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EU Health Union and State Aid Policy: With Great(er) Power Comes Great Responsibility

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 December 2020

Andrea BIONDI  and
Oana ȘTEFAN Open the ORCID record for Oana ȘTEFAN [Opens in a new window]
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Abstract

This contribution evaluates whether European Union State aid policy could play a role in achieving deeper and more solidary integration in the area of public health. According to Article 107 TFEU, the powers of Member States to grant aid to help their economies are seriously limited. Exceptions to the general prohibition to grant State aid are authorised by the European Commission, which enjoys wide discretion in weighing national objectives against European integration goals. The area of public health has been shielded from the application of these rules, with activities such as the provision of health insurance failing to be considered of economic nature (see most recently the Dôvera judgment). The COVID-19 experience shows that, in cases of major health crises, State aid provisions are practically suspended, with interventions allowed in the name of the fight against the pandemic. The eventual creation of a Health Union will require the re-evaluation of the application of the State aid rules to healthcare. This paper questions whether these rules should evolve as a reflective function of strengthened competences in healthcare or whether existing regulatory powers are enough to determine the interaction between national spending policies, a solidary European Health Union and fair competition.

Type
Articles
Information
European Journal of Risk Regulation , Volume 11 , Special Issue 4: Beyond COVID-19: Towards a European Health Union , December 2020 , pp. 894 - 902
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

*

Professor of European Law, Kings College London, Strand, London WC2R 2LS, UK.

**

Reader in European Law, Kings College London, Strand, London WC2R 2LS, UK; oana.stefan@kcl.ac.uk.

References

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17 <https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/11835-State-subsidy-rules-for-health-and-social-services-of-general-economic-interest-evaluation->.

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28 Point 3.6.

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30 See, for instance, the Commission investigation on aid granted by Spain to Air Nostrum as to enable the company to renew its fleet, SA.50707.

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33 Article 6 of Regulation 1303/2013 – Common Provisions Regulation for European Structural and Investment Funds. (CPR) [2013] OJ L347/320.

34 Arts 37, 38 and 44.

35 Art 62.

36 Art 146.

37 Case C-245/16, Nerea, ECLI:EU:C:2017:521; Case C-138/03, Italy v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2005:714.

38 Notice on the Notion of State Aid, supra, note 12, para 60. Case C-262/12, Vent de Colère ECLI:EU:C:2013:851, paras 25 and 26.

39 Art 2(33) of the CPR cit. above.

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42 Notice on Notion of State Aid, supra, note 12, para 60; GBER, Recital 26.

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