¹ There are many labels attached to Mečiar's regime in Slovakia. Classifications differ from so-called “laggards” (Andrew C. Janos, East Central Europe in the Modern World: The Politics of the Borderlands from Pre- to Postcommunism (2000), “troubled democracies” (Herbert Kitschelt, Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation (1999), at 42), and mixed cases (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Human Rights and Democratization in Slovakia, (1997), Available at: http://www.csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.Download&FileStore_id=267). See also Bunce, Valerie and Wolchik, Sharon, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Post-Communist Countries (2011). Overall, the literature agrees on the undemocratic character of the Slovak regime up until 1998.Google Scholar

² See Kosař, David, Perils of Judicial Self-Government in Transitional Societies (2016), 254-256.Google Scholar

³ Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers. Recommendation No. R (94) 12 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the independence, efficiency and role of judges. 13 October 1994, http://www.barobirlik.org.tr/dosyalar/duyurular/hsykkanunteklifi/recR(94)12e.pdf.Google Scholar

⁴ European Commission, 2000 Regular Report on Slovakia's Progress towards Accession, November 2000. The suggestions to foster the introduction of proper judicial structures reach as far as to the first progress report from 1998. European Commission. Progress Report on Slovakia, 1998, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/archives/pdf/key_documents/1998/slovakia_en.pdf.Google Scholar

⁵ See Bobek, Michal and Kosař, David, Global Solutions, Local Damages: A Critical Study in Judicial Councils in Central and Eastern Europe 15 German L.J. 1257 (2015); and Kosař, supra note 2, at 126-136.Google Scholar

⁶ As Uzelac writes, “socialist legal world was, by its nature, not that socialist” but rather consisted of particular practices, traditions and values. See Uzelac, Alan, Survival of the Third Tradition 377 (2010) 49 Supreme Court L.R. For more on unsuccessful de-communization of the Slovak judiciary see also Kovanič, Martin & Spáč, Samuel, Vyrovnanie sa s minulost'ou v sudcovskom stave, in Nedotkuntelni? Politika sudcovských kariér na Slovensku v rokoch 1993-2015 (Erik Láštic & Samuel Spáč, eds., 2018). Turnover in the Czech counterpart is estimated to be larger, see Samuel Spáč, Judiciary Development after the Breakdown of Communism in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (MA Thesis, Central European University 2013).Google Scholar

⁷ For more see: Kosař, David, Beyond Judicial Councils: Forms, Rationales and Impact of Judicial Self-Governance in Europe (in this special issue).Google Scholar

⁸ See Kosař, supra note 2, at 240-243Google Scholar

⁹ See Kovanič, & Spáč, , supra note 6, at 37-61.Google Scholar

¹⁰ See Bobek, Michal, The Fortress of Judicial Independence and the Mental Transitions of the Central European Judiciaries 14 European Public Law 99 (2008).Google Scholar

¹¹ See particularly Sajó, András and Losonci, Vera, Rule by Law in East Central Europe: Is the Emperor's New Suit a Straightjacket? in Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World 289 (D.Greenberg, ed., 1993), at 322.Google Scholar

¹² Administrative and managerial powers have to a great extent always belonged to the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry decides about the number of courts, judges, law clerks or other court employees, as well as about the budget of the judicial system, and majority of technical and material equipment. The Ministry also manages all ICT systems used by the courts. The Supreme Court is an exception from this rule as it stands as an independent category in the budget approved by the parliament, however it still uses the same ICT systems, although it administers them on its own.Google Scholar

¹³ Various vocabulary has been applied to this dichotomy – it is the difference between independence understood as means and ends, the difference between mechanisms and values, the difference between ‘structural insulation’ and ‘impartiality', or the difference between institutional and decisional independence. For more see e.g.: Burbank, Stephen B. and Friedman, Barry, Reconsidering Judicial Independence in Judicial independence at the crossroads: an interdisciplinary approach 9 (2002), at 9-42; or Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and the role of Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the Courts, 78 Indiana L.J. 153 (2003), at 153-221; or Shimon Shetreet, Judicial Independence and accountability: core values in liberal democracies in Judiciaries in Comparative Perspective 3 (H.P. Lee, ed., 2011) at 3-24.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Under the term ‘judicial accountability’ we include both decisional accountability and behavioral accountability, both on-the-bench and off-the-bench, both formal (e.g. disciplinary proceedings, remuneration) and informal (changing working conditions). For more see Kosař, supra note 2, at 25-120.Google Scholar

