¹ E.g., see,: “One simply cannot be against self-determination of peoples; one then would be for determination by others and thereby for foreign rule, oppression, tyranny, discrimination, despotism etc.” Jörg Fisch, Die Ratlosigkeit der Statussucher—Kosovo und das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker, Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Jan. 2006) (own translation).Google Scholar

² Over the last decades, democracy has emerged as the dominant reference point—“the default”—internationally regarding the control of political power. See, e.g., Amartya Sen, Reif für die Freiheit—Warum Bürgerrechte vor grossen Katastrophen schützen, Internationale Politik 34 (June 2005).Google Scholar

³ See Peters, Anne, The Crimean Vote of March 2014 as an Abuse of the Institution of the Territorial Referendum, Liber amicorum Torsten Stein 225 (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2463536 (“[A] free territorial referendum is emerging as a procedural conditio sine qua non for any territorial re-apportionment.”).Google Scholar

⁴ Leaders of the breakaway Yugoslav and Soviet republics held referendums before declaring independence so as to legitimize their respective SD claims. See Cassese, Antonio, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal 79 (1995). More recently, separatist regions in the Caucasus have sought to “earn[] their sovereignty” by successfully building effective democratic institutions. Nina Caspersen, Separatism and Democracy in the Caucasus, 50 Survival 4, 113-14 (2008) (without emphasis).Google Scholar

⁵ Traditionally, external SD refers to a decision on the international legal status of a particular population and territory. Secession—one such form—is defined here as a process of their withdrawal from a larger existing state whose result is the creation of a new state. It may be brought about consensually or non-consensually.Google Scholar

⁶ Democratic secessionism is understood here as a variant of the right of SD. It is a general, free-standing right of secession that is vested in a group of persons that wishes to secede from its existing political community. The secessionist group proceeds to delimit “its” territory democratically. The aim thereby is to “maximise the number of individuals who live in mutually desired political associations” and to establish rightful political boundaries by the majority principle. Aleksandar Pavkovic, Secession, Majority Rule and Equal Rights: a Few Questions, 3 Macquarie Univ. L.J. (2003), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MqLJ/2003/5.html. See also Beran, Harry, A Liberal Theory of Secession, 32 Pol. Stud., 21 (Mar. 1984); David D. Speetzen & Christopher Heath Wellman, Choice Theories of Secession, in Ashgate Research Companion to Secession 413-26 (Aleksandar Pavkovic & Peter Radan eds., 2011).Google Scholar

⁷ Patten, Alan, Democratic Secession from a Multinational State, 112 Ethics 558, 560 (2002).Google Scholar

⁸ See, e.g., Philpott, David, Self-Determination in Practice, in National Self-Determination and Secession 79 (Margaret Moore ed., 199S).Google Scholar

⁹ As argued, for example, by Mill: “Where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a prima facie case for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves apart.” John Stuart Mill, Chapter 16: Of Nationality, as connected with Representative Government, in Representative Government (1861).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Formatively, see Kaufmann, Chaim, Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars, 20 Int'l Security 136 n. 4 (1996).Google Scholar

¹¹ “Ein anderes Mal möge hier der Versuch eines Code dieses sogenannten Völkerrechts gemacht werden, wobei man ein Vaterunser beten und darauf losgehen muss.” Jacob Burckhardt, Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen 125 (1970).Google Scholar

¹² For further information, see Tierney, Stephen, Whose Political Constitution? Citizens and Referendums, 14 German L.J. 2185, 2192 (2013) (“by the late 20th century, […] the referendum had become, for many, an automatic part of constituent constitutionalism and even of the constitutional amendment process.”).Google Scholar

¹³ For more information on “sovereignty politics,” see When Referendums Work; Vox Pops, Economist, http://www.economist.com/node/17249644. Outside of the last year and partially outside of Europe, referendums on political status (including independence) have been held in the last decade and a half in East Timor, Montenegro, Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, Puerto Rico, South Ossetia, and South Sudan.Google Scholar

