1 The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) has pointed out “that Muslims, like other religious groups remain inadequately recorded statistically” and that “even demographic data relies often on unofficial estimates that vary substantially;” see Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia, EUMC, ed. (2006), at 7-8. Some commentators also point out how problematic the definition of “Muslim” or “cultural Muslim” often is, since it is – due to a lack of data – often based on ethnicity rather then religious belief and thus follows the Islamic concept that one becomes a Muslim either by birth or by religious conversion and that one cannot change one's religious belief. For further discussion, see Riem Spielhaus, Religion und Identität. Vom deutschen Versuch, “Ausländer” zu “Muslimen” zu machen, March Internationale Politik 28, 29-32 (2006), available at: www.internationalepolitik.de/archiv/2006/maerz2006/religion-und-identitat–vom-deutschen-versuch—–auslander—-zu—-muslimen—-zu-machen.html, accessed: 2 April 2007.Google Scholar

2 There are also “older” Muslim communities in the Balkans particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, Greece and Bulgaria as well as smaller Minorities as e.g. Tartars in parts of Poland and of course parts of the Sinti and Roma populations throughout Europe.Google Scholar

3 Especially many of the second and third-generation Muslims born into secular European societies are re-examining their identity and their beliefs. On the search for new identities and the dangers of a “deterritorialized” Islam, see Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: The search for a new ummah (2004).Google Scholar

4 On the integration of Muslims in the EU, see The integration of Muslim Migrants in Europe: Religious and political Aspects in the Aftermath of 11 September 2001, EU Commission Intermediary Report (2003); U.S. Congressional Research Service. Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries (Order Code RL33166, 18 November 2005) Paul Gallis, Kristin Archick, Francis Miko, and Steven Woehrel, eds., available at: CRS-web [hereinafter CRS-Report Integration]; Mirjam Dittrich, Muslims in Europe: addressing the challenges of radicalisation, (European Policy Centre Working Paper, 23, 2003), available at: www.epc.eu, accessed: 10 August 2006. Detailed country-profiles and further information available at: http.euro-islam.info. For more in depth analysis see Roberta Aluffi Beck Peccoz and Giovanna Zicone, The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minorities in Europe (2004); European Muslims and the secular state (Jocelyn Césari and Sean McLoughlin, eds., 2005); J. Césari, When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and in the United States (2004); J. Césari, Islam and Fundamental Rights in Europe, Report for the European Commission, DG Justice and Home Affaires (2004 B); Musulmani in Italia: La Condizione giuridica delle communità islamiche (Silvio Ferrari, ed., 2000); Andrew Geddes, Immigration and European Integration: Towards a Fortress Europe? (2000); Jytte Klausen, The Islamic Challenge. Politics and Religion in Western Europe (2005); Robert Pauly Jr., Islam in Europe: Integration or Marginalization? (2004); Thorsten Gerald Schneiders et al., Muslime im Rechtsstaat (2005); Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics (Koopmans/Statham, eds., 2000); Robert Pauly, Jr., Islam in Europe: Integration or Marginalization? (2004); Islam in Europe: The Politics of Religion and Community (Steven Vertovec and Ceri Peach, eds., 1997).Google Scholar

5 Supra note 1, at 8.Google Scholar

6 See T⊘ger Seidenfaden and Rune Engelbrecht Larsen, Karikatur-krisen. En unders⊘gelse af baggrund og ansvar (The Cartoon Crisis: An Investigation into Background and Responsibilities) (2006).Google Scholar

7 See A collection of country reports from RAXEN, The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2001).Google Scholar

8 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996).Google Scholar

9 The political analyst José Casanova pointed out that in Europe “immigration and Islam are almost synonymous”, since the “overwhelming majority of immigrants in most European countries, the UK being the main exception, are Muslims and the overwhelming majority of western European Muslims are immigrants”. According to Casanova “this entails a superimposition of different dimensions of ‘otherness’ that exacerbates issues of boundaries, accommodation and incorporation: The immigrant, the religious, the racial, and the socio-economic underprivileged ‘other’ all tend to coincide.” See José Casanova, Religion, European secular identities, and European integration, available at: www.eurozine.com/articles/2004-07-29-casanova-en.html, accessed: 20 February 2007.Google Scholar

10 As Klausen, supra note 4, has pointed out in her study on the Muslim elites in Europe, many secular Muslims that are part of societal elites feel defensive and marginalized due to the constant allegation that Muslims are potential terrorists.Google Scholar

11 See Andrea Brandt and Cordula Meyer, Religious Divisions in Germany. A Parallel Muslim Universe, Spiegel-Online, 27 February 2007, available at: www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,467360,00.html, accessed: 3 April 2007.Google Scholar

12 Roy, supra note 3, and Fukuyama, Francis, Identity and Migration 17 Journal of Democracy 5 (2006) and adapted for reprint in Prospect Magazine, February 2007, available at: http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=8239, accessed: 3 April 2007. See also Giles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (2004); Giles Kepel, The Roots of Radical Islam (2005).Google Scholar

13 See Gabriel, Mark A., Die Offenbarungen Mohammeds. Der Islam ist in Schwierigkeiten, Das Parlament, 4 September 2006, quoting supra 8:12, 8:39, 8:60, or 9:29 of the Koran which he interprets as violently antiChristian and anti-Jewish.Google Scholar

14 See Spiegel-Online, 23 November 2006, available at: http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/0,1518,druck-450090,00.html, accessed: 3 April 2007.Google Scholar

15 See: Europeans have stopped Defending their Values, Spiegel-Online, 2 October 2006, available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,druck-440340,00.html, accessed: 3 April 2007.Google Scholar

16 Kermani, Navid, Islam in Europa – neue Konstellationen, alte Wahrnehmungen, in Muslime im säkularen Rechtsstaat 11 (Thomas Hartmann, Margret Krannich eds., 2001).Google Scholar

17 According to the 2005 yearly report of the Bundesverfassungsschutz (German Internal Intelligence Service) less than 1% of the Muslims living in Germany – approximately 32,000 people – have supported Islamist organizations, but the numbers have risen from around 30,950 in 2003, see Annual Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution 191 (2005), available at: http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/download/SHOW/vsbericht_2005_engl.pdf, accessed: 3 April 2007.Google Scholar

18 See Interview with the Journalist Hazem Saghie, Warum die Wut weiter wachsen wird, Die Zeit 17 Aug. 2006 who points out, that the anger and frustration of young people is permanently rekindled by images of American or Israeli acts of brutality. Everything fits into the image of “We against them.” Chechnya, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon form a single panorama of Muslim suffering.Google Scholar

19 Some analysts say that the increase of jihadist websites and internet chat-rooms has resulted in extremism appealing to ever younger Muslims. Recent media reports indicate instances of very young French Muslim teenagers being recruited to fight in Iraq; German and Italian law enforcement authorities also have reportedly disrupted efforts by Islamist extremists to recruit European youths for Iraq. See Marlena Telvick, Al Qaeda Today: The New Face of the Global Jihad, Frontline, , available at: www.pbs.org, accessed: 25 January 2005; Rotella, Sebastian, Europe's Boys of Jihad, Los Angeles Times, 2 April 2005. For more recent in-depth analysis see Jihadi terrorists in Europe, their characteristics and the circumstances in which they joined the jihad: an explanatory study (Edwin Bakker, ed., 2007); Marc Sageman, Understanding terror networks (2004).Google Scholar

20 Numerous terrorist arrests were also made in Belgium, France, Italy, and the UK. The 11 March 2004 terrorist bombings of commuter trains in Madrid, Spain that killed 191 people were carried out by an Al Qaeda-inspired group of North Africans, mostly Moroccans resident in Spain. On 7 July 2005 “home-grown” Islamic terrorists struck the London transport system killing at least 52 people, plus the four bombers, and injuring over 700. On 21 July 2005, four attackers tried but failed to set off four explosions on London's tube and bus lines; no casualties resulted. In July 2006 there were further attempts in Britain to attack planes with liquid explosives and an attempt to blow up commuter trains in Cologne. See European Approaches to Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (Kristin Archick, Carl Ek, Paul Gallis, Francis T. Miko, and Steven Woehrel eds., 2006), available at: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33573.pdf, accessed: 3 April 2007.Google Scholar

