Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-55b6f6c457-cn8nj Total loading time: 0.278 Render date: 2021-09-23T16:04:41.451Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "metricsAbstractViews": false, "figures": true, "newCiteModal": false, "newCitedByModal": true, "newEcommerce": true, "newUsageEvents": true }

Enhancing Political Representation Through the European Economic Constitution? Regressive Politics of Democratic Inclusion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 July 2019

Abstract

Interrelation between economic and political dimensions of constitutionalism – European market integration and erosion of democratic representation within Member States of the EU – Regulatory externalities between national democracies – European market citizenship and its ramifications for democratically legitimate exercise of the power to tax – Underinclusiveness of domestic democratic process – Political representation beyond the state – European economic constitution as a source of political empowerment and the EU economic freedoms as political rights – The European Court of Justice as a protector of representation – Reinforcing political participation through regulatory competition – European market freedoms enhance representation but at the expense of political equality – Economic freedoms as insufficient means of political empowerment – Improving democratic representation and equality beyond the state requires properly political citizenship instead of mere market rights

Type
Articles
Copyright
© 2019 The Authors 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

PhD Researcher, Faculty of Law, University of Turku; email: jojaak@utu.fi. For their useful comments on the earlier versions of this article, the author would like to thank Jan Komárek, Jo Shaw, two anonymous reviewers, all the participants in the 2018 EuConst Colloquium (Amsterdam) and all the participants in the EU Citizenship, Democracy and Fundamental Rights seminar (Turku). The usual disclaimers apply.

References

1 See Grimm, D., ‘Der Staat in der kontinentaleuropäischen Tradition’, in D. Grimm, Recht und Staat der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft (Suhrkamp 1987) p. 53 at p. 63 ff and J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Polity Press 1996) p. 388446 Google Scholar.

2 See K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Beacon Press 1957) p. 249–258 and C. Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen (Duncker & Humblot 1963) p. 23–26.

3 T.H. Marshall, ‘Citizenship and Social Class’, in T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays (Cambridge University Press 1950) p. 1 at p. 10–27.

4 For this aspiration, see H.M. Heinig, Der Sozialstaat im Dienst der Freiheit. Zur Formel vom “sozialen” Staat in Art. 20 Abs. 1 GG (Mohr Siebeck 2008) p. 277–291.

5 This experience characterised some initial visions and scholarly interpretations of European integration, especially the neofunctionalist understanding. For instance, see E. Haas, The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social and Economical Forces 1950–1957 (Stevens & Sons 1958) p. 11–19. For a summary, see Walker, N., ‘The Philosophy of European Union Law’, in Arnull, A. and Chalmers, D. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (Oxford University Press 2015) p. 3 Google Scholar at p. 8–9.

6 For instance, see W. Hallstein, Die Europäische Gemeinschaft (Econ Verlag 1974) p. 26–30.

7 K. Tuori, ‘The Many Constitutions of Europe’, in K. Tuori and S. Sankari (eds.), The Many Constitutions of Europe (Ashgate 2010) p. 3 at p. 15–27 and H. Brunkhorst, Das doppelte Gesicht Europas. Zwischen Kapitalismus und Demokratie (Suhrkamp 2014) p. 59–129.

8 J.E. Fossum, ‘The European Union and Democracy’, in D. Patterson and A. Södersten (eds.), A Companion to European Union Law and International Law (Wiley Blackwell 2016) p. 136 at p. 137.

9 See M.T. Greven, ‘Can the European Union Finally Become a Democracy’, in M.T. Greven and L.W. Pauly (eds.), Democracy beyond the State? The European Dilemma and the Emerging Global Order (Rowman & Littlefield 2000) p. 35 at p. 37 and Follesdal, A. and Hix, S., ‘Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik’, 44 Journal of Common Market Studies (2006) p. 533 CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 534–537.

10 F.W. Scharpf, ‘Economic Integration, democracy, and the welfare state’, 4 Journal of European Public Policy (1997) p. 18 at p. 19–23 and Offe, C. and Preuss, U.K., ‘The problem of legitimacy in the European polity: is democratization the answer?’, in Crouch, C. and Streeck, W. (eds.), The Diversity of Democracy. Corporatism, Social Order and Political Conflict (Edward Elgar 2006) p. 175 Google Scholar at p. 177–180.

