Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 June 2019
How have Asian nations conducted, or how are they conducting, constitution-making in the face of pressures associated with globalisation, and how do they balance those forces with domestic interests and realities? This article aims to develop an analytical framework that can capture this global–local interplay. It introduces the concept of ‘glocalised constitution-making’ to denote the co-existence and relationship between the two governance levels as manifested in the forces, actors and norms pertaining to the process of drafting a new constitution as well as its substance. Glocalisation permeates the entirety of a constitution-making episode, from the impetus to initiate the process, to its design and inclusiveness of interests featured, and the scope of topics considered. The effects of glocalised constitution-making for domestic drafters are arranged along a continuum with approbation and aversion as the polar opposites. The precise location on the continuum will depend on the value preferences of the domestic stakeholders and the matters under consideration. The application of this analytical framework is illustrated with reference to recent constitution-making exercises in Bhutan, Nepal, Thailand, East Timor and Sri Lanka.
1 JH Wigmore, A Panorama of the World’s Legal Systems (Thomson/West, St Paul, MN, 1928); P Arminjon, B Nolde and M Wolff, Traité de Droit Comparé (Libraire Générale, Paris, 1951); R David, Major Legal Systems in the World Today: An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law (3rd edn, Stevens, London, 1985); K Zweigert and H Kötz, Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung auf dem Gebiete des Privatrechts (3rd edn, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 1996). Also J Esquirol, ‘René David: At the Head of the Legal Family’ in A Riles (ed), Rethinking the Masters of Comparative Law (Hart, Oxford, 2001).
2 U Mattei, ‘Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal Systems’ (1997) 44 American Journal of Comparative Law 5.
4 Hirschl, R, Comparative Matters – The Renaissance of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) 192.Google Scholar
5 Leaving aside journal articles, recent book-length treatments of Asian constitutional arrangements include A Chen (ed), Constitutionalism in Asia in the Early Twenty-First Century (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014); W-C Chan, L-A Thio, K Tan and J-R Yeh, Constitutionalism in Asia – Cases and Materials (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2014); R Dixon and T Ginsburg (eds), Comparative Constitutional Law in Asia (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2014); J Neo (ed), Constitutional Interpretation in Singapore – Theory and Practice (Routledge, Abingdon, 2016); PJ Yap, Courts and Democracies in Asia (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017); DS Law, H Lau and A Schwartz (eds), Oxford Handbook of Constitutional Law in Asia (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019, forthcoming) as well as, albeit not comparative in outlook, the volumes on Thailand, Indonesia, Myanmar, Pakistan, India, Taiwan, Singapore, China, Malaysia, Japan and Vietnam in the Constitutional Systems of the World Series (Hart Publishing, Oxford).
6 Choudhry, S and Ginsburg, T, ‘Introduction’ in Choudhry, S and Ginsburg, T (eds), Constitution-Making (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2017).Google Scholar
7 On which, e.g. W Dale, ‘The Making and Remaking of Commonwealth Constitutions’ (1993) 42 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 67; B Lapping, End of Empire (St Martin’s Press, New York, NY, 1985). Arguably unsurprisingly, this also produced constitutions that (strongly) resembled that of the European colonial powers, see e.g. KYL Tan, ‘The Making and Remaking of Constitutions in Southeast Asia: An Overview’ (2002) 6 Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law 1; H Kumarasingham (ed), Constitution-making in Asia: Decolonisation and State-building in the Aftermath of the British Empire (Routledge, Abingdon, 2016).
8 See e.g. WC Chang, ‘East Asian Foundations for Constitutionalism: Three Models Reconstructed’ (2008) 3 National Taiwan University Law Review 111.
9 Mirroring the (still) dominant trend within the comparative constitutional discourse, most recent Asian scholarship studies the judicial application of constitutional rules as opposed to the creation thereof, a process during which non-judicial actors take centre stage. In addition to the books cited in (n 5), see also A Chen and A Harding (eds), Constitutional Courts in Asia – A Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018); J-R Yeh and W-C Chang (eds), Asian Courts in Context (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015); PJ Yap, Constitutional Dialogue in Common Law Asia (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015).
10 For Vietnam, see NS Bui, ‘Contextualizing the Global Constitution-Making Process: The Case of Vietnam’ (2016) 64 American Journal of Comparative Law 931.
12 Ibid 142.
13 Jackson, V, Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational Era (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) 3.Google Scholar
14 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (AM Cohler et al. eds and trans, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1989); G Hegel, Outlines of the Philosophy of Right (TM Know trans, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008).
15 For constituent power, see A Arato, The Adventures of the Constituent Power: Beyond Revolutions? (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017).