¹⁴ See generally, Randall, Maya Hertig, Démocratie directe et partition d'Etats: réflexions sur l'exercice du pouvoir déconstituant, in Direkte Demokratie: Herausforderungen zwischen Politik und Recht 339 (Andrea Good & Bettina Platipodis eds., 2013).Google Scholar

¹⁵ E.g., in crafting a secession clause, drawing up the list of eligible voters or setting limits on campaign spending.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Miller, Russell A., Self-Determination in International Law and the Demise of Democracy?, 41 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 601 (2002–03).Google Scholar

¹⁷ See Roth, Brad R., Sovereign Equality and Moral Disagreement: Premises of a Pluralist International Legal Order 80–81 (2011).Google Scholar

¹⁸ See G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514 (Dec. 14, 1960); see also G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970).Google Scholar

¹⁹ Saxer, Urs, Unabhängig werden ist nicht einfach, Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Sept. 2, 2008) (own translation).Google Scholar

²⁰ Crawford, James, The Creation of States in International Law 417 (2d ed. 2006).Google Scholar

²¹ Notably no such plebiscite or referendum was foreseen regarding the disputed status of Kosovo. See S.C. Res. 1244 (1999), S/RES/1244 (1244), June 10, 1999; Rambouillet Accords: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, S/1999/648 (June 7, 1999).Google Scholar

²² To do so would be tantamount to declaring themselves “a suicide club.” Daniel Thürer, Autonomie statt Sezzession [sic]?, 2 unizürich—Magazin der Universität Zürich (1996) (own translation). The Great Powers also pursue their own interests, granting or refusing recognition to individual secession claims so as to bolster allies and weaken adversaries.Google Scholar

²³ See, e.g., Dion, Stéphane, Address at the School of Public Policy University College London: How to deal with secessionist demands in democracies (Oct. 15, 2003) (notes from the address) (on file with author).Google Scholar

²⁴ European Commission for Democracy Through Law, Self-Determination and Secession in Constitutional Law, at 2, CDL-INF/2000/2 (Dec. 10–11, 1999), available at http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-INF%282000%29002-e.Google Scholar

²⁵ Such provisions include the current Ukrainian Const. art. II, cl. 2.Google Scholar

²⁶ See also Radan, Peter, Conference of the Association for Research on Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Americas: Constitutional Law and Secession (2007) (unpublished paper) (on file with author).Google Scholar

¹¹ For example, the EU could equally well have insisted in the Montenegrin referendum on independence that the requisite majority be fifty percent or sixty percent. It settled on fifty-five percent. In the case of the referendum in southern Sudan, it was set at sixty percent of those voting; in Scotland, fifty percent plus one. What exactly constitutes “a clear majority” in the case of Quebec independence is left up to politics by the Supreme Court of Canada. See Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.), available at http://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1643/index.do. Canada's Clarity Act, which is to give effect to the advisory opinion, leaves the question up to the Canadian parliament after a vote on independence. An Act to Give Effect to the Requirement for Clarity as set out in the Opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference, S.C. 2000, c. 26, available at http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-31.8/page-1.html.Google Scholar

²⁸ Further see discussion of re-doing or undoing of Irish referendum on Lisbon Treaty in Grainne de Burca, If at First You Don't Succeed: Vote, Vote Again: Analyzing the Second Referendum Phenomenon in EU Treaty Change, 33 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1472 (2011).Google Scholar

²⁹ See Release, Press, General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Resolution [GA/11493] Calling Upon States Not to Recognize Changes in Status of Crimea Region, U.N. Press Release GA/11493 (Mar. 27, 2014), available at http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ga11493.doc.htm.Google Scholar

³⁰ See generally, William W. Burke-White, Crimea and the International Legal Order, Research Paper No. 14–24, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Univ. of Pa. Law School (July 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2474084.Google Scholar

³¹ For references, see Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, Wikipedia, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annexation_of_Crimea_by_the_Russian_Federation.Google Scholar

