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How Rhetorical Strategies Reproduce Compromise Agreements: The Case of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2013

Markus Kornprobst
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Abstract

How do actors, once they have reached agreement on a compromise, make this compromise persist? Being rooted in mutual concessions, it can never be taken for granted that compromises, once agreed upon, stay in place. Contestation about compliance is something that is very much to be expected and does not inevitably destabilize a compromise. Whether such a destabilization occurs or not depends on how actors communicate with one another. I contend that whether compromise persists or not has a great deal to do with the interplay of offensive and defensive rhetorical strategies that actors employ. I identify six offensive strategies (recourse, elaboration, entrapment, accusation, ostracism, abandonment) and six defensive ones (accommodation, placation, denial, deflection, inattentiveness, rejection), and chart the degrees to which offensive–defensive exchanges of strategies are conducive to reproducing compromises. Recourse–accommodation interplays on the one hand (most conducive) and abandonment–rejection interplays on the other (least conducive) form the poles of the spectrum of exchanges. I probe my theoretical framework by inquiring into the stability of the grand compromise that underpins the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The findings support my framework. The parties have tended to stay away from heavy rhetorical artillery and stuck to less robust rhetorical strategies. Elaboration and placation strategies have played a particularly important role for making the grand compromise persist.

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Articles
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 47 , Special Issue 3: Politics as Compromise , 2012 , pp. 342 - 367
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2012.

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References

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7 Michel De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1988, p. 36. Burke (from whom Schimmelfennig otherwise draws heavily) makes a similar point when he argues that identification, and not persuasion, is the aim of rhetoric: Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives.

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13 Entrapment is what the literature, following Schimmelfennig's work, also often refers to as shaming. Mattern's work on usages of a ‘narrative gun’ echo this rhetorical strategy. Mattern, Janice Bially, ‘The Power Politics of Identity’, European Journal of International Relations, 7: 3 (2001), pp. 349–98CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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17 Literature on rational design points to renegotiations and a new equilibrium as a way out of these problems. Yet this is not what happened with the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Parties have agreed on adjustments, for example Security Council Resolution 1540 in 2004, but these adjustments hardly qualify as a new equilibrium that allows moving beyond the fundamental problems that have beset the regime from the very beginning. On rational design, see Koremenos, Barbara, Lipson, Charles and Snidal, Duncan, ‘Rational Design: Looking Back to Move Forward’, International Organization, 55: 4 (2001), pp. 1051–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18 For recent studies adding to our understanding of non-proliferation as seen through the lens of appropriateness and consequentialism, respectively, see, for instance, Maria Rost Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint, Athens, University of Georgia Press, 2009; and Verdier, Daniel, ‘Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Exclusion in the Nuclear Proliferation Regime’, International Organization, 62: 3 (2008), pp. 439–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19 Somewhat more recently, another issue has become very prominent as well – the establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. Nonetheless, disarmament and peaceful use are the key issues of the non-proliferation regime given the time frame of this study (1970–2010).

20 I retrieved these documents mainly from the IAEA Library (for the proceedings of the first review conferences), the United Nations (http://www.un.org/depts/ddar/) and Reaching Critical Will (http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org). The latter is a non-governmental initiative associated with the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.

21 This section focuses on the most enduring major issues surrounding disarmament since 1970. For more details on other contentious issues, such as alleged nuclear proliferation in the shape of weapons-sharing (e.g. USA–Germany) and technical support (e.g. USA–India deal) as well as the specific issues surrounding North Korea and Iran, see, for instance, the following recent pieces: Ogilvie-White, Tanya, ‘International Responses to Iranian Nuclear Defiance: The Non-Aligned Movement and the Issue of Non-Compliance’, European Journal of International Law, 18: 3 (2007), pp. 453–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar; David Cortwright and Raimo Väyrynen, Towards Nuclear Zero, Adelphi Papers 410, 2010, p. 87; Kirk, Jason, ‘Indian-Americans and the U.S.–India Nuclear Agreement: Consolidation of an Ethnic Lobby?’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 4 (2008), pp. 275–300 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Weiss, Leonard, ‘U.S.–India Nuclear Cooperation: Better Later than Sooner’, Nonproliferation Review, 14: 3 (2007), pp. 429–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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23 Fartash, Iran, Summary Record of the Second Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1975); Elaraby, Egypt, Summary Record of the Ninth Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1990); Spring, Ireland, Summary Record of the Second Meeting, NPT Review and Extension Conference (1995).

24 Abdel-Maguid, Egypt, Summary Record of the Sixth Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1985).

25 Morokhov, USSR, Summary Record of the Second Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1975); Earle, USA, Summary Record of the Second Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1980); Morozov, USSR, Summary Record of the Second Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1980); Lehman, USA, Summary Record of the Third Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1990); Petrovsky, USSR, Summary Record of the Third Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1990).

26 Earle, USA, Summary Record of the Second Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1980); Lehman, USA, Summary Record of the Third Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1990).

27 Ennals, USA, Summary Record of the Second Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1975); Adelman, USA, Summary Record of the Fourth Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1985); Issraelyan, USSR, Summary Record of the Third Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1985); Dunn, USA, Summary Record of the Sixth Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1985).

28 Morokhov, USSR, Summary Record of the Second Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1975); Earle, USA, Summary Record of the Third Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1980).

