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4 Marmor, Andrei, Interpretation And Legal Theory 141 (2nd ed., 2005).Google Scholar

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7 Choudhry, Sujit, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 Ind. L.J. 819, 885–86 (1999).Google Scholar

8 In Choudhry's view, e.g., a Universalist interpretation of the constitution by courts will work that assumption into the domestic constitutional psyche so that it becomes part of the culture of constitutional argument. See Choudhry, supra note 7, at 888.Google Scholar

9 For example, the Hungarian Constitutional Court in Decision 43/1995, June 30, 1995 (available at http://www.mkab.hu/decisions_stat/decisions), ruled against the so-called “Bokros package” of austerity measures of the mid-1990s, named after the then finance minister, when it determined as unconstitutional a series of statutes which contained serious reductions in social benefits on the grounds that the government's failure to maintain at least a nominal level of social support violated fundamental rights, and that the speed with which these programs had been amended violated the principle of legal certainty. The new 2011 Constitution, voted on by a two-thirds majority in the Hungarian Parliament, effectively protects governments from the Court's interference with economic and financial policy that had occurred under the pre-2012 rules.Google Scholar

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11 Sagar, Arun, Constitutional Interpretation in Federations and its Impact on the Federal Balance, 3 Perspectives On Federalism 1, 4 (2011), http://www.on-federalism.eu/attachments/088_download.pdf.Google Scholar

12 This is true even between systems, which, to the outside observer, appear to be culturally, linguistically and legally “close.” András Jakab, Two Opposing Paradigms of Continental European Constitutional Thinking: Austria and Germany, 58 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 933, 943–46, 951 (2009).Google Scholar

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14 See Greene, Jamal, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 Tex.L. Rev. 1, 43–9 (2009); James Allan and Nicholas Aroney, An Uncommon Court: How the High Court of Australia has Undermined Australian Federalism, 30 Sydney L. Rev. 245, 292–3 (2008); Mahabir Prashad Jain, Indian Constitutional law 833 (6th ed. 2008). See generally Christopher David Gilbert, Australian And Canadian Federalism 1867–1984: A Study Of Judicial Techniques (1986); Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative Study (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., 2006); Gregory Taylor, Characterization In Federations: Six Countries Compared (2006).Google Scholar

15 See generally Markus, Rau, Subsidiarity and Judicial Review in German Federalism: The Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in the Geriatric Nursing Act Case, 4 German L.J. 223 (2003); Giacomo Delledonne, Subnational Constitutionalism: A Matter of Review, 4 Perspectives On Federalism 294 (2012), available at http://www.onfederalism.eu/attachments/134_download.pdf; Antonio Moreira Maués, Constitutional Justice and Subnational Constitutional Space: The Cases of Brazil and Spain (2007), available at http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/statecon/workshop11greece07/workshop11/Moreira.pdf.Google Scholar

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17 Maria Isabel González Pascual, Methods of Interpreting Competence Norms. Judicial Allocation of Powers in a Comparative Perspective, 14 German L.J. 1501 (2013).Google Scholar

18 See Jarass, Hans D., Allgemeine Probleme der Gesetzgebungskompetenz des Bundes, in Neue Zeitschrift Für Verwaltungsrecht 1089, 1092 (2000).Google Scholar

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20 See Stepan, Alfred, Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model, 10 J. of Democracy 19, 21–22 (1999). See generally Juan José Linz & Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (1996); The Politics of Constitutional Change in Industrial Nations: Redesigning the State (Keith Banting & Richard Simeon eds., 1986). A further distinction between the administrative federalism of Germany and the legislative one of Spain and, increasingly, of Italy should also be acknowledged. See generally Gian Franco Cartei & Vincenzo Ferraro, Reform of the Fifth Title of the Italian Constitution: A First Step Towards a Federal System?, 8 Eur. Pub. L. 445 (2007); Arthur B. Gunlicks, German Federalism and Recent Reform Efforts, 6 German L.J. 1283 (2005); Jörn Ipsen, Die Kompetenzverteilung zwischen Bund und Ländern nach der Föderalismusnovelle, in Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2801 (2006); Luis Ortega, The Decentralization Alternatives on the Spanish Constitutional System, 10 Eur. Pub. L. 469 (2009).Google Scholar

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22 See Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, Art. 70 (Ger.).Google Scholar

