¹ Bickerman, E., Institutions des séleucides (Paris, 1938), 121–2Google Scholar.

² Rostovtzeff, M., Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World, second edition (Oxford, 1953), 695–6Google Scholar.

³ Eddy, S., The King is Dead: Studies in the Near Eastern Resistance to Hellenism (Lincoln, NE, 1961), 98–9Google Scholar, 124. Seleucid kings did have some mid-twentieth century defenders, however; for example, Tarn, W., The Greeks in Bactria and India (Cambridge, 1966), 465Google Scholar, insisted (incorrectly, as I argue) that ‘Hellenistic kings did not sack their own temples’.

⁴ Kuhrt, A. and Sherwin-White, S., From Samarkand to Sardis (Berkeley, CA, 1993)Google Scholar.

⁵ For empire defined by negotiation between the king and subject, see also Ma, J., Antiochos III and the Cities of Western Asia Minor (Oxford, 1999), 179–242Google Scholar.

⁶ E.g. on the benefactions to the temple of Nebo (Nabu) in Babylon, see Kuhrt, A. and Sherwin-White, S., ‘Aspects of Seleucid Royal Ideology: the Cylinder of Antiochus I From Borsippa’, JHS 111 (1991), 71–86Google Scholar. See also Rigsby, K., ‘Seleucid Notes’, TAPhA 110 (1980), 248–54Google Scholar; Welles, C., Royal Correspondence of the Hellenistic Period (New Haven, CT, 1934), 280–8Google Scholar, for benefactions to Zeus Baitokaike in southern Syria. Useful editions of Babylonian records from the Hellenistic period include Sachs, A. and Hungar, H., Astronomical Diaries (Vienna, 1988)Google Scholar; Grayson, A., Assyrian and Babylonian Chronicles (Locust Valley, NY, and Gluckstadt, 1975)Google Scholar; I. Finkle and R. van der Spek, Babylonian Chronicles of the Hellenistic Period, <http://www.livius.org/cg-cm/chronicles/chron00.html>, accessed 24 September 2013.

⁷ Finke and van der Spek (n. 6), lines 10–12, translation at <http://www.livius.org/cg-cm/chronicles/bchp-antiochus_sin/antiochus_sin_01.html>, accessed 24 September 2013. See also Grayson (n. 6), 120.

⁸ The so-called Borsippa cylinder with an accessible translation is available in Austin, M., The Hellenistic World from Alexander to Roman Conquest, second edition, (Cambridge, 2006), 304–5Google Scholar. Kuhrt and Sherwin White, (n. 6), 75–6 provides text. See also Strootman, R., ‘Babylonian, Macedonian, King of the World: The Antiochos Cylinder from Borsippa and Seleukid Imperial Integration’, in Stavrianopoulou, E. (ed.), Shifting Social Imaginaries in the Hellenistic Period (Leiden, 2013), 67–97Google Scholar, who emphasizes the agility with which Seleucid kings manipulated native traditions.

⁹ For a similar royal benefaction under Antiochus III, see Kuhrt, A., ‘The Seleucid Kings and Babylonia: New Perspectives on the Seleucid Realm in the East’, in Bilde, P. et al. (eds.), Aspects of Hellenistic Kingship (Cambridge, 1996), 46–9Google Scholar; Kuhrt and Sherwin-White (n. 4), 216; Sachs and Hungar (n. 6), no. 187.

¹⁰ Joseph, AJ 138–53.

¹¹ Levi, M., ‘The Predatory Theory of Rule’, Politics and Society 10 (1981), 431–65Google Scholar, with a more complete discussion of the ‘theory of predatory rule’ in Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley, CA, 1988), 10–40Google Scholar. ‘Predatory rule’ is admittedly a term used with great fluidity; at one extreme, all forms of rule – from the democratically elected Barack Obama to the autocratic Xi Jinping to the despotic Robert Mugabe – could be deemed ‘predatory’ on the assumption that persons in power derive some form of private benefit from their position of ‘rulership’ (even Mr Obama receives a decent salary and vast personal prestige from holding office). As a rule, however, responsive democracies are usually exempted from the ‘predatory’ definition (although not by Levi!), which is reserved for autocratic or patrimonial rulers, as well as democratic governments mired in corruption. A. Bavister-Gould, ‘Predatory Leaderships, Predatory Rule and Predatory States’ (available online at <http://www.dlprog.org/ftp/>, accessed 10 October 2013), provides a useful overview of the concept as applied to modern states.

