1. Despite J. K. Davies's view that Timotheos was far more severe on disobedient members of the league than the picture provided by Isokrates, : Athenian Propertied Families, 600–300 B.C. (Oxford, 1971), 510Google Scholar, no. 13700; see Cargill, J., The Second Athenian League (Berkeley, 1981), 171Google Scholar.

2. See also Develin, R., Athenian Officials, 684–321 B.C. (Cambridge, 1989), 256, 260CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Davies, , Historia 18 (1969), 310Google Scholar, and Cargill, , op. cit., 175Google Scholar, on Chares' first generalship.

3. E.g., Nepos 13.4.4, who distinguishes between ‘worthy’ generals and their ‘unworthy’ successors.

4. E.g., Ellis, J. R., Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism (London, 1976), 87Google Scholar. Cargill believes Chares, ‘in the judgement of his contemporaries and of later ancient authors’ to have been ‘uniquely brutal and lawless among generals of his time…’ (op. cit., 181).

5. W. K. Pritchett uses these two stratēgoi as the leading examples of unscrupulous conduct in the stratēgia, at least under a democratic government: The Greek Stale at War, Vol. II (Berkeley, 1974), 39–42Google Scholar.

6. R. W. Parke's recent attempt to explore the ambiguities in Chares' reputation seems to have proceeded too far in the opposite direction. From the arch-villain Chares, he has composed a revisionist portrait that even partially excuses the general for the sack of Sestos and other acts of violence because he had received tacit instructions from the Athenian assembly to deal harshly with dissenting allies: XAPHΣΑГГΕΛΗΘΕΝ: Biography of a Fourth Century Slralegos (Ph.D., British Columbia, 1986), 39Google Scholar. The moral and political implications of accepting vaguely issued orders as a defence for wartime atrocities is a theme familiar to twentieth-century historians and need not be debated here.

7. Hammond, N. G. L. and Griffith, G. T., A History of Macedonia, Vol. III (Oxford, 1988), 311Google Scholar.

8. Schol. Aristophanes, Peace 347Google Scholar, portrays the bankrupt and disenfranchized Phormion remaining ‘idle in the countryside until the Akarnanians demanded him as a general’ due to an inability, despite his staggering initial success as commander of the fleet, to capitalize on these victories politically. Roberts, J. T. (Hermes 110 [1982], 354–62)Google Scholar suggests that this process began after Perikles' death, and was caused by the resultant political vacuum. This view receives some support from Bloedow, E. F. (Historia 36 [1987], 19)Google Scholar who sees a reduction in strategiate political authority as stemming from Perikles' habit of surrounding himself with officers solely reliant on him for political focus.

9. Phokion, of course, became proverbial for securing election to the generalship over forty-five times (Plut, . Phokion 8.1–2Google Scholar).

10. Chares' officers received similarly harsh treatment from his critics (Isokrates 8.44–5, Aischines 2.71). In particular, the captains Deiares, Deipyros, and Polyphontes are attacked by Aischines as ἡγεμόνων ἀλαζονείας While it is clearly unusual for junior officers to receive this degree of political attention, lochagoi such as the above occupied important positions in the complex structure of mercenary bands, and their independent authority was enhanced by the likelihood that they commanded more immediate allegiance from the troops attached to them than the generals who contracted them. See McKechnie, P., Outsiders in Greek Cities in the Fourth Century B. C. (London, 1989), 71Google Scholar.

11. Larsen, J. A. O. (CP 41 [1946], 98)Google Scholar argues that payment for stratēgoi is likely because it tallies with a Periklean emphasis on open access to Athenian high office. There is no suggestion that it was ever accepted that such an egalitarian practice should apply to the stratēgoi, who were, after all, installed in office through the comparatively undemocratic procedure of election rather than sortition. If the strategic offices weie, through payment, open to all on the sole basis of talent, the social composition of the stratēgia throughout the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. makes it clear that it remained the case that the political elite alone need apply.

