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Reforming the Electoral System of the Dutch Lower House of Parliament: An Unsuccessful Story

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Gert-Jan Leenknegt  and
Gerhard van der Schyff

Abstract

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Which element of democracy is to prevail in the composition of parliament: an accurate reflection of minorities and their ideas, or a strong bond between citizens and their representatives? The answer, it seems, is to be determined to a large extent by the national political culture. The political history of the Netherlands makes strict proportionality the highest principle in this regard. Over the years, various attempts at fundamental electoral reform have been left stranded. It seems that the current system of proportional representation will remain intact in the Netherlands in spite of periodic attempts at change, as it probably best reflects the Dutch culture's longing for maximum inclusiveness.

Type
Articles
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 8 , Issue 12 , 01 December 2007 , pp. 1133 - 1146
Copyright
Copyright © 2007 by German Law Journal GbR 

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