not a matter of concern. More important is his perception of a fundamental consensus in the collection of diverse positions which he cites. All share in common (1) a belief in the necessity for some absolute norm of reason beyond the contingencies of any particular religious tradition and (2) a confidence in the accessibility of such a norm. Troeltsch thus locates his own conception of the religious a priori in this larger tradition of philosophy of religion.

²⁶ In his 1906 essay, “Religion and the Science of Religion,” Troeltsch already suggests something of his disappointment with James on this issue. He notes that while James's pragmatism may have freed his empiricism from the bondage of materialism, “he left us with the impossibility of getting beyond the chaos of the variety of religious experiences” (Troeltsch Writings, 108).

²⁷ Troeltsch believed it necessary to retain from the Hegelian “evolution of Spirit” only the notion of a future goal. The metaphysical construct of world reason, the dialectics of its unfolding, and the deductive movement from a future ideal to historical phenomena had to be rejected (“Religion and the Science of Religion,” Troeltsch Writings, 117). Like many others in his philosophical generation, Troeltsch assumed the necessity for some philosophical version of Geist, Windelband's if not Hegel's. Hans Jonas unselfconsciously called upon a Hegelian dialectical version of Geist to support his “pure existentialist” studies in Augustine (1930) and Gnosticism (1934) not long after Troeltsch fell back upon the future unfolding of Spirit as his last refuge in “The Place of Christianity Among World Religions” (1923). Any thinker deserves to have his intentions differentiated from the culturally available self-evident options of his time.

²⁸ “Die Stellung des Christentums”; abbreviated in text as (G:page number) for German and (E:page number) for English (see n. 8 above for English edition).

²⁹ For more personal expressions of Troeltsch's piety, see his correspondence with von Hügel: Apfelbacher, Karl-Emst and Neuner, Peter, eds., Ernst Troeltsch: Briefe an Friedrich von Hügel (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1974).Google Scholar For a systematic study of the role of that piety in his theology, see Apfelbacher, Karl-Ernst, Frömmigkeit und Wissenschaft: Ernst Troeltsch und sein theotogisches Programm (Beiträge zur ökumenischen Theologie 18; Munich: Schöningh, 1978).Google Scholar

³⁰ The English translation of this essay would make Troeltsch into a racist. In the quote above, the English text reads “a highly developed racial group”; the German term is Menschheitsgruppe. On seven other occasions in this essay, Menschheitsgruppe or Völker is translated as “race” or “racial”; only in one instance is the German root Rasse.

³¹ Troeltsch consistently identified idealism as the form of thought necessary for the rational expression of Christian faith. Among the several forms of idealism, only critical idealism provided a viable alternative to positivism (Troeltsch Writings, 111).

³² The contrast between Christianity as “true religion” and all other “false religions” was credible only so long as Christian origins were identified with a supernatural revelation while all other religions were regarded as merely religions of nature (“The Dogmatics of the ‘Religions Geschichtliche Schule,’” AJT 17 [1913] 2ff.).Google Scholar

³³ For a critique of the nineteenth-century understanding of religious experience, see Proudfoot, Wayne, Religious Experience (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).Google Scholar

³⁴ In a chapter titled “The Collapse of Troeltsch's Theology,” Benjamin Reist cited “theological method” as the cause of the “failure of Troeltsch's theology” (Toward a Theology of Involvement: The Thought of Ernst Troeltsch [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966] 197ff.).Google Scholar The argument of this essay judges Troeltsch's “failure” by reference to the goals of his own theological proposal, not any external, normative theological method. In a secondary sense, Troeltsch's “failure” simply marks the break-down of the nineteenth century mind-set as a viable religious orientation.