12. Parke believes this was the likely procedure through which Chares sought senior office, and even argues, with no supporting evidence, that Chares began his career as one of Timotheos' junior officers (op. cit., 7–9). However, compare this with Jordan, B. (The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period [Berkeley, 1970], 237)Google Scholar who, while conceding the possibility of such a system, states that ‘there are no certain examples for a direct “promotion” of a taxiarch to general’. Cf. a 21, where he adds that ‘a possible but not very probable case may be that of Lamachos’.

13. See Keaney, J. J. and Szegedy-Maszak, A., TAPA 106 (1976), 227–40Google Scholar.

14. Cawkwell, G. L., CQ 34 (1984), 340–1CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15. Larsen, (op. cit., 97)Google Scholar suggests a figure of three drachmaiper day during the fifth century on the basis of Thucydides' record of a two-drachmai daily wage for the Athenian hoplites at Potidaia (3.17).

16. E.g., IGii² 1279; 1286; 1299; 1303; 1305; 1307; 2854; SEG 24 154.

17. The hipparch on Lemnos was an exception, receiving a salary, assumedly collected from the klerouchs on the island (Aristotle, , Ath. Pol. 62Google Scholar. 2; Hyp. 2. 17). The fact that most hipparchs would also have served in the junior office of phylarch, which may also have been salaried, does not detract from the financial exclusivity of the post (Larsen, , op. cit., 98)Google Scholar. It was not the state, but the phylarchs themselves who supplied their mounts, which was clear evidence of their financial independence.

18. Demosthenes, for instance, talks of the ‘closed ranks’ party policy imposed by Aischines over his supporters: 19. 225–6.

19. See Rhodes, P. J., LCM 3 (1978), 208Google Scholar, with particular reference to Demosthenes' exposure to this type of paranoia.

20. See Taplin, O., Greek Fire (London, 1989), 201Google Scholar, for a concise but lively discussion on this issue.

21. Hansen, M. H. (Eisangelia. The Sovereignly of the People's Court and the Impeachment of Generals and Politicians [Odense, 1975], 64–5)Google Scholar discusses the alarmingly high ratio of generals to politicians in these trials, and concludes that the suspicion of treason in the activities of generals was genuine, though usually unfounded (‘The sources do not provide us with a single example of a general being convicted because he was honest but unqualified’). Pritchett, (op. cit., 43)Google Scholar claims that, though treason was the standard charge, prodosia trials were always initiated on a simple basis of success or failure.

22. S. Hornblower has claimed that the disaster occurred because Chabrias' premature death unexpectedly left the impetuous Chares in sole command: The Greek World 419–323 B.C. (London, 1983), 242Google Scholar. There is little in Diodoros' account to suggest that these two officers were holding a joint command. For Chabrias' military status at Chios, see Cargill, , op. cit., 181 n. 39Google Scholar.

23. See Sealey, R., PACA 1 (1958), 61–87Google Scholar, for comment on the competition for leadership in the stratēgia during the Social War. Kratinos the Younger's Giants contains a character named Sochares who may be intended to represent Aristophon, who assisted Chares in securing Timotheos' conviction: Edmonds, J. M., The Fragments of Attic Comedy (3 vols., Leiden, 1957–1961) vol. II F 2 (p. 3 nd.)Google Scholar.

24. Schol. Aisch. in Edmonds, , FAC IIIa, 402–3Google Scholar.

25. Whitehead, D., CP 81 (1986), 317–18Google Scholar.

26. To illustrate the incompleteness of available strategic lists; Develin, (op. cit., 237–62)Google Scholar has been able to identify fewer than forty generals for the period dating from the foundation of the Second Naval League (377/6 B.C.) until the year prior to Aristophon's election (364/3 B.C.). For the period spanning the Second Naval League to the end of the Lamian War in 322 B.C., Develin has assembled fewer than 150 names (237–413). This for a span of time in which approximately 550 strategic commissions are available.

27. Lewis, D. M. (JHS 81 [1961], 121–2)Google Scholar compares Timotheos' eclipse with that of Phrynichos (preceding his assassination) in 411 B.C., as examples ‘of what might happen when the auctoritas of a man in his position was not sufficient to carry his views through’.