¹⁵ See for instance Popova's definition which holds that “independent judiciary delivers decisions that do not consistently reflect preference of a particular group of actors” in Maria Popova, Politicized Justice in Emerging Democracies: A study of Courts in Russia and Ukraine (2012).Google Scholar

¹⁶ See Kosař, , supra note 2, at 25-72.Google Scholar

¹⁷ See e.g. European Commission. Progress report on Slovakia 1999, p.14. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/archives/pdf/key_documents/1999/slovakia_en.pdf. Or European Commission, 2001 Regular Report on Slovakia's progress towards accession, SEC (20010 1475, 13 November 2001, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/archives/pdf/key_documents/2001/sk_en.pdf Google Scholar

¹⁸ See e.g. Kühn, Zdeněk, Socialistická Justice, In Komunistické právo (Michal Bobek, Pavel Molek & Vojtěch Šimíček, eds., 2009); Hakeem O. Yusuf, Calling the Judiciary to Account for the Past: Transitional Justice and Judicial Accountability in Nigeria. 30 Law & Policy 194 (2008); David Dyzenhaus, Judging the Judges, Judging Ourselves: Truth, Reconciliation and the Apartheid Legal order (2003).Google Scholar

¹⁹ We use plural here as Czechoslovakia was a federal state. Additionally, judges at the lowest level were elected by political representatives at the local level. See Kühn, supra note 18.Google Scholar

²⁰ The critique also addressed substantive execution of the powers. In 1997, the government refused to nominate 12 judges for re-election without any reasoning. See Kosař, supra note 2, at 256.Google Scholar

²¹ See for instance European Commission, Agenda 2000, Progress report 1998, Monitoring reports 1999-2000. Google Scholar

²² The process was a little more complicated regarding the position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who was elected by the parliament, but the parliament could not dismiss him. However, when in 1997 the Chief Justice Milan Karabin resigned from this position to be replaced by Štefan Harabin, a judge much more closely associated with government parties, it officially happened for health-related reasons, yet Karabin shortly after that continued in his judicial career and eventually became Chief Justice again in 2003. See Kosař, David & Spáč, Samuel, Predsedovia súdov: Od ministerských “spojok” k autonómnym aktérom, in Nedotkuntel'ní? Poutika sudcovských kariér na Slovensku v rokoch 1993 – 2015 (Erik Láštic & Samuel Spáč, eds., Univerzita Komenského, 2018).Google Scholar

²³ See Kosař, supra note 2, at 256.Google Scholar

²⁴ See Kosař, supra note 2, at 49.Google Scholar

²⁵ See Bobek, & Kosař, , supra note 5.Google Scholar

²⁶ See Kosař, supra note 2, at 338-339.Google Scholar

²⁷ Minister of Justice Jozef Liščák even referred to some judges as “buggers and frats stupid as cues.” See See Kosař, , supra note 2, at 255.Google Scholar

²⁸ See Kosař, supra note 2, at 255.Google Scholar

²⁹ In 1997, when the parliament, upon nomination by the Minister, elected Štefan Harabin to become Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, neither the judicial board of the Supreme Court nor the Council favored the appointment. For more see Kosař, & Spáč, , supra note 22.Google Scholar

³⁰ See the following Section.Google Scholar

³¹ See Bunce, & Wolchik, , supra note 1.Google Scholar

³² See Bobek, & Kosař, , supra note 5; Kosař, supra note 2, at 126-136.Google Scholar

³³ The amendment included a larger bulk of reforms concerning the Constitutional Court, preparing the ground for Slovak accession to the EU, creation of the Supreme Audit Office of the Slovak Republic and reforms regarding regional self-government.Google Scholar

³⁴ Act No. 185/2002 on the Judicial CouncilGoogle Scholar

³⁵ The idea for such an institution had been promoted by the Association of Judges of Slovakia since 1995, but successfully started its operation only in September 2004. The Academy is governed by a ten-member Board: five nominated by the JCSR from all judges, five nominated by the Minister of Justice, two of them upon the suggestion of the General Prosecutor. Until 2009, at least two members nominated by the Minister had to be judges, thus securing a clear majority for judicial actors.Google Scholar

³⁶ See Spáč, , supra note 6.Google Scholar

³⁷ See Spáč, , supra note 6, at 60-64.Google Scholar

³⁸ See Bröstl, Alexander, At the Crossroads on the Way to an Independent Slovak Judiciary in Systems of Justice in Transition: Central and Eastern European Experiences Since 1989 (Jiři Přibáň, Pauline Roberts & James Young, eds., 2003); or Pavol Rohárik, The Judiciary and Its Transition in Slovakia after 1989 in Systems of Justice in Transition: Central and Eastern European Experiences Since 1989 (Jiři Přibáň, Pauline Roberts & James Young, eds., 2003).Google Scholar

³⁹ See Kosař, , supra note 2; and Ján Svák, Slovenská skúsenost's optimalizáciou modelu správy súdnictva in Hledání optimálneho modelu správy soudnictví pro Českou republiku (J. Kysela, ed., 2008); and Tim Haughton, Exit Choice and Legacy: Explaining Patterns of Party Politics in Post-communist Slovakia”30 East European Politics 210 (2014).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ See Svák, , supra note 39.Google Scholar

⁴¹ The explanatory note actually included the expectation that political branches will nominate experts in law or representatives of other legal professions.Google Scholar

⁴² Between 2002 and 2007 there were twelve judges to six non-judges at the JCSR. Between 2007 and 2012, the ratio shifted to sixteen judges to two-non-judges. Since then, there have always been at least thirteen judges among the members of the JCSR. All in all, political branches have so far nominated 40 members to the JCSR, 20 of whom were judges.Google Scholar

⁴³ This issue was influenced by political conflict regarding the status of ‘judicial candidates.’ Centre-right governments preferred open selection procedures, leftist and nationalistic parties favored ‘judicial candidates’ trained and socialized within the system. As a consequence, even before 2011 when selection procedures became obligatory, judges were commonly selected in competitive procedures as positions of ‘judicial candidates’ were often left vacant by the decision of the Minister of Justice. This was changed in 2008 by the leftist-nationalist government represented by Minister Štefan Harabin, who enacted into law the preference for ‘judicial candidates.’ For more see: Juraj Palúš, Právna úprava výberu sudcov na Slovensku in Prístup k spravodlivosti -Bariéry a východiská: Výber sudcov (Kristína Babiaková, ed., 2015).Google Scholar

⁴⁴ There are two types of disciplinary senates. In the first instance, the senate consists of three members elected by the JCSR upon nomination by judicial boards, the parliament and the Minister. In the second instance, senates have five members, one nominated by judicial boards, and two nominated by the parliament and the Minister each. Until 2012 there was no requirement to include any non-judges in the senates, hence disciplinary procedures were clearly dominated by judicial actors.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ See Kosař, , supra note 2, at 299-332.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ For more about Harabin see Kosaŕ, , supra note 2, at 248-254.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Šipoš, Gabreil, Spáč, Samuel & Klátik, Peter. Kto je s kým rodina na našich súdoch; available at: https://transparency.blog.sme.sk/c/342665/Kto-je-s-kym-rodina-na-nasich-sudoch.html Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Although previous ministers used this power as well, none of them had done so to a comparable degree as Harabin. Available data show that Minister Ján Čarnogurský (1998 – 2002) changed altogether 33% of court presidents, Daniel Lipšic (2002 – 2006) changed 26% of court presidents, and Lucia Žitňanská (2006) changed 7% of court presidents. Once Harabin left the office this practice became much more common. Since 2010 there have been two governments with two Ministers of Justice; both of them changed about 50% of court presidents. For more see Kosař, & Spáč, , supra note 22. Among court presidents who were dismissed by Harabin was Ludovít Bradáč: from the regional court in Banská Bystrica, who was one of most notable representatives of the Association of Judges of Slovakia, which was very critical of Mečiar's government during 1990s.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Most notably, in 2002, court presidents lost their power to assign cases to judges due to the adoption of a system of computerized random assignment. See Staroňová, Katarína, Projekt ‘Súdny manažment’ ako protikorupčný nástroj in Jedenásť statočných: Prípadové štúdie protikorupčnych nástrojov na Slovensku (Emília Sičáková Beblavá & Miroslav Beblavý, eds. 2008).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ For more see Kosař, & Spáč, , supra note 22.Google Scholar

