1 Almond, G. A. and Verba, S., italic>The Civic Culture, Little, Brown, 1965 Google Scholar and Edinger, L. J., Politics in Germany, Little, Brown, 1968 Google Scholar.

2 Dahrendorf, R., Society and Democracy in Germany, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1968 Google Scholar.

3 For an analysis see Irving, R. E. M. and Paterson, W. E., ‘The West German Parliamentary Election of November 1972’, Parliamentary Affairs, Winter 1973, pp. 218–39Google Scholar.

4 See Paterson, W. E., ‘Foreign Policy and Stability in West Germany’, International Affairs, 07 1973, p. 428 Google Scholar.

5 For a collection of such views see Schäfer, G. and Nedelmann, C. (eds), Der CDU Staat, Suhrkamp, 1969 (2 Vols.)Google Scholar.

6 Abendroth, B. W., Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft und Demokratie in der Bundesrepublik, Frankfurt, 1965 Google Scholar. This book is an attack by a famous Marxist scholar at Marburg University on Allemann, F. R., Bonn ist nicht Weimar, Berlin—Köln, 1956 Google Scholar. One frequently cited example of such continuity is in the language and emotive terms used by national conservatives and even Hitler against Versailles and Locarno during the Weimar Republic and now used against Brandt and the Ostpolitik—‘betrayal’, ‘traitor’, ‘denial of the rights of the German yolk’, etc. See Kühnl, R., Die von F. J. Strauss repräsentierten politischen Kräfte und ihr Verhältnis zum Faschismus, Pahl‐Rugenstein, Cologne, 1972 Google Scholar.

7 For a detailed analysis of Berufsverbote (occupational disqualifications) see Dyson, K. H. F., ‘Anti‐Communism in the Federal Republic of Germany: The Case of the Berufsverbot’, Parliamentary Affairs, Winter 1974, pp. 51–67 Google Scholar.

The practice of Berufsverbote offends against at least two of Machiavelli’s maxims of good politics: his maxim that in politics one should avoid the ‘middle course’, i.e. better to seek abolition of the DKP or to practise toleration to communists (Discourses, Book 2, Chapter 23), and his recommendation that ‘when an evil has sprung up within a state … it is safer to temporize with it rather than to attack it violently’ (ibid. Book I, Chapter 33).

8 See e.g. R. Kühnl, ‘Rechtsextremismus in der Bundesrepublik’, a paper delivered at the Conference on West German Political Development at the University of Liverpool, January 1975. One key problem which haunts discussion of Right‐wing extremist potential is that of clear definition of its elements. The category becomes large because so much can be included within it—nationalism, racial and other prejudices, law and order, respect for authority and tradition, hierarchy and obedience, a concern for military tradition, anti‐pluralism, anti‐intellectualism, militant anti‐communism etc. Consistently, electoral studies and public opinion polls have shown the potential electoral strength of a Right‐wing nationalist movement to be between 8 and 15 per cent. The NPD was the first movement to succeed in uniting a major portion of this support. Otherwise its members have tended to abstain, vote for a variety of Right‐wing splinter groups or supported the Right‐wing of the CDU/CSU or the FDP. See e.g. Nagle, J. D., The National Democratic Party, Berkeley, University of California, 1970, pp. 123–79Google Scholar.

9 See e.g. Hennis, W., Die Deutsche Unruhe, Wegner, Hamburg, 1969 Google Scholar: Schelsky, H., ‘Die Strategie der Systemüberwindung’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 12 1971 Google Scholar: Fromme, F. K., ‘Amtssessel für Verfassungsfeinde’, FAZ, 26 11 1971 Google Scholar. In its report for 1972 the Office for Protection of the Constitution gave the following figures for members of the public service who belong to unconstitutional parties or organizations (eighteen were listed on the left and thirteen on the right): 1,307 Left radicals (235 in the federal service); 1,413 Right radicals (841 in the federal service). Total employment in the public service at federal, state and local levels was 3.2 million. There seems to be a tendency for the numbers of Left radicals to rise whilst the figure for Right radicals remains rather static. In September 1971 there had been under 600 Left radicals.

10 Carl Schmitt, Cf., Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes, Hamburg, 1938 Google Scholar, and Koselleck, R. and Schnur, Roman (eds), Hobbes‐Forschungen, Duncker and Humblot, Berlin, 1969 Google Scholar. For a good example of conservative jurisprudence see ForsthofF, Ernst, Rechtsstaat im Wandel, Stuttgart, 1964 Google Scholar. For an attack upon this tradition see Bracher, Karl‐Dietrich, ‘StaatsbegrifF und Demokratie in Deutschland’, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, IX, 1968, pp. 2–27 Google Scholar.