³² On the Crimean Peninsula today, the majority is ethnic Russian, the rest being either Russian-speakers (Ukrainians) or “leaning towards” Russia (Crimean Tatars). See generally Katie LaRoque, The “Moral Project” of Post-Communist Ukraine: Understanding the State, Nation(s), and the Future of Ukraine, 11 Democracy and Soc'y 6 (2014).Google Scholar

³³ Putin, Vladimir, Address to the Russian Federation, President of Russia (Mar. 18, 2014), available at http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889.Google Scholar

³⁴ In this respect, the Kremlin's political calculations have been borne out. A large number of states supported Russia, abstained, or were absent in voting on the General Assembly's condemnatory resolution. Moreover, the Referendum's outcome has not been challenged and no attempt has been made to overturn it, before the UN or elsewhere.Google Scholar

³⁵ Falk, Richard A., Human Rights Horizons 112 (2000).Google Scholar

³⁶ Given the multi-ethnicity of most countries today, the use of independence referendums could be even more widespread in future. In Europe alone, possible regions include the Basque country, Corsica, Flanders, Northern Cyprus, Republika Srpska, Transdniestria, and Veneto.Google Scholar

³⁷ The UN's nation-building efforts in East Timor have been sharply criticized on this basis. See Fan, Hua, The Missing Link between Self-Determination and Democracy: The Case of East Timor, 6 Nw Univ. J. Int'l Human Rts. 176, paras. 25–30 (2008).Google Scholar

³⁸ As the French philosopher Renan puts it, “if anyone has a right to be consulted in this matter, it is the inhabitant.” Ernest Renan, Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation?, (Mar. 11, 1882), available at http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/bib_lisieux/nation04.htm (own translation).Google Scholar

³⁹ These “arm-twisters” should “defer more to the political wills of the constituents that will end up living under the newly created constitutional orders.” Zoran Oklopcic, What's in a Name: Five Theses on the Self-Determination of Peoples, The TransAtlantic Assembly (Feb. 15, 2006), available at http://transatlanticassembly.blogspot.com/2006/02/whats-in-name-five-theses-on-self.html.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ See, e.g., Etzioni, Amitai, The Evils of Self-Determination, 89 Foreign Pol'y 21, 25 (Winter 1992-93) (“[p]eople desire and deserve a government that is responsive to them but not necessarily a separatist one.”).Google Scholar

⁴¹ As exemplified by the opinions of the Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia (a.k.a. Badinter Arbitration Committee).Google Scholar

⁴² Similarly, see: “[i]t [is …] within the power of the people of Canada […] to effect whatever constitutional arrangements are desired within Canadian territory, including, should it be so desired, the secession of Quebec from Canada.” [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 85 (Can.).Google Scholar

⁴³ For example, see: “[T]hose who wish to undermine or to destroy the Canadian federal system must define clearly the risks involved and demonstrate that the new judicial and political situation they want to establish would be in the general interests of our people.” Pierre Trudeau, On Quebec Nationalism, in The Essential Trudeau 105, 115 (Ran Graham ed., 1998).Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See Yves Beigbeder, International Monitoring of Plebiscites, Refrenda and National Elections 91 (1994).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ A current example is the plight of minority groups in Kosovo under Albanian domination.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ E.g. speaking of “sore losers” “re-fighting old battles” and of an always present “threat” or “a looming, restless spectre.”Google Scholar

¹⁷ In Scotland, the prospect of a neverendum will allegedly create political uncertainty and damage economic well-being. It would be logical, however, for any devolution plan proposed to be voted on just as the option of independence was earlier.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Hayden, Robert M., Blueprints for a House Divided: The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav Conflicts 145 (2000).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ See Nancy, Jean-Luc, The Truth of Democracy 34 (Pascale-Anne Brault & Michael Naas trans., 2010) (“[D]emocracy is first of all a metaphysics and only afterwards a politics.”).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ These were, more precisely, white male adults in the population of the Thirteen Colonies speaking through representatives to the Continental Congress in Philadelphia in the summer of 1776.Google Scholar

⁵¹ At its founding, the US was thereby “spared the cheapest and most dangerous disguise that ‘the absolute’ ever assumed in the political realm, the disguise of a nation.” Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 195 (2d ed. 1998).Google Scholar