11 See Kaupa, C., The Pluralist Character of the European Economic Constitution (Hart 2016) p. 2685 Google Scholar.

12 Scharpf, F.W., Governing in Europe. Effective and Democratic? (Oxford University Press 1999) p. 45 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13 Hayek, F.A., The Road to Serfdom (Routledge 1993) p. 172 Google Scholar.

14 Scharpf, supra n. 12, p. 45.

15 For the history of income tax integration, see P. Genschel, Steuerwettbewerb und Steuerharmonisierung in der Europäischen Union (Campus 2002) p. 128–189 and Menéndez, A.J., ‘Neumark vindicated: the three patterns of Europeanisation of national tax systems and the future of the social and democratic Rechtsstaat ’, in Chalmers, D. et al. (eds.), The End of the Eurocrats’ Dream. Adjusting to European Diversity (Cambridge University Press 2016) p. 78 Google Scholar.

16 See E.-J. Mestmäcker, ‘On the Legitimacy of European Law’, 58 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht/The Rabel Journal of Comparative and International Private Law (1994) p. 615 at p. 620.

17 On the separation between vertical and horizontal sovereignty, see Grimm, D., Sovereignty. The Origin and Future of a Political and Legal Concept (Columbia University Press 2015) p. 92 Google Scholar and p. 121.

18 See A. Schäfer and W. Streeck, ‘Introduction: Politics in the Age of Austerity’, in A. Schäfer and W. Streeck (eds.), Politics in the Age of Austerity (Polity 2013) p. 1 at p. 1. See also Offe and Preuss, supra n. 10, p. 178–179.

19 Hence, one should be cautious enough not to depoliticise the development of the transnational market order: see Teubner, G., Constitutional Fragments. Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization (Oxford University Press 2012) p. 12 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

20 Innerarity, D., ‘The Inter-Democratic Deficit of the European Union’, in Dawson, M. et al. (eds.), Beyond the Crisis. The Governance of Europe’s Economic, Political, and Legal Transformation (Oxford University Press 2015) p. 173 CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 178.

21 N. Bobbio, The Future of Democracy. A Defence of the Rules of the Game (Polity 1987) p. 24–25.

22 Dahl, R., Democracy and Its Critics (Yale University Press 1989) p. 119131 Google Scholar.

23 M. Zürn, ‘Democratic Governance beyond the Nation-State’, in Greven and Pauly, supra n. 9, p. 91 at p. 92–94.

24 Particularly in the context of taxation, see Menéndez, A.J., ‘Another View of the Democratic Deficit: No Taxation without Representation’, in Joerges, C. et al. (eds.), What Kind of Constitution for What Kind of Polity? Responses to Joschka Fischer (European University Institute 2000) p. 125 Google Scholar at p. 130–135.

25 In the context of state sovereignty and autonomous communities, see C. Laborde and M. Ronzoni, ‘What Is a Free State? Republican Internationalism and Globalisation’, 64 Political Studies (2016) p. 279. More specifically in regard to taxation, see T. Rixen, ‘Globalisierung und fiskalische Demokratie’, 59 Politische Vierteljahresschrift (2018) p. 103.

26 For a comprehensive approach, see J. Habermas, ‘The Postnational Constellation and the Future of Democracy’, in J. Habermas, Postnational Constellation. Political Essays (Polity 2011) p. 58.

27 Locke, J., Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge University Press, 1988) II treatise, articles 138140 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

28 Rousseau, J.-J., ‘Political Economy’, in Rousseau, J.-J., Discourse on Political Economy and The Social Contract (Oxford University Press 2014), section III.Google Scholar

29 See J. Jaakkola, ‘A Democratic Dilemma of European Power to Tax: Reconstructing the Symbiosis between Taxation and Democracy Beyond the State?’, German Law Journal (forthcoming).

30 See also Snell, J. and Jaakkola, J., ‘Economic Mobility and Fiscal Federalism: Taxation and European Responses in a Changing Constitutional Context’, 22 European Law Journal (2016) p. 772 at p. 777779 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

31 Craig, P., ‘The Evolution of the Single Market’, in Barnard, C. and Scott, J. (eds.), The Law of the Single European Market (Hart 2002) p. 1 Google Scholar at p. 4.

32 Weiler, J.H.H., ‘The Transformation of Europe’, in Weiler, J.H.H., The Constitution of Europe. ‘Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?’ And Other Essays on European Integration (Cambridge University Press 1999) p. 10 at p. 1639Google Scholar and Grimm, D., ‘The Democratic Costs of Constitutionalisation: The European Case’, 21 European Law Journal (2015) p. 460 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

33 Quite interestingly, the constitutional functions of European law grew in an adverse direction from what took place in the context of some national constitutional orders: see Böckenförde, E.-W., ‘Grundrechte als Grundsatznormen’, in Böckenförde, E.-W., Staat, Verfassung, Demokratie. Studien zur Verfassungstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht (Suhrkamp 1993) p. 159 Google Scholar.