21 Leiken, Robert S., Director of the Immigration and National Security Program at the Nixon Center and author of the book “Bearers of Jihad? Immigration and National Security After 9/11,” has argued that the deficit of integration policies in European Countries has made European Muslim populations a hotbed for breeding terrorism. See Europe's Angry Muslims, in 84 Foreign Affairs 120 (2005), available at: www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2004/muslimext-uk.htm, accessed: 3 April 2007; see also Fukujama, supra note 12.Google Scholar

22 For a recent overview of immigration and integration policies in Europe, see Bolzman, Claudio and Boucher, Manuel, De l'Immigration à l'Intégration: En Europe, à chaqun son “modèle”, in Le Monde Diplomatique, June 2006, at 15; Ziegler, K., Integration und Ausgrenzung im Lichte der Migrationspolitik der Europäischen Union – die ‘Festung Europa’? Integration und Recht 127 (K. Sahlfeld et al., eds., 2003); Elizabeth Collett, One size fits all? Tailored integration policies for migrants in the European Union (EPC Working Paper No.24, April 2006), available at: www.epc.eu/TEWN/pdf/602431467_EPC%20Working%20Paper%2024.pdf, accessed: 3 April 2007. Thomas Gross, Integration of Immigrants: The Perspective of European Community Law, 7 European Journal of Migration and Law 145 (2005); Bertozzi, Stefano, Legal Migration: Time for Europe to play its Hand, (CEPS Working Document No.257, February 2007); Bertozzi, Stefano, Integration: An ever-closer challenge (CEPS Working Document No.258, Feb 2007), both available for free download at: www.ceps.be, accessed: 3 April 2007.Google Scholar

23 This has especially been the case in countries such as Germany, Austria, and Switzerland that did not have immigration from former colonies but invited foreign workers to their territories on the basis of bilateral treaties in order to counter shortages on the labor market in the 1950s and 1960s. See CRS-Report Integration, (2005), at 31- 38; Riva Kastoryano, Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in France and Germany (2002). Since 2005 “integration” has become one of the priorities of domestic policy in Germany. For an official presentation of German immigration and integration policy, see the homepage of the German Federal Ministry of the Interior available at www.bmi.bund.de and focused on the phenomenon of migration see www.zuwanderung.de, as well as the homepage of the Federal Authority for Migration and Refugees available at: www.bamf.bund.de, all accessed: 11 May 2006. For a more critical assessment of the history of German “Ausländerpolitik“ until 2001, see Ulrich Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland. Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, Flüchtlinge (2001).Google Scholar

24 See CRS-Report, supra note 23, at 10-21. For an interesting insight into British government policy see the so-called Turnbull-correspondence leaked to the British press in April-May 2004, available at: www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2004/muslimext-uk.htm, accessed: 3 April 2007. See also for a more recent view of the current situation in Britain: Special report Islam and free speech. Racial and religious hatred: Of imams and Nazis, The Economist, 11 February 2006, at 26, which illustrates how the case against the imam of Finsbury-Park Mosque, Al Hamza, in London has changed British attitude towards dealing with the Muslim faith community. On the Netherlands see Buruma, Ian, Wie der Multikulturalismus zu retten ist, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung [FAZ], 7 November 2006. Jonathan Paris, Europe and its Muslims, 86 Foreign Affairs [Foreign Aff.] 181 (2007) points out, that the UK, along with Scandinavia, Germany, and the Netherlands, has promoted an integration-policy, which is loosely called “multiculturalism” and involves a refusal to assert the superiority of local values. In particular UK-authorities are now discovering, that “a sizable percentage of their Muslim citizens have become angry, isolated, and dangerous.” An example of this new awareness is, according to Paris, the highly unusual warning in November 2006 by the head of the MI5 that some 1,600 suspects in 200 terrorist cells were under surveillance.Google Scholar

25 Fukujama, supra note 12, also argues that the “old multicultural model” “needs to be replaced by more energetic efforts to integrate non-western populations into a common liberal culture.” Flowing from a “misplaced sense of respect for cultural differences – and in some cases out of imperial guilt” it has been “based on group recognition and group rights” which could not be reconciled with liberalism since, or when, “not all groups uphold the liberal values.” According to Fukujama liberal societies have their own values regarding the equal worth and dignity of individuals and could therefore not be culturally neutral. Consequently cultures “that do not accept these premises” – according to Fukujama – “do not deserve equal protection in a liberal democracy.” Some Muslim communities were making “demands for group rights” that simply could not be “squared with liberal principles of individual equality” e.g. “special exemptions from the family law, the right to exclude non-Muslims from certain types of public events, or the right to challenge free speech in the name of religious offence (as with the Danish Cartoons Incidents)” or have “expressed ambitions to challenge the secular character of the political order as a whole” and thus “clearly intrude on the rights of other individuals in the society” and pushed “cultural autonomy well beyond the private sphere.”Google Scholar

26 On France, see CRS-Report, supra note 23, at 21-31. The wide-scale riots and violence that broke out in late October 2005 throughout France in reaction to the deaths of two young Muslims and more recent incidents in 2006 have also been considered by analysts as indicators for integration failures. Stéphanie Giry, France and Its Muslims, 85 Foreign Aff. 87 (2006), underlines though, that this diagnosis is “glib and alarmist”, “overlooks more nuanced and encouraging sociological realities” and that the problem of radicalization and jihadism is largely distinct from the issue of Muslim integration. Robert S. Leiken, supra note 21 stresses instead that France has stood out from the generally lenient policies on Islamic extremism, which were adopted by other European States: This assessment is echoed by Paris, supra note 24, who stresses that the French in their fight against the GIA have long adopted a “no-nonsense, preemptive style” in counterterrorism and intelligence, supplemented by an aggressive judiciary. For further analysis on the Islamic associations in France, see Olivier Roy, La Laïcite face a l'Islam (2005); Franck Fregosi, L'Islam e la Francia secondo Jean Pierre Chevènement. Profili teorici di un Islam repubblicano, in Musulmani in Italia: La Condizione giuridica delle communità islamiche, supra note 4, at 301-308.Google Scholar

27 Giry, supra note 26, has stressed that the French system of laïcité encourages assimilation and discourages ethnic or religious identification. Also Fukujama, supra note 12, praises French republicanism, “which in its classic form refused to recognize separate communal identities and used state-power to homogenize French society” but points out that the growth of terrorism and urban unrest has led to intense debate in France, why this form of integration has failed. Fukujama's explanation is that the French might themselves have given up the old concept of citizenship in favor of a version of multiculturalism. The headscarf ban of 2004 is interpreted by Fukujama as “the reassertion of an older concept of citizenship.”Google Scholar

28 Fukujama, supra note 12, argues that if in Europe the liberal principle of pluralism based on individuals rather than groups is really to be established, then it corporatist institutions inherited from the past must be addressed.Google Scholar

29 In November 2006 the head of the British domestic intelligence service, MI5, announced publicly, that some 1,600 suspects in 200 terrorist cells were under surveillance, see Paris, J., supra note 24. For a critical assessment, see Levy, Carl, The European Union after 9/11: The Demise of a Liberal democratic Asylum Regime? 40 Government and Opposition 26 (2005). Jochen Bittner and Michael Mönninger, Europa rüstet auf. Vier Jahre nach dem 11. September: Im Vergleich zu Frankreich, England und Italien fallen die Anti-Terrorgesetze in Deutschland noch milde aus, Die Zeit 9 August 2005 available at http://hermes.zeit.de/pdf/archiv/2005/37/Anti-Terror.pdf. Following the London attacks and the more recent uncovered plans to attack planes flying from the UK with liquid explosives by Islamist extremists, the British government, e.g. plans to review immigration controls to make it easier to exclude or deport foreign individuals who incite violence. UK legislation enacted in 2004 allows court-ordered detentions without charge for up to 14 days, and permits a range of “control orders,” including house arrest, for terrorist suspects. Previous measures of indefinite detention without trial were challenged in December 2004 by the House of Lords ruling on the Anti-Terrorism Act, the so-called Belmarsh Case, A (FC) and Others (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56, available at: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldjudgmt/jd041216/a&others.pdf, accessed: 3 April 2007.Google Scholar

