1. Quoted in Woodward, Bob, Bush at War (NY: Simon & Schuster, 2002), p. 205.Google Scholar Bush told Karl Rove that “Just like my father's generation was called in World War II, now our generation is being called.” George H.W. Bush's generation, however, had been involved in fighting World War II. George W. Bush's generation (he graduated from college in 1968) did the fighting in Vietnam, while the President had been in the National Guard and the Vice President had a deferment for school and later because of his family. It was the generation after Bush that would have to do the fighting in the wars of his administration.

2. For an analysis of the first year of the Bush administration and the president's cabinet, see Pfiffner, James P., “The Transformation of the Bush Presidency,” in Pfiffner, James P.and Davidson, Roger H.Understanding the Presidency 3rd ed. (NY: Longman, 2003), pp.453–471.Google Scholar

3. See Boyer, Peter J., “A Different War,” The New Yorker (1 07 2002), pp.54–67;Google Scholar Loeb, Vernon and Ricks, Thomas E., “Rumsfeld's Style, Goals Strain Ties in Pentagon,” Washington Post (16 10 2002)Google Scholar, p. A1.

4. Time Magazine (10 September 2001), cover.

5. Woodward, , Bush at War, p. 14.Google Scholar Important portions of this paper are based on the reporting in Woodward's book, which calls for a note on his credibility. Wood ward has published a number of books on the internal working of politics at the top of the United States government. There is no doubt that he has had privileged access and that many government officials over the past 30 years have wanted to tell their side of the story to him. For this book, the president himself spend several hours with Woodward and gave his tacit permission for other members of the administration to talk with him. None has publicly said that Woodward misrepresented what they said to him. According to Paul Bedard (“Washington Whispers,” U.S. News and World Report, 2 December 2002, p. 4), White House officials said the book was “85 to 90 percent accurate,” and “made us look as good as we are.” It must also be kept in mind that as he was writing this book, Woodward was also working on his presumed next book on U.S. war with Iraq. He could not be too tough on the Bush administration without jeopardizing his access for his next book. Thus, Woodward's reporting is valuable, but must be read carefully.

6. Schmitt, Eric, “Cheney Assembles Formidable Team.” The New York Times (2 03 2001), p.1, A8.Google Scholar

7. Time magazine (30 December 2002–2006 January 2003), p. 93.

8. Schmitt, Eric, “Cheney Assembles Formidable Team.” The New York Times (2 03 2001), p. A8.Google Scholar

9. See LeMann, Nicholas, “Without a Doubt,” The New Yorker (14 and 21 10 2002), p.164.Google Scholar

10. Gallup Organization.2001. Poll Trend, Presidential Ratings—Job Approval website, 12/12/01. Available from www.gallup.com.

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12. Woodward, , Bush at War, pp.34–35, 156, 316, 318.Google Scholar

13. Woodward, ,Bush at War, pp.77–78, 97.Google Scholar

14. Woodward, , Bush at War, pp. 79–80.Google Scholar

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23. Woodward, , Bush at War, p. 259.Google Scholar

24. Woodward, , Bush at War, pp. 265, 291–292.Google Scholar

25. Woodward, , Bush at War, pp. 293–294.Google Scholar

26. Woodward, , Bush at War, p. 301.Google Scholar

27. Woodward, , Bush at War, p. 306.Google Scholar

28. Woodward, , Bush at War, pp.212–213.Google Scholar Casualty figures from Kaufman, Marc, “On Afghan Border, War Drags On,” Washington Post (25 01 2003), p.1, A14.Google Scholar

29. Woodward, , Bush at War, p.144.Google Scholar

30. Woodward, , Bush at War, pp.145–146.Google Scholar

31. Woodward, , Bush at War, p.73.Google Scholar

32. Tomsen, Peter, “A Rebuilding Plan than Already Needs Repair,”Washington Post (27 10 2002), p. B3.Google Scholar See also Margaret Coker, “Afghan War Over, But Nation-Building Battle Continues,” Cox News Service (6 October 2002) [no page number]; Gall, Carlotta, “Half a Million Are Left Homeless In Afghan Cities as Winter Bites,” The New York Times (2 01 2003), p.1, A8.Google Scholar For an upbeat analysis that calls for more U.S. aid to Afghanistan, see Oakley, Robert, “The New Afghanistan: Year 2,” Washington Post (301 2003), p. A19.Google Scholar