28. See Dem. 23.17; Pritchett, , op. cit., 86Google Scholar, for Chares' political dealings with Charidemos and Kersobleptes. For a list of the indictments directed against Chares throughout his career, see Pritchett, 10.

29. For reasons of regional security, despatch as commander in the Hellespont remained the pinnacle of an Athenian general's career until the loss of the fleet and the standardization of the strategic portfolios. See Hal, Dion.. To Ammaios 1.9.734f.Google Scholar; Philochoros in Jacoby, F., FGrHist 328 F 49–51Google Scholar. For Chares as ‘General to the Hellespont’ see IGii² 228 (341/0 B.C. = Tod, M. N., A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions, Vol. II [Oxford, 1948], 174)Google Scholar. He may have been responsible for the prosecution of the unsuccessful Leosthenes (I) whom he replaced in the north Aegean: Hyp, 3.1–2; Diod. 15.95.2; cf. Roberts, , op. cit., 367–71Google Scholar.

30. Pritchett, , op. cit., 41Google Scholar.

31. Athenaios, , Deipnosophists 12. 532 c–dGoogle Scholar; Theopompos in Jacoby, , FGrHist 115 F 213Google Scholar.

32. Athenaios, , Deipnosophists 12. 532 d–eGoogle Scholar; Jacoby, , FGrHist 115 F 249Google Scholar.

33. Cf. Pritchett, , op. cit., 41Google Scholar.

34. This despite Pritchett's claim that ‘ordinarily there was a tight definition of the tasks assigned to stralegoi’: op. cit., 54.

35. See Herakleides, , Unnamed Play (F a 1–5)Google ScholarEdmonds, , FAC II, 532–3Google Scholar; Athenaios, , Deipnosophists 12.532 eGoogle Scholar.

36. Mossé, C. (Athens in Decline [London, 1973], 56)Google Scholar characterized this group as ‘certain ambitious strategoi… [who] had not given up hope of taking revenge on the allies’.

37. See Dem. 8.24.7; 30.31, for the orator's defence of Chares. Chares' alliance with Aristophon in the 350s is ignored by Plutarch. Cf. Dein. 3.17; Diod. 16.21.4; Polyainos 3.9.29; Nepos 19.3; Aristotle, , Rhet. 1398a 7–11Google Scholar; Tritle, L., Phocion the Good (London, 1988), 106 n. 54Google Scholar.

38. Nepos 19.2–3; cf. Plut, . Phokion 14. 3Google Scholar; Moralia 188b–c, 851a; Philochoros in Jacoby, , FGrHist 328 F 162Google Scholar; IGii² 1628.437; 1629.958. See also Develin, , op. cit., 338Google Scholar.

39. Tritle, (op. cit., 109–11)Google Scholar argues that several prominent Athenian politicians had become converted to Phokion's policy of greater political autonomy for the allies. He does not equate Demosthenes with these, and ignores his influence in bringing Chares to prominence.

40. See Develin, , op. cit., 341Google Scholar.

41. Χάρης ήκεεν ἒχων τοὺς ξενους, και στρατηγὸς ύϕ' ύμῶν αὐτοκράτωρ εἰς Χερρόνησον ἐξέπλει (Dem. 23.173.5–7).

42. Though not, it would seem, Hypereides, who remained an enthusiastic supporter of Chares: Plut, . Vit. X Or. 848eGoogle Scholar.

43. McKechnie, (op. cit., 85–93)Google Scholar discusses the relationships, usually strained, between fourth-century commanders of largely mercenary armies and the cities they served. Mosse concludes that ‘a general whose prestige was as great as that of Chares unquestionably represented a threat’ (op. cit., 56), but does not imagine he was behind the emergency measures proposed by Aristophon, Androtion, and Leptines in 355 B.C., which could have played into the hands of a general with dictatorial ambitions. As individual politicians these men seem to have required Chares for political focus rather than vice versa. Cf. schol. Aisch. in Edmonds, , FAC IIIa, 402–3Google Scholar.