16 Ginsburg, T, Rockmore, D and Foti, N, ‘We the Peoples: The Global Origins of Constitutional Preambles’ (2014) 46 George Washington International Law Review 305.Google Scholar
18 M Tushnet, ‘The Inevitable Globalization of Constitutional Law’ (2009) 49 Virginia Journal of International Law 985, 987–95. See also J-R Yeh and W-C Chang, ‘The Emergence of Transnational Constitutionalism: Its Features, Challenges and Solutions’ (2008) 27 Pennsylvania State International Law Review 89, 97, positing that ‘In all directions of the globe, there are now similar constitutions.’
19 See in particular DS Law and M Versteeg, ‘The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism’ (2011) 99 California Law Review 1172; R Dixon and E Posner, ‘The Limits of Constitutional Convergence’ (2010) 11 Chicago Journal of International Law 399.
20 This has been aided by the development of a knowledge society, with vast opportunities for the circulation of information, such as through constitutional databases like the Constitute Project.
21 So e.g. W Osiatynski, ‘Paradoxes of Constitutional Borrowing’ (2004) 1 International Journal of Constitutional Law 244, 244.
22 Cf e.g. arts 49 and 2 TEU.
23 Z Elkins, T Ginsburg and B Simmons, ‘Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights Practice’ (2013) 54 Harvard International Law Journal 64; Law and Versteeg (n 19); Dixon and Posner (n 19); DS Law, ‘Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights’ (2008) 102 Northwestern University Law Review 1277.
24 E.g. C McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights? Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights’ (2000) 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 499.
25 E.g. M Sunder, ‘Enlightened Constitutionalism’ (2005) 37 Connecticut Law Review 891, arguing that the court of world opinion should initiate a transnational dialogue in response to envisaged deviations from liberal constitutional values by constitution-makers.
26 Hart, V, ‘Democratic Constitution Making’ (2003) Special Report 107 of the United States Institute of Peace.Google Scholar
27 R Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Cultures (Sage, London 1992); R Robertson, ‘Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity’ in M Featherstone, S Lash and R Robertson (eds), Global Modernities (Sage, London, 1995); R Robertson, ‘Globalization Theory 2000+: Major Problematics’ in G Ritzer and B Smart (eds), Handbook of Social Theory (Sage, London, 2003).
28 E Swyngedouw, ‘Neither Global nor Local: ‘‘Glocalization’’ and the Politics of Scale’ in K Cox (ed), (Guilford, New York, NY, 1997); E Swyngedouw, ‘Globalisation or ‘Glocalisation’? Networks, Territories and Rescaling’ (2004) 17 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 25.
29 G Ritzer, The Globalization of Nothing (Sage, London, 2003); G Ritzer, Globalization: A Basic Text (Wiley-Blackwell, London, 2010).
30 E.g. T Fleiner and L Basta Fleiner, Constitutional Democracy in a Multicultural and Globalised World (Springer, New York, NY, 2009) 9; R Hirschl, Comparative Matters: The Renaissance of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) 282.
32 R Robertson, ‘Globalisation or glocalisation?’ (2012) 18 Journal of International Communication 191, 192 (original emphasis). Here he inter alia refers to the work by Greenfield on nationalism, who shows that the emergence of national identities in the US, Germany and Russia developed as part of an ‘essentially international process’.
33 Miller, LE and Aucoin, L, ‘East Timor’s Constitutional Passage to Independence’ in Miller, LE and Aucoin, L (eds), Framing the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution-Making (US Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC, 2010).Google Scholar
34 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 165 LNTS 19; 49 Stat 3097, art 1.
35 See also N Walker, ‘Sovereignty and Beyond: The Double Edge of External Constitutionalism’ (2018) 58 Virginia Journal of International Law 799.
36 See e.g. Y Hasebe and C Pinelli, ‘Constitutions’ in M Tushnet, T Fleiner and C Saunders (eds), Routledge Handbook of Constitutional Law (Routledge, Abingdon, 2013); D Grimm, ‘Types of Constitutions’ in M Rosenfeld and A Sajó (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012).
37 V Iyer, ‘Constitution-making in Bhutan: A Complex and Sui Generis Experience’, paper presented at the Workshop ‘Constitution-Making in 21st Century Asia’ (Singapore, 13–14 November 2017) (copy on file with the authors).
38 PK Varma, ‘How Democracy Took Roots in Bhutan’ (The Hindu, 1 April 2015) <https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns/How-democracy-took-roots-in-Bhutan/article10752146.ece>.