23 See C.E., B.O.E. Art. 148–49 (Spain).Google Scholar

24 See Pilar Domínguez Lozano, Internal Conflicts and “Interregional Law” in the Spanish Legal System, 5 Spanish Yearbook of Int'l L. 43, 44–48 (1997).Google Scholar

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26 See generally Cartei, Gian Franco, Devolution and the Constitution: The Italian Perspective, 10 Eur. Pub. L. 33 (2004).Google Scholar

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29 See Woehrling, José, Le príncipe d'égalité, la système fédéral canadien et le caractère distinct du Québec, in Québec-Communauté française de Belgique: Autonomie et spécificité dans le cadre d'un système fédéral 119, 122 (Pierre Patenaude ed., 1991).Google Scholar

30 Katz, Ellis & Tarr, George Alan, Does Federalism Promote or Undermine Rights?, in Federalism and Rights ix, x (Ellis Katz & George Alan Tarr eds., 1996).Google Scholar

31 See Fossas, Enric, National Plurality and Equality, in Democracy and National Pluralism 63, 76 (Ferran Requejo ed., 2001).Google Scholar

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33 Cf. the common interpretation of the German Basic Law rights chapter by the Federal Constitutional Court and the constitutional courts of the Länder. See Steiner, supra note 19, at 15–19.Google Scholar

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39 See Parti écologiste Les Verts v. European Parliament, CJEU Case 294/83, 1986 E.C.R. 1339, para. 23; Re Draft Treaty on a European Econ. Area, CJEU Opinion 1/91, 1991 E.C.R. I-6079, para 20; Kadi v. Council and Comm'n, CJEU Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351, para. 81.Google Scholar

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45 In such situations, the EU's competence to act may be either exclusive (Art. 3 TFEU), shared (Art. 4 TFEU), coordinating (Arts. 2 and 5 TFEU) or “complementary” (Art. 6 TFEU). See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Sep. 5, 2008. For a pre-Lisbon discussion of this field, see generally Thomas Von Dannwitz, Vertikale Kompetenzkontrolle in föderalen Systemen–Rechtsvergleichende und rechtsdogmatische Überlegungen zur vertikalen Abgrenzung von Legislativkompetenzen in der Europäischen Union, 131 Archiv Des Öffentlichen Rechts 510 (2006).Google Scholar

46 For various criticisms of the principle, see, e.g., George Berman, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 331 (1994); Christian Calliess, Subsidiaritäts- Und Solidaritätsprinzip in der Europäischen Union (1999); Antonio Estella, The EU Principle of Subsidiarity and its Critique (2002); Allan Francis Tatham, EC Law in Practice: A Case-Study Approach 36–41 (2006). Its application is the subject of further Treaty definition under Protocol (No. 2) “On the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality” to the TEU and TFEU.Google Scholar

47 See Schütze, Robert, European Constitutional Law 177–86 (2012).Google Scholar

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50 Srl CILFIT v. Ministero della Sanità, CJEU Case 283/81, 1982 E.C.R. I-3415, 3430.Google Scholar

51 See Pollicino, Oreste, Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice in the Context of the Principle of Equality Between Judicial Activism and Self-Restraint, 5 German L.J. 283, 289 (2004).Google Scholar

52 The public policy, public security and public health exceptions are to be found in Arts. 45(3), 52(1) and 62 TFEU; and the public service exception in Arts. 45(4), 51 and 62 TFEU.Google Scholar

53 See Tridimas, Takis, The General Principles of EU Law 118–32 (2nd ed. 2006).Google Scholar

54 See generally, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA (Simmenthal No. 2), CJEU Case 106/77 1978 E.C.R. I-629, and the loyalty clause present in the Treaties since the beginning and, since the Lisbon Treaty amendments, numbered as Art. 4(3) TEU, by means of which the CJEU emphasizes the duty of cooperation, inter alia, with national authorities including the courts, in the enforcement of EU law. See also Luxembourg v. Parliament, CJEU Case 230/81, 1983 E.C.R. I-255, paras. 35 et seq. Google Scholar

