¹ Nussbaum, Martha, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (2007).Google Scholar

² Sandel, Michael J., Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do? (2009).Google Scholar

³ Sen formally commented on A Theory of Justice for Harvard University Press before its publication and wrote his Collective Choice and Social Welfare at the same time as Rawls's famous text; see Sen, Amartya, The Idea of Justice 52–53 (2009).Google Scholar

⁴ Id. at xi.Google Scholar

⁵ Id. at xi & xxii.Google Scholar

⁶ He presented parts of The Idea of Justice at Harvard, Yale, Northwestern, Cardozo and Washington Law Schools and has been an interlocutor of the likes of H.L.A. Hart, Tony Honore, Joseph Raz and Jeremy Waldron. He cotaught a class at Oxford with Ronald Dworkin; id. at 264.Google Scholar

⁷ Id. at 40–41.Google Scholar

⁸ Id. at 45.Google Scholar

⁹ Id. at 53.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Id. at 68. (“[I]f the justice of what happens to a society depends on a combination of institutional features and actual behavioral characteristics … then is it possible to identify ‘just’ institutions for a society without making them contingent on actual behavior … “)Google Scholar

¹¹ He advocates Adam Smith's impartial spectator approach as preferable to the contractarian approach of Kant and Rawls.Google Scholar

¹² Sen, supra note 3, at 71.Google Scholar

¹³ Id. at 82.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Id. at 95.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Id. at 117.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Although Kantian impartiality is more widely accepted, Sen states that it faces fundamental limitations and problems for international justice. He seeks to overcome these problems using Smith's open impartiality, which has been partially realized in the involvement of NGOs, trade unions, et. al. in global affairs; id. at 151.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Id. at 168.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Id. at 169.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Id. at 174.Google Scholar

²⁰ Id. at 179.Google Scholar

²¹ Id. at 191.Google Scholar

²² Id. at 183. (“The possibility of plurality of sustainable reasons is not only important in giving rationality its due, it also distances the idea of rational choice from its putative role as a simple predicator of actual choice, as it has widely been used in mainstream economics. Even if every actual choice happens to be invariably rational in the sense of being sustainable by critical scrutiny, the plurality of rational choice makes it hard to obtain a unique prediction about a person's actual choice from the idea of rationality alone.”)Google Scholar

²³ Id. at 206.Google Scholar

²⁴ Id. at 208–217.Google Scholar

²⁵ Id. at 225.Google Scholar

²⁶ Id. at 231; Martha Nussbaum also uses a capability approach (Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 232).Google Scholar

²⁷ Sen, supra note 3, at 235.Google Scholar

²⁸ Id. at 253. Cohen has critiqued the capabilities approach and Sen deals with Cohen's criticisms in the text (Sen, supra note 3, at 235).Google Scholar

²⁹ Id. at 260–263. To read about primary goods, see Rawls, John, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 57–61 (2001) or John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition 78–81 (1999).Google Scholar

³⁰ Sen, supra note 3, at 234.Google Scholar

³¹ Id. at 235.Google Scholar

³² Id. at 253.Google Scholar

³³ Id. at 259.Google Scholar

³⁴ Id. at 276Google Scholar

³⁵ Id. at 293.Google Scholar

³⁶ Id. at 295.Google Scholar

³⁷ Id. at 299.Google Scholar

³⁸ Id. at 317.Google Scholar

³⁹ Id. at 322.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ I.e. Mughal emperor Akbar, Buddha and the Sanskrit epic Mahabharata; Id. at 37, 205, 208.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Sen, supra note 3, at xiii.Google Scholar

⁴² Id. at 322, 328.Google Scholar

⁴³ Id. at 333.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Id. at 338.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Id. at 355–358. He later problematizes Bentham's views; id. at 362–364.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Id. at 360, 258.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Id. at 362.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Id. at 363.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Id. at 365.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Williams, Bernard, In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moral Argument in Political Argument 72 (2007) (“Whether it is a matter of philosophical good sense to treat a certain practice as a violation of human rights, and whether it is politically good sense, cannot ultimately constitute two separate questions”).Google Scholar

⁵¹ Sen, supra note 3, at 385–387.Google Scholar

⁵² Id. at xi.Google Scholar

⁵³ Id. at 392.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Id. at 294.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Id. at 8.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Id. at ix (“[A] theory of justice that can serve as the basis of practical reasoning must include ways of judging how to reduce injustice and advance justice, rather than aiming only at the characterization of perfectly just societies”).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Id. at 4 (“Arbitrary reduction of multiple and potentially conflicting principles to one solitary survivor, guillotining all the other evaluative criteria is not, in fact, a perquisite for getting useful and robust conclusions on what should be done. This applies as much to the theory of justice as it does to any other part of the discipline of practical reason”).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Id. at x (“[T]he presence of remedial injustice may well be connected with behavioral transgressions rather than institutional shortcomings …. Justice is ultimately connected with the way people's lives go, and not merely with the nature of the institutions surrounding them”).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Id. at 5–6.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Id. at xvi.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Id. at 7.Google Scholar

⁶² Id. at 5–6.Google Scholar

⁶³ Id. at 413.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Id. at xxi.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Id. at xvi.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Id. at 74.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Id. at 62.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Id. at 62–65.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Id. at 207.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Id. at 85.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Id. at 12.Google Scholar

⁷² Rawls, John, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 13 (2001); his society only needs to be reasonably just as opposed to ideal, 4.Google Scholar

⁷³ Id. at 10.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ For Rawls's major statement on public reason, see Rawls, John, Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition 212–254, 440–490 (2005). The former lecture appeared in the original 1993 edition of the book and the latter revisits the original concepts therein. The former was included as a “Major Statement” on the idea of deliberative democracy in James Bohman & William Rehg (eds.), Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics 92 (1997). Iris Marion Young's work was also included in that volume at 383. For a robust understanding of Young's deliberative democracy see Young, Iris Marion, Inclusion and Democracy (2002).Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Sen, supra note 3, at 97.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Id. at 231.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Rawls, supra note 73, at 11–12.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ The capability approach demands consideration of responsibility towards the future of other species that are threatened with destruction, but Sen does not focus on future generations; Sen, supra note 3, at 251.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Id. at 101.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Id. at 97.Google Scholar

⁸¹ Id. at xxvii.Google Scholar

⁸² Scanlon, Tim, When Does Equality Matter?, presented at a legal theory workshop at the University of Toronto on 22 October 2010.Google Scholar

⁸³ Sen, supra note 3, at 413.Google Scholar