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The division of powers between the EU and the Member States with regard to deliberate release of GMOs (the new Directive 2001/18)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

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The first directives regulating the use and trade of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) were adopted at the Community level in 1990. These acts formed a core of the Community gene technology legal regime and harmonised the authorisation procedures prior to both contained use and deliberate release of genetically modified organisms. Accordingly, no GMO may be placed on the European Union market without obtaining a written consent for it and only after an appropriate environmental risk assessment has been carried out. Under the old Deliberate Release Directive 90/220, 18 GM products were allowed to be placed on the Community market following either the Commission decisions or Member States consent and over 1000 were notified to the Member States authorities for experimental purposes.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 2002 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

* I am very grateful to Prof. Grainne de Burca for all her useful comments and constant support. I also thank my friends Sharon, Karolina and Przemek for their help. Google Scholar

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(85) Cf. Annex 2, MEMO/01/277, supra n. 2.Google Scholar

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(100) That is why incoherence between EU and national legislation, at least in theory, should not remain for long.Google Scholar

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(103) Art. 8 of the new Directive.Google Scholar

(104) Art. 23 of the new Directive, cf. A. Mastromatteo, supra n. 81, 429.Google Scholar

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(107) Cf. Sheridan, B., supra n. 14, 82 – Austria (3), France (2), Germany, Greece, Luxembourg (1).Google Scholar

(108) Cf. Art. 16 of the old Directive, supra n. 1.Google Scholar

(109) Hervey, T. K., supra n. 26, 323.Google Scholar

(110) Sand, I.-J., supra n. 30, 16; T. K. Hervey, supra n. 26, 324.Google Scholar

(111) Ibidem, 324.Google Scholar

(112) Hervey, T. K., supra n. 26, 324; E. Vos, supra n. 21, 168; cf. as well I.-J. Sand, supra n. 30, 1617.Google Scholar

(113) Cf. Sheridan, B., supra n. 14, 82, 84; I.-J. Sand, supra n. 30, 16; L. Krämer, supra n. 18,171.Google Scholar

(114) Sheridan, B., supra n. 14, 83; none of the opinions of the relevant Scientific Committee within the Commission confirm the reasons for GMOs ban invoked by Member States; cf. opinions at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/scp/outcome_gmo_en.html. In the future as stated above the tasks of these committees will be taken over by the European Food Authority, cf. supra n. 73Google Scholar

(115) Generally on the subject, see Ch. Joerges, Integrating Scientific Expertise into Regulatory Decision-Making, EUI Working Paper, RSC No. 96/10.Google Scholar

(116) The same Lawrence, D., Kennedy, J. and Hattan, E., supra n. 11, 52; S. Francescon, supra n. 6, 313; cf. as well T. K. Hervey, supra n. 26, 323.Google Scholar

(117) Art. 23.2. of the new Directive.Google Scholar

(118) The same Sheridan, B., supra n. 14, 82.Google Scholar

(119) Cf. AG Opinion, case C-6/99, supra n. 20, par. 82. The influence may be surprisingly strong, see above and cf. E. Vos, supra n. 21, 170.Google Scholar

(120) Cf. data showing general negative public attitude in Europe towards GMO in Vogel, D., Ships passing in the night: The Changing Politics of Risk Regulation in Europe and the United States, EUI Working Paper, RSC No. 2001/16, 11-13; T. K. Hervey, supra n. 26, 324ff.Google Scholar

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(122) Although not expressly stated by the ECJ it is regarded as such by the Commission, D. Chalmers, EU Law, Vol. I, Ashgate Dartmouth 1998, 222.Google Scholar

(123) This is true for all the fields where the regulatory comitology procedure is applicable, not exclusively for GMOs deliberate release.Google Scholar