¹ See Atwood, Margaret, Lusus Naturae, in Stone Mattress: Nine Wicked Tales 125, 130 (2014).Google Scholar

² In what follows a person is an oft-used short-hand for a legal person but we occasionally variate and use terms such as legal personality or legal subject to refer to legal person.Google Scholar

³ See Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness 576 (1958).Google Scholar

⁴ Eric Hobsbawm, Introduction: Inventing Traditions, in The Invention of Tradition 1, 6 (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1983).Google Scholar

⁵ See General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119); see also Opinion 4/2007 of the Data Protection Working Party on the Concept of Personal Data, 01248/07/EN WP 136) 22–23 (discussing the concept of personal data).Google Scholar

⁶ Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway 72 (2007).Google Scholar

⁷ David Fagundes, Note: What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1745, 1768 (2001).Google Scholar

⁸ For other examples from upholding this myth, see, e.g., Hicks, Stephen C., On the Citizen and the Legal Person, 59 Cincinnati L. Rev. 789, 869 (1991); Anu Pylkkänen, Onko oikeuden henkilöllä sukupuolta?, 36 Oikeus 147, 148 (2007) (asking to “develop an understanding of the legal person,” or noting how little discussion there is on what personhood entails“ (author translation)).Google Scholar

⁹ See Barthes, Roland, Mythologies 29 (1972).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Susan Marks, Four Human Rights Myths, in Human Rights 217, 231 et seq. (David Kinley, Wojchiech Sadurski, & Kevin Walton eds., 2013).Google Scholar

¹¹ For a discussion with regard to fetal personhood and women's rights, see Madrazo, Alejandro, Narratives of Prenatal Personhood in Abortion Law, in Abortion Law in Transnational Perspective: Cases and Controversies 327 (Cook, Rebecca J., Erdman, Joanna N., & Dickens, Bernard M. eds., 2014).Google Scholar

¹² For such a reading of ideology's traits, see Ricoeur, Paul, Ideology and Utopia as Cultural Imagination, 7 Philos. Exch. 17 (1976).Google Scholar

¹³ Marks, supra note 10, at 232.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁴ See Gaius, Institutiones 13 (E.A. Whittuck ed., 4th ed. 1904).Google Scholar

¹⁵ See Esposito, Roberto, The Dispositif of the Person, 8 L. Cult. & Human. 17 (2012); Roberto Esposito, Third Person: Politics of Life and Philosophy of the Impersonal (2012).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Korsgaard, Christine M., Kantian Ethics, Animals, and the Law, 33 Oxf. J. Leg. Stud. 629 (2013); Rafael Domingo, Gaius, Vattel, and the New Global Law Paradigm, 22 Eur. J. Int'l L. 627 (2011).Google Scholar

¹⁷ See, e.g., Israel, Jonathan, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity (2001) (discussing the influence of different stages of Enlightenment with different views regarding universality and what he titles Radical Enlightenment). For a materialist critique on the influence of this, see Lilti, Antoine, 64 Comment ecrit-on l'histoire intellectuelle des Lumieres? Spinozime, radicalisme et philosophie Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales (2009); Ann Thomson, Bodies of Thought: Science, Religion, and the Soul in the Early Enlightenment (2008) (attempting to provide a counter-narrative).Google Scholar

¹⁸ The matter was not solely of having trials for animals, but also “the court, viewing insensate creatures as the equivalent of vulnerable minor.” See Cohen, Esther, Law, Folklore and Animal Lore, Past & Present 6, 13 (1986).Google Scholar

¹⁹ As Christine Korsgaard argues, such a position is not sole or even the most likely interpretation of Kant's formulation. Nevertheless, the way Kant's tradition is perceived at present matters relatively little to past interpretation of his work by legal theorists. See Korsgaard, supra note 16.Google Scholar

²⁰ But see Kelley, Donald R., Gaius Noster: Substructures of Western Social Thought, 84 Am. Hist. Rev. 619, 645 et seq. (1979) (providing an interpretation of Savigny's limited impact outside his work in Roman law).Google Scholar

²¹ See Friedrich Carl von Savigny, 2 System des heutigen Römischen Rechts 60 (1840).Google Scholar

²² Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.).Google Scholar

²³ Calverley, David J., Legal Rights for Machines: Some Fundamental Concepts, in Machine Ethics 213, 219 (Michael Anderson & Susan Leigh Anderson eds., 2011). Compare however to an account provided in Noonan, John T., Persons and Masks of the Law: Cardozo, Holmes, Jefferson, and Wythe as Makers of the Masks (1976) highlighting the role of Blackstone in shaping the doctrine rather than considering the outcome merely a neutral enactment between positive law and more general principles of common law.Google Scholar

²⁴ Richard Hartzmann, John Austin, in Dictionary of Literary Biography: British Philosophers 1800-2000 18–25 (2002); M. H. Hoeflich, John Austin and Joseph Story: Two Nineteenth Century Perspectives on the Utility of the Civil Law for the Common Lawyer, 29 Am. J. Leg. Hist. 36 (1985).Google Scholar

²⁵ See Austin, John, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 5 (1832).Google Scholar

²⁶ See Hoeflich, supra note 24, at 44.Google Scholar

²⁷ See Kelley, supra note 20, at 644.Google Scholar

²⁸ It is contested to what extent the individual's command or possession over herself was the very founding treatise of individualism and subsequent form of governance and of law. For debate, see, e.g., C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (1977); Quentin Skinner, The Ideological Context of Hobbes's Political Thought, 9 Hist. J. 286 (1966), but few would, according to Peter Lindsay, Possessive Individualism at 50: Retrieving Macpherson's Lost Legacy, 21 Good Soc. 132, 134 (2012) question the existence of such claims at the heart of Enlightenment perception of an individual that was later embodied as a person.Google Scholar