29 Lehman, USA, Summary Record of the Third Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1990).

30 Gaynor, Ireland, Summary Record of the Second Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1975).

31 Dabiri, Iran, Summary Record of the Second Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1980).

32 Group 77, working paper containing some basic elements for the sections of the final document of the Conference dealing with items allocated to Main Committee I, NPT/Conf. II/C.I/2, pp. 2–3. For simplicity, I do not distinguish between the G77 and the Non-Aligned Movement because the membership is almost identical. At earlier review conferences, the group self-identified as the G77 and later as the Non-Aligned Movement.

33 Carter, Message to the Participants, NPT Review Conference (1980). Note that the NPT was a priority on Carter's foreign policy agenda. This serves as a reminder that priorities are not automatically translated into a particular rhetorical strategy.

34 In 1995, clashes over disarmament even threatened the main purpose of this conference, i.e. the indefinite extension of the NPT. In order to prevent this important endeavour from failing, the conference chair resorted to a procedural trick. The parties accepted the indefinite extension of the NPT without voting on it.

35 Lehman, USA, Summary Record of the Third Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1990).

36 Wade Boese and Miles Pomper, ‘Interview with Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Rademaker’, 19 April 2005, available online at http://www.armscontrol.org/print/2176.

37 Zarif, Iran, Concluding Statement, NPT Review Conference (2005).

38 Fathalla, Egypt, Statement at the General Debate, NPT Review Conference (2005).

39 Van, China, Statement at the General Debate, NPT Review Conference (2005).

40 Kinslyak, Russia, Statement at the General Debate, NPT Review Conference (2005).

41 There were, of course, also exceptions to this trend. See, for example, Kharrazi, Iran, Statement at the General Debate, NPT Review Conference (2000).

42 Petrovsky, USSR, Summary Record of the Third Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1990).

43 Albright, US, Statement at the General Debate, NPT Review Conference (2000).

44 Non-Aligned Movement, Statement at the Main Committee I, delivered by Badr, Egypt, NPT Review Conference (2010).

45 Stephen Smith, ‘Successful NPT Review Conference’, media release, 30 May 2010, at http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2010/fa-s100530.html.

46 Fartash, Iran, Summary Record of the Second Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1975).

47 Abdel-Maguid, Egypt, Summary Record of the Sixth Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1985).

48 Gaynor, Ireland, Summary Record of the Second Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1975).

49 Sirjani, Iran, Summary Record of the Fourth Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1985); Nasseri, Iran, Summary Record of the Third Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1990); Velayati, Iran, Summary Record of the Eighth Meeting, NPT Review and Extension Conference (1995).

50 Morokhov, USSR, Summary Record of the Second Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1975); Morozov, USSR, Summary Record of the Second Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1980); Adelman, USA, Summary Record of the Fourth Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1985); Dunn, USA, Summary Record of the Sixth Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1985).

51 Ennals, USA, Summary Record of the Second Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1975).

52 Thus Article 5 of the NPT became defunct.

53 Adelman, USA, Summary Record of the Fourth Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1985); Luce, UK, Summary Record of the Sixth Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1985).

54 Group 77, working paper containing some basic elements for the sections of the final document of the Conference dealing with items allocated to Main Committee I, NPT/Conf. II/C.I/2, p. 2.

55 Brezhnev, USSR, Statement to the Participants, NPT Review Conference (1980).

56 Ennals, USA, Summary Record of the Second Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1975).

57 Juppé, France, Summary Record of the Second Meeting, NPT Review and Extension Conference (1995).

58 Earle, USA, Summary Record of the Second Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1980); Morozov, USSR, Summary Record of the Second Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1980); Rivasseau, France, Statement at the General Debate, NPT Review Conference (2005).

59 Dabiri, Iran, Summary Record of the Third Plenary Meeting, NPT Review Conference (1980).

60 Spring, Ireland, Summary Record of the Second Meeting, NPT Review and Extension Conference (1995).

61 Sanders, USA, Closing Statement, NPT Review Conference (2005). ‘ENR’ means uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing.

62 Van, China, Statement at the General Debate, NPT Review Conference (2005).

63 Zarif, Iran, Concluding Statement, NPT Review Conference (2005).

64 In 2000, the offensive strategies were still sharper. In 2010, however, the tone was different. The Non-Aligned Movement pursued an elaboration strategy: Non-Aligned Movement, Statement at the Main Committee I, delivered by Badr, Egypt, NPT Review Conference (2010).

65 ‘P5’ stands for the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council: China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States; Joint Statement of the P5 to the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, available at http://ukun.fco.gov.uk/en/news/?view=News&id=22221160 (accessed 29 February 2012).

66 This does not apply to what Margalit calls ‘rotten compromises’: Avishai Margalit, On Compromise and Rotten Compromises, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2009.

67 On the salience of talk, see Mitzen, Jennifer, ‘Reading Habermas in Anarchy: Multilateral Diplomacy and Global Public Spheres’, American Political Science Review, 99: 3 (2005), pp. 401–17CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

68 Literature on cheap talk contends that talk matters in a pre-bargaining situation because of the exchange of information between parties. For a recent statement, see Ramsay, Kristopher W., ‘Cheap Talk Diplomacy, Voluntary Negotiations, and Variable Bargaining Power’, International Studies Quarterly, 55: 4 (2011), pp. 1003–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

69 Jürgen Habermas, Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1991.