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Banking in National Socialist Germany, 1933–39

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 September 2008

Christopher Kopper
Christopher Kopper
Affiliation:
University of Göttingen
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Financial History Review , Volume 5 , Issue 1 , April 1998 , pp. 49 - 62
Copyright
Copyright © European Association for Banking and Financial History 1998

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References

1 This essay presents some of the important conclusions reached in the research for my doctoral dissertation (Bochum University, 1992), subsequently published as Zwischen Marktwirtschaft und Dirigismus. Bankenpolitik im ‘Dritten Reich’ 1933–1939 (Bonn, 1995).Google Scholar

2 This was the kernel of the ‘Dimitrov doctrine’, formulated in 1934 by Georgij Dimitrov, General Secretary of the Communist International, and canonised by communist historiography up to 1989.

3 From 1935, the balance sheets of all banks in Germany had to comply with the provisions of the Kreditwesengesetz [Banking Law] and were, therefore, comparable without reservation.

4 See, e.g., Deutsche Bundesbank, Deutsches Geld- und Bankenwesen in Zahlen (Frankfurt-a-Main, 1976).Google Scholar

5 See, e.g., Institut für bankhistorische Forschung, Deutsche Bankengeschichte, vol. III (Frankfurt-a Main, 1983).Google Scholar

6 See Wellhöner, V., Groβbanken und Industrie im Kaiserreich (Göttingen, 1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Wixforth, H., Banken und Schwerindustrie in der Weimarer Republik (Cologne, 1995).Google Scholar

7 Wirtschaftliches Sofortprogramm der NSDAP, reprinted in Jacobsen, H.-A. and Jochmann, W. (eds), Ausgewählte Dokumente zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus 1933–1945 (Bielefeld, 1966).Google Scholar

8 Schacht, to Hitler, , 29 08. 1932Google Scholar, in Michaelis, H. and Schraepler, E. (eds), Ursachen und Folgen, vol. VIII (Berlin, 1963), p. 620f.Google Scholar

9 According to the Reichsbankgesetz [Reichsbank Law], 1930, the Generalrat [General Council] of the Reichsbank appointed the Reichsbank President. After the Nazi seizure of power, this was only a formality involving the compliance of the Generalrat. Regarding the circumstances of Schacht's election, see the notice of Max Warburg about the meeting of the Generalrat, 16 Mar. 1933, in Archives of M. M. Warburg-Brinckmann & Co., Hamburg.

10 Bundesarchiv, Potsdam [henceforth BA P]: R 43II, nos. 229, 233, 244, 397, Schacht's correspondence with Reich Chancellery, Mar.-Apr. 1933.

11 BA P: Reichsbank, no. 6918, Report from the Economics and Statistics Dept., Reichsbank, about losses of German banks during the banking crisis, Nov. 1933.

12 ibid., Report from the Economics and Statistics Dept., Reichsbank, about the losses of private and public banks, 20 Jan. 1934.

13 See the concise description in Pohl, M., Konzentration im deutschen Bankwesen (1848–1980) (Frankfurt-a-Main, 1982), p. 386f.Google Scholar

14 BA P: Reichsbank, no. 6918, Guidelines for Reichsbank members on board of directors, 10 Nov. 1933.

15 BA P: Deutsche Bank, no. 21082, Report from Franz Urbig, chairman of the board of directors, Jul. 1933.

16 Bundesarchiv, Koblenz [henceforth BA K]: FINAD, 2/50/1, files of the Financial Intelligence Division of the American Military Government in Germany [henceforth OMGUS]; and BA P: Reichswirtschaftsministerium, files no. 18547, 18567.

17 BA K: OMGUS-FINAD, 2/184/5–6, interrogation of executive member, Carl Goetz, 21 Jan. 1946.

18 Regarding Schacht's resignation as Minister for Economic Affairs, Goebbels, Minister for Propaganda and head of party propaganda, wrote in his diary, 12 Aus. 1937: ‘Trouble about Schacht, who probably will go or must go. He doesn't want to defray the German credit policy. In reality, he is a professional gripe’; and, on 6 Nov. 1937: ‘In the case of Schacht the Führer wants to wait until 9 Nov. 1937 [the date of great party celebrations] is over. But Schacht must get away. We all agree in this case’: Goebbels, J., Die Tagebücher, 4 vols (Munich, 1987).Google Scholar

19 Ehrlicher, W., Geldkapitalbildung und Realkapitalbildung (Tübingen, 1956), pp. 113–15, 288.Google Scholar

20 Anleihestockgesetz [Law for blocked accounts for excess dividends], 4 Dec. 1934; and Swatek, D., Untemehmenskonzentration als Ergebnis und Mittel nationalsozialistischer Wirtschaftspolitik (Berlin, 1972), p. 60.Google Scholar

21 See Wirtschaft und Statistik, 14 (1934)–16 (1936).Google Scholar

22 ibid., 15 (1935), P. 886; 16 (1936), pp. 122, 374, 599, 964; and 17 (1937), pp. 194f., 485f., 604–6. Because of mergers, reconstitutions and liquidations, data for industrial joint stock companies with share capitals of at least RM 1 m. cannot be compared from year to year.