¹² The resources of Babylonia were extensive. Herodotus 3.92.1–2 reports that Babylonia and Assyria paid the Persians annual taxes of 1,000 Babylonian talents a year (approximately 33 tons of bullion), while the satrap of Babylonia is said to have taken in an artaba of silver a day (Herodotus 1.192).

¹³ Levi (n. 11, [1988]), 52–72.

¹⁴ For the substantial economic aspects behind Hellenistic temples, see Dignas, B., Economy of the Sacred in Hellenistic Asia Minor (Oxford, 2008), 13–35Google Scholar; Debord, P., Aspects sociaux et économiques de la vie religieuse dans l'Anatolie Gréco-Romaine (Leiden, 1982), 185–213Google Scholar. For administrative relationships between Seleucid temples and the king, see Capdetrey, L., Le Pouvoir Séleucid (Rennes, 2007), 167–89Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Aphergis, G., The Seleukid Royal Economy (Cambridge, 2004)Google Scholar, 151.

¹⁶ Debord (n. 14), 215–41.

¹⁷ Translation from van der Spek, R., ‘The effect of war on the prices of barley and agricultural land in Hellenistic Babylonia’, in Andreau, J., Briant, P., and Descat, R. (eds.), Économie antique: la guerre dans les économies antiques (Saint-Bertrand-de-Comminges, 2000)Google Scholar, 302.

¹⁸ For the date of Antigonus' campaign in Babylonia, using Babylonian astronomical records, see Wheatley, P., ‘Antigonus Monophthalmus in Babylonia: 310–308 bc’, JNES 61 (2002), 39–47Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Seleucus' army in 301 bc had 20,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry: see Diod. Sic. 20.113.4. On the links between cash, plunder, and royal power, see Austin, M., ‘Hellenistic Kings, War and the Economy’, CQ 36 (1986), 460–6Google Scholar.

²⁰ Aphergis (n. 15), 175 states without hesitation that the despoiler was Seleucus I.

²¹ Polyb. 10.27.11.

²² Plin. HN 5.42; Strabo 11.13.1.

²³ A variant of the goddess Anaitit: see Plut. Vit. Artax. 27.3.

²⁴ Newell, E., The Coinage of the Eastern Seleucid Mints (New York, 1938), 215–17Google Scholar, links the incident to a series of copious silver tetradrachms, issue nos. 605–609.

²⁵ Justin, 41.5.7; Walbank, F., A Commentary on Polybius (Oxford, 1957)Google Scholar, i.236.

²⁶ Battle of Raphia: Polyb. 5.79; Battle of Magnesia: Livy 37.37.9.

²⁷ Bar-Kochva, B., The Seleucid Army. Organization and Tactics in the Great Campaigns, second edition (Cambridge, 1979)Google Scholar, 10.

²⁸ The problem of pay in the Seleucid army is summarized by Aphergis (n. 15), 201–3.

²⁹ Antiochus III extorted other monies to fund his Eastern campaign. Previously he had forced the king of Armenia to pay a 300 talent indemnity (Polyb. 8.23.5), and he would later demand large sums of cash from the Indian dynast Sophagesenus (Polyb. 11.34.11), as well as 500 talents of silver and 1,500 talents of spices from the Gerrhae living along the Red Sea (Polyb. 13.9.4).

³⁰ Polyb. 10.27.11–12.

³¹ Arr. Anab. 7.14.5.

