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Making International Legal Persons in Investment Treaty Arbitration: State-owned Enterprises along the Person/Thing Distinction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Abstract

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Investment treaty arbitration (ITA) has emerged as a space where the international legal personality of states and foreign investors is continuously created, maintained, and redefined. Focusing on treatment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), this Article juxtaposes investment law's doctrinal foundations with Roberto Esposito's political philosophy to explore the dynamics, porosity, and ramifications of international legal personality in ITA. Skeptical of gradual conceptualizations of legal personality, this Article frames investment law in terms of Esposito's person/thing distinction and argues for SOEs to form a liminal category that exposes malleability of legal doctrines when ITA tribunals make or break international legal persons. Ultimately, the ITA cases seem to open a distinct dispositif of a SOE that both delineates the exact normative demarcation of the state as international legal person and creates pockets of indistinguishability and politics at its borders—often to the detriment of the Global South. This insight provides a new perspective on the creation of international legal persons in ITA and international law more generally but, at the same time, also adds a new dimension to Esposito's overarching framework resting on the asymmetric relationship between persons and things.

Type
Special Issue Traditions, Myths, and Utopias of Personhood
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 by German Law Journal, Inc. 

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198 Gus van Harten, The Public-Private Distinction in the International Arbitration of Individual Claims Against the State, 56 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 371–94 (2007).Google Scholar

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204 Amr Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 Harv. Int'l L. J. 419, 455 (2000). The public/private distinction, in particular, lies at the heart of many critiques mounted against ITA. For recent scholarship, see especially Maupin, supra note 202, at 387–400 and René Urueña, Subsidiarity and the Public-Private Distinction in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 79 L. Contemp. Probs. 99, 104–07, 119–21 (2016).Google Scholar

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210 Compare with Aldo Musacchio, Sergio Lazzarini & Ruth Aguilera, New Varieties of State Capitalism: Strategic and Governance Implications, 29 Acad. Mgmt. Persp. 115 (2015).Google Scholar

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218 See Jackson, Robert, Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (1990). For a powerful critique, see Siba N'Zatioula Grovogui, Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans: Race and Self-Determination in International Law (1996). For general discussion, see Selkälä & Rajavuori, supra note 3.Google Scholar

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225 Id. at 105.Google Scholar

226 See, e.g., Said, Edward W., Orientalism (5th ed. 2003).Google Scholar

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229 Id. at Chapter Two, Section “The Black of the White and the White of the Black.” Emphasis in original.Google Scholar

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237 Compare, however, with umbrella clauses that have been noted “to ‘lower’ [some investment] relationships to the private law level (by emphasizing the private-law nature of the relevant undertakings), and to ‘elevate’ their protection to the international level.” Mosche Hirsch, Human Rights & Investment Tribunals Jurisprudence Along The Private/Public Divide, in New Directions in International Economic Law 5, 11–12 (Todd Weiler & Freya Baetens eds., 2011). For more thorough discussion, see works cited in supra note 52.Google Scholar

238 Compare with Soirila, supra note 22, at 2.Google Scholar

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241 Tulip v. Turkey Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, para. 288 (Mar. 10, 2014).Google Scholar

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243 Tulip v. Turkey Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, para. 321 (Mar. 10, 2014).Google Scholar

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257 See, e.g., Nadeja Victor & Inna Sayfer, Gazprom: the Struggle for Power, in Oil and Governance: State-owned Enterprises and the World Energy Supply 655 (David Victor, David Hults, & Mark Thurber eds., 2012).Google Scholar

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