39 Bothe, W, ‘The Monarch’s Gift: Critical Notes on the Constitutional Process in Bhutan’ (2012) 40 European Bulletin of Himalayan Research 27, 37.Google Scholar
40 On which, e.g. NS Cooray and S Abeyratne (eds), Decentralization and Development of Sri Lanka within a Unitary State (Springer, Singapore, 2017); M Yusoff et al., ‘Decentralized Administration and Minority Accommodation in Sri Lanka’ (2015) 6 Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 1; R Oberst, ‘Decentralization and Local Government in Sri Lanka’ in D Vajpeyi (ed), Local Democracy and Politics in South Asia (Springer, Wiesbaden, 2003).
41 For more detail, see S Bisarya, ‘Forces and Mechanisms in Plurinational Constitution-Building in South Asia’ in IDEA (ed), Annual Review of Constitution-Building Processes: 2015 (International IDEA, Stockholm, 2016).
42 Crouch, M and Ginsburg, T, ‘Between Endurance and Change in South-east Asia: The Military and Constitutional Reform in Myanmar and Thailand’ in IDEA (ed), Annual Review of Constitution-Building Processes: 2015 (International IDEA, Stockholm, 2016) 68, 75–6.Google Scholar
43 Cf Yeh and Chang (n 18); A Harding and P Leyland, The Constitutional System of Thailand: A Contextual Analysis (Hart, Oxford, 2011).
44 Human Rights Committee, Comm No 205/1986 (Appl No) UN Doc CCPR/C/43/D/205/1986, Oxford Reports on International Law 1735 (UNHCR 1991).
45 UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 25: Article 25 (12 July 1996, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7).
46 C Saunders, ‘Constitution-Making in the 21st Century’ (2014) 4 International Review of Law 1, 2.
47 See e.g. V Hart, ‘Constitution-Making and the Transformation of Conflict’ (2001) 26 Peace & Change 153; S Voigt, ‘The Consequences of Popular Participation in Constitutional Choice – Towards a Comparative Analysis’ in A van Aaken, C List and C Lütge (eds), Deliberation and Decision: Economics, Constitutional Theory and Deliberative Democracy (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2004).
48 Ginsburg, T, Elkins, Z and Blount, J, ‘Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?’ (2009) 5 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 1.Google Scholar
49 Hart (n 26) 11.
50 See now UN Secretary General, ‘Guidance Note of the Secretary General: United Nations Assistance to Constitution-making Processes’ (April 2009), <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/guidance-note-of-the-secretary-general-united-nations-assistance-to-constitution-making-processes/> 4.
51 Constitutional Affairs Branch, Department of Political Affairs, UNTAET, ‘A Report of the National Constitutional Consultation in East Timor, June–July 2001’ (UNTAET, Dili, 2001).
52 Regan, A, ‘Constitution-making in East Timor: Missed Opportunities?’ in da Costa Babo Soares, D et al. (eds), Elections and Constitution Making in East Timor (Australian National University, Canberra, 2003) 40.Google Scholar
53 Sri Lanka Parliament, ‘Resolution for the Appointment of the Constitutional Assembly’ (9 March 2016) point 1.
54 See Public Representations Committee on Constitutional Reform, ‘Report on Public Representations on Constitutional Reform’ (May 2016) <http://english.constitutionalassembly.lk/images/pdf/PRC_1.pdf>.
55 <https://english.constitutionalassembly.lk>. Cf Resolution for the appointment of the Constitutional Assembly (n 53) points 4(b), 11 and 12.
56 Centre for Policy Alternatives, ‘Opinion Poll on Constitutional Reform’ (CPA, Colombo, 2017) <http://www.cpalanka.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Rapid-survey_final-report_March-2017.pdf> 2.
57 Thailand Constitution (2017), preamble.
58 Human Rights Watch, ‘Thailand: Events of 2016’ <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/thailand>.
59 See e.g. SD Muni, ‘Bhutan: Marching towards Democracy’ (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2008); Iyer (n 37).
60 Tobgye, LS, The Constitution of Bhutan: Principles and Philosophies (Thimphu, no publisher stated, 2015) 20.Google Scholar
61 Ibid 10.
62 Bothe (n 39).
63 See generally B Karki and R Edrisinha (eds), Participatory Constitution-Making in Nepal: Issue of Process and Substance (United Nations Development Programme, Kathmandu, 2014).
64 A Saati, ‘Participatory Constitution-Building in Nepal – A Comparison of the 2008–2012 and the 2013–2015 Process’ (2017) 10 Journal of Politics and Law 33.