23 See, e.g., the speech of Eduard Mosler (speaker of the executive board of the Deutsche Bank) at the annual shareholders' meeting on 7 Apr. 1937, published in the Frankfurter Zeitung (8 04. 1937).Google Scholar

24 Deutsche Bundesbank, Deutsches Geld- und Bankenwesen, pp. 78–85, 102.Google Scholar

25 According to Balderston, T., ‘German banking between the wars: the crisis of the credit banks’, Business History Review, 65 (1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, the volume of debt to the credit banks fell from RM 7, 771 m. in 1929 to RM 4, 227 m. in 1938. Balderston included Deutsches Geld- und Bankwesen in Zahlen, using a slightly different definition for credit banks. As the rise of private banks' debtors from 1937 to 1938 was about RM 317 m., a reduction of about 50% between 1929 and 1937 can be estimated.

26 See the banks' Annual Reports for 1933 to 1938.Google Scholar

27 See Statistische Jahrbücher, 1935–1939/1940Google Scholar, and the Annual Reports of the Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank.

28 Statistisches Jahrbücher für das Deutsche Reich, 1935 and 1939/1940.Google Scholar

29 See Untersuchung des Bankwesens, 2nd part (Berlin, 1934), pp. 212–49.Google Scholar

30 Gesetz über die Zinsermäßigung bei öffentlichen Anleihen [Law for the reduction of interest for public loans], 27 Feb. 1935.

31 See Ernst, F., ‘Anlaß und Bedeutung der Geldzinssenkung’, Der deutsche Volkswirt, 9 (1934/1935), pp. 1029–31.Google Scholar Ernst was the Reichskommissar für das Kreditwesen [Reich Commissioner for the supervision of banking].

32 See, e.g., the speeches of Dresdner Bank executive, Hans Schippel, at the annual meeting, 10 May 1935; and of Deutsche Bank executive, Mosler, Eduard, at the annual meeting, 8 04. 1936Google Scholar, both published in Frankfurter Zeitung (11 05 1935 and 9 04. 1936).Google Scholar

33 Deutsche Bundesbank, Deutsches Geld- und Bankenwesen, pp. 76–9.Google Scholar

34 Address of Schlieper to the Deutsches Institut für Bankwissenschaft und Bankwesen, 3 Mar. 1936, subsequently published (Berlin, 1936).

35 Boelcke, W. A., Die Kosten von Hitlers Krieg. Kriegsfinanzierung und finanzielles Kriegserbe in Deutschland 1933–1948 (Paderborn, 1985), p. 31.Google Scholar

36 Deutsche Bundesbank, Deutsches Geld- und Bankenwesen, pp. 78–83, 118f.Google Scholar

37 According to Wirtschaft und Statistik, 17 (1937)Google Scholar, the average acceptance credit amounted to less than RM 500, the average current account credit RM 2,000 and the average loan RM 1,000.

38 ibid., pp. 78–87, 102f.

39 Emergency decree [Notverordnung], 5 10. 1931Google Scholar, in Reichsgesetzblatt, I (1931).Google Scholar

40 Wirtschaft und Statistik, 18 (1938), p. 81f.Google Scholar

41 BA K: Reichsfinanzministerium, no. 13684; see the executive order for the amendment of the Banking Law, 30 Jun. 1936; and the secret file notice from Ministerialrat Prause (Ministry of Finance), 26 Jun. 1936.

42 Deutsche Bundesbank, Währung und Wirtschaft in Deutschland 1876–1975 (Frankfurt-a-Main, 1976), pp. 322–5Google Scholar; and the Annual Reports of the ‘big three’ banks, 1933 to 1936.Google Scholar

43 OMGUS-Ermittlungen gegen die Deutsche Bank [edited and printed (Nördlingen, , 1985)], p. 140Google Scholar; and BA P: Reichskanzlei [Reich Chancellery], no. 234, memorandum of the Reichsbank-direktorium [Reichsbank executive board] to the Führer and Chancellor, 7 Jan. 1939.

44 ibid., Deutsche Bank, no. 22833, correspondence between the Deutsche Bank and the Dresdner Bank.

45 ibid., Deutsche Bank, no. 22802, minutes of Eduard Mosler over negotiations in the Ministry for Economic Affairs, 24 Sep. 1936; and ibid., Reichswirtschaftsministerium, no. 18569, minutes of official, Hans Schniewind (Ministry for Economic Affairs), 7 Jul. 1936.

46 Nuremberg trials, document EC-281, p. 131Google Scholar, financial survey from the Amt für deutsche Roh- und Werkstoffe [Department for domestic raw materials at Göring's Four Year Plan organisation] for the period 23 Oct. 1936 to 20 May 1937.

47 Mosler's speech at the general meeting on 6 Apr. 1938, published in Berliner Börsen-Zeitung (6 04. 1938).Google Scholar

48 BA P: Deutsche Bank, no. 22783, minutes of Deutsche Bank executive, Hellmuth Pollems, over negotiations with the Ministry for Economic Affairs, 9 Mar. 1939.

49 BA K: OMGUS/FINAD 2/197/12, minutes of Dresdner Bank executive, Emil Meyer, about negotiations with the Ministry for Aviation, 20 May 1935.