²⁹ For the historical origins of this nexus, compare Cohen, Morris R., Property and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L. Q. 8, 18 et seq. (1927), with 2 Heinrich Ahrens, Cours de droit naturel ou De Philosophie du droit. 7 et seq. (7th ed. 1875) (providing accounts stressing other foundational nexii, such as humanity).Google Scholar

³⁰ See Lundberg, Sofia, Child Auctions in Nineteenth Century Sweden: An Analysis of Price Differences, 35 J. Hum. Resources 279 (2000); Elisabeth Engberg, Boarded Out by Auction: Poor Children and Their Families in Nineteenth-Century Northern Sweden, 19 Contin. Chang. 431 (2004).Google Scholar

³¹ See Finland [Constitution] July 17, 1919, section 5 (containing general equality clause); Id., section 6(1) (protecting inter alia personal liberty).Google Scholar

³² See Glickman, Lawrence B., Business as Usual: The Long History of Corporate Personhood, Boston Review (Aug. 23, 2017), http://bostonreview.net/politics/lawrence-b-glickman-business-usual-long-history-corporate-personhood (for an argument of longstanding power of perceiving business interests and corporations as apolitical).Google Scholar

³³ See Stern, Philip J., The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India (2011). For a continued relevance of this distinction, see Mikko Rajavuori chapter in this volume, Making International Legal Persons in Investment Treaty Arbitration: State-owned Enterprises Along the Person/Thing Distinction, 18 German L. J. (2017).Google Scholar

³⁴ See Janet McLean, The Transnational Corporation in History: Lessons for Today?, 79 Ind. L.J. 363, 373 (2004).Google Scholar

³⁵ Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819).Google Scholar

³⁶ See Barkan, Joshua, Corporate Sovereignty: Law and Government under Capitalism (2013). For the most influential formulation in the present, see Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976); Henry Hansmann & Reinier H Kraakman, The End Of History For Corporate Law, 89 Geo. L J. 439 (2001).Google Scholar

³⁷ For this and other earlier history of the minority protection, see Rosting, Helmer, Protection of Minorities by the League of Nations, 17 Am. J. Int'l L. 641 (1923).Google Scholar

³⁸ Here we use the term employed by Umut Özsu. See Umut Özsu, The Ottoman Empire, the Origins of Extraterritoriality, and International Legal Theory, in Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law 123 (Anne Orford & Florian Hoffman eds., 2016). There are other terms as well, such as semi-sovereign employed by Matthew Craven. See Craven, Matthew, Statehood, Self-determination, and Recognition, in International Law 203 (Evans, Malcom D. ed., 3rd ed. 2010). In this instance, the choice of the term carries no particular theoretical leaning.Google Scholar

³⁹ For a critical analysis on the purpose of this system of minority protection in the Ottoman Empire, see Özsu, supra note 38.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ See generally Fink, Caro, Defending the Rights of Others (2004).Google Scholar

⁴¹ See generally Wheatley, Natasha, Spectral Legal Personality in Interwar International Law: On New Ways of Not Being a State, L. & Hist. Rev. (forthcoming).Google Scholar

⁴² For the English debate, see generally Quentin Skinner, A Genealogy of the State, 162 Br. Acad. Publ. Online 325 (2008).Google Scholar

⁴³ See, e.g., Koskenniemi, Martti, Transformations of Natural Law: Germany 1648–1815, in Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law 59 (2016) (showing these contractual similarities); Skinner, supra note 42; Craven, supra note 388.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 120 (Richard Tuck ed., 2008).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Samuel von Pufendorf, Law of Nature and Nations 645 (4th ed. 1729).Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Koskenniemi, supra note 43.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ For these classifications, see Craven, supra note 38.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ See Dewey, John, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 Yale L.J. 655, 673 (1926).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ See Korhonen, Outi, International Law Situated (2000) (regarding a State seeking membership among the order of civilized States); Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (2004) (analyzing inclusion/exclusion through universalism/particularism); Vasuki Nesiah, Human Shields/Human Crosshairs: Colonial Legacies and Contemporary Wars, 110 AJIL Unbound 323 (2016) (discussing the disregard of certain forms of suffering at the dawn of international humanitarian law).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ See Maitland, Frederic William, Moral Personality and Legal Personality, 6 J. Soc. Comp. Legis. 192 (1905) (proposing the dilemma with regard to corporations).Google Scholar

⁵¹ David Hunter Miller, Nationality and Other Problems Discussed at the Hague, 8 Foreign Aff. 632, 633 (1930).Google Scholar

⁵² Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 299 (1958). For more recent literature, see Lindahl, Hans, A-Legality: Postnationalism and the Question of Legal Boundaries, 73 Mod. L. Rev. 30 (2010); Hans Lindahl, Fault Lines of Globalization (2013) (arguing, likewise, against the possibility to include everyone).Google Scholar

⁵³ Turner, Brian S., Outline of a Theory of Citizenship, 24 Soc. 189, 194 (1990) (arguing the same with regard to citizenship, claiming that it required a universalistic notion of subject). This universalistic notion created a space, then, for social struggles, as whoever controlled the definition of what it means to be a citizen controlled the construction of the whole political body. See also id., for language requirements, and discrimination of aboriginal people and people of color in granting citizenship.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ See generally Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (rev. ed. 2006).Google Scholar

⁵⁵ See Moyn, Samuel, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History 13 (2010).Google Scholar

