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Anti-Extremism, Negative Republicanism, Civic Society: Three Paradigms for Banning Political Parties

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Peter Niesen

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Restrictions on political association and expression are problematic from a democratic point view. The default assumption seems to be that democracy minimally entails that all citizens have claims to participate in the legislative programming of society, which, given the size and complexity of democratic societies, they have to realize to a significant degree as participants in the debates of a political public sphere or through their membership in and support for political organisations such as parties. If they lack such chances, political decisions will lack democratic legitimacy. Where the law prohibits such options, \“it cuts off the possibility of participating in the open ended future required by democracy. Precisely to the extent the law imposes a version of what the future can or cannot be …[people] are reduced to heteronomous subjects, instead of autonomous citizens.\” It follows that the burden of justification for future-constraining regulations on freedom of association and expression is on those who propose and favour them.

Type
Research Article
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 3 , Issue 7 , July 2002 , E1
Copyright
Copyright © 2002 by German Law Journal GbR

References

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