¹ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 2728/13, 2 BvR 2729/13, 2 BvR 2730/13, 2 BvR 2731/13, 2 BvE 13/13, June 21, 2016, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2016/06/rs20160621_2bvr272813.html [hereinafter Gauweiler]. For a detailed press release of this judgment in English, see Release, Press, Bundesverfassungsgericht, Constitutional Complaints and Organstreit Proceedings Against the OMT Programme of the European Central Bank Unsuccessful (June 21, 2016), http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2016/bvg16-034.html.Google Scholar

² The technical features of the programme were announced in a press release available online. See Release, Press, European Central Bank, Technical Features of Outright Monetary Transactions (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html.Google Scholar

³ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 2728/13, 2 BvR 2729/13, 2 BvR 2730/13, 2 BvR 2731/13, 2 BvE 13/13, Jan. 14 2014, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2014/01/rs20140114_2bvr272813en.html [hereinafter Gauweiler Reference]. For more on this case see Wendel, Mattias, Exceeding Judicial Competence in the Name of Democracy: The German Federal Constitutional Court's OMT Reference, 10 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 263 (2014); Ingolf Pernice, A Difficult Partnership Between Courts: The First Preliminary Reference by the German Federal Constitutional Court to the CJEU, 21 Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L. 3 (2014); see also Special Issue - The OMT Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court, 15 German L.J. 108–382 (2014).Google Scholar

⁴ Gauweiler Reference at paras. 99–100.Google Scholar

⁵ Id. at paras. 102–03.Google Scholar

⁶ Case C-62/14, Gauweiler v. Deutscher Bundestag, (June 16, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu/ [hereinafter OMT Ruling]. For more on this case, see generally Paul Craig & Menelaos Markakis, Gauweiler and the Legality of Outright Monetary Transactions, 41 Eur. L. Rev. 1 (2016); Georgios Anagnostaras, In ECB We Trust…The FCC We Dare! The OMT Preliminary Ruling, 40 Eur. L. Rev. 744 (2015); Vestert Borger, Outright Monetary Transactions and the Stability Mandate of the ECB: Gauweiler, 53 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 139 (2016); Alicia Hinarejos, Gauweiler and the Outright Monetary Transactions Programme: The Mandate of the European Central Bank and the Changing Nature of Economic and Monetary Union, 11 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 563 (2015); Monica Claes & Jan-Herman Reestman, The Protection of National Constitutional Identity and the Limits of European Integration at the Occasion of the Gauweiler Case, 16 German L.J. 917 (2015); Heiko Sauer, Doubtful it Stood…: Competence and Power in European Monetary and Constitutional Law in the Aftermath of the CJEU's OMT Judgment, 16 German L.J. 971 (2015); Federico Fabbrini, After the OMT Case: The Supremacy of EU Law as the Guarantee of the Equality of the Member States, 16 German L.J. 1003 (2015); Sven Simon, Direct Cooperation Has Begun: Some Remarks on the Judgment of the ECJ on the OMT Decision of the ECB in Response to the German Federal Constitutional Court's First Request for a Preliminary Ruling, 16 German L.J. 1025 (2015); Special Issue - The European Court of Justice, the European Central Bank and the Supremacy of EU Law, 23 Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L. 1 (2016).Google Scholar

⁷ Gauweiler at paras. 195–96.Google Scholar

⁸ Id. at paras. 191, 197.Google Scholar

⁹ Id. at para. 190.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Id. at para. 177.Google Scholar

¹¹ OMT Ruling at paras. 47–49.Google Scholar

¹² Gauweiler Reference at paras. 70–72.Google Scholar

¹³ Id. at para. 73.Google Scholar

¹⁴ OMT Ruling at paras. 55, 89.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Gauweiler Reference at paras. 74–78.Google Scholar

¹⁶ OMT Ruling at paras. 60–61.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Id. at paras. 111–21.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Id. at paras. 105–08.Google Scholar

¹⁹ See Sauter, Wolf, Proportionality in EU Law: A Balancing Act? (Tilburg L. & Econ. Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 2013-003), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2208467; see also Tor-Inge Harbo, The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law, 16 EUR. L.J. 158 (2010).Google Scholar

²⁰ Case C-380/03, Germany v. Parliament and Council, (Dec. 12, 2006), http://curia.europa.eu/; see also Case C-343/09, Afton Chemical Ltd. v. Sec'y of State for Transp., (July 8, 2010), http://curia.europa.eu/.Google Scholar