³² Most notably, he assumed the title of ‘the Great’ (Megas) after his return from the East (App. Syr. 1); for discussion see Ma (n. 5), 272–3. Plaut. Mostell. 775 refers to magnus Alexandrus, suggesting that the usage ‘Alexander the Great’ had become common usage by c. 200 bc. Note also Antiochus' conspicuous valour in the battle of the River Arius (Polyb. 10.49), imitating Alexander's heroic leadership style, on which see Keegan, J., The Mask of Command (New York, 1987), 13–91Google Scholar.

³³ Kuhrt and Sherwin-White (n. 4), 197.

³⁴ Polyb. 5.79.7.

³⁵ Polyb. 10.28.1–7. See also Schmitt, H., Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Antiochos' des Grossen und seiner Zeit (Wiesbaden, 1964), 101–2Google Scholar; Taylor, M., Antiochus the Great (Barnsley, 2013)Google Scholar, 74.

³⁶ Kuhrt and Sherwin-White (n. 4), 197.

³⁷ Livy 37.40. Bar-Kochva (n. 27), 67, considers these to be Greco-Macedonian military settlers from Media, rather than native Medes, although this rests on the baseless hypothesis that only Greco-Macedonians were allowed in this elite force. On the importance of Iranian forces in Seleucid armies, however, see Kuhrt and Sherwin-White (n. 4), 53–5, as well as M. Olbrycht, ‘Iranians in the Diadochi period’, in V. Alonso Troncoso and Anson, E.M. (eds.), After Alexander. The Time of the Diadochi (323–281 bc) (Oxford, 2013), 169–82Google Scholar.

³⁸ App. Syr. 39; Polyb. 21.43.19.

³⁹ Diod. Sic. 29.15; Strabo 16.1.18, Justin 32.2.2. On the unique nature of Elamite resistance, see example 9 below.

⁴⁰ Death of Antiochus III: Diod. Sic. 28.3.2; Strabo 16.1.18; Justin 32.2.

⁴¹ 2 Macabees 3:1–13.

⁴² Schwartz, D., 2 Maccabees (Berlin and New York, 2008), 185–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hadas, M., Third and Fourth Books of Maccabees (New York, 1953)Google Scholar, 12 (Jerusalem was under Ptolemaic control until c. 200 bc). Goldstein, J., II Maccabees (New York, 1983), 197–8Google Scholar, notes that the entire Heliodorus story fits a broader Near Eastern narrative trope of the ‘despoiler repelled’. Gruen, E., ‘Hellenism and Persecution: Antiochus IV and the Jews’, in Green, P. (ed.) Hellenistic History and Culture (Berkeley, CA, 1993)Google Scholar, 242 describes the Heliodorus story as a ‘wonderful tale’, if ‘apocryphal’. For text and commentary of 3 Maccabees, see Anderson, M., ‘3 Maccabees’, in Charlesworth, J. (ed.), The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha (New York, 1985), ii.509–29Google Scholar.

⁴³ On the Heliodorus inscription, see Cotton, H. and Worrle, M. ‘Seleukos IV to Heliodorus: A New Dossier of Royal Correspondence from Israel’, ZPE 159 (2007), 191–205Google Scholar, with follow-up by Gera, D., ‘Olympiodorus, Heliodorus and the Temples of Koile Syria and Phionike’, ZPE 169 (2009), 125–55Google Scholar; Jones, C. ‘The Inscription From Tel Maresha for Olympiodorus’, ZPE 171 (2009), 101–4Google Scholar; and Bencivenni, A., ‘“Massima considerazione”: forma dell’ ordine e immagini potere nella corrispondenze di Seleuco IV’, ZPE 176 (2011), 139–53Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ On the supervision of temple finances by Hellenistic kings, see Dignas (n. 14), 36–59. G. Gorre and S. Honigman ‘Kings Taxes and High Priests: Comparing Ptolemaic and Seleukid Policies’, in Bussi, S. (ed.) Egitto dai Faraoni agli Arabi (Pisa and Rome, 2013), 105–19Google Scholar, note that the Heliodorus incident implies the sort of secular management of temple finances that was common in Ptolemaic Egypt; Ptolemaic relations with temples are discussed in further detail below.