33. Kaufman, Marc, “On Afghan Border, War Drags On,” Washington Post (25 01 2003), p. 1, A14.Google Scholar

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35. Kessler, Glenn, “U.S. Decision On Iraq Has Puzzling Past,” Washington Post (12 01 2003), p.1, A20.Google Scholar

36. Kessler, “U.S. Decision on Iraq, p. A20.

37. This is based on the account of the speech by Bush speech writer David Frum in Chapter 12 of his book. Frum notes condescendingly that “Bush read the speech closely. He edited it in his own bold hand. He understood all its implications.” Frum added, “Once he uttered it, ‘axis of evil' ceased to be a speech writer's phrase and became his own..”Frum, David,Right Man (NY: Random House 2003), pp. 224, 238–240.Google Scholar

38. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Administration of George W. Bush, 2002 (29 January 2002), p. 133–139.

39. Kessler, Glenn, “U.S. Decision On Iraq Has Puzzling Past,” Washington Post (12 01 2003), p. 1, A20.Google Scholar

40. Frum, , The Right Man, p. 240.Google Scholar

41. Kessler, “U.S. Decision on Iraq,” p. A20.

42. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Administration of George W. Bush, 2002, “Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York” (1 June 2002), pp. 944–948.

43. Thomas E. Ricks, “Some Top Military Brass Favor Status Quo in Iraq,” Washington Post (28 July 2002), p. 1, A23. Also, Thomas E. Ricks, “Generals, Officials Are Split Over Iraq,” Washington Post (1 August 2002), p. 1, A24, in which he says, “Much of the senior uniformed military, with the notable exception of some top Air Force and marine generals, opposes going to war anytime soon, a stance that is provoking frustration among civilian officials in the Pentagon and in the White House.”

44. Weisman, Steven R. 2002. “History Lessons for Wartime Presidents and Their Generals.” The New York Times, 9/15/02, p. wk14.Google Scholar

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47. Those who argued strongly for war with Iraq who did not have combat experience included: President Bush, Vice President Cheney, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld (who flew Navy jets in 1953–1954), Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, House Whip Tom DeLay, Chair of Defense Policy Board Richard Perle, and commentator William Kristol. Combat veterans who were skeptical of the wisdom of war with Iraq include: Secretary of State Colin Powell, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, some members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (in the summer of 2002), many career military officers (in the summer of 2002), Senator Chuck Hagel (voted for the Resolution on Iraq on 10/12/02), Senator John Kerry (voted for the resolution), Retired General Anthony Zinni (former Chief of U.S. Central Command), Retired General and former national Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, James Webb (Vietnam veteran and former Secretary of the Navy), General Wesley Clark, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Nor man Schwartzkopf, commander of U.S. forces in the 1991 Gulf War.

48. Newsweek (Sept. 2, 2002), p. 28. See also Associated Press story in The New York Times (26 August 2002), p. 1.

49. Washington Post, “Powell Aide Disputes Views on Iraq.” (28 August 2002) p. A16.

50. Webb, James, “Heading for Trouble.” The Washington Post (4 09 2002), p. A21.Google Scholar

51. Tuckwiller, Tara, “Don't invade yet, ex-NATO chief says,” Charleston Gazette (15 10 2002), p. 1A.Google Scholar

52. Ricks, Thomas E., “Desert Caution,” Washington Post (28 01 2003), p. C1.Google Scholar Schwartzkopf prefaced the above remarks with, “The thought of Saddam Hussein with a sophisticated nuclear capability is a frightening thought, okay? “

53. Woodward, , Bush at War, p. 333–334.Google Scholar

54. Milbank, Dana, “Cheney Says Iraqi Strike Is Justified.” The Washington Post, (27 08 2002), p. 1, A8.Google Scholar

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61. Quoted in Newsweek (27 January 2003), p. 25.