30 On 21 September 2001 the European Council adopted an Action Plan on Terrorism which has since been updated. On 13 June 2002, two framework decisions were adopted by the Council of Ministers to establish a European Arrest Warrant (OJ L 190, 18 July 2002, at1–20) and define a common concept of terrorist offences which all the Member States of the European Union must include in their legal system. Further measures were adopted in the following years. For further details see http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/terrorism/fsj_terrorism_intro_en.htm, accessed: 3 April 2007. See European Approaches to Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, supra note 6; Jan Hecker, Die Europäisierung der inneren Sicherheit, 59 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 273 (2006); Mirjam Dittrich, Facing the Global Terrorist Threat: A European Response (EPC-Working Paper No.14, January 2005), available at: www.epc.com, accessed: 3 April 2007; Daniel Keohane, The EU and Counter-Terrorism (Centre of European Reform, CER Working Paper, May 2005). This working paper can be ordered from the CER website (www.cer.org.uk).Google Scholar

31 A comprehensive strategy, that is going beyond repressive means, is also proposed by the European Commission in its Communication adopted on 21 September 2005 entitled “Terrorist recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation” (COM, 2005 313 final).Google Scholar

32 German Federal Minister of the Interior Otto Schily called for the creation of a “European Islam”, see German News, 28 November 2004, available at: http://www.germnews.de/dn/2004/11/28, accessed: 3 April 2007.Google Scholar

33 For an overview see Sara Silvestri, The Situation of Muslim Immigrants in Europe in the 21st century: The Creation of National Muslim Councils, in ‘Crossing Over’ - Comparing Recent Migration in Europe and the United States, 101 (H. Henke, ed., 2005). In its communication on Terrorist recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation (COM, 2005 313 final) adopted on 21 September 2005 the European Commission (EC) has encouraged an exchange of views and opinions with regard to Dialogue between the State and Religions, in order to create a method of communication to eliminate barriers and develop understanding of cultural diversities based on religious ideas (particularly when dealing with radical, extremist and fundamentalist concepts). The EC has stressed that the EU fully respects the status of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States under national law (Declaration No 11 to the Amsterdam Treaty) and that the relationship between the State and Churches and religious associations is not an EU competence. At the same time there is also a tradition of dialogue between religions, churches and communities of conviction on the EU-level which has established a wide and diverse network of confessional and non-confessional partners. The EU intends to build on these initiatives in order to contribute to the prevention of violent radicalization and proposes to establish 2008 as the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue. The year is supposed to make Europeans more sensitive to questions of intercultural dialogue as well as to better use EU programs in promoting the positive values resulting from such a Dialogue.Google Scholar

34 This difficulty is illustrated with regards to various European countries, see Musulmani in Italia: La Condizione giuridica delle communità islamiche, supra note 4.Google Scholar

35 For a tentative assessment of the debate on training imams in some European countries, see: Hans-Christian Jasch, Insegnamento islamico e formazione degli imam in alcuni Paesi europei, in 47-40 Amministrazione Pubblica 87 (Gennaio/Giugno 2006).Google Scholar

36 Leiken, supra note 21, pointed out, that Hofstad's Syrian imam mentored Bouyeri (the murderer of Dutch film-maker Van Gogh) and that the London imam Abu Hamza al-Masri coached Moussaoui . He also mentions that a decade ago in France, the Algerian Armed Islamic Group proselytized beurs (the French-born children of North African immigrants) and turned them into the jihadists who terrorized train passengers during the 1990s. According to Leiken post-September 11 recruitment appears more systematic and strategic with Al Qaeda's focus being on the second generation.Google Scholar

37 The mechanism has been described by Roy, supra note 3.Google Scholar

38 UK officials have been inclined toward “watchful tolerance” of such extremists claiming that freedom of speech must be protected and that cracking down on them would only drive them underground and deprive authorities of valuable intelligence information. See Elaine Sciolino and Don Van Natta, For a Decade, London Thrived as a Busy Crossroads of Terror, N.Y. Times, 10 July 2005; Steve Coll and Susan Glasser, In London, Islamic Radicals Found a Haven, Washington Post, 10 July 2005.Google Scholar

39 In France e.g., home to approximately 5 million Muslims, 9 out of ten imams have been born abroad and half of them do not even speak enough French to preach in French. In the Netherlands and Germany many imams are trained, paid and sent by the Turkish religious authority Diyanet.Google Scholar

40 See Sara Silvestri, The Institutionalization of Islam in Europe: a Case Study of Italy, Council for European Studies-newsletter, September 2005, points out that trans-national Islamic organizations (e.g. Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Islamic World League) together with the public authorities of some Muslim countries of emigration (e.g., Morocco, Algeria, and Turkey), often seek to intervene in the establishment and appointment process of Muslim authorities in Europe (as in the case of the Exécutif des Musulmans de Belgique). According to her “it is common knowledge that Turkey controls a number of mosques through the European branches of the Ministry for Social Affairs (the Diyanet) and that Saudi Arabia has financed the construction of major mosques (open to and used regularly for prayer by large numbers of Sunni Muslims of various traditions) in European capitals, such as Brussels, London, and Rome.” A quick glance at the list of the officials and board of directors (often nationals, if not diplomats, of Muslim and Islamic countries) of these mosques and cultural centers and at the activities that they sponsor — conferences, Arabic language and Quran classes, free distribution of religious publications does – according to Silvestri – provide an idea of how this subtle interference often works.Google Scholar

41 Several analysts suggest that mainstreaming Muslims into European society would not necessarily translate into an embracing of liberal values and some even question whether Islam itself is compatible with European political principles and values.Google Scholar

42 With consultations starting already in 1999 it was the French Minister of the Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, who eventually managed to create in 2003 the “Conseil Français du Culte Musulman” (CFCM). The CFCM is supposed to become the official representation of French Muslims. It is designed as a discussion forum with government officials, where certain issues such as construction of mosques, observance of religious holidays, education of imams and ensuring for example, appropriate food for Muslims in the French prison system are to be addressed. The CFCM has a board which is elected for three years from delegates from mosques and establishes a bureau executif which then elects the CFCM-President. At the same time the 25 regional Muslim Councils are elected (CRCM). Despite all its efforts so far the French government has not succeeded in establishing a fully representative Council. While there are also alleged fundamentalists in the CFCM, reportedly some of the more radical currents of Islam have declined to participate in the elections for the CRCMs and the CFCM itself. Some Arab governments, wishing to maintain influence over their Diaspora, have reportedly also urged mosques and imams not to participate in the CFCM and the CRCMs. In part, this reluctance was also a product of rivalry among different Muslim groups. A French journalist recently described the CFCM as “marriage forcé malheureux entre l'islam traditionnel et l'islam intégriste au sein d'un Conseil ni vraiment élu ni vraiment representative, mais plutôt symptomatique du désir d'instrumentaliser l'islam de France à des fins de pragmatisme politique“, see Caroline Fourest, Où en est l”islam de France', Le Monde, 1 February 2007. On the CFCM, see Protocol for the agreement to establish the CFCM, available at: http://fides.ifrance.com/fides/html/islam7.html, accessed: 3 April 2007.Google Scholar

43 Augustin Motilla, L'accordo di cooperazione tra la Spagna e la Commissione islamica. Bilancio e prospettive, in Musulmani in Italia: La Condizione giuridica delle communità islamiche, supra note 4, at 243-308.Google Scholar

44 CRS-Report, supra note 4, at 10-21; M. Dittrich, supra note 4, at 25.Google Scholar

45 For further details on the “Exécutif des Musulmans de Belgique”, see Maria Luisa Lo Giacco, La rappresentanza unitaria dell'Islam in Belgio, La Condizione giuridica delle communità islamiche, supra note 4, at 289-300; M. Dittrich, supra note 4, at 17, 23. Belgium is the only country which is considered to have managed to establish a truly representative Council through organized elections. Critics point out, though, that the counsel does not represent the Moroccan majority in a proportionate manner but favors the Turkish Muslims who participated more actively in the elections. On the integration of Islam in Belgium, see Jordane Carpentier de Changy, Felice Dassetto, Brigitte Maréchal, Islam en Belgique: Societe multiculturelle et co-inclusion. Conclusions d'une recherche-action, (Università Catolique de Louvain, Centre Interdisciplinare d'études de l'Islam dans le Monde Contemporain-CISMOC, February 2006).Google Scholar

