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The 1996 Elections and Nicaragua’s Fragile Transition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

Henry Patterson
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Extract

SIX YEARS AFTER THE ELECTIONS OF 1990 FOLLOWING THE DEFEAT OF the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) which had ruled Nicaragua since it led the popular insurrection to overthrow the corrupt and dictatorial Somoza regime in 1979, the Sandinistas experienced their second bruising encounter with electoral democracy. Daniel Ortega, who as outgoing president of the republic was defeated by Violeta Chamorro of the National Opposition Union (UNO) in 1990, was once again defeated. This time the defeat was much less of a shock. Chamorro's victory in 1990 had surprised many observers despite the fact that a number of opinion polls had predicted the result. These had been dismissed by the Sandinistas as politically suspect as they had been carried out by Costa Rican organizations. Up until the opening of the FSLN's campaign in June 1996, polls had shown Ortega as the clear underdog with a gap of up to 20 per cent between him and Arnoldo Alemán, the candidate of the rightist Liberal Alliance. However, an unexpectedly cohesive and effective FSLN campaign had narrrowed the gap and by September polls were showing the two with between 38 and 46 per cent each. But, as in 1990, the ‘don't knows’ would vote decisively against the FSLN on polling day.

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Articles
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 32 , Issue 3 , July 1997 , pp. 380 - 398
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 1997

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References

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