⁴⁵ Schwartz (n. 42), 186; Rappaport, U., ‘Did Heliodorus try to rob the treasures of the Jerusalem temple? Date and probability of the story of II Maccabees, 3’, REJ 171 (2011), 10–19Google Scholar. See also Bickerman, E., Studies in Christian and Jewish History (Leiden, 1986), ii.190–1Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ Native priestly elites certainly had a long set of Near Eastern tropes about temple despoliation to flesh out their paranoia: see Weitzman, S., ‘Plotting Antiochus's Persecution’, JBL 123 (2004), 219–34Google Scholar, for links between Babylonian protest literature and 2 Maccabees. This does not necessarily mean that reports of despoliation are false, but rather that the Jews adopted similar tropes for describing similar woes.

⁴⁷ Geller, M., ‘New Information on Antiochus IV’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 54 (1991), 1–4Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ Translation from Geller (n. 47).

⁴⁹ S. Eddy (n. 4), 136–7, also assumes with confidence that the removed gold was appropriated by the state.

⁵⁰ Daniel 11:25–31.

⁵¹ On the problem of one versus two incidents in Jerusalem, see Green, P.From Alexander to Actium (Berkeley, CA, 1990), 512Google Scholar; Mørkholm, O., Antiochus IV of Syria (Copenhagen, 1966), 142Google Scholar; Gruen (n. 42), 246; Dancy, J., A Commentary on I Maccabees (Oxford, 1954), 68Google Scholar. I do not think that the quality of the sources currently allows a firm conclusion either way.

⁵² On the day at Eleusis, see Polyb. 29.27.4–9. The impact upon Antiochus IV may be overstated by Polybius: see for example, Morgan, M., ‘The Perils of Schematism: Polybius, Antiochus Epiphanes and the “Day of Eleusis”’, Historia (1990), 37–9Google Scholar; also Mittag, P., Antiochos IV. Epiphanes. Eine politische Biographie (Berlin, 2006), 224Google Scholar. It is hard to see, however, how Popilius Laenas' diplomatic theatre could have been anything but a humiliating setback, even if the king was planning to withdraw from Egypt on his own.

⁵³ Polyb. 29.27.4.

⁵⁴ On the ‘saving face’ aspect of the sack, see Daniel 11:30; Gruen, E., The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome (Berkeley, CA, 1984), 661Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ Joseph, Ap. 2.83–4 states, citing Polybius and Strabo, that Antiochus IV needed the money (egestate pecuniarum).

⁵⁶ Mørkholm (n. 51), 142–3.

⁵⁷ 2 Mac. 4:27.

⁵⁸ Antiochus III had reduced Jewish tribute by one-third, and the tribute was 300 talents in the time of Seleucus IV (Sulpicius Severus, Chronicles, 2.17.5); the Ptolemaic tribute was therefore probably 450 talents. See also Aphergis (n. 15), 249.

⁵⁹ Mørkholm, (n. 51), 132. See also Cohen, G., The Hellenistic Settlements in Syria, the Red Sea Basin, and North Africa (Berkeley, CA, 2006)Google Scholar, 176 n. 8. Grainger, J., A Seleucid Prosopography and Gazetteer (Leiden, 1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 726, mentions the marriage but not the despoliation.

⁶⁰ Will, E., Historie politique du monde hellénistique, second edition (Nancy, 1982), 354–5Google Scholar, suggests that hiera polis might be the name of an Elamite location, rather than Hierapolis-Bambyke. Mittag (n. 52), 150–1, also doubts a despoliation, although admits it as a distinct possibility. Diana of Hierapolis fits quite well with Atargatis of Bambyke, however, and Granius Licinianus is elsewhere accurate, if brief in his references and poorly preserved in his manuscript. Cross-fertilization of details between sources does not necessarily negate the conclusion that some sort of incident took place at each location.

⁶¹ Aphergis (n. 15), 174, notes that lavish gifts from temples to kings as part of religious ceremonies also represented a transfer, albeit a voluntary one, of wealth from temple to king.