34 See Grimm, D., ‘Ursprung und Wandel der Verfassung’, in Grimm, D., Die Zukunft der Verfassung II. Auswirkungen von Europäisierung und Globalisierung (Suhrkamp 2012) p. 11 Google Scholar and especially at p. 34.

35 See Lenaerts, K., ‘The European Court of Justice and Process-Oriented Review’, 31 Yearbook of European Law (2012) p. 3 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

36 Ely, J.H., Democracy and Distrust (Harvard University Press 1980) p. 87 Google Scholar and more extensively p. 73–104.

37 C. Joerges, ‘Taking the Law Seriously: On Political Science and the Role of Law in the Process of European Integration’, 2 European Law Journal (1996) p. 105 at p. 117.

38 The inevitability of externalities resembles Stephen D. Krasner’s account of interdependence as a logically structural constituent in an international community without supranational ordering: see S.D. Krasner, ‘Economic Interdependence and Independent Statehood’, in R.H. Jackson and A. James (eds.), States in a Changing World. A Contemporary Analysis (Clarendon Press 1995) p. 301 at p. 301–302.

39 M. Maduro, ‘Reforming the Market or the State? Article 30 and the European Constitution: Economic Freedom and Political Rights’, 3 European Law Journal (1997) p. 55 at p. 77 and M. Maduro, We the Court. The European Court of Justice and The European Economic Constitution. A Critical Reading of Article 30 of the EC Treaty (Hart 1998) p. 172.

40 Neyer, J., ‘Europe’s Justice Deficit: Justification and Legitimacy in the European Union’, in Neyer, J. and Wiener, A. (eds.), Political Theory of the European Union (Oxford University Press 2010) p. 169 Google Scholar at p. 170.

41 Joerges, supra n. 37, p. 117.

42 Maduro (1997), supra n. 39, p. 68.

43 Joerges, supra n. 37, p. 117.

44 Maduro (1997), supra n. 39, p. 72.

45 Maduro (1997), supra n. 39, p. 73 and also Maduro, M., ‘Europe and the constitution: what if this is as good as it gets?’, in Weiler, J.H.H. and Wind, M. (eds.), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Cambridge University Press 2003) p. 74 Google Scholar at p. 85.

46 Joerges, supra n. 37, p. 117.

47 F. de Witte, ‘Interdependence and Contestation in European Integration’, 3 European Papers (2018) p. 475 at p. 482–485.

48 In addition to this discussion, the 19th century witnessed a substantive discourse on the material limits of taxation, beyond which legitimate taxation may not step, especially in terms of its distributive consequences (for instance, see J.S. Mill: Principles of Political Economy with Some of their Applications to Social Philosophy (August M. Kelley 1961) p. 802–822).

49 K. Wicksell, ‘A New Principle of Just Taxation’, in R.A. Musgrave and A.T. Peacock (eds.), Classics in the Theory of Public Finance (Macmillan 1958) p. 72, at p. 87 and further at p. 89–90, p. 95, p. 117–118.

50 See F. Schui, ‘Zum Begriff des Steuerstaats’, in P. Becker (eds.), Sprachvollzug im Amt. Kommunikation und Verwaltung im Europa des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts (Transcript 2011) p. 107 at p. 112 and p. 118–125.

51 For instance, see Wicksell, supra n. 49, p. 87–97.

52 C. Webber and A. Wildavsky, A History of Taxation and Expenditure in the Western World (Simon and Schuster 1986) p. 555.

53 Brennan, G. and Buchanan, J.M., The Power to Tax. Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution (Cambridge University Press 1980) p. 153 Google Scholar.

54 Brennan and Buchanan, supra n. 53, p. 13–33.

55 Brennan and Buchanan, supra n. 53, p. 1–12.

56 Brennan and Buchanan, supra n. 53, p. 153–167.

57 Brennan and Buchanan, supra n. 53, p. 168, p. 171–172 and p. 184.

58 For an excellent intellectual history of the transnational neoliberal vision, see Slobodian, Q.: Globalists. The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism (Harvard University Press 2018) p. 91145 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

59 F.A. Hayek, ‘The Economic Conditions of Inter-state Federalism’, in F.A. Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (University of Chicago Press 1958) p. 255 at p. 260 and p. 264–269.

