In a grand decision handed down in February, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court - FCC) held that a marital agreement was unconstitutional, by which a woman resigned, in the event of an eventual divorce, any allocation for her as well as for her son. The Court concluded that the agreement violated both the constitutional provisions pertaining to the protection of the family and to that of the child. The Court upheld the law that prohibits a parent from disavowing claims to the support allocation for a dependent child, but went further in declaring that, by having been led to sign a marital agreement including the surrender of claims to financial support of such drastic degrees, the contracting woman suffered nothing less than a violation of her constitutional rights. According to the Court, this agreement constituted a violation of the rights of the child at the same time, as the bleakness of the mother's financial situation was seen by the FCC to prevent an orderly and safe upbringing of the dependent child.

On July 12, 2001, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) handed down its judgement in the case of Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany (application number 42527/98). The Court of Human Rights unanimously rejected the applicant's alle-gation that Germany violated Article 6 § 1 (access to court and fairness of the proceedings), Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The French are rightly proud of having spawned the Enlightenment. Their philosophers made a profound contribution to modern theories of government, which heavily influenced, inter alia, the Founding Fathers in the drafting of the American Constitution. (Montesquieu's arguments for a separation of powers, for example, are clearly reflected in the design of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the US government.) The French political class have also largely determined the nature of post-war European integration. The edifice in Brussels reflects above all their habits, interests and vision of Europe. (For example, the European Union is run by a bureaucratic elite like France itself.) This latter conception of government is, however, unlikely to prove to be as successful over the long term as the former. Indeed, the way in which European integration has so far proceeded raises serious questions about both its sustainability and its transferability.

The aim of this article is to contribute to our understanding of the legal and political dimensions of treaty reform in the European Union (EU). It raises a conceptual issue by addressing the conditions under which Chancellor Kohl yielded to an increase in sub-national influence and the extent to which Länder (Federal State) politicians were able to exercise that influence to determine the outcome in a key area during the Amsterdam European Council, 16–18 June 1997. (3) The initial section highlights a political and legal analysis of German politics and European treaty reform during the 1996 process. The second section explores emerging asymmetrical specificity on the German political and institutional landscape post-Maastricht. The closing section offers an explanation of the results in qualified majority voting (QMV) for the treaty provisions on freedom, security and justice at Amsterdam, and the implications for our understanding of treaty reform in the Union.

In January 1999 German Foreign Minister J. Fischer called for a debate on the creation of a constitution for the European Union. Since then, many German politicians have exposed their vision of the future of Europe and its constitution. However, even one year later, the matter appeared still to be a ‘German concern’ only.