46 Magdi Allam, Il master per gli imam moderati, Corriere della Sera, 25 April 2005.Google Scholar

47 Austria was one of the first European countries to establish as early as in the early 90s an academy under state control in order to train imams and religious-teachers for Austrian state schools. This initiative is based on a legal framework which goes back to 1911 when the Austro-Hungarian Empire recognized Islam as a religion in order to facilitate integration of its new Muslim subjects in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, annexed in 1908. For further details, see Jasch, supra note 35, as well as the homepage of the officially recognized Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich, available at: www.derislam.at, accessed: 12 August 2006. For more detailed information on the legal situation of the Muslim communities in Europe, see Aluffi Beck Peccoz/Zincone, supra note 4. For a critical assessment with a comprehensive presentation of the legal framework, see Religionsfreiheit, Intoleranz, Diskriminierung in der Europäischen Union. Österreich 2003-2004 (Human Rights without Frontiers International, ed.), available at: www.hrwf.net/religiousfreedom/publications/ext/Osterreich.pdf, accessed: 3 April 2007.Google Scholar

48 The Egyptian-born, Italian journalist, Magdi Allam, supra note 46 has pointed out that the newly established course for future imams in Morocco for 150 men and 50 women (sic!) – a fact which distinguishes the course from more fundamentalist Islamic schools – aims at educating moderate imams. Allam also explains that sermons of the Friday-prayers in Morocco, Egypt, Saudi-Arabia, Algeria and Yemen have to be approved by state authorities before being delivered and states that of the key-challenges will be the financing of the home-grown imams in Europe, since most Muslim Communities rely on imams which are financed by Turkey or Arabic countries.Google Scholar

49 Interview with Paolo Ferero, Italian Minister of Social Solidarity: En Italie, les clandestins ont afflué malgré des lois restrictives, Le Monde, 9 August 2006. For information on the overall phenomenon of immigration in Italy, see Immigrazione, Dossier Statistico 2005, XV Rapporto sull'immigrazione. Immigrazione è globalizzazione, (Caritas/Migrantes, ed., 2005) [hereinafter Immigrazione, Dossier Statistico 2005].Google Scholar

50 Immigrazione, Dossier Statistico 2005, supra note 49. For further information, see www.caritasitaliana.it, accessed: 3 April 2007.Google Scholar

51 According to Filippi, Stefano, Moschee, l'invasione silenziosa: in Italia sono già più di 600, in Il Giornale, 24 December 2006, at 8 who refers to “conservative estimates” in the “Dossier Statistico” supra note 49, for 2006 more than 1.2 million people practice Islam as their religion in Italy. Many Muslims in Italy have only temporary stay-permits or even reside illegally in the country as so-called “clandestine.” Italian citizenship law requires people to have resided legally in Italy for ten years or to be married to an Italian citizen in order to apply for Italian citizenship. For further details refer to law No.91 of 5 February 1992 (Nuove norme sulla cittadinanza), and DPR No.572 of 12 October 1993 (Regolamento di esecuzione della Legge 5 Feb. 1992, n. 91 recante nuove norme sulla cittadinanza) and DPR No.362 of 18 April 1994 (Regolamento recante disciplina dei procedimenti di acquisto della cittadinanza italiana). A proposal for a bill presented by the Minister of Interior Giuliano Amato on 4 August 2006 aims at reducing the time of legal residency to five years and give access to Italian citizenship to the children of immigrants born in Italy, see Cittadinanza per gli immigrati, La Repubblica, 5 August 2006, at 2-3. On irregular migration to Italy see Immigrazione Irregolare in Italia/Irregular Migration in Italy, (European Migration Network, Punto Nazionale di Contatto in Italia, ed., 2005).Google Scholar

52 On Muslims in Italy see Ferrari, Silvio, Corbetta, Filippo, and Parolin, Gianluca, The Situation of Muslims in Italy, in Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Minority Protection Volume II. Case Studies in Selected Member States, by Open Society Institute 227 (2002), available at: www.eumap.org/reports/2002/eu/international/sections/italy/2002_m_italy.pdf, accessed: 2 April 2007; Sara Silvestri, The Institutionalization of Islam in Europe: a Case Study of Italy, Council for European Studies Newsletter, September 2005, Available at: www.ces.columbia.edu/pub/Silvestri_sep05.html, accessed: 20 February 2007; Andrea Pacini, I Musulmani in Italia. Dinamiche organizzative e processi di interazione con la società e le istituzioni italiane, in: La Condizione giuridica delle communità islamiche, supra note 4, at 19-105. See also the detailed review by Cilardo, Agostino, Musulmani in Italia: La condizione giuridica delle communità islamiche, a cura di Silvio Ferrari: articolo recensione, 3 Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies (2000), at 114-126. On efforts of dialogue to promote integration in Italy, see Jasch, Hans-Christian, State-Dialogue in Italy and Germany for Promoting Integration of Muslims, in 3 Turkish Policy Quarterly [TPQ] 57 (2006). For detailed statistics see Immigrazione Irregolare in Italia/Irregular Migration in Italy, supra note 49, at 67-71.Google Scholar

53 Although Muslims account only for ca. 2% of the total population, 14% of Italy's prison population is Muslim, 98 percent of whom are foreign nationals. Italian prisons are the most overcrowded in Europe, with an occupancy level of 131.5%, see Immigrazione, Dossier Statistico 2005, supra note 49, and the 2005 World Prison Population List, available at: www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/rel/icps/world-prison-population-list-2005.pdf, accessed: 3 April 2007.Google Scholar

54 According to the Caritas, which is monitoring immigration to Italy 12.1% of the migrants have a college or university degree compared to 7.5% of the Italians, see Immigrazione, Dossier Statistico 2005, supra note 49.Google Scholar

55 For detailed accounts of the rivalries and alliances of the four main Italian Muslim associations and their relations with sympathizers and with the Italian state, see Allievi, Stefano, Organizzazione e potere nel mondo musulmano: il caso della comunità di Milano, in I musulmani nella società europea 157 (Waardenburg, Jacques, Abu-Salieh, Sami A., Salhi, Mohammed, et al., 1994); Allam, Magdi, La mappa dell'islam italiano, in Islam, Italia 41 (Roberto Gritti and Magdi Allam, ed., 2001).Google Scholar

56 See Allam, , supra note 55.Google Scholar

57 Filippi, Stefano, supra note 51, quotes the spokesman of UCOII, Hamza Piccardo, mentioning 160 mosques and Muslim prayer rooms which are associated to UCOII.Google Scholar

58 In 1998 UCOII and CICI made an attempt to unite (by forming the Consiglio Islamico d'Italia, or Islamic Council of Italy) and submitted a joint proposal for an intesa (an agreement) to the Italian government. The experience led immediately to a controversy over issues of representation and hegemony over the Muslims living in Italy. As a result, most members of the Council resigned. The Council has not been revoked, but it is de facto defunct. See Silvestri, supra note 52.Google Scholar

59 UCOII is a sister organization of the French Union des Organizations Islamiques de France (UCOIF) which also claims to represent one third of French Islam and is also believed to be close to the “International Muslim Brotherhood” (IMB). On UCOIF, see Caroline Fourest, Où en est l”Islam de France', Le Monde, 1 February 2007.Google Scholar

60 Art. 19 of the Italian Constitution: Tutti hanno diritto di professare liberamente la propria fede religiosa in qualsiasi forma, individuale o associata, di farne propaganda e di esercitarne in privato o in pubblico il culto, purché non si tratti di riti contrari al buon costume.Google Scholar

61 The Catholic Church enjoys traditionally a special status. Art. 7 of the Italian Constitution specifies that State and the Roman Catholic Church are sovereign and independent and that their relationship is regulated by the Lateran treaty from 1929, which has been modified in 1984.Google Scholar

62 Art. 8 of the Italian Constitution:Tutte le confessioni religiose sono egualmente libere davanti alla legge. Le confessioni religiose diverse dalla cattolica hanno diritto di organizzarsi secondo i propri statuti, in quanto non contrastino con l'ordinamento giuridico italiano. I loro rapporti con lo Stato sono regolati per legge sulla base di intese con le relative rappresentanze.Google Scholar