⁵⁶ See Boyer, Paul, By the Bomb's Early Light (1994) (perspective of U.S. events); Special Issue on British Nuclear Culture, 45 British J. Hist. Sci. (2012) (perspective of U.K. events); see, e.g., Moore, Alan, Dave Gibbons & John Higgins, Watchmen (Len Wein & Barbara Kesel eds., 1987); Stanley Kubrick, Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (1964).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ See Günther Anders, Theses for the Atomic Age, 3 Mass. Rev. 493 (1962).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ See, e.g., Heidegger, Martin, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays Technology and values: Essential readings 1 (1977) (presenting an account of technology's power to reduce humans into mere standing-reserve for technologies to employ).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Charles Chaplin, The Great Dictator (1940).Google Scholar

⁶⁰ We follow here Willian N. Jr. Eskridge, Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 2062 (2002) in dividing different parts of this struggle for full set of rights into three: politics of protection, politics of recognition, and politics of remediation (p. 2065). The first stage (protection) attempts to seek safeguards against life, liberty and property, whilst the second stage (recognition) seeks to address remaining discriminatory practices. The third stage of remediation attempts to rectify past material wrongs of past discrimination.Google Scholar

⁶¹ On eugenic practices, see Wessel, Merle, Castration of male sex offenders in the Nordic welfare state in the context of homosexuality and heteronormativity, 1930–1955, 40 Scand. J. Hist. 591 (2015); Jenny Bjorkman, Vard for samhallets basta (2001); Jutta Ahlbeck-Rehn, Diagnostisering och disciplinering (2006); Markku Mattila, Kansamme parhaaksi (1999). For the assimilation policies and colonial legacy of Sámi people, see Jukka Nyyssönen, Sami Counter-Narratives of Colonial Finland. Articulation, Reception and the Boundaries of the Politically Possible, 30 Acta Boreal. 101 (2013); Henry Minde, Assimilation of the Sami - Implementation and Consequences, 20 Acta Boreal. 121 (2003).Google Scholar

⁶² Nira Yuval-Davis, Gender and nation, 16 Ethn. Racial Stud. 621 (1993).Google Scholar

⁶³ R.M. Smith, One United People: Second-Class Female Citizenship and the American Quest for Community, 1 Yale J.L. & Human. 229 (1988).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ See, e.g., Marilley, Suzanne M., Woman Suffrage and the Origins of Liberal Feminism in the United States 1820–1920 (1997).Google Scholar

⁶⁵ See Blom, Ida, Structures and Agency: a transnational comparison of the struggle for women's suffrage in the Nordic countries during the long 19th century., 37 Scand. J. Hist. 600 (2012) (for arguments employed in Nordic countries).; see Smith, supra note 62 (presenting arguments in the U.S.); see Hause, Steven C. & Kenney, Anne R., Women's suffrage and social politics in the French Third Republic (1984) (presenting arguments in the French Third Republic).Google Scholar

⁶⁶ See, e.g., Louise Michele Newman, White Women's Rights (1999).Google Scholar

⁶⁷ See, e.g., Pat Stretton & Christine Finnimore, Black Fellow Citizens: Aborigines and the Commonwealth Franchise, 25 Aust. Hist. Stud. 521 (1993) (discussing the practice of enfranchisement and disfranchisement through language requirement); Benno C. Jr. Schmidt, Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era. Part 3: Black Disfranchisement from the KKK to the Grandfather Clause, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 835 (1982).Google Scholar

⁶⁸ A. McGrath & W. Stevenson, Gender, Race, and Policy: Aboriginal Women and the State in Canada and Australia, 38 Lab. Hist. 37, 43 (1996).Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Knut Einar Eriksen & Einar Niemi, Den finske fare: sikkerhetsproblemer og minoritetspolitikk i nord 1860-1940, 258 (1981); Minde, supra note 61, at 131.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).Google Scholar

⁷¹ See Schmidt, supra note 67 (discussing a clause that allowed those whose ancestors were entitled to vote in 1866 to vote without literacy tests.).Google Scholar

⁷² See Blom, supra note 65 (regarding women's position).Google Scholar

⁷³ In a UNESCO Statement Issued 18 July 1950, this much is stated in the first paragraph: “Scientists have reached general agreements in recognizing that mankind is one.”Google Scholar

⁷⁴ See Claude Levi-Strauss, Race and History 5–6 (1952).Google Scholar

⁷⁵ See Unesco, The Race Question 3 (July 18, 1950), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001282/128291eo.pdf.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954)Google Scholar

⁷⁷ See Dudziak, Mary L., Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy 3 (2000); Dudziak, Mary L., Brown as a Cold War Case, 91 J. Am. Hist. 32 (2004).Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Dudziak, supra note 77, at 39.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ See Fanon, Frantz, Black Skin, White Masks (1952).Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Bob Hepple, The European Legacy of Brown v Board of Education, Univ. Ill. L. Rev. 605 (2006); Minow, Martha L., Brown v. Board in the World: How the Global Turn Matters for School Reform, Human Rights and Legal Knowledge, 50 San Diego L. Rev. 1 (2013); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Brown v. Board of Education in International Context, 36 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 493 (2005).Google Scholar

⁸¹ Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State 94 (1949).Google Scholar

⁸² See these debates, Tuo Yu, Approaches for Dealing with the “Natural Person” in the Chinese Legal System: A Statutory Way and a Principled Way, 18 German L. J. (2017) and Lisette ten Haaf, Unborn and Future Children as New Legal Subjects: An Evaluation of Two Subject-Oriented Approaches—The Subject of Rights and the Subject of Interests, 18 German L. J. (2017).Google Scholar

⁸³ See Bunch, Charlotte, Women's Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vision of Human Rights, 12 Hum. Rts. Q. 486 (1990).Google Scholar

⁸⁴ See Schneider, Elizabeth M., The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 589 (1986) (discussing the inadequacy of laws alone as means of social change).Google Scholar

