¹ I shall leave aside, for the purpose of this discussion, ways of imagining a transnational deliberative democracy. They are so remarkable that they merit separate discussion. See, e.g., Drysek, John S. & Simon Niemeyer, Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative Governance (2010).Google Scholar

² See Grimm, Dieter, Does Europe Need a Constitution?, 1 Eur. L. J. 282 (1995); Dieter Grimm, Europa ja – aber welches? Zur Verfassung der europäischen Demokratie 121–31 (2016).Google Scholar

³ For similar observations, preparing the contrast to “post-democracy,” see Crouch, Colin, Post-Democracy 2–3 (2004).Google Scholar

⁴ See Habermas, Jürgen, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen. Studien zur politischen Theorie 191 (1996).Google Scholar

⁵ It is submitted, hence, that the topics that are likely to spur vigilance and engagement on the part of the citizenry focus on questions of solidarity. For helpful introductions to this latter topic, see Offe, Claus, Pflichten versus Kosten: Typen und Kontexte solidarischen Handelns, in Transnationale Solidarität: Chancen und Grenzen 35–50 (Jens Beckert, et al. eds., 2004); Andrea Sangiovanni, Solidarity as Joint Action, 1 J. Applied Phil. 340 (2015).Google Scholar

⁶ See Scharf, Fritz W., Governing Europe: Effective and Democratic? 121, 171, 193 (1999).Google Scholar

⁷ See Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice 7 (1971).Google Scholar

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⁹ Regrettably, in the age of global terrorism this appears to be also the case for highly sensible issues, such as the processing of data by institutions, such as Europol and Interpol. More democratic vigilance would clearly be desirable here.Google Scholar

¹⁰ It should be noted that the group that one would be ready to embrace as one's own is perhaps not primarily a composed of fellow nationals. Rather, it is most likely to consist of those enacting various life styles that one considers to be “cool” or “normal.” An urban life style, whatever this may precisely be, is not tied to one particular culture. Only secondarily and indirectly, however, does the urban life style become a national affair if a people develops the ability, or at least the desire, to control its existence for reasons having to do with what they believe to be their historical legacy. It is not the case that cultures “are” national, as though this were a given social fact. Rather, the collective ambition to sustain practices and belief for a group of people is what bestows upon various elements of culture a national imprint. National cultures emerge from intermittent endorsements of various cultural fragments. Thus understood, culture becomes an “object of collective preferences.” Andreas Cassee, Globale Bewegungsfreiheit: Ein philosophisches Plädoyer für offene Grenzen 155 (2016). See also Waldron, Jeremy, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, in The Rights of Minority Cultures 93–119 (Will Kymlicka, et al. eds., 1995); Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship 85–87 (1995).Google Scholar

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¹² See Offe, supra note 5, at 42.Google Scholar

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¹⁴ For the by now classical statement, see, Kymlicka, Will, Liberalism, Community, and Culture 164–65 (1989).Google Scholar

¹⁵ See MacIntyre, Alasdair, Is Patriotism a Virtue? 11 (1984).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Given that there is no real unconditional form of life, we need, all the more desperately, to cling to the unconditional that is the fruit of particularity.Google Scholar

¹⁷ See Cassee, supra note 10; Waldron, supra note 10; Kymlicka, supra note 10.Google Scholar

¹⁸ This identification, with the excellence of fellow nationals, is perhaps the most intriguing and also the most pernicious aspect of nationality. The historical memory of the nation facilitates effortless participation in greatness and glory. It is this element of individual transcendence that explains why nations may well be secular equivalents of religion.Google Scholar

¹⁹ See Dworkin, Ronald, A Matter of Principle 168 (1985).Google Scholar

²⁰ See, e.g., Weiler, Joseph H.H., The Constitution of Europe (1999).Google Scholar

²¹ This statement must not be mistaken for a justification of such partiality. It merely aims to account for its significance from the perspective of social psychology.Google Scholar

²² See, Miller, David, On Nationality 164 (1995).Google Scholar

²³ See Yack, Bernard, Nationalism and the Moral Psychology of Community 81 (2012).Google Scholar

²⁴ This is the mistake committed by Weiler in his discussion of the Maastricht decision. See, Weiler, Joseph H.H., Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision, 1 Euro. L. J. 219, 223–24 (1995).Google Scholar