⁶² On the death of Antiochus IV, see Mendels, D. ‘A Note on the Tradition of Antiochus IV's Death’, IEJ 31 (1981), 53–6Google Scholar, who discusses the relationship between Jewish and Greek sources; see also Mittag (n. 52), 308, and Walbank (n. 25), iii. 473–4. Gera, D. and Horowitz, W., ‘Antiochus IV in Life and Death: Evidence from the Babylonian Astronomical Diaries’, JAOS 117 (1997), 241Google Scholar, deals with the Babylonian evidence of his funeral procession.

⁶³ Not counting Jerusalem, of course, where civil violence was already taking place prior to Antiochus IV's intervention.

⁶⁴ The Augustan geographer Strabo (16.1.17.13–14) described the region as ‘rugged and full of bandits’ (τραχεῖα ἡ πολλὴ καὶ λῃστρική), and noted their capacity with the bow. This does not mean that the Elamites were independent. Note, for example, Elamite slingers at the Battle of Magnesia in 190 bc (Livy 37.40.9), suggesting that Seleucid kings had the ability to muster troops from the region.

⁶⁵ See especially example 6, above. Even in the violence of the sack of Jerusalem, 2 Maccabees 2:15 reports that Menelaus followed royal orders and opened the temple treasures. Although this accusation is probably slanderous, it may hint at the reality of collaboration between pro-Seleucid officials and the king in the midst of the Jerusalem stasis.

⁶⁶ Polyb. 30.26.9 also notes that Antiochus IV sacked a number of Egyptian temples during his invasion; cf. Ath. 195 F. Certainly Antiochus IV's reputation as a temple-robber might lead to the accretion of additional accusations. But historical reputations are not necessarily unearned.

⁶⁷ On late indemnity payment, see Livy 42.6.6.

⁶⁸ For Antiochus IV's army reforms, see N. Sekunda, Hellenistic Infantry Reform in the 160s bc (Warsaw, 2001), who argues that Antiochus and other Hellenistic rulers sought to retool their forces based in part on Roman tactics and equipment.

⁶⁹ On the reconstruction of the Temple of Olympian Zeus, see Polyb. 26.1.11; Livy 41.20.8–9; Vitr. 7.Praef.15, 17; Strabo 9.1.17; Granius Licnianus 28.10–13 [Critini]. See also Bevier, L., ‘The Olympieion at Athens’, Papers of the American School of Classical Studies (1885), 198–201Google Scholar; Thompson, H., ‘Athens and the Hellenistic Princes’, PAPhS 97 (1953), 256–7Google Scholar; Abramson, H., ‘The Olympieion in Athens and its Connections with Rome’, California Studies in Classical Antiquity 7 (1974), 2–4Google Scholar; Corso, A., ‘Vitruvius and His Monuments’, ABSA 92 (1997), 380–3Google Scholar.

⁷⁰ Justin, Epit. 39.2. For the critical link between money and legitimacy for the late Seleucids, see Mittag, P., ‘Blood and Money: On the Loyalty of the Seleucid Army’, Electrum (2008), 51–5Google Scholar. For the short reign of Alexander II Zabinas, see Will (n. 60), 435–6; Ehling, K., Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der späten Seleukiden (164–63 v.Chr.) (Stuttgart, 2008), 212–14Google Scholar.

⁷¹ Euseb. Chron. 1.257 reports that Alexander poisoned himself instead. It should be noted that two Christian sources (Arn. Adv. nat. 6.21 and Clem. Al. Protr. 5.53) attribute the looting of a gold statue of Zeus to Antiochus Cyzicenus. It is quite likely that they are in fact confusing Cyzicenus with Zabinas, probably misreading Diodorus or Trogus, rather than describing an additional incident.

⁷² Translation by Pamela Mensch, in Romm, J. (ed.), The Landmark Arrian. The Campaigns of Alexander (New York, 2010)Google Scholar. Also note Alexander's sacrifice at the temple of Heracles Melquart after capturing Tyre (Arr. 2.24.5–6), his supposed prostration before the high priest in Jerusalem (Joseph, AJ 11.331), and his sacrifice to the Apis Bull (Arr. Anab. 3.1.4). Polybius (5.10.8) comments on Alexander's exemplary behaviour towards Persians temples.