⁵¹ See Kosaŕ, , supra note 2, at 68-72 and 264-332; or Pavol Žilincik & Samuel Spáč, Selektívna zúčtovatel'nost': Príklady z disciplinárneho súdnictva, in Nedotkuntelní? Politika sudcovských kariér na Slovensku v rokoch 1993 – 2015 (Erik Láštic & Samuel Spáč, eds., Univerzita Komenského 2018).Google Scholar

⁵² See Bojarski, Lukasz & Werner Stemker Köster, The Slovak Judiciary: its current state and challenges (2012).Google Scholar

⁵³ See Kosař, , supra note 2, at 68-72.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ See Žilinčík, & Spáč, , supra note 51.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ In 2000, Majchrák, while in position of Vice-president of the Supreme Court, addressed a critical letter to Štefan Harabin, at that time Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, expressing his concerns and disapproval of Harabin's actions in office. See: http://www.sudcovia.sk/sk/dokumenty/1334-otvoreny-list-juraja-majchraka-stefanoviharabinovi-z-8-8-2000 Google Scholar

⁵⁶ For more information about disciplinary procedures against judges critical of Harabin and his allies see: http://www.sudcovia.sk/sk/dokumenty/disciplinarne-konania/406-14disck-14ot Google Scholar

⁵⁷ See e.g. CEPEJ – Council of Europe, European Judicial Systems: Efficiency and Quality of Justice (2016).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ See Kosař, , supra note 2, at 326; Zuzana Čaputová & Eva Kováčechová, Prístup k spravodlivosti. Bariéry a východiská. Vybrané aspekty disciplinárního súdnictva, (2012). Available at: https://viaiuris.sk/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/pilk-2012.pdf.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ This initiative later led to the establishment of a new judicial association called ‘For Open Justice'. For more see Bojarski, & Köster, Stemker, supra note 52, at 76.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ For the definition of judicial independence as a feature of output see Popova, , supra note 15.Google Scholar

⁶¹ The General Prosecutor unlawfully confirmed the existence of a recording of Harabin's phone call with an Albanian living in Slovakia, Baki Sadiki, who had in the past been accused of committing drug crimes. This incident has been frequently used against Harabin by his political opponents in the public debate. See: Matúš Burčík, Harabin dostane za potvrdenie telefonátu so Sadikim 150-tisíc eur. SME, November 6, 2013.Google Scholar

⁶² In addition, all of these judges were nominated for judgeship in September 2009 by the JCSR, which was at the time led by Štefan Harabin. For more see: Veronika Prušová, Šefka súdu pomohla náhode aj pri pridelení Harabinovej žaloby. SME, May 5, 2013.Google Scholar

⁶³ For more on the issue of Slovak Specialized Criminal Court see: Matthew Stephenson, Specialized anti-corruption courts: Slovakia (2016).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Slovak Constitutional Court, judgment of 20 May 2009, PL. ÚS 17/2008.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ For instance, in the Global Corruption Barometer 2013, the judiciary was perceived as the most corrupt institution in Slovakia. Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer (2013). Also, concerns about independence can be found in Klaus Schwab and Xavier Sala-i-Martín, The Global Competitiveness Report 2015-2016 (2016).Google Scholar

⁶⁶ See Bobek, & Kosař, supra note 5.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Červená pre Harabina, Pluska, June 10, 2009. Available at: http://www.pluska.sk/old/aktuality/cervena-preharabina.html Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Prušová, Veronika, Harabin: Diplomati si kupujú sudcov darčekmi, SME, May 20, 2010. Available at: https://domov.sme.sk/c/5383790/harabin-diplomati-si-kupuju-sudcov-darcekmi.html Google Scholar

⁶⁹ See the following Section and Samuel Spáč, Matej Šimalčík & Gabriel Šípoš, Let's Judge the Judges: How Slovakia Opened its Judiciary to Unprecedented Public Control (2018).Google Scholar

⁷⁰ After the reform there were actually three political nominees and two judicial nominees, which was struck down by the Constitutional Court. See Section, C.I. Google Scholar

