1 Korhonen, Outi, International Governance in Post-Conflict Situations, 14 Leiden J. Int'l L. 495, 526 (2001).Google Scholar

2 Fraenkel, Ernst, Military Occupation and the Rule of Law: Occupational Government in the Rhineland, 1918–1923 205 (1944).Google Scholar

3 On the Authority of the Interim Administration, S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999) (vests UNMIK with “all legislative authority” over the territory and people of Kosovo). Cf. UNMIK Reg. 1999/1, para. 1.1, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/1999/1 (July 25, 1999) (effectively self-institutionalises all public powers that would normally attributed to a state government. UNMIK remains composed of a pillar structure, each reporting to the SRSG. Until 2005, it was divided into four major components; its structure reflected the heavy dependence of the operation on the efforts and resources of various states and international organisations. While two pillars remained with the UN (civil administration and police/justice), the other pillars were distributed to the OSCE (institution building) and the EU (economic reconstruction)). See also cf. Ruffert, Matthias, The Administration of Kosovo and East Timor, 50 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 477, 613 (2001); Zimmermann, Andreas & Stahn, Carsten, Yugoslav Territory, United Nations Trusteeship or Sovereign State? Reflections on the Current and Future Legal Status of Kosovo, 70 Nordic J. Int'l L. 423 (2001); Matheson, Michael J., United Nations Governance of Postconflict Societies, 95 Am. J. Int'l L. 76 (2001); Wilde, Ralph, From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International Territorial Administration, 95 Am. J. Int'l L. 583 (2001); Yannis, Alexandros, The Concept of Suspended Sovereignty in International Law, 13 Eur. J. Int'l L. 1037 (2002).Google Scholar

4 On a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo, UNMIK Reg. 2001/9, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2001/9 (May 15, 2001) (CF divides all spheres of governmental authority into powers that are to be transferred to the newly created local institutions (Chapter V of the CF) and reserves others for the continued exercise by UNMIK (Chapter VIII). The latter mostly concern sovereignty related matters such as external relations, the administration of state and public property and enterprises, control over the civil registry database, railways and civil aviation, protection of minority rights, public order and safety, defence, and the appointment and removal of judges and prosecutors). Cf. Stahn, Carsten, Constitution without a State? Kosovo under the United Nations Constitutional Framework for Self-Government, 14 Leiden J. Int'l L. 531 (2001) (providing a concise study on the constitutional history of Kosovo and the recent attempts to build political institutions).Google Scholar

5 Strobe Talbott, U.S. Deputy Sectretary of State, Keynote Address at the Aspen Institute, The Balkan Question and the European Answer (August 25, 1999) (quoted by William Bain). William Bain, The Political Theory of Trusteeship and the Twilight of International Equality, 17 International Relations 59, 69 (2003).Google Scholar

6 The case of Kosovo's privatisation process illustrates the dilemma of pursuing divergent interests: While the provisional institutions of self-government (PISG) have, since 2002, pursued an intensive campaign to kick-start the privatisation of public assets in Kosovo, the international agent has stalled the process by its continued recourse to international law and the limits it imposes on UNMIK in its fiduciary exercise of powers. See Bernhard Knoll, From Benchmarking to Final Status? Kosovo and the Problem of an International Administration's Open-Ended Mandate, 16 Eur. J. Int'l L. 637 (2005) (discussing the aforementioned case of Kosovo's privatisation process).Google Scholar

7 This categorisation is frequently employed. Cf. Ed Vulliamy, Farewell, Sarajevo, The Guardian, November 2, 2005 (comment made by the former High Representative for Bosnia, Lord Jeremy Ashdown: “I am formally accountable to the Steering Board of the [Peace Implementation Council] every week… I have to have the capitals’ broad agreement with what I do. Sometimes, if I have 70% of them behind me, I'll go ahead with the decision… I am also responsible to the Bosnian people. If I pass a decree that is refused, my authority is gone like morning dew”).Google Scholar

8 See Beauvais, Joel C., Benevolent Despotism: A Critique of U.N. State-building in East Timor, 33 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 1101, 1106 and 1166 (2001) (makes reference to the UN Security Council and donor countries as UNTAET's primary constituencies).Google Scholar

9 Bain, William, Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power 153 (2003).Google Scholar

10 See e.g., a report by the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly which, regarding the continuation of supreme international authority in Bosnia, considered it “irreconcilable with democratic principles that the HR should be able to take enforceable decisions without being accountable to them or obliged to justify their validity and without there being a legal recourse” (Article 13 of Resolution 1384 of the CoE PA, 20^th Sitting, 23 June 2004). See also Report by the CoE Political Affairs Committee, Strengthening of Democratic Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Doc. 10196, 4 June 2004), §35. The absence of legislative review and other defects of Kosovo's legal system are discussed in Bernhard Knoll, Beyond the Mission Civilisatrice: The Properties of a Normative Order within an Internationalized Territory', 19 Leiden J. Int'l L. 275–304 (2006).Google Scholar

11 See Harland, David, Legitimacy and Effectiveness in International Administration, 10 Global Governance 15, 18 (2004) (presenting a similar argument); see also Richard Caplan, International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction 34 (2005).Google Scholar

12 This definition of an international territorial administration is drawn from Wilde, supra note 3, at 585.Google Scholar

13 Caplan, Richard, A New Trusteeship?: The International Administration of War-Torn Territories 57–58 (Mats R. Berdal ed., 2002).Google Scholar

