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Our Current Sense of History

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 July 2009

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The horizon is generally conspicuous, whereas the surrounding landscape, close to us, is taken for granted. Yet, in the social and historical world (and perhaps in some measure in the physical world also), the horizon we perceive depends on our more immediate environment and its general features. A forest or a savannah, a local hillock or a hollow, make a great difference to the kind of skyline that is seen. But it is in the nature of things that what is close and familiar should also be treated with familiarity and contempt, and that its importance should normally be ignored. It is its ordinariness, obviousness, which causes us to take it for granted: but the hold it has over us is immeasurably strengthened precisely by the fact that we do take it for granted. What is noticed can be queried, but that which seems utterly obvious eludes questioning. The horizon, by contrast, errs in the opposite direction. It is often quite spuriously dramatic. If you walk to the point on the distant skyline, you may well find, when you reach it, that it is just as ordinary a place as your starting point. But as long as it remains on the skyline, it occupies the dramatic point at which the sky meets land or water, the point where the sun sets or rises. It has a striking suggestiveness, and symbolises our deeper or more ecstatic aspirations—quite unlike the close and dusty immediate locality, which tends instead to remind us of our compromises, shabbiness and mediocrity.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Archives Européenes de Sociology 1971

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References

(1) For instance, Mrs. Shirley Letwin writes (Spectator, 9 January 1971, pp. 52 and 54): “[…] historians are not concerned with what might have happened, they try to explain what actually did happen. They do not explain an event in terms of its connection with universal laws; they trace its connection with other events. […] as long as he remains a historian, he [does not use] events to illustrate laws”. Mrs. Letwin, who clearly here speaks as the representative of a whole school, proceeds, rightly from her viewpoint, to repudiate Max Weber, ideal types, and the whole Kantian notion that rational explanation must mean subsumption under general law. The contrasted ideal appears to be accurate narrative, rational in some other, non-Kantian, sense.

(2) Cf. Gallie, Bryce, Philosophy and Historical Understanding (London 1964)Google Scholar.

(3) John Locke Lectures, given in Oxford in 1969. Italics mine.

(4) Lamb, Charles, Essays of Elia: Witches and other night fears (London, Univ. Tutorial Press, [s.d], “Witches and other night fears”, pp. 8182Google Scholar.

(5) Gellner, Ernest, Thought and Change (London 1964)Google Scholar.

(6) Moore, Barrington Jr, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston 1966)Google Scholar.

(7) Martin, David, Notes for a General Theory of Secularisation, European Journal of Sociology, X (1969), 192201CrossRefGoogle Scholar.