⁵² To be more precise: The Declaration conflates individual with collective rights, bringing together the idea that all “men” are created equal and endowed with certain rights (individuals against their governors) with the idea that a “people” assuming statehood are separate and free and are entitled to respect in their foreign relations (one people against another). Indeed, the Declaration implies that these individual and collective rights reinforce each other. See Armitage, David, The Declaration of Independence: A Global History (2007); see also Adam I.P. Smith, All Men, Times Literary Supplement (June 8, 2007), available at http://www.the-tls.co.uk/tls/reviews/history/article749863.ece.Google Scholar

⁵³ Further see Donald W. Livingstone, The Very Idea of Secession, 5 Soc'y 38–39 (1998).Google Scholar

⁵⁴ N.B.: No consideration of other groups should be required in cases of subjugation, domination or exploitation.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ This view has gained credence through recent international practice. See the reaction of Foreign Minister of Spain, a country with a particular interest in the debate on democratic secessionism, to the prospect of Scottish secession: “If in the UK, both parties agree that this is consistent with their constitutional order, written or unwritten, Spain would have nothing to say, just that this does not affect us. […] No one would object to a consented independence of Scotland.” The minister also stated that the independence of Kosovo, which Spain does not recognize, was a different case because it was based on a “unilateral decision.” Graeme Murray, Spain will not Veto an independent Scotland Joining EU, Scottish Express, Feb. 26, 2012 (citing Jose Manuel Garcia-Margallo).Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Thürer, Daniel & Burri, Thomas, Self-Determination, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law para. 22 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2010), http://ilmc.univie.ac.at/uploads/media/self-determination_empil.pdf.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Similarly, see Tully, James, Introduction, in Multinational Democracies 5 (Alain-G. Gagnon & James Tully eds., 2001).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ There is precedent in this respect. The “Good Friday Agreement” provides that the British Secretary of State will call a referendum on independence in seven-year intervals if it is “likely” that the majority of those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the UK and form part of a united Ireland instead. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, 46 Eliz. 2, c. 47, available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/19980047.htm.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ In reference to the ongoing “threat” of Scottish independence, it seems appropriate to refer to the prediction of Macbeth: “We have scotch'd the snake, not kill'd it. She'll close and be herself, whilst our poor malice remains in danger of her former tooth.” William Shakespeare, Macbeth act 3, sc. 2, 14–15.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Appropriately, the current constitutions of both the Czech and Slovak Republics provide for a reunification of the states by mutual assent, and the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe provided for a state that has withdrawn from the Union to rejoin it. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe art. 1-60(5), 2004 O.J. (C 310), (Dec. 16, 2004).Google Scholar

⁶¹ For measures that may be taken in a pluralistic society to militate against majority rule see inter alia Thürer. These measures include minority political rights, e.g. “say & control” per Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life. Lund Recommendations, OSCE (1999), available at http://www.osce.org/hcnm/30325.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Buchanan, Allen, Theories of Secession, 26 Phil. and Pub. Aff. 31, 42–44 (1997).Google Scholar

⁶³ Jennings, W.I., The Approach to Self-Government 56 (1956).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ O'Brien, John, International Law 163 (2001).Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Oklopcic, supra note 39.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Lijphart, Arend, Back to Democratic Basics: Who Really Practices Majority Rule?, in Democracy's Victory and Crisis 125, 143 (Axel Hadenius ed., 1997).Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Trudeau, The Reason Behind Federalism, in The Essential Trudeau 117, 119 (Ran Graham ed., 1998).Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Likewise, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo assumed in its report that there is a people of Kosovo with little discussion: “The people of Kosovo must take over the running of their affairs.” Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned 287 (2000).Google Scholar