⁸⁵ See Fraser, Arvonne S., Becoming Human: The Origins and Development of Women's Human Rights, 21 Hum. Rts. Q. 853 (1999).Google Scholar

⁸⁶ See Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (2010).Google Scholar

⁸⁷ See, e.g., Engle, Karen, Female Subjects of Public International Law: Human Rights and the Exotic Other Female, 26 New Eng. L. Rev. 1509 (1992) (showing an international legal perspective).Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Ann Shola Orloff, Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship: The Comparative Analysis of Gender Relations and Welfare States, 58 Am. Soc. Rev. 303 (1993).Google Scholar

⁸⁹ See in general of these and other arguments about abortion in Kate Greasley, Arguments about Abortion: Personhood, Morality, and Law (2017).Google Scholar

⁹⁰ See Rollet, Catherine, La santé et la protection de l'enfant vues à travers les congrès internationaux (1880–1920), 101 Ann. Demogr. Hist. (Paris) 97 (2001); Joëlle Droux, L'internationalisation de la protection de l'enfance: acteurs, concurrences et projets transnationaux (1900–1925), 52 Crit. Int. 17 (2011); Declaration of Geneva of the Rights of the Child, Mar. 1924, in the Rights of the Child: International Instruments 3 (Maria Rita Saulle ed., 1995) (international legal codification).Google Scholar

⁹¹ See Teitelbaum, Lee E., Foreword: The Meanings of Rights of Children, 10 N. M. L. Rev. 235, 236 (1980) (presenting a much later general acceptance of the rights of child, declaring “[t]he United Nation's call to arms on behalf of the child apparently finds, therefore, everyone on one side, with no declared enemy to conquer”).Google Scholar

⁹² See, e.g., Toni Selkälä, “But in This Twilight Our Choices Seal Our Fate,” XLVII Oikeustiede–Jurisprudentia 253 (2014).Google Scholar

⁹³ See Moyn, Samuel, Christian Human Rights (2015).Google Scholar

⁹⁴ See Alston, Philip, The Unborn Child and Abortion Under the Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child., 12 Hum. Rts. Q. 156 (1990).Google ScholarPubMed

⁹⁵ See Selb, Walter, Schädigung des Menschen vor Geburt—ein Problem der Rechtsfähigkeit?, 166 Arch. für die Civilistische Prax. 76 (1966).Google Scholar

⁹⁶ For Finland, see Heli Leppälä, Vammaisuus hyvinvointivaltiossa (2014). For Germany, see Elsbeth Bösl, Politiken der Normalisierung, Zur Geschichte der Behindertenpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2015). For the U.S., see Perske, Robert, The Dignity of Risk and the Mentally Retarded, 10 Ment. Retard. 24 (1972).Google Scholar

⁹⁷ Herr, Stanley S., Rights into Action: Protecting Human Rights of the Mentally Handicapped, 26 Cath. U. L. Rev. 201 (1977); Gunnar Dybwad & Herr, Stanley S., Unnecessary Coercion: An End to Involuntary Civil Commitment of Retarded Persons, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 753 (1979).Google Scholar

⁹⁸ See, e.g., Millon, David, Theories of the Corporation, Duke L.J. 201 (1990). For a historical exposition, see, e.g., Tara Helfman, Transatlantic Influences on American Corporate Jurisprudence: Theorizing the Corporation in the United States, 23 Ind. J. Global Leg. Stud. 383 (2016).Google Scholar

⁹⁹ There is a long tradition in philosophy for collective responsibility starting from at latest in Hobbes' oeuvre with, for example, Joel Feinberg, See Feinberg, Joel, Collective Responsibility, 65 J. Philos. 674, 687 et seq. (1968) (suggesting a contributory group fault where responsibility is collective but not distributive). These differ from what came to be argued as a specific responsibility of corporations falling to them due to actions condoned by its executive structures. From Virginia Held onwards there are specific references to corporations and their particular moral agency. See Held, Virginia, Can a Random Collection of Individuals be Morally Responsible?, 67 J. Philos. 471 (1970).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ For an example in the field of business ethics, see Manning, Rita C., Corporate Responsibility and Corporate Personhood, 3 J. Bus. Ethics 77 (1984); Goodpaster, Kenneth E. & John B. Jr. Matthews, Can a Corporation Have a Conscience?, 60 Harv. Bus. Rev. 132 (1982); Goodpaster, Kenneth E., The Concept of Corporate Responsibility, 2 J. Bus. Ethics 1 (1983).Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ French, Peter A., The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 Am. Philos. Q. 207, 210 (1979).Google Scholar

¹⁰² Goodpaster & Matthews, supra note 100, at 133. For a more recent source, see Parker, Christine, Meta-regulation: Legal Accountability for Corporate Social Responsibility, in The New Corporate Social Accountability: Corporate Social Responsiblity and the Law 207 (Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu, & Tom Campbell eds., 2007).Google Scholar

¹⁰³ This notion persists among contemporary business & human rights debate. For a discussion on this, see Karp, David Jason, Responsibility for Human Rights: Transnational Corporations in Imperfect States (2014).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.CJ. 174 (Apr. 11).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ See Mbembe, Achille, On the Postcolony 2 (2001).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ See G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/5-6/3201 (May 1. 1974) (adopting the “Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order”).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ See, e.g., Bedjaoui, Mohammed, Pour un nouvel ordre économique international (1979); Upendra Baxi, The New International Economic Order, Basic Needs and Rights: Notes Towards Development of the Right to Development, 23 Indian J. Int'l L. 225 (1983).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ For the dismal outcome of NIEO, see Umut Özsu, “In the Interests of Mankind as a Whole”: Mohammed Bedjaoui's New International Economic Order, 6 Human. 129 (2015); Margot Salomon, From NIEO to Now and the Unfinishable Story of Economic Justice, 62 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 31 (2013).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ Nicolas Van de Walle, African economies and the politics of permanent crisis, 1979–1999 155 (2001).Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ See also Rajavuori, supra note 33.Google Scholar

¹¹¹ Stone, Christopher D., Should Trees Have Standing? 8 (1974).Google Scholar

¹¹² Garry Gasparov, The Chess Master and the Computer New York Review of Books (2010).Google Scholar

¹¹³ Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society 22 (1989).Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ With regard to Europe, see Homeyer, Ingmar Von, The Evolution of EU Environmental Governance, in Environmental Protection: European Law and Governance 1, 8–11 (Joanne Scott ed., 2009); Adler, Jonathan H., Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History of Environmental Protection, 14 Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 89 (2002); Meadows, Donella H. et al., The Limits to Growth (1972).Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of Genetics, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 313, 315 (1992).Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ See id. Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ Nikolas Rose, The Politics of Life Itself, 18 Theory Cult. Soc. 1, 21 (2001).Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ Martin Scheinin, Ihmisarvon loukkaamattomuus valtiosääntöperiaatteena, in Juhlakirja Kaarlo Tuori 50 vuotta 57 (Paul van Aerschot, Paula Ilveskivi, & Kirsi Piispanen eds., 1998).Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ Of the string of theories proposed at the time, the Gaia theory might be the most notable. See Lovelock, James E. & Lynn Margulis, Atmospheric Homeostasis by and for the Biosphere: the Gaia Hypothesis, 26 Tellus A 1 (1974).Google Scholar

¹²⁰ Donna J Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Rseinvention of Nature 151 (1991).Google Scholar

¹²¹ Id. Google Scholar

¹²² See Naffine, Ngaire, Law's Meaning of Life 163 (2009).Google Scholar

¹²³ See id. Google Scholar

¹²⁴ For invisible exclusionary practices, see Butler, Judith, Gender Trouble (1990). The pragmatism of lawyers is of an older origin, with the likes of Roscoe Pound and Oliver Wendell Holmes promoting it in name of legal realism: “Not only does the law in the books seek to surround accused persons with safeguards which the practical exigencies of prosecution will not put up with, but at other times it demands conviction of persons whom local or even general opinion does not desire to punish.” See Pound, Roscoe, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Am. L. Rev. 12 (1910).Google Scholar

¹²⁵ Another example could be drawn between the U.S. Federal prohibition on funding research that creates new stem cell lines through destroying embryos, but does not prevent private funding for such projects nor use of already existing stem cell lines in federally funded research projects.Google Scholar

¹²⁶ See Conley, Robin, “At the Time She Was a Man”: The Temporal Dimension of Identity Construction, 31 Pol. & Legal Anth. R. 28 (2008).Google Scholar

¹²⁷ See, e.g., Assoc'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (showing that science frames the difference between natural DNA and complementary DNA (cDNA) that is not naturally occurring, allowing patenting of latter but not the former).Google Scholar

¹²⁸ ECJ, Case C-364/13, Int'l Stem Cell Corp. v. Comptroller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2451, Judgment of 18 December 2014.Google Scholar

¹²⁹ Case C-34/10, Brüstle v Greenpeace eV, 2011 E.C.R. I-09821, para. 35.Google Scholar

¹³⁰ See Rowlands, Mark, Animal Rights: Moral Theory and Practice (2d ed. 2009) (discussing the importance of moral theories in animal rights).Google Scholar

¹³¹ Yasco Horsman, Braying, Howling, Growling for Justice: Animal Personhood in Law, Literature, and Cinema, 28 L. Lit. 319 (2016).Google Scholar

¹³² But see Wise, Steven M., Animal Thing to Animal Person—Thoughts on Time, Place, and Theories, 5 Animal L. 61 (1999).Google Scholar

¹³³ See, e.g., Lennkh, Sabine, The Animal: A Subject of Law? A Reflection on Aspects of the Austrian and German Juridical Systems, 24 Int. J. Semiot. Law - Rev. Int. Sémiotique Jurid. 307 (2011); Camara Federal de Casacion Penal, Orangutan Sandra s/ recurso de casacion S/HABEAS CORPUS, 18 Dec 2014.Google Scholar

¹³⁴ See, e.g., Wolfe, Cary, Before the Law: Humans and Other Animals in a Biopolitical Frame (2012).Google Scholar

¹³⁵ Sabine Brels, L'animalité humaine: du constat scientifique aux conséquences éthico-juridiques, 17 Lex Electron. 1 (2012).Google Scholar

¹³⁶ See Horsman, supra note 131.Google Scholar

¹³⁷ Double contingency refers, originally, to a confrontation encountered when meeting another human face-to-face. Through a mutual system of symbols, the problem of social interaction is provided with a solution. It asks a simple question of how the other will understand me. With regard to animals, we presume that we share a symbolic system and are able to understand their problems and provide solutions to them. It also means that we give explanations to their gestures that are often derivative from those we share with other humans.Google Scholar

¹³⁸ See Vanderstraeten, Raf, Parsons, Luhmann and the Theorem of Double Contingency, 2 J. Class. Soc. 77 (2002) (discussing double contingency in sociology).Google Scholar

¹³⁹ Gunther Teubner, Rights of Nonhumans? Electronic Agents and Animals as New Actors in Politics and Law, 33 J.L. Soc. 497 (2006).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁰ See generally Jasanoff, Sheila, Designs on Nature (2007). The nomenclature of nonhuman animals resembles much of that of the pre-embryo employed in biomedical research to justify interventions to some embryos but not others.Google Scholar

¹⁴¹ Emilie Hache & Bruno Latour, Morality of Moralism?, 16 Common Knowledge 311 (2010).Google Scholar