63 For an official view on religious freedom in Italy, see L'attuazione della libertà religiosa in Italia: Note essenziali di legislazione e dottrina (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri and Ministero dell'Interno, ed., 1995).Google Scholar

64 Various initiatives/proposals have been introduced in Parliament to modernize this law, which has been upheld and reinterpreted by the Italian Constitutional court. See Norme sulla libertà religiosa e abbrogazione della legislazione sui culti ammessi, d.d.l. N° 2531-1576-1902-A.Google Scholar

65 A first draft for an intesa with the state was presented in 1992 by the U.C.O.I.I.; the next request was presented in 1993 by the CICI. In 1994 AMI proposed also a draft for an intesa and in 1996 Coreis has presented another draft. For a detailed account, see Renzo Guolo, La rappresentanza dell'islam italiano e la questione delle intese, in Musulmani in Italia. La condizione giuridica delle comunità islamiche, supra note 4; Cilardo, supra note 52, at 114. The full texts of these intese-projects have been published in: Islam en Europe. Législation relative aux Communautés Musulmanes (COMECE 2001) and Fouad Allam, L'Islam contemporaneo in Europa e in Italia fra affermazione identitaria e nuova religione minoritaria, in Secondo Rapporto sull'Integrazione degli Immigrati in Italia 577 (Giovanna Zincone, Ed. for Commissione per le politiche d'integrazione degli immigrati, 2001).Google Scholar

66 The only Islamic Organization which has been awarded public legal personality in 1974 is the CICI (s.a.)Google Scholar

67 Sara Silvestri, supra note 52 explains in her article that the most conspicuous reason why no intesa has been concluded with between the Islamic faith communities and the state are, that the Italian Muslims are mainly: “(a) non-citizens who are not entitled to become a ‘recognized’ religious association and thus sign an agreement with the state and (b) the multitude of competing Muslim organizations that claim to represent the entire Muslim community. But hidden behind these obstacles lie much more delicate reasons for the failure to conclude an agreement; these can be linked to internal rivalries, mainly between Muslims, and Italian party politics that have little to do with the issue of Islam per se;” see also Renzo Guolo, supra note 65. The situation is somewhat similar to the situation in Germany where Muslim organizations are aspiring to become public entities in order to benefit from the same privileges as the Churches and the Jewish Community, see infra, III, 2.Google Scholar

68 In the absence of an intesa with the Italian State the relationship of these faith-groups with the Italian state continues to be regulated by the law N° 1159 of 24 June 1929.Google Scholar

69 The first intesa was signed after 8 years of negotiations with the Valdese Methodist Church (Valdese Table) on 21 February 1984 and was endorsed as a law on 11 August 1984 (Law N° 449/1984).Google Scholar

70 For a detailed analysis, see Musulmani in Italia. La Condizione giuridica delle communità islamiche, supra note 4; Cilardo, supra note 52.Google Scholar

71 For detailed accounts of the rivalries and alliances of the four main Italian Muslim associations and their relations with sympathizers and with the Italian state see Allievi, supra note 55; Allam, supra note 55.Google Scholar

72 Silvestri, supra note 52 points out that Muslim representatives, for their part, complain that the entire Italian system is rigid and still shaped according to the former state religion, Catholicism but that strong opposition to the institutionalization of Islam in Italy also comes from certain political, religious, and intellectual circles that were obsessed with the possibility that Muslims would have undue influence on Italy once the intesa had been obtained.Google Scholar

73 Oriana Fallaci, a respected writer and famous political interviewer, who has died recently, has been rallying public opposition against the construction of Mosques. In her book “La Rabbia e l'Orgoglio” (The Rage and the Pride), in which she has claimed, that the West was superior to Islam, she used phrases such as “multiplied like rats” to describe Muslims immigrants, and called Muslims “vile creatures, who urinate in baptisteries.” Despite leading to a court case against Fallaci for insulting the Muslim communities, the book has sold at least 1.5 million copies and has caused a big debate also outside Italy. See C. Balmer, Fallaci Charged in Italy with Defaming Islam, Reuters, 25 May 2005; Italy Looks at Controlling New Mosques, CBC News, 25 March 2004, available at: http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2004/03/25/italy_mosques040325.html, accessed: 2 April 2007.Google Scholar

74 In accordance with the Constitution, the educational system does not provide separate public funding for religious education. However, according to Art. 33 of the Italian Constitution schools and “educational institutes” may be established at private expense, provided they guarantee equal access and equal educational treatment for all and observe standard curriculum requirements. Moreover, private schools, including those with a religious orientation, may receive direct or indirect State funding, mainly through regional governments. Numerous private Catholic schools operate on this basis. However, no legally-accredited Islamic schools have been established.Google Scholar

75 In October 2006 a polemic has started on the opening of a Muslim school in Milan, which had not been granted public authorization by the Ministry of Education.Google Scholar

76 EC-Doc. 15983/03 JAI 373.Google Scholar

77 The principles of the Declaration were also taken into the 2004 EU-Action Plan for the fight against terrorism as well as in the joint EU-US-Declaration.Google Scholar

78 Asked to comment on the search for a legitimate Muslim interlocutor, Minister Pisanu replied that compared to the “consolidated” French Muslim community, the Italian one is “shapeless, in an embryonic stage, thus unable to express today a democratic legitimacy.” The proposed Italian solution was to be “more modest and cautious.” The most crucial thing, Pisanu affirmed, is to “make this dialogue [between government and Muslims] start” and to help an “Italian Islam grow on solid foundations.” Quoted according to: Silvestri, supra note 47, also points out that Minister Pisanu believed that the whole of Europe should appreciate the importance of establishing official relations with the faith communities, and for this reason, had promoted the above mentioned European Charter of Interfaith Dialogue among the European Justice and Home Affairs ministers.Google Scholar

79 On 12/13 August 2005 the Italian police forces carried out a country-wide raid in which 7,318 places which were known to be meeting points of the “Islamist scene” (Call- and Internetshops, Halal-butcheries and Money-transfer services) were searched; 32,703 people were checked, 141 arrested and 701 people were expelled. Two of the 141 arrests were on grounds of alleged terrorist activity. See Italian Muslims say new terror measures fall short, N.Y.TImes, 26 July 2005; see Bittner and Mönninger, supra note 29. Muslim Organizations in Italy have condemned the London bombings publicly and advised their members to cooperate with the police. The biggest Muslim Organization, the Union of Islamic Communities and Organizations in Italy (UCOII), announced publicly that “Terrorism is incompatible with the teachings, the law and the culture of Islam.”Google Scholar

80 Decree of 10 September 2005 (Decreto istitutivo della Consulta), published in the Gazette Ufficiale, 26 Oct. 2005, 250 and press-communication of the Ministry of the Interior of 10 September 2005, published at: www.interno.it/news/articolo.php?idarticolo=22026 and www.interno.it/salastampa/comunicati/elenchiviminale/comunicato.php?idcomunicato=857, accessed: 3 April 2007. On the Council for Italian Islam see Paba, Maria Patrizia, Council for Italian Islam, (contribution to the conference of the Ministers of Interior “Dialogue of Cultures and religions” in Vienna, 19 May 2005, published in Italian as La Consulta per l'Islam italiano, 47-49 Amministrazione Pubblica 107 (Gennaio/Giugnio 2006); Antonella Ratti, Nasce presso il Ministero dell'Interno la Consulta per l'Islam italiano, in Associazione Italiana dei Costituzionalisti, Cronache, published at: www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it/cronache/attivita_organi/consulta_islam/index.html, accessed: 3 April 2007. Critical assessment: Nicola Colaianni, La Consulta per l'Islam italiano: un caso di revisione strisciante della Costituzione, Osservatorio delle libertà ed istituzione religiose (OLIR), published at: www.olir.it/areetematiche/85/documents/Colaianni_ConsultaIslam.pdf, accessed: 3 April 2007. See also Fischer, Heinz-Joachim, Eine Charta für die Muslime, FAZ, 5 October 2006.Google Scholar