14 Adapted from Steffek, Jens, The Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse Approach, 9 Eur. J. Int'l Rel. 249, 271 (2003).Google Scholar

15 UNMIK/REG/2001/9, supra note 4, at §1.1 and §1.2 (emphasis added).Google Scholar

16 See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General, No Exit without Strategy: Security Council Decision-Making and the Closure or Transition of UN Peacekeeping Operations, p. 2, U.N. Doc. S/2001/394 (April 20, 2001).Google Scholar

17 The agreement was signed on 23 February 2001 and promulgated by Serbia on 16 June 2001 following its ratification by both countries’ parliaments.Google Scholar

18 http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2002/trans/tr210202.htm (UNMIK Spokesperson noted in a 21 February 2002 press brief that “it is not up to us to recognize the Agreement or not. We administer the territory as it was defined by the 1244”).Google Scholar

19 Marcus Brand, Kosovo under International Administration: Statehood, in Constitutionalism and Human Rights 143 (2002) (quoting President Kostunica) (dissertation on file with the University of Vienna).Google Scholar

20 Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Deplores Kosovo Assembly's Resolution Concerning Province's ‘Territorial Integrity,’ U.N. Doc. SC/7413 (May 24, 2002) (strongly condemning subsequent Resolution by the Kosovo Assembly on the Territorial Integrity of Kosovo, which was also declared void by the SRSG).Google Scholar

21 See Knoll, Bernhard, UN Imperium: Horizontal and Vertical Transfer of Effective Control and the Concept of Residual Sovereignty in ‘Internationalised’ Territories, 7 Austrian Rev. Int'l & Eur. L. 3 (2002) (It is more than questionable whether Serbia has ever been in a position to exercise aspects of foreign relations with regard to territorial dispositions during the period of Kosovo's protected status. By signing away land to fYRoM during UNMIK's interim imperium over the territory, Serbia failed to recognise the United Nations jurisdiction therein. Such interpretation would see both fYRoM and Serbia in breach with their obligations under the UN Charter).Google Scholar

22 Both the Decision on Ramush Haradinaj's Motion for Provisional Release (Case No. It-04–84-Pt, Trial Chamber II, (June 6, 2005) and the subsequent permission to engage in political activities (Case No. IT-04–84-AR65.1) (March 10, 2006) have infuriated not only Serbia's government but also the ICTY Prosecutor. Statement, Statement to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. AN/MOW/1085e (June 7, 2006) (alleged that UNMIK “refuses to co-operate fully with the Tribunal”).Google Scholar

23 Id.Google Scholar

24 Benevolent Despotism, supra note 8, at 1129–1134 (Beauvais notes, the shift from the factional representation in East Timor's National Consultative Council to the expanded representation in the East Timorese National Council led to a considerable increase in the legitimacy of UNTAET).Google Scholar

25 Chesterman, Simon, You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building §§ 223 (2004). See also Noah Feldman, What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation Building 98 (2004).Google Scholar

26 UNTAET SRSG Sergio Vieira de Mello, How Not to Run a Country: Lessons for the UN from Kosovo and East Timor 4 (2000) (unpublished manuscript).Google Scholar

27 Ditore, Koha, June 24, 2004; see also his more recent remarks that “Kosovo institutions should express the political will of Kosovo citizens. It is the obligation of the institutions to convey this will in a democratic way” (Zëri, November 16, 2005, 3).Google Scholar

28 See OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Background Report On the Assembly's Proposal of Amendments to the Constitutional Framework (July 12, 2004) (providing background to the amendment process).Google Scholar

29 Working Group on Preparing Proposals to Amend and Complete the Constitutional Framework, Proposal of Amendments and Supplements to the Constitutional Framework (May 24, 2004) (proposed amendments foresaw new competencies for the PISG in a number of areas including international relations, public security, justice and judicial review, energy, and local government. Extensive changes to the right to hold referenda on issues of “particular importance to the people of Kosovo” were proposed as well, all of which would have encroached upon UNMIK's reserved competencies). See also the Kosovo daily Zëri, May 27, 2004, at 1 and 4–5.Google Scholar

30 Press Release, UNMIK, UNMIK's Statement on Today's Session of the Kosovo Assembly, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/PR/1202 (July 8, 2004).Google Scholar

31 See OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK), Spot Report: On the Monitoring of the Assembly of Kosovo 3 (July 7, 2004), at 3.Google Scholar

32 OMIK, Spot Report on the Assembly of Kosovo's Adoption of Proposed Amendments to the Constitutional Framework 2 (July 13, 2004).Google Scholar

33 See Habermas, Jürgen, Communication and the Evolution of Society 178 (T. McCarthy trans., 1978).Google Scholar

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35 See Knaus, Gerald & Martin, Felix, Travails of the European Raj: Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 14 Journal of Democracy 60, 66–67 (2003). Wood, Nicholas, Nation-Building Effort in Kosovo is at a Crossroads, N. Y. Times, October 10, 2005 (As the former Principal Deputy SRSG Rossin admitted, “the development of their institutions is somewhat retarded by our continuing role”).Google Scholar

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37 UN DPKO Best Practices Unit, December 2003, at 21.Google Scholar

38 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, U.N. Doc. A/55/305, S2000/809, reprinted in 39 ILM 1432 (2000), at §78.Google Scholar

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