²⁵ See, e.g., Heller, Hermann, Politische Demokratie und soziale Homogenität (1928), in 2 Gesammelte Schriften 423–33 (M. Drath et al eds., 1971); Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Staat-Nation-Europa: Studien zur Staatslehre, Verfassungstheorie und Rechtsphilosophie 111 (1999).Google Scholar

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²⁷ See Böckenförde, supra note 25, at 110–11.Google Scholar

²⁸ It also implies that liberal nationalism is not at all a contradiction in terms. See Tamir, Yael, Liberal Nationalism 35 (1993).Google Scholar

²⁹ See Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang, Wissenschaft-Politik-Verfassungsgericht 289–90, 474 (2011).Google Scholar

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³² See Böckenförde, supra note 25, at 100 (quoting Jean Monnet saying that if he had to start the integration process over again he would begin with culture).Google Scholar

³³ Böckenförde, for example, believes that the creation of a European nation state is not at all precluded. See, e.g., Böckenförde, supra note 25, at 101–02; Böckenförde, supra note 29, at 475.Google Scholar

³⁴ See Böckenförde, supra note 25, at 110–11.Google Scholar

³⁵ See Korsgaard, Christine M., Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity (2009).Google Scholar

³⁶ See Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, Political Writings: Discourse on Inequality, Discourse on Political Economy, On Social Contract 70 (J. Conaway Bonadella trans., 1987).Google Scholar

³⁷ See Freud, Sigmund, Der Untergang des Ödipuskomplexes, in 5 Studienausgabe 243, 248 (J. Strachey ed., 1982).Google Scholar

³⁸ For a pioneering foray into this field, see Bohman, James, Democracy across Borders: From Dêmos to Dênmoi (2007); See also Sofia Näsström, Democratic Representation Beyond Election, 22 Constellations 1, 1–12 (2015).Google Scholar

³⁹ On Hegel's external state, see Hegel, G.W.F., Elements of the Philosophy of Right 221 § 183 (H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ The question may be asked whether this does not privilege insiders at the expense of outsiders. Would it not be fairer to strip insiders of all political rights, too?Google Scholar

⁴¹ See Kostakopoulou, Dora, The Future Governance of Citizenship 104 (2008); Spiro, Peter J., Dual Citizenship as Human Right, 8 Int'l J. Const. L. 111, 122, 129–130 (2010).Google Scholar

⁴² See Somek, Alexander, The Cosmopolitan Constitution 249 (2014).Google Scholar

⁴³ It should be borne in mind that the representation of citizens depends on whether matters are still up for resolution or have already been resolved. If citizens are represented in parliamentary assemblies, they are represented as citizens. Their views matter, nevertheless, with the understanding that they are amenable to making deals or being persuaded. They are represented not only through delegates, but also through processes. It is through representative institutions that democracies become republics. Once citizens are represented through governments, the type of representation changes. It is no longer clear that your government represents your views. You are rather represented inasmuch as you are yielding to others. Your identity is represented. This means you are more present as a political being—in your loyalty—in acts of your government than you are present as a citizen in parliament. In a federal system you encounter your loyalty to your own polity in the respect of your state.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ The question is whether the social-democratic Swedes would have to tolerate being conquered by libertarian fellow Europeans. Arguably, the non-national outlook would leave the matter to fair political contests.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ See Mommsen, Wolfgang, 1848: Die ungewollte Revolution 311–312 (1998).Google Scholar

⁴⁶ See Maduro, Miguel Poiares, We the Court: The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Institution (1998).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ See Ely, John Hart, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1982).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ See Somek, supra note 42, at 260–61.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Addressing externalities has the salutary effect that the views of disaffected minorities might also be represented again. Not just the external outsiders, the internal outsiders can be given a voice, too.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Yes, indeed, in a Derridian sense.Google Scholar

⁵¹ The example demonstrates how skewed the idea of representation re-enforcement really is when it becomes equated with protection from discrimination on the grounds of nationality. It suggests that the outsiders would choose to be included and thus to take a free ride on the education system of another state. It does not register that it would not be fair, on the part of the outsiders, to deplete the resources of another state. If, however, the idea is that the insiders and the outsiders are part of a larger constituency the indefiniteness problem would arise again. And even if it did not arise and one assumed that the citizens of the country in question should be viewed as part of one larger constituency that would, at the end of the day, vote against free university admission, then the others would have been given the power to make these citizens worse off.Google Scholar

⁵² See Esping-Andersen, Gosta, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism 26–27 (1990).Google Scholar