81 Art. 1 of the Ministerial Decree of 10 September 2005, supra note 80.Google Scholar

82 Id.Google Scholar

83 “Con l'istituzione della Consulta si compie il primo passo di un cammino, certamente non breve né facile, che dovrà condurci alla formazione di un islam italiano; e cioè di una comunità pacificamente inserita nel tessuto economico e sociale del nostro Paese, libera di professare le proprie convinzioni religiose e di salvaguardare la propria identità, ma al tempo stesso pienamente rispettosa dei nostri valori e dei nostri ordinamenti.“ Press-communication of the Italian Ministry of Interior of 10 September 2005, supra note 80.Google Scholar

84 The Ministry has made it clear, that there is neither an intention of assimilating the Muslims in Italy, nor of taking away their identity, but that the aim is respect for diversity in view of a “participatory inclusion.”Google Scholar

85 See for names and functions: Press-communication of the Ministry of the Interior of 30 November 2005, published at: www.interno.it, accessed: 20 May 2006.Google Scholar

86 Paba, supra note 80, at 109.Google Scholar

87 The decree for setting up the Council also allows the Minister to involve in its activities scholars, experts and representatives from other Ministries. For the coordination of the Council a technical secretariat has been set up in the cabinet of the Ministry of the Interior which communicates with the Council-members and is to involve them in the preparations of the sessions of the Council.Google Scholar

88 On the cartoon-crisis, see Seidenfaden, supra note 6.Google Scholar

89 The proposal aims to facilitate integration of immigrants by introducing elements of the ius soli into Italian citizenship law in order to facilitate the acquisition of Italian citizenship by children of immigrants born on Italian soil. Apart from this the proposal provides for shortening the required time of (legal) residence for foreigners in order to make a claim to Italian citizenship (naturalization) from initially ten to five years. At the same time the proposal would establish the basis for taking an integration test by which the claimant would have to prove his ability to integrate into Italian society. For further discussion see “Cittadinanza per gli immigrati”- Ecco il ddl del governo: basteranno 5 anni per diventare italiani di Caterina Pasolini, La Repubblica, 5 August 2006, at 2.Google Scholar

90 See press statement of the Italian Ministry of the Interior issued 3 October 2006, available at: www.interno.it/stampa.php?sezione=1&id=23045, accessed: 3 April 2007 and taken up by the Corriere della Sera on the 4 October 2007, “Carta dei valori riguarderà ogni immigrato. Amato alla Consulta per l'Islam: il documento ‘dovrà riguardare tutti coloro che vogliono vivere stabilmente in Italia’”, available at: www.corriere.it/Primo_Piano/Politica/2006/10_Ottobre/03/amato.shtml, accessed: 3 April 2007. See also Fischer, supra note 80.Google Scholar

91 The Lega Nord is the only Italian party which opposes EU-accession of Turkey and has proposed to submit the construction of future Mosques in Italy to a referendum. The Party has called for banning the Burka in public and Lega-Nord Minister for reform and successor of party founder Umberto Bossi, Roberto Calderoli, had to step down from Government in February 2006 after having posed with a T-Shirt with caricatures of Muhammad- an event which was followed by violence against Italian representations in Libya. Another party-member, the Minister of Justice, Roberto Castelli, publicly denied the existence of moderate Islam and called the then newly instituted Council of Islam in the Ministry of Interior a “Monster”, see Castelli & Pisanu Consulta islamica, il compromesso impossibile, Corriere della Sera 16 March 2006, www.corriere.it/Primo_Piano/Cronache/2006/03_Marzo/16/consulta.shtml, accessed: 3 April 2007.Google Scholar

92 For further information, see Herbert, , supra note 23; Bundesamt für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration, in: www.handbuch-deutschland.de/book/en/002_004_001.html, accessed: 30 March 2007.Google Scholar

93 The first recruitment-treaty was concluded with Italy in 1955. Today Germany has a population of approximately 600,000 Italian citizens.Google Scholar

94 Due to its Nazi-past post-war Germany assumed a special responsibility for those seeking asylum from political persecution. In 1949 the right to political asylum was enshrined in Art. 16 of the German Basic Law (Constitution). In the early years of the Federal Republic, mainly political refugees from Communist Eastern Europe sought asylum in Germany. However, in the mid-1970s, Germany began to receive an influx of asylum seekers from other countries. In 1992, a record 440,000 applications for asylum were submitted. While only a small percentage (4.25%) were granted asylum, many were able to take advantage of lengthy procedures to stay in Germany and receive housing and social benefits while their cases were adjudicated. With German reunification and rising unemployment came growing resentment from German taxpayers. In 1993, the Federal Government responded to rising social tensions by toughening asylum criteria and streamlining the process for adjudication of asylum cases. See http://www.zuwanderung.de/english/1_fluechtlinge.html, accessed: 30 March 2007. Until recently there was debate within the federal government and with the German Länder on how to deal with approximately 200,000 people which have remained in Germany as “tolerated” foreigners without a proper stay-permit (in many cases people who could not be sent back for humanitarian reasons).Google Scholar

95 Id.Google Scholar

96 See Flucht aus Deutschland. Größte Auswanderungswelle der Geschichte, in Spiegel-Online, 22 June 2006, at: www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,423009,00.html, accessed: 22 June 2006.Google Scholar

97 Langenau, Lars, Mikrozensus. Familie ist out, Zuwanderung in, Spiegel-Online, 6 June 2006 accessed: 6 June 2006.Google Scholar

98 The initial German citizenship law, which was based on the Citizenship-law of Imperial Germany from 1913, was modified on 15 July 1999. The wide reaching changes went into force on 1 January 2000. Eligibility for German citizenship, prior to 2000, was based largely on German ancestry and not country of birth. According to the results of the micro-census by 2006 about 3 million foreigners have become German citizens, among those some 160,000 Muslims each year. It has been estimated that within a decade there might be over 3 million Muslim German citizens. For further information see www.einbuergerung.de and www.integrationsbeauftragte.de/themen/staats.html, last accessed 20 June 2006; Omer Taspinar, Europe's Muslim Street, Foreign Policy (March, 2003), available at: www.foreignpolicy.com/users/login.php?story_id=5&URL, accessed: 30 March 2007.Google Scholar

99 Brandt, and Meyer, , supra note 11. To ensure, that those who were asking for German citizenship also embraced “western values” some of the German Länder – who have to enact the citizenship-law – have introduced “naturalization-tests” which were aiming in particular at Muslim citizens who were under suspicion of not accepting behavioral norms in Germany or were even considered to be potential supporters of fundamentalist ideas, see OSZE prangert Gesinnungstest für Muslime in Deutschland an, 27 April 2006, at: http://www.islam.de/5247_print.php, accessed: 3 April 2007; Treffen der Innenminister: Einheitlicher Einbürgerungstest gescheitert, Spiegel-Online, 1 May 2006; Integration. Einbürgerungskurse und Sprachtests werden Pflicht, Spiegel-Online, 5 May 2006.Google Scholar

100 For an overview of Islam in Germany, see profile at: www.euro-islam.info/spip/article.php3?id_article=84, accessed 3 April 2007. For an official portrait of Islam in Germany, see the reply of the German Federal Government to a parliamentary question of members of the CDU/CSU group, Deutscher Bundestag, 14. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 14/4530, 8 November 2000, at 1-93. The numbers are based on a statistic calculation which takes countries of origin into account and information given voluntarily during the last national census in 1987. On the problems related to these numbers and people being labelled as Muslims or in fact “cultural Muslims,” see Spielhaus, supra note 1.Google Scholar

101 Deutscher Bundestag, supra note 100, at 7-8.Google Scholar

102 For a detailed list of the registered Muslim associations in Germany in 2000, see Deutscher Bundestag, supra note 95, at 9-13; “Germany,” available at: www.euro-islam.info, accessed: 20 October 2007; Beck, Volker, Rechtliche Gleichstellung des Islam in Deutschland- aber wie? at: www.migration-boell.de/web/integation/47_853.asp, accessed: 20 February 2007.Google Scholar

103 On IGMG Milli Görüs, see Germany's annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2005, at 215-222, available at: www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/publikationen/verfassungsschutzbericht, accessed: 23 December 2006.Google Scholar