¹⁴² Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 267 (1997).Google Scholar

¹⁴³ See Horsman, supra note 131.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁴ Naffine, supra note 122. See, e.g., Mannio, Niilo A., Yhteisöllisestä juridisesta henkilöstä, Lakimies 1 (1918) (showing that these thoughts are hardly novel in law).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁵ Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal (2004).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁶ Id. Google Scholar

¹⁴⁷ The military-aged male as a legitimate target is explored in Grégoire Chamayou, Drone Theory (2015); see, e.g., Ajana, Btihaj, Governing through Biometrics: The Biopolitics of Identity (2013) (biometric means to control passage).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁸ Linda Bosniak, Persons and Citizens in Constitutional Thought, 8 Int'l. J. Const. Law 9 (2010).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁹ Agamben, supra note 145.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁰ These structures are commonly seen as parts of transnational law, a fusion of international and domestic legal orders, that are instrumental for the liberal theory. See José E Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter's Liberal Theory, 12 Eur. J. Int'l L. 183 (2001) (showing liberal theory and its critique).Google Scholar

¹⁵¹ B.S. Chimni, Responses to Hathaway: Globalization and Refugee Blues, 8 J. Refug. Stud. 298 (1995).Google Scholar

¹⁵² Itamar Mann, Dialectic of Transnationalism: Unauthorized Migration and Human Rights, 1993–2013, 54 Harv. Int'l L.J. 315 (2013).Google Scholar

¹⁵³ See Badiou, Alain, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil (2001) (showing the importance of noble suffering and evil to human rights).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁴ EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁵ See Johns, Fleur, Data, Detection and the Redistribution of the Sensible in International Law, 111 Am. J. Int'l L. 57.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁶ See James C Hathaway & Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence, 53 Colum. J. Trans'l. L. 235 (2015).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁷ See generally Mbembe, Achille, Critique of Black Reason (2017).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁸ See generally Mann, Itamar, Humanity at Sea (2016). For an attempt to shed a light to the events taking place on the perilous journey from thinghood to personhood, see Pollock, Lindsay, Hasko Positive Negatives (2015); see also Julia O'Connell Davidson, ‘Things’ Are Not What They Seem: On Persons, Things, Slaves, and the New Abolitionist Movement, 69 Current Legal Prob. 227 (2016).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁹ A terrorist caught is often rendered invisible through a network of clandestine detention centers or camps that escape all but martial jurisdiction. Here, the logic of person-making between a migrant and a terrorist converge.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁰ See Lubell, Noam & Derejko, Nathan, A Global Battlefield? Drones and the Geographical Scope of Armed Conflict, 11 J. Int. Crim. Just. 65 (2013).Google Scholar

¹⁶¹ See Christof Heyns et al., The International Law Framework Regulating the Use of Armed Drones, 65 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 791 (2016).Google Scholar

¹⁶² See Berkowitz, Roger, Drones and the Question of “The Human”, 28 Ethics Int'l Aff. 159 (2014).Google Scholar

¹⁶³ Lauren Wilcox, Embodying Algorithmic War: Gender, Race, and the Posthuman in Drone Warfare, 48 Security Dialogue 11, 13 (2017).Google Scholar

¹⁶⁴ For an analysis of such power in action, see Allinson, Jamie, The Necropolitics of Drones, 9 Int. Pol. Soc. 113 (2015).Google Scholar

¹⁶⁵ The term everywhere war is loaned from Derek Gregory. See Gregory, Derek, The Everywhere War, 177 Geographical J. 238 (2011). The function of data to construct nodes and linkages as a highly impersonal sign of terrorism is widely discussed in literature. See, e.g., Weber, Jutta, Keep Adding. On Kill Lists, Drone Warfare and the Politics of Databases, 34 Env't. Plan. D: Soc. & Space 107 (2016); Berkowitz, supra note 162; Wilcox, supra note 163.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁶ See Chamayou, supra note 147.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁷ See Allinson, supra note 164.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁸ See Heidegger, supra note 58.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁹ Achille Mbembe, Necropolitics, 15 Pub. Culture 11, 18 (2003).Google Scholar

¹⁷⁰ See Gunneflo, Markus, Targeted Killing: A Legal and Political History (2016).Google Scholar

¹⁷¹ See Mbembe, supra note 169.Google Scholar

¹⁷² This reading follows Giorgio Agamben. See generally Agamben, Giorgio, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998).Google Scholar

¹⁷³ See Milanovic, Marko, Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital Age, 56 Harv. Int'l L.J. 81 (2015).Google Scholar

¹⁷⁴ Id. at 93.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁵ See Legrand, Pierre, The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants,” 4 Maastricht J. Eur. Comp. L. 111 (1997).Google Scholar

¹⁷⁶ See Twining, William, Have Concepts, Will Travel: Analytical Jurisprudence in a Global Context, 1 Int'l. J.L. in Context 5 (2005).Google Scholar

¹⁷⁷ Antony Anghie, The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities, 27 Third World Q. 739, 742 (2006).Google Scholar

¹⁷⁸ See Levi-Strauss, supra note 74.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁹ Indigenous Tribe's Blood Returned to Brazil After Decades, BBC News (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-32178286.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁰ See Anghie, supra note 177.Google Scholar

¹⁸¹ See, e.g., Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Cannibal Metaphysics (2014); Philippe Descola, Beyond Nature and Culture (2013).Google Scholar

¹⁸² See Duff, P.W., The Personality of an Idol, 3 Cambridge L. J. 42 (1927) for the long history of this meeting of different ideas of personhood.Google Scholar

¹⁸³ See Hutchison, Abigail, The Whanganui River As a Legal Person, 39 Alternative L. J. 179–82 (2014).Google Scholar

