¹ See Wolfgang Wagner, Die Konstruktion einer europäischen Außenpolitik – Deutsche, französische und britische Ansätze im Vergleich (2001). For other analytical approaches to CFSP, see also Michael E. Smith, The Framing of European foreign and security Policy: towards a post-modern policy framework?, 10 Journal of European Public Policy 556 (2003); Helene Sjursen, Understanding the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Analytical Building Blocs, 9 ARENA Working Paper (2003), http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp_03_9_sjursen.pdf.Google Scholar

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⁵ The numbering and the wording of the Articles correspond to the final version of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe as delivered by the IGC. I will use the name Constitutional Treaty (CT), whenever referring to it. The final document was signed in Rome on 29 October 2004. See Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 53. With regard to the earlier version of the Constitutional Treaty, as delivered by the European Convention, I will use the name Draft Constitutional Treaty (DCT) to underline that the European Convention has proposed the provisions. The Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe was adopted by the European Convention on 13 June and 10 July 2003 and submitted to the President of the European Council in Rome.Google Scholar

⁶ See, e.g., Integration durch Verfassung (Hans Vorländer ed., 2002), Gary S. Schaal, Vertrauen, Verfassung und Demokratie (2004), Petra Dobner, Konstitutionalismus als Politikform (2002).Google Scholar

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⁸ Many critics of CFSP saw the reluctance of the member states to permit the delegation of sovereignty to centralized institutions as a main problem and thus the main source of failure of CFSP, which has been diagnosed with an inability to be “[…] an effective international actor, in terms both of its capacity to produce collective decisions and its impact on events”. See Christopher Hill, The Capability-expectations gap, or conceptualising Europe's international role, 31 Journal of Common Market Studies 305 (1993). See also Philip H. Gordon, Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy, 22 International Security 74 (1997).Google Scholar

⁹ For the conceptualization of delegating versus pooling, see Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht 67 (1998).Google Scholar

¹⁰ See Heinz Kleger et al., Europäische Verfassung – Zum Stand der europäischen Demokratie im Zuge der Osterweiterung (2004).Google Scholar

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¹² I will not examine the debates and controversies in the European Convention itself. For this purpose, see Der Konvent als Labor – Texte und Dokumente zum europäischen Verfassungsprozess (Heinz Kleger ed., 2004).Google Scholar

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¹⁶ See Thym, Daniel, Reforming Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy, 10 European Law Journal 5 (2004).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Article I-27 DCT did not contain paragraph 4.Google Scholar

¹⁸ See Declaration 24 on Article III-296 CT concerning EEAS in the Declarations concerning provisions of the Constitution, attached to the Constitutional Treaty.Google Scholar

¹⁹ See Duke, supra note 13, at 32.Google Scholar

²⁰ See Hill, Christopher, CFSP: Conventions, Constitutions and Consequentiality, XXXII International Spectator No. 4, 75 (2002).Google Scholar

²¹ DCT lacks this provision (Article III-201).Google Scholar

²² Petersberg tasks include, above all, humanitarian and rescue missions. See Martin Ortega, Petersberg Tasks, and Missions for the EU Military Forces, Working Paper (2005), Institute for Security Studies, Paris, http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/04-mo.pdf.Google Scholar

²³ Brunnbauer, Ulf, The Implementation of the Ohrid Agreement: Ethnic Macedonian Resentments, 1 Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe (2002).Google Scholar

²⁴ Diedrichs, Udo and Jopp, Matthias, Flexible Modes of Governance: Making CFSP and ESDP Work, 2 The International Spectator 15 (2003). See Kathrin Blanck, Flexible Integration in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 61 Europainstitut Working Paper (2004), Wirtschaftsuniveristät Wien, http://fgr.wu-wien.ac.at/institut/ef/wp/wp61.pdf.Google Scholar

²⁵ See Schmitt, Burkhard, The European Union and Armaments: Getting a Bigger Bang for the Euro, 63 Chaillot Papers (2003), Institute for Security Studies, Paris, http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai63e.pdf.Google Scholar

²⁶ See Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation Established by Article I-41(6) and Article III-312 of CT.Google Scholar

²⁷ See Article I-41 CT.Google Scholar

²⁸ Addendum to the Presidency Note, Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member Sates, CIG 60/03 ADD 1, Brussels, 9 December 2003.Google Scholar

²⁹ Diedrichs, and Jopp, , supra note 24, at 15.Google Scholar

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³¹ See van Eekelen, Willem F., The Parliamentary Dimension of Defence Procurement, 5 Occasional Paper, (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 2005, http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/Publications%20New/Occasional_Papers/5.pdf).Google Scholar

³² See Thym, Daniel, Parlamentsfreier Raum? Die Rolle des Europäischen Parlaments in der Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, www.whi-berlin.de/EPinderGASP.htm.Google Scholar

³³ Kleger, , supra note 12.Google Scholar

³⁴ Felderer, Bernhard et al, Draft Constitution: The Double Majority Implies a Massive Transfer of Power to the Large Member States – Is this Intended? Institute for Advanced Studies (2003), Vienna, http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/lib/forum1june2003.pdf.Google Scholar

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