11 R. Dahrendorf, op. cit., Chap. 25.

12 W. Paterson, op. cit.

13 Schweigler, G., Nationalbewusstsein in der B.R.D. und der D.D.R., Berteismann, Düsseldorf, 1973, p. 115 Google Scholar.

14 The author would not, of course, disagree with Dahrendorfs views on the gap between humanistic theory and practical inhumanity in Germany. There is, however, much indifference to suffering and hypocrisy in other liberal societies. Undoubtedly there are more private trían public virtues in Germany too. The family would seem to be accorded precedence over the school as a socializing institution, and the emphasis seems to be on values that direct the individual less to getting along with others than to his own personality and development. The school is little more than a place to impart knowledge and rather aloof from social reality. However, the ‘public virtues’ which are supposed to be created by the American educational system are not associated with welfare arrangements comparable to Germany or the comparative absence of vandalism to be found in Germany. One is tempted to conclude that Germany and the USA simply possess different public virtues and both possess many public vices. For Dahrendorfs thesis see R. Dahrendorf, op. cit. Chaps. 19, 20 and 22.

15 The core of SRP leadership found a home in the German Reich Party (DRP) which was the strongest radical Right party till its dissolution in 1965. In the early 1960s the DRP had about 16,000 members, of whom about 50 per cent were former Nazis and 20 per cent ex‐members of the SRP. Like the SRP it was strongest in Lower Saxony, and its support was concentrated in small towns and rural areas. Like the NPD later it was to suffer from internal ideological and personal disputes and party scandals. More important, the groups most susceptible to Right‐wing propaganda (the peasantry and the lower middle class) were profiting like everybody else from the ‘economic miracle’ and enjoying the security of Adenauer’s authoritarian style of democracy. See Allemann, F., ‘The NPD in Perspective’, The Wiener Library Bulletin, Winter 1966/67, pp. 1–9 Google Scholar, and Cromwell, R. S., ‘Rightist Extremism in Postwar West Germany’, Western Political Quarterly, 06 1964, pp. 284–93Google Scholar.

16 For a useful discussion, see Hallett, G., The Social Economy of West Germany, Macmillan, London, 1973 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Chap. 8.

The Drittelparität system which has been introduced in many universities in SPD states proved particularly controversial. Democratization was achieved by giving the three interests—professors, assistants and students—equal voting strength on governing bodies which determine all aspects of university affairs including professorial appointments. The consequences have included politicization of appointments and time‐consuming meetings at the expense of teaching and research. The assistants find themselves in a key position and have been able to elect one of their members as university president in Hamburg (Peter Fischer‐Appelt) and the Free University of Berlin (Rolf Kreibich, a sociology assistant). In the view of the Bund Freiheit der Wissenschaft, an unjustified oligarchical rule of professors has been replaced by a misguided application of the democratic principle, which ignores both the wider responsibilities of universities towards society (e.g. the training function), and the need for the qualified to take final decisions about teaching and research. This group seeks a reassertion of professional ethics and wishes to tailor the democratic principle to the purposes of the university.

17 In the case of Professor von Simson. Reported in Die Welt, 14 June 1974, and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 June 1974.

18 See Löwenthal, R., Hochschule für die Demokratie: Grundlinien für eine sinnvolle Hochschulreform, Markus‐Verlag, Cologne, 1971 Google Scholar. For a more pessimistic view, see Schelsky, H., Abschied von der Hochschulreform, Bertelsmann, Bielefeld, 1969 Google Scholar. Schelsky argues in favour of a sphere within which there should be professional autonomy and against a ‘totalitarian democracy’. Democracy and freedom are not the same thing; without such autonomy there can be no freedom. Löwenthal tends to be more optimistic about ‘democratization’.

19 See W. Hennis, op. cit., and Hennis, W., Verfassung und Verfassungswirklichkeit, Ein Deutsches Problem, Mohr, Tübingen, 1968 Google Scholar. See also Schelsky, H., ‘A German Dilemma’, Encounter, 02 1974 Google Scholar, which argues that democratization is leading to polarization which in turn is producing a ‘primitivization’ of political debate (crude, over‐emotional and over‐simplified treatment of issues). For a reply, see Löwenthal, R., ‘The Conservative Utopia’, Encounter, 06 1974 Google Scholar.