65 Ibid 33–4.
66 K Hachhethu, ‘Legislating Inclusion: Post-war Constitution Making in Nepal’ (2017) 26 Accord 60.
67 Saati (n 64) 35.
68 Hachhethu (n 66).
69 Edrisinha, R, ‘Challenges of Post Peace Agreement Constitution Making: Some Lessons from Nepal’ (2017) 9 Journal of Human Rights Practice 436.Google Scholar
71 See further G Akita, Foundations of Constitutional Government in Modern Japan 1868–1900 (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1967).
72 For Germany, see e.g. US Department of State, Germany 1947–1949: The Story in Documents (US Department of State Publishing, Washington, DC, 1950); E Spevack, ‘American Pressures on the German Constitutional Tradition: Basic Rights in the West German Constitution of 1949’ (1997) 10 International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 411. Questioning whether Japan’s constitution lacks an autochthonous character as a result: D Law, ‘The Myth of the Imposed Constitution’ in D Galligan and M Versteeg (eds), The Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013).
73 See e.g. Kumarasingham (n 7); Lapping (n 7).
74 On which e.g. M de Visser, ‘A Critical Assessment of the Role of the Venice Commission in Processes of Domestic Constitutional Reform’ (2015) 63 American Journal of Comparative Law 701.
75 For a recent discussion, see T Ginsburg, ‘Constitutional Advice and Transnational Legal Order’ (2017) 2 UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational and Comparative Law 5.
76 Backer, L, ‘From Constitution to Constitutionalism: A Global Framework for Legitimate Public Power System’ (2009) 113 Penn State Law Review 671.Google Scholar
77 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Nepal’s Constitution Building Process: 2006–2015: Progress, Challenges, and Contributions of International Community (Publications Office International IDEA, Stockholm, 2015) 33–5.
78 Ibid 29.
79 Tobgye (n 60) 14.
80 M Tushnet, ‘Some Skepticism about Normative Constitutional Advice’ (2008) 49(4) William & Mary Law Review 1473.
81 J Wallis, ‘Cut and Paste’ Constitution-making in Timor Leste’, paper presented at the Workshop ‘Constitution-Making in 21st Century Asia’ (Singapore, 13–14 November 2017) (copy on file with the authors).
82 IDEA (n 77) 36.
83 The Constitutional Assembly of Sri Lanka, ‘Report of the Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights’ <https://english.constitutionalassembly.lk/images/pdf/reports-2018/Fundamental%20rights%20report%20English%20final.pdf> 3.
84 Ibid 6.
85 Osiatynski (n 21) 244.
86 Montesquieu envisaged a functionalist separation of government powers into legislative, executive and judicial power in his The Spirit of Laws (vol I, 1750). Discussions of its historical origins and present-day application can, amongst others, be found in S Krause, ‘The Spirit of Separate Powers in Montesquieu’ (2000) 62 Review of Politics 231; P Resnick, ‘Montesquieu Revisited, or the Mixed Constitution and the Separation of Powers in Canada’ (1987) 20 Canadian Journal of Political Science 97; JH Merryman, ‘The French Deviation’ (1996) 44 American Journal of Comparative Law 109. In contrast Taiwan’s constitution divides government powers among five branches or yuans: the legislative, executive, judicial, examination and control branch, on which e.g. E Ip, ‘Building Constitutional Democracy on Oriental Foundations: An Anatomy of San Yat-Sen’s Constitutionalism’ (2008) 9 Historia Constitucional 373. Notably the idea of distinct control institutions alongside the regular judiciary has begun to find traction more generally, see B Ackerman, ‘The New Separation of Powers’ (2000) 113 Harvard Law Review 633 and M Tushnet, ‘Fifth-Branch Institutions: South Africa’ in DS Law (ed), Constitutionalism in Context (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019, forthcoming).
87 See generally, Z Elkins, T Ginsburg and B Simmons, ‘Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights Practice’ (2013) 54 Harvard International Law Journal 61.
88 Comprehensive Peace Accord between the Nepal Government and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (22 November 2006) preamble and see also points 3.4–3.9.
89 Including the right to equality (East Timor Constitution, section 16); special protection for seniors (section 20); access to the Ombudsman (section 27) and access to personal data (section 38).
90 Report of the Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights (n 83) 7.
91 Bhutan Constitution, art 3(1).
92 On which, see e.g. KN Jayatilleke, Dhamma Man and Law (Buddhist Research Society, Singapore, 1988).
93 Thailand Constitution 2017, Section 16.
94 H Phuyal, ‘Nepal’s New Constitution: 65 Years in the Making’ (The Diplomat 18 September 2015).
95 Nepal Constitution, arts 255, 261–263.
96 Law and Versteeg (n 19); N Dorsen et al. (eds), Comparative Constitutionalism (3rd edn, West, St Paul, MN, 2016); DS Law, ‘Generic Constitutional Law’ (2005) 89 Minnesota Law Review 652.
97 See e.g. R Hirschl, ‘Out of “Global Constitutionalism”’ (2018) 12 Law & Ethics of Human Rights 1; S Choundry, ‘The Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism’ (2004) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 1; C Saunders, ‘The Use and Misuse of Comparative Constitutional Law’ (The George P. Smith Lecture in International Law) (2006) 13 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 37; K Lane Scheppele, ‘Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying Cross-Constitutional Influence through Negative Models’ (2003) 1 International Journal of Constitutional Law 296; Li-ann Thio, ‘Reception and Resistance: Globalisation, International Law and the Singapore Constitution’ (2009) 4 National Taiwan University Law Review 335.
98 Dixon and Posner (n 19) 1.
99 V Jackson, Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational Era (Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 2010). For an interesting extension of her framework that considers the impact of having non-national judges on the bench to adjudicate constitutional cases, see A Dziedzic, ‘Foreign Judges on Pacific Courts: Implications for a Reflective Judiciary’ (2018) Federalismi no 5.
100 The debate on the desirability of the consideration of foreign decisions in the course of domestic constitutional adjudication has spawned a large literature, including a discussions of the manner and extent to which such actually happens and the justifications that can be advanced in support, or against, the practice. See e.g. T Groppi and M-C Ponthoreau (eds), The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges (Hart, Oxford, 2014); Hirschl (n 4) Ch 1; N Dorsen, ‘The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in US Constitutional Cases: A Conversation between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer’ (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 519; G Halmai, ‘The Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation’ in Rosenfeld and Sajó (n 36); M Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) Chs 11 and 13.
101 Jackson (n 99) 71.
102 On occasion, membership of both groups may overlap, on which R Dixon, ‘Constitutional Design Two Ways: Constitutional Drafters as Judges’ (2017) 57 Virginia Journal of International Law 1.
103 Dixon and Posner (n 19) 19.
104 UN Secretary-General, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations Assistance to Constitution-Making Processes (April 2009) <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/Guidance_Note_United_Nations_Assistance_to_Constitution-making_Processes_FINAL.pdf> notably at 4 (‘Ensure national ownership’).
105 Contrast M Versteeg and E Zackin, ‘American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited’ (2014) 81 University of Chicago Law Review 1641, arguing that the US’ economic standing allows it to pursue a policy of isolationalism.
106 The Constitutional Assembly of Sri Lanka, ‘Report of the Sub-Committee on Centre-Periphery Relations’ <https://english.constitutionalassembly.lk/images/pdf/reports-2018/Subcommittee%20report%20on%20Centre-Periphery%20relations%20English%20final.pdf> 246; D Weerasekera, ‘The Interim Report of the Constitutional Steering Committee of Sri Lanka: A Brief Analysis, Part 2’ (Lankaweb, 9 April 2018) <https://www.lankaweb.com/news/items/2018/04/09/the-interim-report-of-the-constitutional-steering-committee-of-sri-lanka-a-brief-analysis-part-2/>.
107 Royal audience by His Majesty Jigme Singye Wangchuck (22 September 2001), referenced in Tobgye (n 60) 6–7.
108 Tobgye (n 60) 17.
109 Ibid 16 (emphasis added).
110 It is probably also undesirable, given the risk of considerable dissonance between the constitutional text eventually adopted and preferred practice that in turn may negatively impact on the longevity of the new constitution.
111 Committee on Judicial System, ‘Preliminary report to the Constituent Assembly with Concept Paper’ (Kathmandu, 2009).
112 Quoted in H Phuyal, ‘The Constitutional Court Debate in Nepal: Where Are We Heading?’ in Karki and Edrisinha (n 63) 281.
113 Ibid 282–3.
114 Ibid 284 and see also AM Bhattarai, ‘Designing the System of Justice for Federal Nepal: Possible Contributions of Comparative Constitutional Law’ (2011) 5 NJA Law Journal 115.
115 The tendency to ensure representation of the various social, religious and other factions often translates into a body of constitutional framers that is heterogeneous in its world views. This makes it difficult for a single, unified view to emerge on how to structure the constitution-writing process and which constitutional arrangements to adopt, and by implication, how to appreciate the input that the global can provide on these matters.
116 Nepal Constitution, art 11(5) and (7).
117 Cf Committee on Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 989th and 990th meetings (WOM/1873, July 2011).
118 ‘Interview with Former Nepal Constituent Assembly Chair’ (2016) 5 The UN Constitutional 3.
119 J Elster, ‘Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process’ (1995) 45 Duke Law Journal 364, 394.