⁶⁹ The framework for voting was established by the Law on the Referendum on State Legal Status that was adopted by the Parliament of Montenegro on 1 March 2006 following extensive consultations between the two sides on the referendum issue and, it should be kept in mind, intervention by the EU. OSCE/ODIHR Referendum Observation Mission, Republic of Montenegro Referendum on State-Status—21 May 2006 (Final Report), Warsaw 4 August 2006, available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/montenegro/20099?download=true.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ In other words, individuals’ prior choice of permanent residency was taken to be determinative of their identity for the purposes of the referendum and not their citizenship or self-designation as ethnic Montenegrins, Serbs, Muslim Slavs, or Albanians. This people have been called the pouvoir constituant composé. Google Scholar

⁷¹ Neither could Quebec dictate the terms of a proposed secession to the other parties to Confederation nor could, as the Court described the situation in an understatement, “the Canadian constitutional order […] be indifferent” to a clear vote in favor of separation from Canada. [1998] 2 S.C.R 217, para. 92 (Can.).Google Scholar

⁷² The maxim of Roman law “quod omnes similiter tangit ab omnibus comprobetur” captures this principle. (Roughly translated: “What touches all similarly, should be approved by all.”) N.B.: Spanish Constitutional Court recently applied this principle with a different result. In its decisions from 2008 and 2014, it required that all Spaniards be able to vote in a referendum on the independence of a territorial unit (the Basque country and Catalonia, respectively) and that such a process be led by the government in Madrid. See Peters, supra note 3, at 270.Google Scholar

⁷³ Further see Glaser, Andreas, Die Beilegung des Jurakonflikts—Ein Modell für die direktdemokratische Sezession in Europa?, 115 Schweizerisches Zentralblatt für Staats—und Verwaltungsrecht 463 (2014); Patrick J. Monahan, Michael J. Bryant & Nancy C. Coté, Coming to Terms with Plan B: Ten Principles Governing Secession, 83 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 36–37 (1996), http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/comingtoterms.pdf.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping: Rep. of the Secretary-General, para. 17, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (June 17, 1992).Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Renan, supra note 38 (own translation).Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Outside of USSR and Yugoslavia, there have only been three universally-recognized secessions in the last twenty-five years—Czechoslovakia (1993), East Timor (2002), and South Sudan (2012)—none of which has set off a chain reaction in their respective regions. The break-up of Czechoslovakia, for example, did not produce two failed states and weaken international structures but solved an intransigent problem and strengthened the EU. (N.B.: The “Velvet Divorce” was orchestrated by political elites not by the electorate.)Google Scholar

⁷⁷ E.g., Horowitz, Donald L., The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede, 14 J. Democracy 5, 10–11 (2003).Google Scholar

⁷⁸ See generally Mancini, Susanna, Rethinking the Boundaries of Democratic Secession: Liberalism, Nationalism, and the Right of Minorities to Self-Determination, 6 Int'l J. Constitutional L. 553 (2008).Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Similarly, Similarly see Sujit & Howse, Robert, Constitutional Theory and the Quebec Secession Reference, 13 Can. J.L. and Jurisprudence, 144 (2000). In point of fact, Quebec has seen two referendums on sovereignty, and the issue still cannot be considered “settled” once and for all.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ See “[I]t may be Canada's [and by extension other multiethnic countries'] particular fate to engage periodically in existential constitutional discussions that may be impossible to resolve once and for all.” Sujit Choudhry, Referendum? What Referendum?, 15 Lit. Rev. of Can., 7 (2007).Google Scholar

⁸¹ See U.S. Declaration of Independence: “Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes.” The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).Google Scholar

⁸² The Swiss regulation of direct democratic process is well-developed and worthy of being referred to, e.g. in terms of time needed to collect the required signatures, delay before vote held to allow proper deliberation, and moratorium until another vote on same issue. See generally Linder, Wolf, Schweizerische Demokratie: Institutionen, Prozesse, Perspektiven 241-99 (2d ed. 2005).Google Scholar

⁸³ Consider states’ (in)ability to define what constitutes a minority in the Council of Europe's eponymous framework convention, let alone to lay down comprehensive, binding rules about the preservation of the particular characteristics of such groups.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ The conflict parties might agree to postpone a definitive decision on secession by instituting autonomy for a prescribed period, at the end of which the secessionist unit would be able to express its preference for either through a referendum.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ See also Packer, John, The Origin and Nature of the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life, 11 Helsinki Monitor 29 (2000).Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Or “may justice be done though the heavens fall” (own translation).Google Scholar