⁷¹ For more see: Samuel Spáč, By the Judges, For the Judges: The study of judicial selection in Slovakia, (Dissertation Thesis, Comenius University, 2017), at 90-125.Google Scholar

⁷² On the concept of legitimacy see e.g. Gibson, James L., Caldeira, Gregory A. & Baird, Vanessa A., On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 The American Political Science Review 343 (1998), at 343; and W. S. Richards, Survey article: the legitimacy of Supreme Courts in the context of globalization, 4 Utrecht L.R. 104 (2008), at 104.Google Scholar

⁷³ See e.g. Stillman, Peter G., The Concept of Legitimacy, 7 Polity 32 (1974), at 32; and David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (2013), or Başak Çali, Anne Koch, Nicola Bruch, The Legitimacy of Human Rights Courts, A Grounded Interpretivist Analysis of the European Court of Human Rights, 35 Human Rights Quarterly 955 (2013), at 955.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ See e.g. Schmitt, Carl, Legality and Legitimacy (2004); and David Dyzenhaus, Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Herman Heller in Weimar (1999).Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Supra note 74; and various contributions in: Legitimacy in International Law (Rudiger Wolfrum & Volker Roben ed. 2008).Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Buchanan, Allen & Keohane, Robert. The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions. 20.4 Ethics & International Affairs 405 (2006).Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Suchman, Mark C., Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches, 20 Academy of Management Review 571 (1995), at 571.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Act No. 385/2000 Coll.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Act No. 757/2004 Coll.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Art. 141a of the Slovak ConstitutionGoogle Scholar

⁸¹ Act No. 185/2002 CollGoogle Scholar

⁸² Art. 141 of the Slovak ConstitutionGoogle Scholar

⁸³ See the Section B.2.I.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ It needs to be stressed that the Constitutional Court cannot initiate a review, and hence acts only if some other institution files a petition. Within the scope of judicial administration, this power belongs to the JCSR, among other actors.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ Slovak Constitutional Court, judgment of 8 May 2014, PL. ÚS 102/2011.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ See the Section B.3.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ The JCSR, led by Harabin, refused to nominate judges selected by such committees for appointment. After the change in government in 2012, Minister Tomáš Borec sought compromise by nominating, almost exclusively, judges on his ‘list’ who would eventually be accepted by the JCSR.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Slovak Constitutional Court, judgement of November 8, 2015, PL. ÚS 2/2012.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ Lewicki, Roy J., McAllister, Daniel J. & Bies, Robert J. Trust and Distrust: New Relationships and Realities, 23 Academy of Management Review 438 (1998), at 438-58.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Eurobarometer 385. Justice in the EU.Google Scholar

⁹¹ Besides other factors, a steep increase of distrust between 1997 and 2002 could be a consequence of the widespread feeling of injustice related to general political atmosphere in the country and its various financial frauds, and even murders, which had not been investigated and their culprits remained unconvicted. So-called Mečiar's amnesties can serve as an example which had the potential to affect overall perception of justice in the society. For more on Mečiar's amnesties, which were eventually scrapped by the parliament in 2017, see for instance Michal Ovádek, “Unrichtiges Recht” in Slovakia? The Radbruch Formula and Positive Law from the Nineties, VerfBlog, February 7, 2017. Available at http://verfassungsblog.de/unrichtiges-recht-in-slovakia-the-radbruch-formula-and-positive-law-from-the-nineties/ Google Scholar

⁹² Source: Via Iuris, Focus 2015 (Via Iuris, Focus. Vývoj nedôvery v súdy a súdnictvo, roky 1997-2015. https://www.aktuality.sk/foto/305603/5/tri-stvrtiny-slovakov-nedoveruju-sudom-a-dovera-sudnictva-staleklesa/); Via Iuris 2016 (Via Iuris. Správa z prieskumu verejnej mienky o dôvere verejnosti k súdom. http://www.viaiuris.sk/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Spr%C3%A1va-z-prieskumu-d%C3%B4vera-verejnostivo%C4%8Di-s%C3%BAdom-2016.pdf). The question asked was: “To what extent do you trust or distrust the courts and the judiciary?” Possible answers: I definitely trust/I rather trust/I rather distrust/I definitely distrust them. Legend: The data in the figure represent the share of respondents who rather + definitely distrust the courts and the judiciary.Google Scholar

