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Loyalty in the European Union. A review

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

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The accession of up to twelve East-European States to the European Union in the next decade is likely to change the possibilities for substantive consensus within the Union for the worse. Yet, the consensus on the means to pursue the objectives of the Union has thus far made European integration successful. Insofar as the feasibility of substantial consent between the Member States diminishes, the need to have rules and principles regulating the conflict between the relevant actors increases. These rules and principles must facilitate the creation of solutions to the new challenges that face the Union. Thus, it is essential for the Union's future that the law of the European Union offers both such rules and principles. One of the most outstanding principles which could perform this important task is the principle of loyalty as developed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) based on Article 10 EC Treaty.

Type
Other
Copyright
Copyright © 2002 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

* (*) The author wishes to thank Mr. Eric Pickett for his helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.Google Scholar

+ (+) Academic assistant for Public Law at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University, Frankfurt am Main.Google Scholar

(1) Armin Hatje, Loyalität als Rechtsprinzip in der Europäischen Union, Nomos: Baden-Baden 2001.Google Scholar

(2) In the following paragraphs, I use the terms EC and EU interchangeably if the context does not require the distinction. Hatje consistently differentiates between them throughout his text.Google Scholar

(3) The same, of course, applies to the Community.Google Scholar

(4) The literal translation of the term Hatje uses (German: Moderation) is “moderation”. However, the content of this function of the loyalty principle as Hatje sees it, is more adequately described by the term “mediation”.Google Scholar

(5) Thus, the French “empty chair politics” is an infringement of the principle of loyalty.Google Scholar

(6) ECJ, joined cases C-6 & 9/90, Francovich et al. v. Italy, [1991] ECR I-5357; ECJ, case C-46/93, Brasserie de Pěcheur v. Germany, [1996] ECR I-1029.Google Scholar

(7) cf. Armin von Bogdandy, The case for unity: The European Union as a single organization with a single legal system, CMLRev 36 (1999), pp. 887 et seqq.Google Scholar

(8) ECJ, case 204/86, Greece v. Council, [1988] ECR 5323, para. 16; ECJ, case C-65/93, Parliament v. Council, [1995] ECR I-643, para. 23.Google Scholar

(9) ECJ, joined cases 205 to 215/82, Deutsche Milchkontor et al. v. Germany, [1983] ECR 2633, para. 19.Google Scholar

(10) ECJ, case C-231/96, Edilizia Industriale Siderurgica (Edis) v. Ministero delle Finanze, [1998] ECR I-4951, para. 34.Google Scholar

(11) ECJ, case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, [1995] ECR I-4165, para. 37.Google Scholar