104 See Geplanter Dachverband. Integrationsminister lobt die Muslime, Spiegel-Online, 5 March 2007, available at: www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518, accessed: 5 March 2007.Google Scholar

105 According to the annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2004 a small minority of less than 0.1 % or about 32,000 Muslim residents in Germany were members of 24 Islamic organizations with extremist ties, at: www.bmi.bund.de/Internet/Content/Common/Anlagen/Broschueren/2003/Islamisus__Id__25235__de,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/Islamismus_Id_25235_de.pdf, released on 17 May 2005, accessed: 3 April 2007. According to the President of the Bundeskriminalamt (Federal Criminal Investigation Agency) in November 2006 there were 220 ongoing investigations with an Islamist background in Germany; five attacks have been prevented, see Reuters, 15 November 2006, http://de.today.reuters.com, accessed: 15 November 2006.Google Scholar

106 The status of these religious denominations as of “public entity” is based on Art 136-139 and 141 of the German Constitution of 11 August 1919 (Weimar Constitution, WRV), norms which have been incorporated into the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz, GG) of 1949 in Art 140. The status of public entity grants faith communities special rights such as full independence in matters of employment (“Dienstherreneigenschaft“), recognition of the community's religious oath in a court of law, automatic membership of the followers with the community, fiscal protection and exemption from real estate taxes on property designated as belonging to the public domain, the right to receive a percentage of the national revenue based on tax payers’ declarations of membership and access to public control boards such as the Rundfunkräte, For more see Beck, supra note 102, at 5-6; Deutscher Bundestag, supra note 100, at 33-38; Césari (2004 A), supra note 4, at 229-230.Google Scholar

107 In its reply to the German Parliament (Deutscher Bundestag, supra, note 100, at 33-38) the then-federal government but also Beck, supra note 102, at 7 also point to critical voices within the Muslim community who consider an incorporation of Islam into the Grundgesetz as artificial and difficult to reconcile with the essence of Islam. The German Federal Interior-Minister Schäuble stressed that there is further need for explaining the German model of “separation” between the religious communities and the State to the Muslim population in order to integrate Islam into the existing system. See Wolfgang Schäuble, Muslime in Deutschland, FAZ, 27 September 2006, available at: www.faz.net/s/RubBF7CD2794CEC4B87B47C719A68C59339/Doc~E268337CD8D8940F19D87988EB8071591~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html, accessed 3 April 2007. In its reply to a recent question from the opposition in Parliament (Deutscher Bundestag, 16. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 16/3758, 7 December 2006, at 10) the federal government evaded the question whether the incorporation of Islam into the Grundgesetz as a public entity was a goal of the German Conference on Islam (see infra, C. III) but concedes that it would be helpful for government to have one or more legitimized partners for cooperation in fields such as Islamic religious education. A “central partner” would therefore be desirable but in the limits of the constitution there was no way that government could constrain religious groups to organize in such a manner, since all religious communities enjoy the freedom to organize themselves within the limits of the law. The government would therefore limit itself to “constructively support” the process of self-organization of Muslims in the country.Google Scholar

108 Over the last years, only some of Germany's 16 states have come to agreements with various Islamic groups for some forms of religious instruction. For an overview of the state of play in 2000, see Deutscher Bundestag, supra note 100, at 40-44. For a recent commentary see Arnfried Schenk, Allah an der Tafel. Die 700.000 muslimischen Schüler in Deutschland sollen islamischen Religionsunterricht bekommen. Doch nur langsam kommen Schulversuche in Gang, Die Zeit, 9 June 2004, available at: www.zeit.de/2004/25/C-Islamunterricht?page=all, accessed: 30 March 2007; Diana Zacharias, Access of Muslim Organizations to Religious Instruction in Public Schools: Comment on the Decision of the Federal Administrative Court of 23 February 2005, 6 German Law Journal [GLJ] 1319 (2005), available at: www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol06No10/PDF_Vol_06_No_10_1318-1337_Developments_Zacharias.pdf, accessed: 30 March 2007.Google Scholar

109 The most populated Land of Germany, Northrhine Westfalia, has offered Islamic education in the context of “mother-tongue lessons” in Turkish, Arabic and Bosnian since the 1980s. In 1999 an experimental teaching (Modellprojekt) of Islamic education in German has been offered as an individual subject on ca. 100 schools with the objective to reach all of the approximately 282,000 Muslim pupils in the Land. These “experimental lessons” are organised in cooperation with various Islamic associations.Google Scholar

110 In Berlin, which as a Land enjoys a special historical status and where religious education is not taught as a normal school-subject, an Islamic association, the “Islamische Föderation” (www.islamische-foederation.de), has won a lengthy court case against the state government and is now allowed to provide Islamic religious education in Berlin schools. See Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG] [Federal Administrative Court] 23 Feb. 2000, 110 Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts [BVerwGE] 326. The Federation remains a controversial partner for the state partly because of its relationship to Milli Görüs, the Turkish Islamic movement which is reported to have ties with the radical International Muslim Brotherhood. See Schenk, supra, note 108.Google Scholar

111 According to the Central Institute of Islamic Archives in Germany, about 18% of all Muslim school children attended Koran schools in 2003. Many German politicians also complain, that female Muslim pupils boycotting mixed school lessons in sports, swimming and sexual education or class trips thus promoting the creation of parallel societies and hindering integration; see Brandt and Meyer, supra note 99. According to Martin Spiwak, Ins Schwimmen geraten: Politiker klagen, Die Zeit, 7 December 2006, available at: www.zeit.de/2006/50/B-Schulverweigerung, accessed: 30 March 2007, this is not the case. He is of the opinion that it is easy to blame immigrants and their religion for pupils failing in school, which might help to exculpate German politicians but does not solve the often significant educational problems of immigrants in Germany.Google Scholar

112 For a long time there has been hardly any training of imams in Germany. Most imams are “imported” from outside of Europe. They are usually trained in Turkey or sometimes even in Saudi Arabia and have little familiarity with Germany or the West. They often even come to Germany with negative and sometimes even hostile views of Western institutions and values. In 2004, two chairs have therefore been established in Germany for the education of teachers of Islam: The Centrum für Religiöse Studien (CRS) is situated in Münster and another chair has been established at the Johann-Wolfgang-von-Goethe University in Frankfurt/Main. While the first is financed with (German) state money, the second receives funding from Diyanet, the official Turkish Authority for religious Affairs – a fact which has caused public debate since some critics are afraid that Turkey will use the funding in order to influence the training of Islamic scholars in Germany. See College Launches Disputed Islamic Program, Deutsche Welle, 27 March 2005. On CRS, see http://www.unimuenster.de/ReligioeseStudien/Islam/index.html, accessed: 30 March 2007.Google Scholar

113 For an overview, see Deutscher Bundestag, supra, note 100, at 26-30.Google Scholar

114 In 2003, the Federal Constitutional Court has ruled against the Land of Baden-Württemberg in its effort to ban a Muslim teacher wearing the headscarf, but left the door open for state level bans of the hijab. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 24 September 2003, 2 BvR 1436/02, available at: www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20030924_2bvr143602.html, accessed: 30 March 2007. For a commentary see Matthias Mahlmann, Religious Tolerance, Pluralist Society and the Neutrality of the State: The Federal Constitutional Court's Decision in the Headscarf Case, 4 GLJ 1099 (2003), available at: www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol04No11/PDF_Vol_04_No_11_1099-1116_Public_Mahlmann.pdf, accessed: 30 March 2007. A few months earlier the Federal Constitutional Court had upheld a decision of the Federal Labour Court which had ruled that it is impermissible to dismiss an employee in a department store because of wearing a head scarf, see BVerfG 30 July 2003, 1 BvR 792/03, available at: www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20030730_1bvr079203.html, accessed: 30 March 2007. The defendant had argued that he would incur financial losses because costumers were not accustomed to such a sight. The BAG had not engaged in a principled discussion of the role of fundamental rights like the freedom of religion in this case but argued simply that there was no evidence for the economic losses given. Compare Bundesarbeitsgericht [BAG] [Supreme Labour Court], 10 October 2002, 2 AZR 472/01, available at: http://lexetius.com/2002,3160, accessed: 30 March 2007. Achim Seifert, Federal Labor Court strengthens religious freedom at the workplace, in 4 GLJ, 559 (2003), available at: www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol04No06/PDF_Vol_04_No_06_559-569_Private_Seifert.pdf, accessed: 30 March 2007. In an actio popularis the Bavarian Constitutional Court has ruled that the Bavarian law on public education does not discriminate against Muslims by banning symbols which might be seen in contradiction with “Christian occidental values”, compare the decision of the Bayerischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof [Bavarian Administrative Appeals Court - BayVGH], 15 January 2007, Vf. 11-VII-05, résumé available at: www.bayern.verfassungsgerichtshof.de, accessed: 20 February 2007. See also Kopftuch bleibt verboten, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 16 January 2007, at 5.Google Scholar