¹⁸⁴ See Miglani v. State of Uttarakhand, Writ Petition No. 140 of 2015, High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital (India), MCC 139/2017.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁵ See Lalander, Rickard, The Ecuadorian Resource Dilemma: Sumak Kawsay or Development?, 42 Critical Soc. 623 (2016).Google Scholar

¹⁸⁶ See Whittemore, Mary Elizabeth, The Problem of Enforcing Nature's Rights Under Ecuador's Constitution: Why the 2008 Environmental Amendments Have No Bite, 20 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J. 659 (2011).Google Scholar

¹⁸⁷ See Constitución de la República del Ecuador [Constitution] 2008, art. 57.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁸ See Ray, Rebecca & Chimienti, Adam, A Line in the Equatorial Forests: Chinese Investment and the Environmental and Social Impacts of Extractive Industries in Ecuador (2015); Mikko Rajavuori, How Should States Own? Heinisch v. Germany and the Emergence of Human Rights-sensitive State Ownership Function, 26 Eur. J. Int'l L. 727–46 (2015) (discussing how states should own and operate according to the European system).Google Scholar

¹⁸⁹ See Adelman, Sam, Tropical Forests and Climate Change: a Critique of Green Governmentality, 11 Int. J. Law Context 195 (2015); The Double Life of International Law: Indigenous Peoples and Extractive Industries, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1755 (2016).Google Scholar

¹⁹⁰ Miglani v. State of Uttarakhand, supra note 184, at 61.Google Scholar

¹⁹¹ See Arvidsson, Matilda, The Subject in International Law: The Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority of Occupied Iraq and its Laws (2017); Luis Eslava, Local Space, Global Life: The Everyday Operation of International Law and Development (2015).Google Scholar

¹⁹² See Brand, Peter, Green Subjection: The Politics of Neoliberal Urban Environmental Management, 31 Int. J. Urban Reg. Resol. 616 (2007); see, e.g., Constitution of the City of Mexico (Constitución Política de la Ciudad de México), 5 February 2017, art. 13. (calling for a healthy environment).Google Scholar

¹⁹³ See Kantorowicz, Ernst, The king's two bodies: a study in medieval political theology (2016); Arvidsson, supra note 191.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁴ See Gathii, James Thuo, Imperialism, Colonialism, and International Law, 54 Buff. L. Rev. 1013 (2007); Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (2004).Google Scholar

¹⁹⁵ See Grear, Anna, Human Rights–Human Bodies? Some Reflections on Corporate Human Rights Distortion, The Legal Subject, Embodiment and Human Rights Theory, 17 L. & Critique 171 (2006).Google Scholar

¹⁹⁶ David Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of the Corporation, 107 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 139, 139 (2013).Google Scholar

¹⁹⁷ Upendra Baxi, The Future of Human Rights 17–18 (2d ed. 2006).Google Scholar

¹⁹⁸ See Ciepley, supra note 196.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁹ But see Fleur Johns, Theorizing the Corporation in International Law, in The Theory of International Law 635 (Anne Orford ed., 2016).Google Scholar

²⁰⁰ Peter Dicken, Global Shift: Mapping the Changing Contours of the World Economy 106 (5^th ed. 2007).Google Scholar

²⁰¹ See Ciepley, supra note 196.Google Scholar

²⁰² See Grear, supra note 195.Google Scholar

²⁰³ See Ciepley, supra note 196.Google Scholar

²⁰⁴ Baxi, supra note 197, at 246.Google Scholar

²⁰⁵ Marks, supra note 10, at 230.Google Scholar

²⁰⁶ Dennett, Daniel C., Conditions of Personhood, in The Identities of Persons 175 (Amelie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1976).Google Scholar

²⁰⁷ For additional sources, see, e.g., Law, Anthropology, and the Constitution of the Social, (Alain Pottage & Martha Mundy eds., 2004); Mireille Hildebrandt, Criminal Liability and “Smart” Environments, in Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law 507 (R. A. Duff ed., 2011); Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights (2000); Upendra Baxi, Human Rights in a Posthuman World (2009); Yan Thomas, Le sujet de droit, la personne et la nature, 100 Debat 107 (1998); Marta Madero, Penser la tradition juridique occidentale: Une lecture de Yan Thomas, 67 Ann. Hist. Sci. Soc. 103 (2012); Jonathan Erhardt & Martino Mona, Rechtsperson Roboter–Philosophische Grundlagen für den rechtlichen Umgang mit künstlicher Intelligenz, in Intelligente Agenten und das Recht 61 (Sabine Gless & Kurt Seelmann eds., 2016); Reinhard Damm, Personenrecht: Klassik und Moderne der Rechtsperson, 202 Arch. für die civilistische Prax. 841 (2002); Heike Baranzke, Das Tier als Subjekt eigener Interessen in Recht und Ethik?–Möglichkeiten und Grenzen interessenethischer Ansätze für eine Ethik der Verantwortung für Tiere, in Tierschutz bei der religiösen Schlachtung / Animal Welfare at Religious Slaughter 91 (Johannes Caspar & Jörg Luy eds., 2010); Critical Beings: Law, Nation and the Global Subject (Peter Fitzpatrick & Patricia Tuitt eds., 2004); Yoriko Otomo, Unconditional Life: The Postwar International Law Settlement (2016); Alain Supiot, Homo Juridicus: On the Anthropological Function of the Law (2007).Google Scholar

²⁰⁸ Derek Parfit, Personal Identity, 80 Phil. Rev. 3, 4 (1971).Google Scholar

²⁰⁹ See Douzinas, supra note 207.Google Scholar

²¹⁰ See Antony Anghie & B. S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts, 2 Chinese J. Int'l L. 77, 85–6 (2003).Google Scholar