⁷³ On execution of temple despoilers, see Arr. Anab. 6.27.4 and 7.4.2. A protective order on papyrus, probably issued by the Peukestes installed by Alexander as a lieutenant in Egypt, orders troops away from priestly property: see Turner, E., ‘A “Commander-in-Chief's” Order from Saqqâra’, JEA 60 (1974), 239–42Google Scholar.

⁷⁴ For this figure for Alexander's bullion stockpile at Ecbatana, see Diod. Sic. 17.80.3; Strabo 15.3.9.

⁷⁵ See n. 31 above.

⁷⁶ Diod. Sic. 1.84.8. See also Crawford, D., ‘Ptolemy, Ptah and Apis in Hellenistic Memphis’, Studia Hellenistica (1980), 15–18Google Scholar; Stambaugh, J., Sarapis Under the Early Ptolemies (Leiden, 1972), 65–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Thompson, D., ‘The High Priests of Memphis under Ptolemaic Rule’, in Beard, M. and North, J. (eds.), Pagan Priests. Religion and Power in the Ancient World (Ithaca, NY, 1990), 107–16Google Scholar.

⁷⁷ On this claim see Plutarch De Is. et Os. 11, 31 (= Deinon of Herakleia FGrH 690 F 21); Ael. NA 10.28; Suda s.v. Apides (A 3201). Sulpicius, Chronicles 2.14, acquits the Persian king of killing the bull, but records that he publically ridiculed it. The story echoes that of Cambyses killing the Apis in Hdt. 3.27–9, whose veracity remains in dispute; see Depuydt, L., ‘Murder in Memphis: The Story of Cambyses's Mortal Wounding of the Apis Bull (ca. 532 b.c.e.)’, JNES 54 (1995), 119–26Google Scholar. Even if the story of Artaxerxes and the Apis is apocryphal, it may nonetheless represent Ptolemaic propaganda stressing the benevolence of the new order compared to the old.

⁷⁸ For Ptolemaic economic relationships with temples, see Manning, J., Land and Power in Ptolemaic Egypt (Cambridge, 2003), 328–41Google Scholar.

⁷⁹ 3 Maccabees 1–2.

⁸⁰ On Ptolemaic revenues, see Jerome Commentary on Daniel, 15.1, for the reign of Ptolemy II; Cicero put the revenues of the later Ptolemies at 300 million sesterces, or 12,500 talents (Strabo 17.1.13). See also Manning, J., The Last Pharaohs (Princeton, NJ, 2010), 126–7Google Scholar. The extent of Seleucid revenues is unknown. Aphergis (n. 15), 259, estimates that revenues for the empire at its peak of territorial extent (Seleucus I in the 280s; Antiochus III in the 190s) was between 15,000 and 20,000 talents, while in moments of territorial contraction (e.g. the reign of Antiochus IV) he postulates revenues between 11,000 and 15,000 talents. Mittag (n. 52), 86, posits Seleucid revenues at 15,000 talents in the reign of Antiochus IV, largely following Aphergis' speculative model. Le Rider, G. and de Callataÿ, F., Les Séleucides et les Ptolémées (Paris, 2006), 169–75Google Scholar, suggest revenues of 10,000–15,000 talents based on spotty literary evidence and a hasty estimate of military expenditures. Bringmann, K., ‘Königliche Ökonomie im Spiegel des Euergetismus der Seleukiden’, Klio 87 (2005), 110–15Google Scholar argues, based on Seleucid benefactions, that the kings were routinely cash poor, having collected much of their revenue in kind, which would make Roman indemnity payments all the more onerous, and temple treasures all the more tempting. On the problem of tax collection in kind or in cash, see also De Callataÿ, F., ‘La richesse des rois séleucides et le problème de la taxation en nature’, Topoi S6 (2004), 29–43Google Scholar. I suspect that Aphergis' and Mittag's estimates are too high, but it should also be noted that the vast geographic extent of the Seleucid Empire required higher expenditures, in particular on standing military forces, so that Seleucid expenditures were probably much higher than those of the Ptolemies, even if their revenues were similar.