115 See the decision of the BVerfG, 15 January 2002, 1 BvR 1783/99, available at: www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/decisions/rs20021030_1bvr178399.html. On this decision: The Constitutional Court's “Traditional Slaughter” Decision: The Muslims’ Freedom of Faith and Germany's Freedom of Conscience, 3 GLJ (2002), available at: www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=128, accessed: 30 March 2007. The Federal Administrative Court followed this decision in a recent judgment, see BVerwG, 23 November 2006, 3 C 30.05, available at: www.bverwg.de/media/archive/4732.pdf, accessed: 30 March 2007, despite constitutional changes which have given more weight to the protection of animals.Google Scholar

116 After 9/11, Germany adopted new anti-terrorism laws that limited the protection accorded to Muslim extremists. Legislation approved in November 2001, targeted loopholes in German law that permitted terrorists to live and raise money in Germany. The immunity of religious groups and charities from investigation or surveillance by authorities was revoked, as were their special privileges under the right of assembly, giving the government greater freedom to act against extremist groups. Under the legislation, terrorists could now be prosecuted in Germany, even if they belonged to foreign terrorist organizations acting only in other countries.Google Scholar

117 Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz: Aufgaben, Befugnisse, Grenzen (2002) at 62. Available on the website for the German Federal Bureau for the Protection of the Constitution, www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/publikationen/allgemeine_infos/abg/abg.pdf, accessed: 23 December 2006.Google Scholar

118 Under the anti-terrorism laws of 2001 (Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus vom 9. January 2002, Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2002 Teil I Nr. 3, 11 January 2002, available at: www.bmi.bund.de/Internet/Content/Common/Anlagen/Gesetze/Terrorismusbekaempfungsgesetz__pdf,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/Terrorismusbekaempfungsgesetz_pdf.pdf, accessed: 30 March 2007, security authorities enjoy extended powers.Google Scholar

119 Peter J. Katzstein, Same War — Different Views: Germany, Japan, and Counterterrorism, 57 International Organization, 731 (2003).Google Scholar

120 This is based on remarks of Jörg Zierke (Director of the BKA) during a press conference on 21 July 2005.Google Scholar

121 In 2006 both of the major German political parties CDU and SPD but also some of the Länder-Governments have published “action-plans” for integration policy. See e.g. the CDU position paper Für einen nationalen Aktionsplan Integration, 4 April 2006 at: http://www.cducsu.de/upload/fvintegration060404.pdf, accessed: 3 April 2007, and the SPD-Leitlinien zur Integrationspolitik, published 10 July 2006 at: www.spd.de/show/1682982/110706_FB_integration_NCI.pdf, accessed: 3 April 2007, as well as the “20-Punkte-Aktionsplan Integration” of the government of North-Rhine Westfalia published on 27 June, www.politikerscreen.de/index.php/Common/Document/field/document/id/41240, accessed: 3 April 2007.Google Scholar

122 See the homepage of the German Federal Ministry of the Interior, “Deutsche Islamkonferenz”, at: www.bmi.bund.de/cln_028/nn_122688/Internet/Navigation/DE/Themen/Deutsche__Islam__Konferenz/deutscheIslamKonferenz__node.html__nnn=true, accessed: 30 March 2007; Wolfgang Schäuble, The German Conference on Islam, TPQ Winter 15 (2006-07); Jasch, supra note 52, at 67-71; Deutscher Bundestag, 16. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 16/3758, 7 December 2006, at 10-15.Google Scholar

123 See the homepage of the German Federal Ministry of the Interior, “Deutsche Islamkonferenz”, ibid.Google Scholar

124 See also Deutscher Bundestag, supra note 122, at 11-12 (answer to questions 33-34).Google Scholar

125 This strong element of individual representatives has met with strong criticism by the representatives of institutional Islam who also threatened to boycott the conference. Other critics remarked that the DIK was scheduled at the beginning of the Ramadan, see Yassin Musharbash, Islamkonferenz. Lob für Schäubleerste Konflikte zwischen den Muslimen, Spiegel-Online, 27 September 2006, at: www.Spiegel.de, accessed: 27 September 2006; Verbände kritisieren Zusammensetzung der Islamkonferenz, AFP 16 September 2006.Google Scholar

126 The state representatives are: the Federal Minister of Interior, Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble; the Federal Minister of Justice, Brigitte Zypries; the special Chargé for integration, Dr. Maria Böhmer; the State-Secretary in the Foreign Office, Georg Boomgaarden; representatives of the Federal Chancellery, the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social affairs and the Office of the Chargé for Culture and Media; the Bavarian Minister of Interior and current president of the standing Conference of the Interior Ministers of the Länder (“Innenministerkonferenz,” IMK), Dr. Günther Beckstein; the Berlin Senator for the Interior, Dr. Erhardt Körting; the president of the standing Länder-conference on Culture and Public education (Kultusministerkonferenz, KMK) and Minister of Culture of Schleswig-Holstein, Ute Erdsiek-Rave; the Minister of Culture and public education of Bavaria, Siegfried Schneider.Google Scholar

127 For short portraits of the participants, see Islamkonferenz-Teilnehmer. Von radikal bis liberal, Spiegel-Online, 27 September 2006. The representatives are: the president of the Turkish community, Kenan Kolat; the economist and development expert from the public Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), Nassir Djafari; the sociologist and women's rights activist, Dr. Necla Kelek; the Secretary General of the European Centre for Integration, Badr Mohammed; a special chargé of the Holtzbrinck-Gruppe (Editor's), Walid Nakschbandi, a school-teacher Havva Yakkar, the doctor and President of the German-Turkish club, Dr. Ezhar Cezairli; the lawyer and women's rights activist, Seyran Ates; the writer Feridun Zaimoglu and the oriental scientist and writer Dr. Navid Kermani. See commentary by Wolf Günter Lerch, Mit dem Islam erst am Anfang, FAZ, 28 September 2006, at 1.Google Scholar

128 Minister Schäuble even invited the members of the DIK to see the presentation of Idomeneo together which had been criticized for showing the beheaded heads of Jesus, Buddah, Muhammad and Poseidon together. Most of the Muslim representatives followed Schäule's invitation, see Musharbash, supra note 125; Bernadette Schweda, Jetzt wollen (fast) alle in die Oper, Das Parlament, 5 February 2007; Katharina Schuler, Der Wohlfühl-Gipfel, Die Zeit Online, 27 September 2006, available at: www.zeit.de/online/2006/39/Gipfel-2, accessed: 30 March 2007.Google Scholar

129 For further information, see the BAMF's homepage at: www.bamf.bund.de, accessed: 30 March 2007.Google Scholar

130 See www.bmi.bund.de/cln_012/nn_1026710/Internet/Content/Themen/Deutsche__Islam__Konferenz/DatenUndFakten/Islamkonferenz__Kurzinfo__en.html, accessed: 30 March 2007.Google Scholar

131 On recent efforts of four of the main Muslim organizations in Germany to create a federation, see supra note 104.Google Scholar

132 Deutscher Bundestag, supra note 122.Google Scholar

133 The birth rate among the German Muslim population is 3 times higher than for non-Muslims and the population is expected to roughly double by 2015, see www.pbs.org/wbgbh/pages/front-line/shows/front/map/de.html, accessed: 20 July 2006. Also in Italy persons coming from traditional Muslim countries are the fastest growing immigrant group. Although Muslims only account for ca. 1% of the total population 14% of Italy's prison population is Muslim, 98 percent of whom are foreign nationals, supra note 53.Google Scholar

134 See supra note 12.Google Scholar