55 See generally Martínez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, CJEU Case C-85/96, 1998 E.C.R. I-2691; Grzelczyk v. Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, CJEU Case C-184/99, 2001 E.C.R. I-6193 [hereinafter Grzelczyk]; Baumbast and R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, CJEU Case C-413/99, 2002 E.C.R. I-7091 [hereinafter Baumbast]; D'Hoop v. Office national de l'emploi, CJEU Case C-224/98, 2002 E.C.R. I-6191; Pusa v. Osuuspankkien Keskinäinen Vakuutusyhtiö, CJEU Case C-224/02, 2004 E.C.R. I-5763; Zhu and Chen v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, CJEU Case C-200/02, 2004 E.C.R. I-9925; Garcia Avello v. Belgian State, CJEU Case C-148/02, 2003 E.C.R. I-11613; Schempp v. Finanzamt München V, CJEU Case C-403/03, 2005 E.C.R. I-6421; Regina, on the application of Bidar v. London Borough of Ealing, CJEU Case C-209/03, 2005 E.C.R. I-2119; Carpenter v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, CJEU Case C-60/00, 2002 E.C.R. I-6279. But the CJEU recognizes that there are limits to its interpretative reach. See generally Sinclair Collis Ltd. v. Comm'rs of Customs & Excise, CJEU Case C-275/01, 2003 E.C.R. I-5965; Office national de l'emploi v. Ioannidis, CJEU Case C-258/04, 2005 E.C.R. I-8275.Google Scholar

56 Grzelczyk, , supra note 55, at para. 31; Baumbast, supra note 55, at para. 82.Google Scholar

57 Now accentuated by the introduction of the EC Directive 2004/38, 2004 O.J. L158/77, as corrected.Google Scholar

58 Tridimas, , supra note 53, at 133.Google Scholar

59 As set out in TFEU Art. 20(1). The intertwining of non-discrimination (equality) and citizenship is confirmed by their appearance together in Part Two of the TFEU.Google Scholar

60 See Commission v. Luxembourg, CJEU Case C-473/93, 1996 E.C.R. I-3207, para. 35.Google Scholar

61 See generally Commission v. Greece, CJEU Case 147/86,1988 E.C.R. 1637; Groener v. Minister for Educ., CJEU Case 379/87, 1989 E.C.R. 3967 [hereinafter Groener]; Soc'y for the Protection of the Unborn Child v. Grogan, CJEU Case C-159/90, 1991 E.C.R. I-4719.Google Scholar

62 See Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council, CJEU Case C-50/00 P, 2002 E.C.R. I-6677, para. 42; Segi v. Council, CJEU Case C-355/04 P, 2007 E.C.R. I-1657, para. 38; Unibet (London) Ltd. v. Justitiekanslern, CJEU Case C-432/05, 2007 E.C.R. I-2271, para. 38 (“Under the principle of cooperation laid down in Article 10 EC [now Art. 4(3) TEU], it is for the Member States to ensure judicial protection of an individual's rights under Community law.”).Google Scholar

63 The present author will not be presenting an extensive and detailed analysis of all the relevant CJEU case-law related to this subject. For such analysis, the reader is directed to Asteris Pliakos, Le contrôle de constitutionnalité et le droit de l'Union européenne: la réaffirmation du principe de primauté, 46 Cahiers de droit Européen 487 (2010); Olivier Peiffert, L'encadrement des règles constitutionnelles par le droit de l'Union européenne, 47 Cahiers de droit Européen 433 (2011); Ingolf Pernice, Der Schutz nationaler Identität in der Europäischen Union, 136 Archiv des Öffentlichen Rechts 185, 207–20 (2011).Google Scholar

64 See generally Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, CJEU Case C-36/02, 2004 E.C.R. I-9609 [hereinafter Omega].Google Scholar

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66 See Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, CJEU Case C-341/05, 2007 E.C.R. I-11767, para. 92.Google Scholar

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70 Thus amounting to a subsidiary argument in the understanding of Armin von Bogdandy & Stephan Schill, Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity Under the Lisbon Treaty, 48 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1417, 1424 (2011).Google Scholar

71 See Runevič-Vardyn v. Vilniaus miesto savivaldybės administracija, CJEU Case C-391/09, 2011 E.C.R. I-3787, para. 86. As the CJEU had previously done in Groener, supra note 61, at para. 18, when it considered that the maintenance and promotion of the Irish language could be qualified as an “expression of national identity and culture,” as contended by the Irish Government.Google Scholar

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