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63. Kessler, Glenn, “Moderate Powell Turns Hawkish On War With Iraq,” Washington Post (24 01 2003), p. 1, A20.Google Scholar Earlier in January 2003 Powell had shown support for the inspection regime, saying, “The inspectors are really now starting to gain momentum,” and that the first report of the inspectors was only “the first formal official report.”

64. Glenn Kessler and Colum Lynch, “France Vows to Block Resolution on Iraq War,” Washington Post (21 January 2003), p. 1.

65. Richburg, Keith B., “NATO Blocked On Iraq Decision,” Washington Post (23 01 2003), p. 1.Google Scholar

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67. State of the Union address (28 January 2003), printed in Washington Post (29 January 2003), pp. A10-A11.

68. Many in the military in 2003 continued to regard Rumsfeld as arrogant, brusque, and demanding. From Rumsfeld's perspective, the military establishment was protecting its turf and resources in its resistance to modernizing. In a memo he said about the many reports the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared, “It is just a lot of people spinning their wheels, doing things we probably have to edit and improve.” (Scarborough, Rowan, “Defense secretary criticizes top staff,” Washington Times (24 01 2003), p. 1Google Scholar) Military professionals also thought Rumsfeld was unnecessarily micro-managing the logistical, tactical, and strategic elements of military planning for war with Iraq. While head of Central Command General Franks projected a need for 250,000 troops, Rumsfeld thought it could be done with 100,000; planning in late January 2003 called for 150,000. Franks thought that air bombardment should last for up to two weeks before ground attack, and Rumsfeld decided that one week was sufficient. According to retired General Merrill McPeak, Air Force Chief of Staff during the 1991 Gulf war. “Rumsfeld is running this on a very short string…. this is a Rumsfeld show. He's really running this buildup, hands on the throttle and steering wheel. (Thompson, Mark and Duffy, Michael, “Pentagon Warlord,” Time (27 01 2003), pp. 22–29.Google Scholar) Norman Schwartzkopf contrasted Rumsfeld with Cheney's approach in 1991, “He [Cheneyr] didn't put himself in the position of being the decision-maker as far as tactics were concerned, as far as trooop deployments, as far as missions were concerned.” (Ricks, Thomas E., “Desert Caution,” Washington Post (28 01 2003), p. C1.Google Scholar) Rumsfeld alienated veterans groups when he said in response to a question about reestablishing the draft, that draftees during the Vietnam War added “… no value, no advantage, really, to the United States armed services over any sustained period of time….” (Loeb, Vernon, “Rumsfeld Apologizes for Remarks on Draftees,”Washington Post (22 01 2003), p. 1, A4.Google Scholar ) Rumsfeld irritated the French and Germans when he referred to them as part of the “old Europe.”

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70. Lemann, Nicholas, “Without a Doubt,” The New Yorker (14 and 21 10 2002), p. 167.Google Scholar

71. For an analysis of the role of the national security advisor see, Pfiffner, James P., The Modern Presidency (NY: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2000), pp. 188–193.Google Scholar

72. For an analysis of presidential decision making during the Gulf War crisis, see Pfiffner, James P., “Presidential Policy-Making and the Gulf War,” in The Presidency and the Persian Gulf War, edited by Whicker, Marcia Lynn, Pfiffner, James P., and Moore, Raymond A. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), pp. 3–23.Google Scholar

73. See Woodward, Bob, The Commanders (NY:: Simon and Schuster, 1991), pp. 41–42, 299–302.Google Scholar

74. Woodward, Bush at War, p. 74.Google Scholar

75. See Burke, John P. and Greenstein, Fred I., How Presidents Test Reality (NY: Russell Sage, 1991), p. 54.Google Scholar

76. Quoted inBurke, John P. and Greenstein, Fred I., How Presidents Test Reality (NY: Russell Sage, 1991), p.54.Google Scholar

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