⁸⁷ As Renan remarks, “we have banished from politics metaphysical and theological abstractions. What remains afterwards? Man—his desires, his needs.” Renan, supra note 38 (own translation).Google Scholar

⁸⁸ For example, see the argument that institutional devices are to be designed and imposed domestically in order to exercise responsible control on the influence of “unfathomable” pre-political forces on politics in society. Ulrich K. Preuss, Constitutional Powermaking for the New Polity: Some Deliberations on the Relations Between Constituent Power and the Constitution, in Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference, and Legitimacy: Theoretical Perspectives 143, 164 (Michel Rosenfeld ed., 1994). Contra Raymond Bourdon, Renouveler la démocratie: Éloge du sens commun (2006) (arguing that common sense is good sense and thus to be trusted).Google Scholar

⁸⁹ I.e. the rallying cry of supporters of extending the electoral franchise in Great Britain in the nineteenth century. In full see: “[T]rust the people, and they will trust you—and they will follow you and join you in the defense of that Constitution against any and every foe. I have no fear of democracy. I do not fear for minorities; I do not care for those checks and securities [thought by some] of such importance.” Randolph Henry Spencer, Lord Churchill, Speech: Trust the People (Apr. 16, 1884), at http://www.bartleby.com/268/5/7.html.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ N.B.: Van der Westhuizen perceives “change in world politics [a]s increasingly being tied to successful argumentation processes and the significance of persuasion”, what he refers to as “ideational power.” Janis van der Westhuizen, How (Not) to Sell Big Ideas: Argument, Identity and NEPAD, Int'l J. 369, 370 (2003).Google Scholar

⁹¹ Russia did the same earlier in supporting South Ossetia's and Abkhazia's secession claims. See Rein Müllerson, Precedents in the Mountains: On the Parallels and Uniqueness of the Cases of Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 8 Chinese J. Int'l L., 2 (2009).)Google Scholar

⁹² See Renan, supra note 38.Google Scholar

⁹³ Ash, Timothy Garton, The Magic Lantern 154 (1990).Google Scholar

⁹⁴ See Horowitz, Donald L., Ethnic Groups in Conflict 230 (2d ed. 2000) (“Whether and when a secessionist movement will emerge is [sic] determined mainly by domestic politics, by the relations of groups and regions within the state. Whether a secessionist movement will achieve its aims, however, is determined largely by international politics, by the balance of interests and forces that extend beyond the state.”).Google Scholar

⁹⁵ See generally, Fisch, Jörg, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker: Die Domestizierung einer Illusion (2010).Google Scholar

⁹⁶ See also Brandt, Michele, Jill Cottrell, Yash Ghai & Anthony Regan, Constitution-Making and Reform: Options for the Process, Interpeace 299–305 (Nov. 2011), available at http://constitutionmakingforpeace.org/sites/default/files/Constitution-Making-Handbook.pdf.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ For example, “it is unlikely that iterations of the secession process will arrive at a result in which no individual is required to go along with the associational preferences of those around him.” Patten, supra note 7, at 578.Google Scholar

⁹⁸ See Müllerson, Rein, Ukraine: Victim of Geopolitics, 13 Chinese J. Int'l L. 133, 140 (2014) (noting that “[t]here is no doubt that most Crimeans […] welcome the reunification of the Crimea with Russia.”).Google Scholar

⁹⁹ See Ukraine's Separatists: Shrinking Country, Economist (Nov. 8, 2014).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ Though not by federalization, which is “assumed to be a way station to secession.” Timothy William Waters, Letting Go of Territorial Integrity: Getting Realism and Ideals Right on Ukraine, Volkerrechtsblog (Jun. 16, 2014), http://voelkerrechtsblog.com/2014/06/16/letting-go-of-territorial-integrity-getting-realism-and-ideals-right-on-Ukraine/.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ Id. Google Scholar