⁸¹ Dion. Hal. 20.9–10; cf. Val. Max. 1 ext. 1. For an overview of the looting of sanctuaries in the context of Greek warfare, see Pritchett, K., The Greek State at War, Vol. 5 (Berkeley, CA, 1991), 160–8Google Scholar.

⁸² De Franciscis, A., Stato e societa in Locri epizefiri (Naples, 1972), 74–84Google Scholar. The king to whom the money was given is never explicitly identified, but was almost certainly Pyrrhus. There is no direct evidence that this was given under coercive auspices, but the sum is so enormous that it is difficult to believe it was given as a strictly voluntary gift.

⁸³ Polyb. 5.9.2–5.

⁸⁴ On weapons dedicated to temples as military resources, see Livy 23.14.4.

⁸⁵ Polyb. 16.1.5.

⁸⁶ Polyb. 32.15.7. See also Diod. Sic. 31.35. Prusias seems to have been motivated by something other than impecuniosity, given that he primarily looted objects of art. See Walbank (n. 25), ii.499, for the similarities between Polybius descriptions of Prusias' and Philip V's actions. Chaniotis, A., War in the Hellenistic World (Malden, MA, 2005), 154–7Google Scholar, discusses the phenomenon of temple despoliation in the wider Hellenistic world. For the temple plundering in the Roman Republic, see Wells, J., ‘Impiety in the Middle Republic: The Roman Response to Temple Plundering in Southern Italy’, CJ 105 (2010), 229–43Google Scholar; here the competitive dynamic of the Roman elite provided a modicum of protection to southern Italian temples.

⁸⁷ Mittag (n. 52), 309–10.

⁸⁸ Most notably Thuc. 2.13.4–5, where Pericles lists the sacred treasures of Athena and other gods as liquid assets that can be ‘borrowed’ for the war. For emergency war ‘loans’ from Greek temples, sometimes paid back and sometimes not, see Pritchett (n. 81), 166–7.

⁸⁹ On Antiochus III and keeping kosher, see Joseph, JA 12.146. The Great King was aware that certain animals were off limits, but curiously omitted pigs from his list!

⁹⁰ We have no incidents of temple despoliation from the crisis years of the 240s–220s, which saw the disastrous Third Syrian War, the War Between the Brothers, and the failed reign of Seleucus III. The sources for this period, however, are extremely poor. It is only when Polybius begins his discussion about the reign of Antiochus III that we have a high-quality narrative of dynastic events. Polybius was well positioned to report on Seleucid history, given that he had a fellow hostage and Seleucid prince, the future Demetrius I, as an informant.

⁹¹ Houghton, A., ‘Seleucid Coinage and Monetary Policy of the Second Century bc’, Topoi S6 (2004), 59Google Scholar, notes that the reign of Antiochus IV also saw a modest reduction of the weight standard for the tetradrachma, from 17 grams to 16.5 grams, a move that he associates with the fiscal stress of the Roman indemnity and other dynastic troubles.

⁹² Bevan, E., House of Seleucus (London, 1902)Google Scholar, remains the most complete blow-by-blow narrative of Seleucid history in English, although now quite out of date. The myriad of threats that the Seleucid dynasty faced from its founding is discussed in Wolski, J., The Seleucids. The Decline and Fall of Their Empire (Krakow, 1999)Google Scholar. On the breakaway kingdoms of Parthia and Bactria, see Lerner, J., The Impact of Seleucid Decline on the Eastern Iranian Plateau (Stuttgart, 1999)Google Scholar. Grainger, J., The Syrian Wars (Leiden, 2010)Google Scholar, chronicles the ups and downs of Seleucid military confrontation with Egypt, while his The Roman War of Antiochos III (Leiden, 2002)Google Scholar deals with this substantial dynastic setback. For the Judean revolt, see Bar-Kochva, B., Judas Maccabaeus. The Jewish Struggle again the Seleucids (Cambridge, 1989)Google Scholar.