²¹ See, e.g., Joined Cases C-293 & 594/12, Digital Rts. Ireland v. Minister for Comm. Marine & Nat., Kärntner Landesregierung,(Apr. 8, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/. For more on this ruling, see generally Orla Lynskey, The Data Retention Directive is Incompatible with the Rights to Privacy and Data Protection and is Invalid in its Entirety: Digital Rights Ireland, 51 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1789 (2014). See also Marie-Pierre Granger & Kristina Irion, The Court of Justice and the Data Retention Directive in Digital Rights Ireland, 39 Eur. L. Rev. 835 (2014).Google Scholar

²² See, e.g., Case C-283/11, Sky Österreich GmbH v. Österreichischer Rundfunk, (Jan. 22, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/. For more on this case, see generally Georgios Anagnostaras, Balancing Conflicting Fundamental Rights: The Sky Österreich Paradigm, 39 Eur. L. Rev. 111 (2014; Wouter Hins, The Freedom to Conduct a Business and the Right to Receive Information for Free: Sky Österreich, 51 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 665 (2014).Google Scholar

²³ OMT Ruling at para. 68.Google Scholar

²⁴ Id. at paras. 72–81.Google Scholar

²⁵ Id. at paras. 82–92.Google Scholar

²⁶ Gauweiler at para. 205.Google Scholar

²⁷ Gauweiler Reference at para. 100.Google Scholar

²⁸ OMT Ruling at paras. 123–26.Google Scholar

²⁹ See Technical Features of Outright Monetary Transactions, supra note 2.Google Scholar

³⁰ For limited coverage and short maturity period of purchased bonds, see OMT Ruling at paras. 86–87, 116–19. For purchases linked to the attainment of the objectives of the programme, see id. at paras. 82, 112.Google Scholar

³¹ Id. at para. 106.Google Scholar

³² Gauweiler Reference at para. 100.Google Scholar

³³ See Technical Features of Outright Monetary Transactions, supra note 2.Google Scholar

³⁴ OMT Ruling at para. 88.Google Scholar

³⁵ See, e.g., Pace, Lorenzo, And Indeed It Was a (Failed) Nullification Crisis: The OMT Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court and the Winners and Losers of the Final Showdown in the OMT Case, SIDIBlog (Italian Society of International Law) (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.sidiblog.org/2016/09/01/and-indeed-it-was-a-failed-nullification-crisis-the-omt-judgment-of-the-german-federal-constitutional-court-and-the-winners-and-losers-of-the-final-showdown-in-the-omt-case/.Google Scholar

³⁶ Gauweiler at para. 195.Google Scholar

³⁷ Id. at paras. 182–86.Google Scholar

³⁸ Id. at paras. 187–89.Google Scholar

³⁹ ECB Monthly Bulletin September 2012, Eur. Cent. Bank, (Sept. 2012), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/mobu/mb201209en.pdf; ECB Monthly Bulletin October 2012, Eur. Cent. Bank, (Oct. 2012), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/mobu/mb201210en.pdf.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ In this regard, see Thiele, Alexander, Friendly or Unfriendly Act? The Historic Referral of the Constitutional Court to the ECJ Regarding the ECB's OMT Program, 15 German L.J. 241, 256–57 (2014); Thomas Beukers, The Bundesverfassungsgericht Preliminary Reference on the OMT Program, 15 German L.J. 343, 347–49 (2014); Pernice, supra note 3, at 11–12.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Gauweiler Reference at para. 71.Google Scholar

⁴² To this end, see Carsten Gerner-Beurle, Esin Küçük & Edmund Schuster, Law Meets Economics in the German Federal Constitutional Court, 15 German L.J. 281, 302 (2014).Google Scholar

⁴³ Gauweiler Reference at paras. 58–60.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ OMT Ruling at para. 40. Google Scholar

⁴⁵ See Goldmann, Matthias, Adjudicating Economics? Central Bank Independence and the Appropriate Standard of Judicial Review, 15 German L.J. 266, 271–72 (2014).Google Scholar

⁴⁶ See Mayer, Franz, Rebels Without a Cause? A Critical Analysis of the German Constitutional Court's OMT Reference, 15 German L.J. 111, 134–36 (2014).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Gauweiler at para. 176.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Id. at paras. 136–52.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ See Kumm, Mattias, Rebel Without a Good Cause: Karlsruhe's Misguided Attempt to Draw the CJEU into a Game of Chicken and What the CJEU Might do About it, 15 German L.J. 203, 207 (2014); see also Mayer, supra note 46.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 2661/06, July 6, 2010, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2010/07/rs20100706_2bvr266106en.html [hereinafter Honeywell]. For more information on this case, see generally Asterios Pliakos & Georgios Anagnostaras, Who is the Ultimate Arbiter? The Battle over Judicial Supremacy in EU Law, 36 Eur. L. Rev. 109 (2011); Mehrdad Payandeh, Constitutional Review of EU Law After Honeywell: Contextualising the Relationship Between the German Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice of the European EU, 48 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 9 (2011); Matthias Mahlmann, The Politics of Constitutional Identity and its Legal Frame—The Ultra Vires Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court, 11 German L.J. 1407 (2010).Google Scholar