20 See K. Sontheimer, ‘Marxistische Staatstheorien in der Politischen Wissenschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, paper delivered at the Conference on West German Political Development (op. cit.). This paper expresses the anxieties of an academic associated with the SPD about the sterility and intolerance for ‘methodological pluralism’ and mere facts introduced into German political science by ‘theological Marxism’.

21 Sontheimer, K., ‘Anti‐Democratic Tendencies in Contemporary German Thought’, Political Quarterly, 07–09 1969, pp. 268–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22 The SDS had been disowned by the SPD in 1961 in favour of the new Social Democratic Students’ Association (SHB). Very soon the relationship between the SPD and the SHB was to become just as strained.

23 Within the universities the Communist Students Association (KSV) had emerged as the most radical force by 1973. It pursued a policy of disruption, defamation and occupation but had little success in student elections. Politically it is close to the Maoist KPD and is, therefore, actively and in fact successfully opposed by the Social Democratic Students Association (SHB) and the ‘Spartakus’. See the interesting attack on the ultra‐Left at Bremen University for its return to ‘medieval scholasticism’ by the socialist historian Geiss, Imanuel, ‘Lieber keine Revolution als so eine’, Der Spiegel, 24 12 1973, pp. 42–5Google Scholar. Geiss, a founder member of Bremen, had just resigned his post.

24 For good accounts of the KPD see Richert, E., Die Radikale Linke von 1945 bis Gegenwart, Colloquium Verlag, Berlin, 1969 Google Scholar, and Fsher, S. L., The Minor Parties of the Federal Republic of Germany, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1974, pp. 111–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

25 The League of Germans (BdD) replaced the KPD in the 1957 election but won less than 60,000 votes. In the 1961 and 1965 elections it competed on the ticket of the DFU, a ‘rally’ party of the Left. Leading officials of the DFU left the party in 1964 claiming that it had come under communist influence, and it was accused of receiving finance from East Germany. Whilst the DFU had little to say on social and economic policies, its programmes indicated communist influence, e.g. demand for disarmament, prohibition of nuclear weapons, recognition of the East German regime and of the Oder‐Neisse Line, German neutrality, the concept of a neutral zone in Europe, an end to conscription, and the lifting of the ban on the KPD. There were few statements of class conflict. See S. L. Fisher, op. cit., p. 122.

26 See ‘Die Kommunisten und das Grundgesetz’, produced by the executive of the DKP in 1973. The reasons for rejection were, firstly, that the Basic Law was the cause of the division of Germany in contradiction to the Potsdam Agreement, and secondly that not enough attention was given to basic social and economic rights. The DKP presents itself as the party which will realize the duty of social responsibility of property included in Articles 14 and 15 of the Basic Law and which will ensure that democracy operates in favour of the worker rather than of monopolies. The ‘Organisationsgrundsätze der DKP’ (produced in 1973) uses the language of class warfare and emphasizes the crucial importance of unity: ‘only a unified and centralized struggle guarantees the effectiveness of the revolutionary party’ (p. 7). The concept of ‘democratic centralism’ is avoided, but Lenin is quoted copiously. In its ‘Grundsatzerklärung’ of April 1969 the DKP had, however, spoken of the need for the Federal Republic to find its own way to socialism (p. 39).

27 On the case of Dr Richard Bünemann, see Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23 January 1975.

28 See J. D. Nagle, op. cit., pp. 123–79, and on the general problems of minor parties see S. L. Fisher, op. cit., pp. 141–51.

29 See H. Schelsky, ‘Die Strategie der Systemüberwindung’, op. cit.

30 See Der Spiegel, 23 December 1974, p. 25.

31 See Deutsche Volkszeitung, 18 July 1974.

32 R. Dahrendorf, op. cit., p. 269, where he speaks of a lack of self‐confidence in political leadership. The argument in this paragraph is indebted to Dr Klaus von Dohnanyi’s inaugural address to the Conference on West German Political Development (op. cit.).

33 See W. Hennis, op. cit. (1968).

34 A further cause for such anxiety is put forward by Dahrendorf. The postwar political elite is not an established elite; its members are strangers to one another and lack social cohesion. There is no real equivalent of the public schools and Oxbridge in Britain or the great training schools in France except perhaps the Faculties of Law. R. Dahrendorf, op. cit., pp. 270–2.

35 See G. Schweigler, op. cit., and W. Paterson, op. cit.