²¹¹ See Israel, supra note 17.Google Scholar

²¹² See, e.g., Julien Offray de La Mettrie, L'homme-machine (1865); Jessica Riskin, The Restless Clock (2016).Google Scholar

²¹³ See Britta van Beers, The Changing Nature of Law's Natural Person: The Impact of Emerging Technologies on the Legal Concept of the Person, 18 German L.J. 560 (2017).Google Scholar

²¹⁴ Id. at 582.Google Scholar

²¹⁵ See Jasanoff, supra note 140.Google Scholar

²¹⁶ See Department of Health & Social Security, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology (1984).Google Scholar

²¹⁷ Van Beers, supra note 213, at 586.Google Scholar

²¹⁸ Margaret Lock, Death in Technological Time: Locating the End of Meaningful Life, 10 Med. Anthropology Q. 575, 582 (1996) (citing Experience with Human Heart Transplantation: Proceedings of the Cape Town Symposium 13–16 July 1968, 40 (Hillel Shapiro ed., 1969)).Google Scholar

²¹⁹ David Kennedy, a World of Struggle 89 (2016).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²²⁰ Tamanaha, Brian Z., Necessary and Universal Truths about Law?, 30 Ratio Juris 3, 4 (2017).Google Scholar

²²¹ Van Beers, supra note 213, at 593.Google Scholar

²²² Martin Heidegger, What Is a Thing? 3 (1968).Google Scholar

²²³ Id. Google Scholar

²²⁴ Tamanaha, Brian Z., What is Law? 60 (2017).Google Scholar

²²⁵ Norman Fost, Organs from Anencephalic Infants: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Yet Come, 18 Hastings Cent. Rep. 5, 7 (1988).Google Scholar

²²⁶ Vo v. France, Center for Reproductive Rights (intervening) and Family Planning Association (intervening), App. No. 53924/00 (2004).Google Scholar

²²⁷ Graham Harman, Tool-Being 2 (2002).Google Scholar

²²⁸ Esposito, supra note 15. One could also conceive of the person at the apex even in a more limited fashion as a masculinist. See, e.g., Otomo, supra note 207. Or one could go even further as to conceive of the person as “the white, European male property-owner.” See Grear, Anna, Deconstructing Anthropos: A Critical Legal Reflection on “Anthropocentric” Law and Anthropocene “Humanity”, 26 L. & Critique 225, 237 (2015).Google Scholar

²²⁹ See Esposito, Roberto, Persons and Things 26, 33 (2015).Google Scholar

²³⁰ See Hacking, Ian, Making Up People, in Beyond the Body Proper: Reading the Anthropology of Material Life 150, 158 (Margaret Lock & Judith Farquhar eds., 2007).Google Scholar

²³¹ See Lestel, Dominique, The Question of the Animal Subject, 19 Angelaki 113 (2014).Google Scholar

²³² See Irma Van der Ploeg, The Illegal Body: “Eurodac” and the Politics of Biometric Identification, 1 Ethics & Info. Tech. 295 (1999); Ajana, supra note 147.Google Scholar

²³³ See Karakayali, Nedim, Two Ontological Orientations in Sociology: Building Social Ontologies and Blurring the Boundaries of the “Social,” 49 Soc. 732 (2015).Google Scholar

²³⁴ Id. at 738.Google Scholar

²³⁵ Baxi, supra note 207, at 206–207.Google Scholar

²³⁶ See, e.g., Wolfe, Cary, What is Posthumanism? 57–61 (2010) (regarding animals).Google Scholar

²³⁷ Rosi Braidottti, The Posthuman 35 (2013).Google Scholar

²³⁸ See Alvarez-Nakagawa chapter in this volume, 18 German L.J. (2017).Google Scholar

²³⁹ See Casper Bruun Jensen & Anders Blok, Techno-animism in Japan: Shinto Cosmograms, Actor-network Theory, and the Enabling Powers of Nonhuman Agencies, 30 Theory, Cult. & Soc. 84 (2013).Google Scholar

²⁴⁰ See Danaher, John, The Threat of Algocracy: Reality, Resistance and Accommodation, Phil. & Tech. 1 (2016); Solum, Lawrence B., Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N. Carol. L. Rev. 1231 (1992).Google Scholar

²⁴¹ Irma Van der Ploeg, “Only Angels Can do without Skin”: On Reproductive Technology's Hybrids and the Politics of Body Boundaries, 10 Body Soc. 153 (2004).Google Scholar

²⁴² Compare to some of the present proposals for animal personhood that rely on sentience that would remove personhood from many humans.Google Scholar

²⁴³ See Haraway, Donna, The Promises of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics for Inappropriate/d Others, in Cultural Stud. 295, 300 (Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, & Treichler, Paula A. eds., 1992).Google Scholar

²⁴⁴ See Lisette ten Haaf chapter in this volume, 18 German L.J. (2017); Tuo Yu chapter in this volume 18 German L.J. (2017).Google Scholar

²⁴⁵ See Jannice Käll chapter in this volume, 18 German L.J. (2017).Google Scholar

²⁴⁶ See Ukri Soirila chapter in this volume, 18 German L.J. (2017).Google Scholar

²⁴⁷ See Mikko Rajavuori chapter in this volume, 18 German L.J. (2017).Google Scholar

²⁴⁸ See Alexis Alvarez-Nakagawa chapter in this volume, 18 German L.J. (2017).Google Scholar

²⁴⁹ See Mika Viljanen chapter in this volume, 18 German L.J. (2017).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁵⁰ See Susanna Lindroos-Hovinheimo chapter in this volume, 18 German L.J. (2017).Google Scholar

²⁵¹ See Visa Kurki chapter in this volume, 18 German L.J. (2017).CrossRefGoogle Scholar