⁵¹ Honeywell at paras. 61–66.Google Scholar

⁵² Gauweiler Reference at paras. 36–43.Google Scholar

⁵³ Honeywell at paras. 67–77.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ See Jürgen Bast, Don't Act Beyond Your Powers: The Perils and Pitfalls of the German Constitutional Court's Ultra Vires Review, 15 German L.J. 167, 179–80 (2014); Thiele, supra note 40, at 254–55; Meyer, supra note 46, at 137–39.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Gauweiler Reference at para. 28 (Lübbe-Wofff, J., dissenting).Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Gauweiler Reference at para. 23 (Gerhardt, J., dissenting).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Gauweiler at paras. 163–73.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Id. at para. 220.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Id. at para. 169.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón at paras. 30–61, Case C-62/14, Gauweiler v. Deutscher Bundestag (Jan. 14, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu/.Google Scholar

⁶¹ See Thomas Beukers & Jan-Herman Reestman, Editorial, On Courts of Last Resort and Lenders of Last Resort, 11 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 227 (2015).Google Scholar

⁶² Joined Cases C-404 & 609/15 Aranyosi, Cărldărraru v. Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Bremen, (Apr. 5, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu/ [hereinafter Aranyosi & Cărldărraru]. For more on this case, see generally Georgios Anagnostaras, Mutual Confidence is not Blind Trust! Fundamental Rights Protection and the Execution of the European Arrest Warrant, 53 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1675 (2016).Google Scholar

⁶³ Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of Feb. 26, 2009, Amending Framework Decisions 2002/584/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA, Thereby Enhancing the Procedural Rights of Persons and Fostering the Application of the Principle of Mutual Recognition to Decisions Rendered in the Absence of the Person Concerned at the Trial, 2009 OJ (L 81) 24.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Case C-399/11, Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, (Feb. 26, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/. This preliminary ruling gave rise to an abundance of academic literature. See generally Nik de Boer, Addressing Rights Divergences Under the Charter, 50 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1083 (2013); Maartje de Visser, Dealing with Divergences in Fundamental Rights Standards, 20 Maastricht J. 576 (2013); Asteris Pliakos & Georgios Anagnostaras, Fundamental Rights and the New Battle Over Legal and Judicial Supremacy: Lessons from Melloni, 35 Y.B. Eur. L. 97 (2015).Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Aranyosi & Cărldărraru, supra note 62, at paras. 75–81.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Id. at paras. 82–87.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Id. at paras. 88–104.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvR 2735/14, Dec. 15, 2015, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2015/12/rs20151215_2bvr273514.html [hereinafter Identity Review Order] (available in English at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2016/bvg16-004.html). For more on this case, see generally Georgios Anagnostaras, Solange III? Fundamental Rights Protection Under National Identity Review, 42 Eur. L. Rev. (forthcoming in April 2017); see also Nowag, Julian, EU law, Constitutional Identity, and Human Dignity: A Toxic Mix?, 53 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1141 (2016).Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Id. at paras. 48–49.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Id. at paras. 76–83.Google Scholar

⁷¹ See Kahn, Mehreen, ‘Not a Good Day for Democracy’ – German Critics Attack ECB Court Ruling, Fin. Times (June 21, 2016), http://www.ft.com/fastft/2016/06/21/critics-hit-out-at-German-ecb-bailout-ruling/.Google Scholar

⁷² European Commission Statement 16/2266, Commission statement on judgment of German Constitutional Court (June 21, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-16-2266_en.htm.Google Scholar

⁷³ See Release, Press, European Central Bank, ECB Announces Expanded Asset Purchase Programme (Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150122_1.en.html. Purchases were officially started in March 2015. See Getting the Machines Revving, Economist: Free Exchange (Mar. 9, 2015, 3:26 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2015/03/quantitative-easing-and-euro.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ See Matussek, Karin, ECB Faces Three Suits Over Quantitative Easing in Germany, Bloomberg (Nov. 10, 2015, 3:44 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-10/ecb-faces-three-suits-over-quantitative-easing-in-german-court.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ See OMT Ruling at paras. 18–33Google Scholar