⁹³ The 2016 EU Justice Scoreboard.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ According to Transparency International Slovakia, every fifth judge has a close family relationship to another judge or other court employee. See Šipoš, , Špáč & Klátik, supra note 47.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ Eurobarometer, supra note 90. According to the 2016 EU Justice Scoreboard, the estimated time needed to resolve a case in court (meaning the time taken by the court to reach an initial decision) was 238 days in Slovakia, only slightly above the average of 225 days calculated for 21 EU countries.Google Scholar

⁹⁶ FOCUS. Percepcia korupcie na Slovensku. Prieskum verejnej mienky pre Transparency International Slovensko (2015). Available at: http://www.transparency.sk/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/FOCUS-Percepcia-korupcie-na-Slovensku-feb.2015.pdf Google Scholar

⁹⁷ Eurobarometer, supra note 90.Google Scholar

⁹⁸ Eurobarometer, supra note 90.Google Scholar

⁹⁹ E.g. in the so-called Bonanno affair, four judges of the Supreme Court sued the tabloid Nový Čas for publishing pictures from their private party held in 2011. The pictures captured their host welcoming them with a submachine gun and blue ear-protectors, imitating the mass murderer who shot dead seven persons in Bratislava two months earlier. In 2017, the Constitutional Court overturned the decisions of district and regional courts and stated that the daily does not need to apologize nor pay any compensation.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ See Section B.II.2. For instance, the media published the transcripts of Harabin's intimate 1994 conversation with an Albanian drug mafia boss, and a former attorney general indirectly confirmed its authenticity (Harabin later sue him for doing so). Among other scandals, he repeatedly publicly insulted other judges or members of Judicial Councils (e.g. calling them “juristutes”), and has several times been accused of bullying judges and attempting to influence their verdicts. See, e.g. Martin, M. ŠIMEČKA, The Crooked Judges of Slovakia. RESPEKT, November 20, 2012. Available at: https://www.respekt.cz/respekt-in-english/the-crooked-judges-of-slovakia.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ For a more detailed discussion of changes see Spáč, , Šimalčík & Šípoš, supra note 69.Google Scholar

¹⁰² This fact effectively de-anonymizes decisions, which themselves are made anonymous. It possibly raises a concern about the conflict between transparency and protection of privacy.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ Work schedules contain information about the composition of senates, rules of case assignment or time-slots allocated for the hearings of each judge.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ So far, there has only been one attempt to make sense of this data. See: Spáč, Samuel, Judging the Judges: Measuring Performance of District Court Judges in Slovakia (2015) (unpublished manuscript, available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285589433_Judging_the_Judges_Measuring_Performance_of_District_Court_Judges_in_Slovakia).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ For more see Spáč, , supra note 71, at 90-125.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ For more detail, see Section B.II.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ See Waldron, Jeremy, Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice?, 54 Boston College L.R. 433 (2013), at 433; and Christoph Möllers, The Three Branches: A Comparative Model Separation of Powers (2013).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ See Waldron, , supra note 106; or Möllers, supra note 107.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ The requirement that the Agency provides security clearances of all new judges was introduced in the Constitutional amendment in 2014 in Art. 154d of the Slovak Constitution. For more see Láštic, Erik and Spáč, Samuel, Slovakia / Slovaquie 26 European Review of Public Law 1209 (2014).Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ See Slovak Constitutional Court, judgement of June 2, 1993, I. ÚS 39/93; or Slovak Constitutional Court, judgement of November 29, 1995, PL. ÚS 29/95; or Slovak Constitutional Court, judgement of July 11, 1996, I. ÚS 7/96.Google Scholar

¹¹¹ Especially the removal of Harabin from the presidential post in the JCSR. See Slovak Constitutional Court, resolution of February, 17 2011, IV. ÚS 46/2011.Google Scholar

¹¹² Ref. Here, SCC was heavily inspired by the case law of the Czech Constitutional Court, to the extent that the Chief Justice informally approached the CCC asking for a solution which CCC had implemented in past, when faced with President Klaus's refusal of to nominate new judges.Google Scholar