60 A.O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Harvard University Press 1974) p. 1–43. For a more general but less well-known analysis, see A.O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests. Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph (Princeton University Press 1977) p. 69–93.

61 U. Beck, The Reinvention of Politics. Rethinking Modernity in the Global Social Order (Polity 1997) p. 94–109.

62 V. Mayer-Schönberger and A. Somek, ‘Introduction: Governing Regulatory Interaction: the Normative Question’, 12 European Law Journal (2006) p. 431 at p. 432.

63 F.W. Scharpf, ‘Globalisierung als Beschränkung der Handlungsmöglichkeiten nationalstaatlicher Politik’, in K.-E. Schenk et al. (eds.), Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie. 17. Band: Globalisierung, Systemwettbewerb und nationalstaatliche Politik (Mohr Siebeck 1998) p. 41 at p. 43–45.

64 See text between n. 8 and n. 16 supra.

65 See C. Tiebout, ‘A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures’, 64 The Journal of Political Economy (1956) p. 416.

66 R.S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State’, 113 Harvard Law Review (2000) p. 1573 at p. 1611–1612 and p. 1616–1625; Scharpf, supra n. 63, p. 45–47; Hirschman (1974), supra n. 60, p. 76. In the EU context, the intra-EU mobility of EU citizens of working age remains around 4%: see E. Fries-Tersch et al., 2017 Annual Report on Intra-EU Labour Mobility. Final Report January 2018 (European Union 2018) p. 26.

67 A. Somek, ‘The Argument from Transnational Effects I: Representing Outsiders through Freedom of Movement’, 16 European Law Journal (2010) p. 315 at p. 342.

68 For a detailed account, see Maduro (1997), supra n. 39, p. 78–79. For discussion, see Somek, supra n. 67, p. 329–335.

69 See A. Somek, ‘The European Model of Transnational Democracy: A Tribute to Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde’, 19 German Law Journal (2018) p. 435 at p. 456.

70 See W. Streeck, Buying Time. The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism (Verso 2014) at p. 79–81.

71 W. Streeck, ‘From Market Making to State Building? Reflections on the Political Economy of European Social Policy’, in S. Leibfried and P. Pierson (eds.), European Social Policy. Between Fragmentation and Integration (The Brookings Institution 1995) p. 389 at p. 416.

72 From a theoretical point of view, see Mouffe, C., On the Political (Routledge 2005) p. 17.Google Scholar

73 This was also later noted by Maduro: see Maduro (2003), supra n. 45, p. 93–94 and p. 101; see also M. Maduro, A New Governance for the European Union and the Euro: Democracy and Justice (RSCAS Policy Paper 2012/11, European University Institute) p. 13–16.

74 See S. Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy. Swedish, British, and American Approaches to Financing the Modern State (Yale University Press 1993) p. 29 and p. 156–160.

75 Offe and Preuss, supra n. 10, p. 180; Follesdal and Hix, supra n. 9, at p. 542 and p. 551.

76 See Jaakkola, supra n. 29.

77 For further discussion, see A. Somek, ‘The Darling Dogma of Bourgeois Europeanists’, 20 European Law Journal (2014) p. 688 at p. 701–702 and p. 709–710.

78 For instance, see Avi-Yonah, supra n. 66.

79 For empirical assessment, see P. Genschel and P. Schwarz, ‘Tax competition: a literature review’, 9 Socio-Economic Review (2011) p. 339; P. Genschel and P. Schwarz, ‘Tax Competition and Fiscal Democracy’, in Schäfer and Streeck, supra n. 18, p. 59.

80 R.S. Avi-Yonah, ‘The Three Goals of Taxation’, 60 Tax Law Review (2006) p. 1 at p. 10–22.

81 M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie (Mohr Siebeck 1972) p. 209–211.

82 See text between n. 8 and n. 29 supra.

Send article to Kindle

To send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Enhancing Political Representation Through the European Economic Constitution? Regressive Politics of Democratic Inclusion
Available formats
×

Send article to Dropbox

To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

Enhancing Political Representation Through the European Economic Constitution? Regressive Politics of Democratic Inclusion
Available formats
×

Send article to Google Drive

To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

Enhancing Political Representation Through the European Economic Constitution? Regressive Politics of Democratic Inclusion
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response

Please enter your response.

Your details

Please enter a valid email address.

Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *