¹ Literature: Balzarini, , Carcano, and Mucciarelli, (eds.), I gruppi di società (Milano: Giuffrè 1996)Google Scholar; Barbièri, , “Comment rénover le droit français de Groupes de Sociétés?”, Les Petites Affiches, No. 133 (5 11 1995)Google Scholar; Barthélémy, et al. , Le Droit des Groupes de Sociétés (Paris: Dalloz 1991)Google Scholar; Emmerich, and Sonnenschein, , Konzernrecht, 6th ed. (Munchen: Beck 1997)Google Scholar; Falcke, , Konzernrecht in Frankreich (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1996)Google Scholar; Gower, / Davies, , Principles of Modern Company Law, 6th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell 1997)Google Scholar; Guyon, , Droit des affaires, Vol. I, 9th ed. (Paris: Economica 1996)Google Scholar; id., Droit des affaires, Vol. II, 6th ed. (Paris: Economica 1997)Google Scholar; Hopt, and Wymeersch, (eds.), European Company and Financial Law, 2nd ed. (Berlin: de Gruyter 1994)Google Scholar; Lamy, , Sociétés commerciales (Paris: Lamy 1998)Google Scholar; Lutter, , “Zur Priviligierung einheitlicher Leitung im französischen (Konzern)-Recht”, in: Festschrift Kellermann (Berlin: de Gruyter 1991) 257Google Scholar; id., Europäisches Unternehmensrecht, 4th ed. (Berlin: de Gruyter 1996)Google Scholar; id., Konzernrecht im Ausland (Berlin: de Gruyter 1994)Google Scholar; Mestmäcker, and Behrens, (eds.), Das Gesellschaftsrecht der Konzerne im internationalen Vergleich (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1991)Google Scholar; Pariente, , Les groupes de sociétés (Paris: Litec 1993)Google Scholar; Schmitthoff, and Wooldridge, (eds.), Groups of Companies (London: Sweet & Maxwell 1991)Google Scholar; Schuberth, , Konzernrelevante Regelungen im britischen Recht (München: Beck 1997)Google Scholar; Wymeersch, (ed.), Groups of Companies in the EEC (Berlin: de Gruyter 1993).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² In the USA there was at the end of the 19th century for a short period a tendency by means of company law to forbid the creation of Groups by providing that a company could not participate in another company; this tendency was abandoned after a short period; Eisenberg, , “Megasubsidiaries: The Effect of Corporate Structure on Corporate Control”, 84 Harvard Law Review (1971) 1577, 1590CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Grossfeld, , Aktiengesellschaft, Unternehmenskonzentration und Kleinaktionär (Tübingen: Mohr 1968) s. 163Google Scholar; Immenga, , “Company Systems and Affiliations”, 13 International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (1985) s. 7–4Google Scholar. In France it was decided earlier in the judgement of the Cour de Cassation of 10 December 1878 (D.P. 1879,1,5 note: Beudant) that participation by one legal person in a company was permitted.

³ Immenga, supra n. 2, ss. 7-11 et seq.; for Europe: Lutter, , “Stand und Entwicklung des Konzernrechts in Europa”, ZGR (1987) 324, at pp. 330 et seq.Google Scholar

The economic sciences, at least in Germany, have been less willing to accept the reality of Groups (with the exception of Group accounting) than legal science. Cf., however, the recently published, e.g., Kirchner, , “Ansätze zu einer ökonomischen Analyse des Konzernrechts”, Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie (1984) 223Google Scholar; Ordelheide, , “Der Konzern als Gegenstand betriebswissenschaftlicher Forschung”, BFuP (Schmalenbach's Zeitschrift für betriebs-wirtschaftliche Forchung) (1986) 293Google Scholar; Theisen, , Der Konzern, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: Poeschel 2000)Google Scholar; Kallfass, , “Ökonomische Analyse der Konzernbildung”, in: Mestmäcker and Behrens, Das Gesellschaftsrecht der Konzerne im internationalen VergleichGoogle Scholar, supra n. 1, p. 19; Pellens, , Aktionärsschutz im Konzern (Wiesbaden: Gabler 1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Prantl, , Konzernbildung, Konzernrecht und Minderheitenschutz in Deutschland – Eine ökonomische Analyse (Frankfurt a.M.: Lang 1994)Google Scholar; Binder, , “Beteiligung in der Konzernpraxis”, AG (1994) 391Google Scholar (empirical investigation of the participation levels in German corporate groups); Mellewigt, , Konzernorganisation und Konzernführung, Eine empirische Untersuchung börsennotierter Konzerne (Frankfurt a.M.: Lang 1995)Google Scholar; Pellens, , “Berucksichtigung der Aktionärsinteressen bei der Gewinnverwendung im Konzern” in: Elschen, Unternehmensicherung und Unternehmensentwicklung (Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel 1995) 162Google Scholar; Ehricke, , “Gedanken zu einem allgemeinen Konzern-organisationsrecht zwischen Markt und Regulierung”, ZGR (1996) 300Google Scholar; Kirchner, , “Zur Fehlkonstruktion des deutschen Konzemrechts: Kritik und Neuansätze in interdisziplinärer Perspektive” in: Schreyögg and Sydow, Managementforschung 7, Gestaltung von Organisationsgrenzen (Berlin: de Gruyter 1997) p. 271Google Scholar; Theisen, , Der Konzern im Umbruch (Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel 1997).Google Scholar

From American literature: Williamson, , The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting (New York: Free Pr. 1985).Google Scholar

⁴ Immenga, supra n. 2, s. 7-2; Lenel, , Ursachen der Konzentration, 2nd ed. (Tübingen: Mohr 1968)Google Scholar; Kübler, and Schmidt, R., Gesellschaftsrecht und Konzentration (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1988)Google Scholar; Noll, , Wettbewerbs- und ordnungspolitische Probleme der Konzentration (Spardorf: Wilfer 1986).Google Scholar

⁵ Cf., comparison of laws in Gassner, , Lang, and Wiesner, , Besteuerung von Unter-nehmensgruppen (Wien: Institut für Finanzwiss. und Steuerrecht 1998)Google Scholar; and Müller, , in: Gassner, (ed.), Besteuerung und Bilanzierung international tätiger Unternehmen (Wien: Linde 1997) 285, at pp. 294 et seq.Google Scholar

⁶ The national and European legal provisions applicable to company groups are legion; cf., only Immenga, supra n. 2, ss. 7-47 et seq.; the many references in national laws in Hopt's collection of national company laws, Groups of Companies in European Laws (Berlin: de Gruyter 1982)Google Scholar; Lutter, , Konzernrecht im Ausland (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter 1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mestmäcker and Behrens, supra n. 1; Schmitthoff and Woodridge, supra n. 1; and Wymeersch, supra n. 1, and the references to European Law, n. 42 et seq.

⁷ OJ(EC) [1983] L 193/1; Lutter, , Europäisches Unternehmensrecht, 4th ed. (Berlin: de Gruyter 1996) pp. 207 et seq.Google Scholar; and Hopt and Wymeersch, supra n. 1, pp. 232 et seq.

⁸ Council Regulation 4064/89/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the Control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ(EC) [1989] L 395/1; Lutter, supra n. 7, pp. 761 et seq.

⁹ Due not least to the Second Company Law Directive (Capital Directive) 77/91/EEC, OJ(EC) [1977] L 26/1 (Lutter, supra n. 7, pp. 109 et seq.); and Hopt and Wymeersch, supra n. 1, pp. 165 et seq., which led to a complete change in the company laws of Great Britain and Ireland, but also to the introduction of the limited liability company in all Member States the legal systems of which, like Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden, until then did not know of such companies; cf., Lutter, supra n. 7, pp. 45 et seq.

¹⁰ Germany also has only a partial regulation, because the provisions of §§ 291 et seq., §§311 et seq. AktG apply only to the Aktiengesellschaft (a marketable share company). The various Konzernrecht principles applicable to the GmbH (limited liability company) are based on judicial decisions. On the development of Corporate Group Law cf., e.g., Hannah, , The Rise of the Corporate Economy, 2nd ed. (London: Methuen 1983)Google Scholar; Horn, and Kocka, , Recht und Entwicklung der Groβunternehmen im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1979)Google Scholar; Spindler, , Recht und Konzern. Interdependenzen der Rechts- und Unternehmenentwicklung in Deutschland und in den U.S.A. zwischen 1870 und 1933 (Tübingen: Mohr 1993)Google Scholar; Nörr, , “Zur Entwicklung des Aktien- und Konzemrechts während der Weimarer Republik”, ZHR (1986) 155Google Scholar; Dettling, , Die Entstehungsgeschichte des Konzemrechts im Aktiengesetz von 1965 (Tübingen: Mohr 1997).Google Scholar

¹¹ Cf., Antunes, , “The Law of Affiliated Companies in Portugal”Google Scholar, in: Balzarini etxs al, supra n. 1, 355; Lutter, and Overrath, , in: Lutter, Konzernrecht imAuslandGoogle Scholar, supra n. 1, 229.

¹² Guyon, , Droit des Affaires, Vol. I, 9th ed. (1996) nos. 580 et seq., 623Google Scholar; and Prentice, in: Lutter, , Konzernrecht im Ausland (1994)Google Scholar, supra n. 1, 93; Barbière, supra n. 1, no. 28.

¹³ Guyon, supra n. 12, p. 89 et seq.; and Barthelemy, et al., supra n. 1, p. 215 et seq.

¹⁴ Corsi, , “L'insolvenza nel gruppo”Google Scholar, in: Balzarini et al., supra n. 1, 1057; and Vanetti, in: Lutter, , Konzernrecht im Ausland (1994)Google Scholar, supra n. 1, 126.

¹⁵ Cf., only Directive 92/121/EEC of 21.12.1992, OJ(EC) [1993] L 29/1 (Loans Directive) reproduced in: Lutter, supra n. 7, 377, and in: Hopt and Wymeersch, supra n. 1, 113; and Directive 92/30/EEC of 6.4.1992, OJ(EC) [1992] L 110/52 (Directive on the Supervision of Financial Institutions on a consolidated basis) reproduced in: Lutter, supra n. 7,421; and in: Hopt and Wymeersch, supra n. 1, 103.

¹⁶ Cf., the collection for Denmark: Andersen, , Dansk koncernret (Copenhagen: Juris- og Økonomforb. 1996)Google Scholar; Gomard, , Samarbejde og ansvar i selskaber og koncerner (Copenhagen: GadJura 1997)Google Scholar; Werlauff, , Koncernretten (Copenhagen: GadJura 1996)Google Scholar; for France: Bezard, , “La Protection des actionnaires minoritaires de la société mère et des sociétés du groupe”Google Scholar, in: Balzarini et al., supra n. 1, 655; Delebecque, , “Groupe de sociétés et procédures collectives: confusion de patrimoines et responsabilité des membres du groupe”, Rev.proc. coll. (Revue des procédures collectives) (1998) 129Google Scholar; Guyon, , “Le droit des groupes de sociétés (droit français)”Google Scholar, in: Balzarini et al., supra n. 1, 195; for the Netherlands: Bartman, and Dorrerzeyl, , Van het concern, 3rd ed. (Amhem: Gouda Quint 1997)Google Scholar; Houven, , Schoonbrood-Wessels, and Gebreurs, , Aansprakelijkheid in concernverhoudingen (Deventer: Kluwer 1993)Google Scholar; Savornin, Lohman, Duties and Liabilities of Directors and Shareholders under Netherlands Law (London: Kluwer Law International 1996)Google Scholar; for Norway: Aakvag, et al. , Noensentrale emner innen norsk konsernrett (Oslo: Ad Notam Gyldendal 1994)Google Scholar; for Italy: Scognamiglio, , Autonomia e coordinamento nella disciplina die gruppi di societa (Torino: Giappichelli 1996).Google Scholar

¹⁷ It is not disputed that this is a special problemat characteristic of a dependent company within a group. There is however a dispute as to what extent special regulation is necessary; cf., Guyon, supra n. 12; and Prentice, supra n. 12.

¹⁸ Guyon, supra n. 12, nos. 501 et seq.; Lutter, , “Limited Liability Companies and Private Companies”, 13 International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, at pp. 155 et seq.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Roberts, and Wiseman, , “Possible defensive measures against stock exchange raids in the UK”, in: Maeijer and Geens, Defensive Measures Against Hostile Take-overs in the Common Market (Dordrecht: Nijhoff/ Graham & Trotman 1990) 213.Google Scholar

²⁰ Immenga, supra n. 2, ss. 7-38 et seq.; on the functional connections between joining a corporate group and the protection of rights during the existence of a corporate group at the level of European Community law cf., Hommelhoff, , “Konzerneingangs-Schutz durch takeover-Recht? – Eine Betrachtung zur europäischen Rechtspolitik”, in: Festschrift Sender (Berlin: de Gruyter 1993) p. 455Google Scholar; cf., however, also Hopt, “Ökonomische Theorie und rechtsvergleichende Erfahrungen mit der freiwilligen Selbstkontrolle im Finanzbereich”, ZHR (1997) 368Google Scholar, supra n. 20, at p. 415; and the literature referred to below at n. 263.

²¹ Explanatory memorandum to §§ 291 et seq. AktG, reprduced in Kropff, , Textausgabe AktG 1965 (Düsseldorf: Buchh. des Instituts der Wirtschaftsprüfer 1965) 373Google Scholar; Emmerich and Sonnenschein, supra n. 1, 14; Karsten, Schmidt, Gesellschaftsrecht, 3rd ed. (Köln: Heymann 1997) pp. 493 et seq.Google Scholar

²² For the historical development of this idea: Dettling, , Die Entstehungsgeschichte des Konzernrechts im Aktiengesetz von 1965 (Tübingen: Mohr 1997) pp. 213Google Scholar et seq.; Hommelhoff, , Die Konzernleitungpflicht (München: Heymann 1982/ reprinted 1988) pp. 32 et seq.Google Scholar

²³ On the qualified de facto Konzern cf., the summary in Emmerich and Sonnenschein, supra n. 1, pp. 350 et seq., and the further references given there.

²⁴ Cf., Altmeppen, , in: Roth and Altmeppen, Komm.z. GmbHG, 3rd ed. (München: Beck 1997) App. § 13Google Scholar; Lutter, and Hommelhoff, , GmbH-Gesetz Kommentar, 14th ed. (Koln: Schmidt 1995) App. § 13Google Scholar; Zöllner, , in: Baumbach and Hueck, Komm. z. GmbH, 16th ed. (München: Beck 1996) App. IGoogle Scholar. However, GmbH Konzernrecht does not recognise the integrated company group.

²⁵ BGHZ83, 122 – Holzmüller.

²⁶ Principally, Lutter, , “Zur Binnenstruktur des Konzerns”, in: Festschrift Harry Westermann (Karlsruhe: Müller 1974) 347Google Scholar; Timm, , Die Aktiengesellschqft als Konzernspitze (München: Heymann 1980), pp. 165 et seq.Google Scholar; for the at first controversial discussion following the Holzmüller decision cf., the report in Emmerich and Sonnenschein, supra n. 1, p. 86 et seq. and the further references there given; and Hüffer, , Komm z. AktG, 4th ed. (München: Beck 1999)Google Scholar §119 Marginal note 17.

²⁷ Cf., Schneider, , “Bankenaufsicht im Konren”, WM (1978) 1250Google Scholar; Schieber, , Die Aufsicht über Finanzkonglomerate (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1998) pp. 57 et seq.Google Scholar; for Italy: Padoa-Schioppa, “Il gruppo bancario nell'ordinarnento creditizio”, in: Balzarini et al., supra n. 1, 507.

²⁸ On major liquidations in Germany cf., the report by Kübler, , “Konzern und Inlovenz – Zur Durchsetzung Konzernmäβiger Sanierungsziele an der Beispielsfällen AEG und Korf”, ZGR (1984) 560Google Scholar, on the Korfliquidation and the AEG crisis; and Wellensiek, , “Erfahrungsbericht zum Vulkan-Konkurs”, ZGR (1999) 234Google Scholar, on the Bremer Vulkan liquidation.

²⁹ Cf., Kondor Comparato, in: Lutter, , Konzernrecht im Ausland (1994)Google Scholar, supra n. 1, 32.

³⁰ Cf., supra n. 11.

³¹ Yeh, , “Das taiwanesische Konzernrecht von 1997”, ZGR (2000) 287.Google Scholar

³² Brus, , Das slowenische Konzernrecht in seiner Herkunft aus dem deutschen Recht der verbundenen Unternehmen (Berlin: Berlin-Verl. Spitz 1999).Google Scholar

³³ For Australia cf, recent Companies Securities Advisory Committee, Corporate Groups Draft Proposals (October 1999); cf, Kluver, , “European and Australian Proposals for Corporate Group Law: a Comparative Analysis”, 1 European Business Organization Law Review (2000) ??.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁴ Cf., for France: Béjot, , “Einige Elemente der Konzernrechtlichen Sonderregeln in Frankreich”Google Scholar, in: Mestmäcker and Behrens, supra n. 1, 173; cf., however, also Guyon, in: Lutter, , Konzernrecht im Ausland (1994)Google Scholar, supra n. 6, 88; for Great Britain: Prentice, supra n. 12, p. 114.

³⁵ For France and Great Britain cf., only Guigou, “Différentes approches de la notion de groupe de sociétés - L'approche en droit des sociétés”, in: Barthelemy, et al., Droit des groupes de sociétés (1991) Text number 1000 et seq.; Lamy, supra n. 1, Text number 1793; Guyon, , “Das Recht der Gesellschaftsgruppe in Frankreich”, ZGR (1991) 218, at p. 219Google Scholar; Wolf, , Konzernhaftung in Frankreich und England (Köln: Heymann 1995) p. 10Google Scholar; Druey, , “Das deutsche Konzernrecht aus der Sicht des übrigen Europa”, in: Gutachten für den 59. Deutschen Juristentag (München: Beck 1992) 310, at p. 312.Google Scholar

³⁶ For other areas, e.g., group banking law cf., below 1.8.

³⁷ Cf., the legal provisions: Art. L 439 – Code du Travail (Definition of “groupe de societes” for the purpose of the establishment of a Group Works Council); Art. L 439 – 2 para. 3 Code du Travail (an auditor, acting for the Group Works Council, has access to all files in all companies of the group); Art. L 122 – 14 – 8 Code du Travail (an employee transferee! to a foreign subsidiary and there dismissed can demand reintegration into the parent company); cf., also the “Videocolor” case (Cour de Cassation, 5.4.1994, Droit Social (1995) p. 487) as provisional conclusion to a succession of decisions on the requirements for the effectiveness of dismissals on the basis of business conditions in a company within a group; cf., also Cass. soc. 27.3.1985, Bull.civ. V, No. 221; Cass. soc. 3.4.1990, Rev.soc. (1990), 625 with note Guyon. Supiot, “Groupes de sociétés et paradigme de l'entreprise”, Rev.tritn.dr.com. (1985) 621; Guyon, in: ZGR (1991), supra n. 35, at pp. 231 et seq.; Teichmann, , Die Gesellschaftsgruppe im französischen Arbeitsrecht (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1999).Google Scholar

³⁸ Observations of Lutter, , “Stand und Entwicklung des Konzernrechts in Europa”, ZGR (1987) 324, at pp. 330 et seq.Google Scholar; id., “Konzernrecht: Schutzrecht oder Organisationsrecht?”, in: Festschrift Volhard (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1996) 105, at p. 107.Google Scholar

³⁹ Supra 1.1.

⁴⁰ For the economic view cf., supra n. 3.

⁴¹ Regulation proposing a Statute for a European Company of 30.6.1970, EEC Bulletin Supplement 8/70 and amended draft COM (75) 150 final of 30.4.1975, EEC Bulletin Supplement 4/75, Art. 223 et seq., reprduced also in: Lutter, , Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht, 1st ed. (Berlin: de Gruyter 1979) at pp. 34 et seq.Google Scholar, pp. 278 et seq., and pp. 329 et seq.; cf. also Gessler, , in: Lutter, Die europäische Aktiengesellschaft, 2nd ed. (Koln: Heymann 1978) 275.Google Scholar

⁴² Preparatory draft of a Ninth Company Law Directive on Links between Undertakings, and, in particular, on Groups of Companies of 1984, Doc. III/1639/84-E. The text has not been published in English. Cf. the German text in: ZGR (1985) 444Google Scholar; Lutter, supra n. 7,239; Hopt and Wymeersch, supra n. 1, 808; also Gleichmann, “Bericht über die Arbeiten yur normativen Erfassung des Problems der verbundenen Unternehmen, insbesondere der Konzerne, bei der europäischen Rechtsangleichung und im Rahmen der Schaffung Europäischen Rechtsangleichung und im Rahmen der Schaffung Europäischem Gesellschaftsrechts”, in: Mestmäcker and Behrens, supra n. 1, 581; Hommelhoff, , “Zum revidierten Vorschlag bei der aktienrechtlichen Anfechtungsklage”, in: Festschrift Fleck (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter 1988) 125.Google Scholar

⁴³ Amended draft of a 13th Company Law Directive concerning Takeover bids of 11.11.1997, COM (97) 565 final, OJ(EC) [1997] C 378/10; more thereon infra at 6.1.1.

⁴⁴ 3rd amended proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) embodying a Statute for a European Company of 16.5.1991, OJ(EC) [1991] C 176/1; Lutter, supra n. 7, 715; and Hopt and Wymeersch, supra n. 1, p. 828 et seq. On the implications for German law of this omission cf., Maul, , Diefaktisch abhängige SE (Societas Europea) im Schnittpunkt zwischen deutschem und europäischem Recht (München: Beck 1998).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983, OJ(EC) [1983] L 193/1; in Lutter, supra n. 7, 211; and in Hopt and Wymeersch, supra n. 1, 232 (Directive on Consolidated Group Accounts)

⁴⁶ See infra under 3.1.

⁴⁷ Directive 92/101/EEC of 23.11.1992, OJ(EC) [1992] L 347/64, Art. 1 and also Lutter, supra n. 7, pp. 109, 122.

⁴⁸ Directive 88/627/EEC of 12.12.1988, OJ(EC) [1988] L 348/62, Art. 1 in: Lutter, supra n. 7, p. 585.

⁴⁹ Directive 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994, OJ(EC) [1994] L 254/64, in: Lutter, supra n. 7, 679.

⁵⁰ Amended draft Directive on takeover bids, OJ(EC) [1990] C 240/7, in: Lutter, supra n. 7, 281, Art. 4.

⁵¹ See infra under 6.1.1.

⁵² Cf., Hommelhoff, , Hopt, , Lutter, and Wymeersch, , 1 Rechtsprechung zum Konzernrecht in Europa (1998).Google Scholar

⁵³ For all relevant EEC acts cf., Lutter, supra n. 7; Hopt and Wymeersch, supra n. 1.

⁵⁴ For the evidence cf., Hopt, , “Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht – Krise und neue Anläufe”, ZIP (1998) p. 96Google Scholar; id., ZHR (1997) 368, supra n. 20, at pp. 379 et seq.

⁵⁵ E.g., Beguin, , in: Rev.soc. (1996) p. 513Google Scholar; contrast Hopt, , “Harmonisierung im europäischen Gesellschaftsrecht – status quo, Probleme, Perspektiven”, ZGR (1992) 265, at pp. 272 et seq.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Cf., Druey, , in: Lutter, Konzernrecht im Ausland (1994) p. 310Google Scholar. Recently, e.g., Barbière, , “Comment rénover le droit francais des groupes de sociéteés?” Les petites affiches (5 Nov. 1997) no. 133, p. 6Google Scholar: “échec d'une réglementation ‘a l’allemande” and (ibid., no. 20 et seq.) against a “modèle germanique” of the contractual group, as in the report by the French commission chaired by Marini, , “La modernisation du droit des sociétés”, La documentation Française (1996) no. 85Google Scholar; Bertrel, , Droit et partrimoine (1996) p. 10 (14)Google Scholar; more liberally, Paillusseau, La modernisation du droit des sociétés commerciales (1996), chron. p. 287, no. 63 et seq.

⁵⁷ The British financial services legislation is undergoing fundamental reformation at the present time; cf., Blair, , “The Reform of Financial Regulation in the UK”, J.Int. Banking Law (1998) 43Google Scholar; Hopt, , “Ökonomische Theorie und rechtsvergleichende Erfahrungen mit der freiwilligen Selbstkontrolle im Finanzbereich”, ZHR (1997) 368Google Scholar, supra n. 20, at pp. 396 et seq.

⁵⁸ Cf., Hopt, , “Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht – Krise und neue Anläufe”, ZIP (1998) 96Google Scholar, for the latest on the Commission's intentions on European Company Law.

⁵⁹ On the Amsterdam Treaty cf., Hilf, and Pache, , “Der Vertrag von Amsterdam”, NJW (1998) 705Google Scholar; Streinz, , “Der Vertrag von Amsterdam”, EuZW (1998) 137.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Specifically on company law: Schön, , “Gesellschaftsrecht nach Maastricht”, ZGR (1995) 1Google Scholar; id., “Mindestharmonisierung im europäischen Gesellschaftsrecht”, ZHR (1996) 221, at pp. 228 et seq.Google Scholar; Hopt, , “Ökonomische Theorie und rechtsvergleichende Erfahrungen mit der freiwilligen Selbstkontrolle im Finanzbereich”, ZHR (1997) 368Google Scholar, supra n. 20, at pp. 379 et seq.; in general, Rohe, , “Binnenmarkt oder Interessenverband?”, 61 RabelsZ (1997) p. 1.Google Scholar

⁶¹ In force since 1.10.1995, amended with effect from 1.1.1998, reproduced inAG(1998) 133; cf., Hopt, , “Auf dem Weg zum deutschen Übernahmegesetz – Überlegungen zum Richtlinienentwurf 1997, zum Übernahmekodex (1997) und zum SPD-Entwurf 1997”, in: Festschrift Zollner (Koln: Heymann 1998) 253Google Scholar; Kallmeyer, , “Pflichtangebote nach dem Übernahmekodex und dem neuen Vorschlag 1997 einer Takeover-Richtlinie”, ZIP (1997) 2147Google Scholar; Kirchner, and Ehricke, , “Funktionsdefizite des Übernahmekodex der Börsensachverständigen-kommission”, AG (1998) 105Google Scholar; Wirth, and Weiler, , “Änderung des Übernahmekodex ab 1.1.1998: Das erweiterte Pflichtangebot”, DB (1998) 117.Google Scholar

⁶² See infra under section 3.

⁶³ See infra under section 4.

⁶⁴ See infra under section 5.

⁶⁵ See infra under section 6.

⁶⁶ See infra under section 7.

⁶⁷ See infra under section 9.

⁶⁸ See infra under section 8.

⁶⁹ See infra under section 10.

⁷⁰ This is not the same as the concept of a framework and minimum harmonisation propogated since 1996 by the Commission in its drafts of the 13th Directive; Hopt, , “Ökonomische Theorie und rechtsvergleichende Erfahrungen mit der freiwilligen Selbstkontrolle im Finanzbereich”, ZHR (1997) 368Google Scholar, supra n. 20, at pp. 380 et seq.

⁷¹ Specifically for company law; in favour: Kübler, , “Rechtsbildung durch Gesetzgebungs-wettbewerb?”, KritV (1994) 79Google Scholar; id., “Aktienrechtsreform und Unternehmensverfassung”, AG (1994) 141Google Scholar; more cautiously: Schön, , “Mindestharmonisierung im europäischen Gesell-schaftsrecht”, ZHR (1996) 221Google Scholar, at pp. 228, 232 et seq.; Hopt, ibid., at pp. 381 et seq.; with evidence for the economic concept of regulatory competition: Merkt, , “Das Europäische Gesellschaftsrecht und die Idee des »Wettbewerbs der Gesetzgeber«”, 59 RabelsZ (1995) 545.Google Scholar

⁷² In the case of group rules for the Societas Europaea, Regulations may be used.

⁷³ Further on the motivation for the public sector to engage in business; Bauer, , in: Veröffentlichungen der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer (1995) 204Google Scholar, at pp. 209 et seq.; Schmidt, R., “Der Übergang öffentlicher Aufgabenerfüllung in private Rechtsformen”, ZGR (1996) 345, 348Google Scholar; specifically on mixed ventures Bös, and Schneider, , “Private public partnerships: Gemeinschaftsunternehmen zwischen Privaten und der öffentlichen Hand”, ZGR (1996) 519Google Scholar; summary overview in Harbarth, , Anlegerschutz in öffentlichen Untenehmen (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1998) § 2 IIGoogle Scholar

⁷⁴ BGHZ 69, 334, 338 et seq. Specifically on the point Emmerich and Sonnenschein, supra n. 1, pp. 32 et seq. and further references given there.

⁷⁵ Koppensteiner, in: Kölner Komm. z AktG, 2nd ed. (Koln: Heymann 1996)Google Scholar § 15 Marginal Note 39 (Marginal Note 52 summary); Lutter, , “100 Bäande BGHZ: Konzernrecht”, ZHR (1987) 444Google Scholar, at pp. 451 et seq.; Raiser, , “Konzemverflechtungen unter Einschluß öffentlicher Unternehmen”, ZGR (1996) 458Google Scholar, at pp. 463 et seq.; further in Emmerich and Sonnenschein, supra n. 1, p. 35 (n. 44).

⁷⁶ BGHZ 135, 107, 113 – VW/Niedersachen.

⁷⁷ Cf., Pavona La, Rosa, in: Pavona La, Rosa (ed.), I gruppi de società (Bologna: II Mulino 1982) 409Google Scholar; Vanetti, supra n. 14, p. 129 et seq.

⁷⁸ Supra 1.3.

⁷⁹ For Belgium cf., Trib. Com. Brussels, 2.10.1982, Revue pratique des sociétés (1982) No. 6218, pp. 244–267Google Scholar, superseded by Brussels 14.9.1988, Tijdschrift Rechtsperson en Vennootschap (1989) 50Google Scholar; Revue de droit commercial de Belge (1989) 171Google Scholar; cf., also Cools, , Les responsabilités des administrateurs publics, Documentation du Ministere des Finances (1986) pp. 71–92.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Cf., Pernice, in: Grabitz and Hilf, Komm. z. Europäischen Union, Stand Mai 1998, Art. 90 EGV Marginal Note 3; Emmerich, in: Dauses, , Handbuch des EG-Wirtschaftsrechts, Stand September 1994, HII Marginal Note 31.Google Scholar

⁸¹ This phrase originates from Bälz, , “Einheit und Vielheit im Konzerrn”, in: Festschrift L. Raiser (Tübingen: Mohr 1974) 320Google Scholarpolykorporatives Unternehmen.

⁸² Cf., Wiedemann, , Die Untemehmensgruppe im Privatrecht (Tübingen: Mohr 1988).Google Scholar

⁸³ Cf., Embid Irujo, in: Wymeersch, , Groups of Companies in the EEC (1993)Google Scholar, supra n. 1, 123, at pp. 126 et seq. (for Spain); Teichmann, supra n. 37; Spada, in: Wymeersch, ibid., 165, at pp. 189 et seq.; Windbichler, , Arbeitsrecht im Konzern (München: Beck 1989).Google Scholar

⁸⁴ § 5 Co-Determination Law of 1976; cf., Lutter, , Mitbestimmung im Konzem (Köln: Heymann 1975).Google Scholar

⁸⁵ Cf., the famous Italian Legge Prodi in Spada, supra n. 83, p. 109 et seq.; and Vanetti, supra n. 14, pp. 126, 132 et seq.

⁸⁶ Cf., Directive 90/435/EEC of 23.7.1990, OJ(EC) [1990] L 225/6, in Lutter, supra n. 7, 796 (Parent-Subsidiary Directive).

⁸⁷ Cf., Ossenbühl, , Umweltgefährdungshaftung im Konzern (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1999).Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Supra n. 45.

⁸⁹ For the Commission's intended revisions cf., Van Hulle, , “Die Zukunft der europäischen Rechnungslegung im Rahmen einer sich ändernden internationalen Rechnungslegung”, WPg (Wirtschaftsprüfung) (1998) 138.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ This uniformity of consolidated annual accounts in Europe is at present in the course of being replaced, possibly by the American Rules of the IAS (International Accounting Standards) or the US-GAAP (US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles): § 292a HGB (German Commercial Code) provides quoted companies the option of preparing their consolidated annual accounts according to internationally recognised accounting principles rather than the German rules, provided that the accounts thereby provided are at least as informative as they would be under the German rules.

⁹¹ The many measures by which the Commission is attempting to build up and develop the European Capital Market should not be overlooked; cf., the critical summary by Möllers, and Ganten, , “Die Wohlverhaltensrichtlinie des BAWe im Lichte der neuen Fassung des WpHG”, ZGR (1998) 773.Google Scholar

⁹² Cf., the evidence provided in supra n. 52 and infra n. 260. The national reports on groups and capital markets will be published in 2001.

⁹³ First draft of a Ninth Directive 1984 (unpublished). The German text is brought by Lutter, , Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht, 2nd ed. (Berlin: de Gruyter 1984) pp. 187 et seq.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ In the words of Barbière, supra n. 55, no. 4: a “tableau à la Monnet”.

⁹⁵ Directive 68/151/EEC of 9.3.1968, OJ(EC) [1968] L 65/8, in: Lutter, supra n. 7, pp. 101 et seq.; and in Hopt and Wymeersch, supra n. 1, pp. 159 et seq. (Publicity Directive).

⁹⁶ The only exception is Directive 90/605/EEC of 8.11.1990 amending Directive 78/660/EEC on annual accounts and Directive 83/349/§§C on consolidated accounts by extending their scope to partnerships and limited partnerships, OJ(EC) [1990] L 317/60.

⁹⁷ These terms are legally defined: cf., §§ 15, 18 AktG.

⁹⁸ Cf., supra n. 93.

⁹⁹ Cf., supra n. 45, in Lutter, supra n. 7, p. 207; Hopt and Wymeersch, supra n. 1, p. 132.

¹⁰⁰ The European Court of Justice had not the opportunity to provide a European interpretation of this concept in the Tomberger case, because the judgement in this case was based solely on the Fourth Directive (Profit and Loss Account of individual companies): case C-234/94 Tomberger v. Gebrüder von der Wettem, [1996] ECR I-3133.

¹⁰¹ Cf., supra nn. 9 and 47, in Lutter, supra n. 7, p. 114.

¹⁰² Council Directive 94/45/EC on the establishment of a European Works Council, OJ(EC) [1994] L 254/64; cf., Lutter, supra n. 7, p. 685.

¹⁰³ Cf., Prentice, in: Wymeersch, , Groups of Companies in the EEC (1993)Google Scholar, supra n. 1, p. 297.

¹⁰⁴ Cf., Pariente, supra n. 1, p. 101 et seq.; Guyon, supra n. 12, Text number 580; id., “Das Recht der Gesellschaftsgruppe”, ZGR (1991) 218, 219Google Scholar; Lamy, supra n. 1, Text number 1791; Bézard, , “Les groupes de sociétés: évolution récentes et perspectives”, JCP (1990)Google Scholar ed. CI, App. 1, p. 15; Bon, et al. , “L'expert comptable judiciare face aux problèmes posés par les groupes de sociétés”, Rev.soc. (1980) 661.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ Lamy, supra n. 1, Text number 1825; and the literature referred to in n. 104.

¹⁰⁶ BGBI I/1996, p. 1548; cf., the introductory contribution of Ruoff, , “Das europäische Betriebsräte-Gesetz (EBRG)”, BB (1997) 2478Google Scholar and further references given there; cf., also the comparative study in Lecher, Nagel, and Platzer, , Die Konstituierung Europäischer Betriebsräte – Vom Informationsforum zum Akteur? (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1998).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ On this concept cf., Guigou, supra n. 35, Text number 2200 et seq.; Pariente, supra n. 1, p. 116 et seq.; Lamy, supra n. 1, Text number 1829; Falcke, supra n. 1, p. 29 et seq.

¹⁰⁸ Cf., Pellerier, , in: Responsabilité des sociétés-mères du fait de leurs filiales (Paris: OECD 1980)Google Scholar; Guyenot, , in: Etudes à la mémoire du doyen Azard (Paris: Cujas 1980) 87Google Scholar; Guyon, supra n. 12, Text number 584; Lamy, supra n. 1, Text number 1825; Falcke, supra n. 1, p. 27.

¹⁰⁹ Cf., Bejot, , La protection des actionaires externes dans les groupes de sociétés en France et en Allemagne (Brussels: Bruylant 1976) pp. 61 et seq.Google Scholar; Guyon, supra n. 12, Text number 589; Borse, , Abhängigkeit und Gläubigerschutz im Recht der französischen SARL sowie der deutschen GmMH (Bochum Univ., Diss., 1989) p. 15.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ Cf., Chieffi, , “Il gruppo di fatto qualificato nella realta giuridica italiana”, in: Balzarini et al.Google Scholar, supra n. 1, 963.

¹¹¹ Other provisions on dependence are: §§ 20; 71a, 71d, 136 para. 2; 145, 311 AktG. In the AktG the concept Konzern is only significant for the expansion of the Supervisory Board places according to § 100 para. 2, sentence 2 AktG.

¹¹² The “International Accounting Standards” (IAS) which are now central to consolidated group accounting practice employ the concept of “power” in this context (cf., IAS 27 para. 12., IASC homepage: www.iasc.org.uk

¹¹³ Other controlling mechanisms, according to the definition in Art. 1 para. 1 Seventh Directive (83/349/EWG, cf., supra n. 45) may be contractual, or concern the right to elect or remove the majority of the directors or the members of the Supervisory Board; this corresponds to § 290 para. 2 HGB.

¹¹⁴ Art. 1 para. 1 Seventh Directive (83/349/EEC), cf., supra n. 86.

¹¹⁵ Wymeersch, supra n. 1, p. 20 et seq.; Geens, in: Lutter, , Konzernrecht im Ausland (1994)Google Scholar, supra n. 1, 29.

¹¹⁶ Ss. 258 et seq. Companies Act and s. 736 Companies Act almost word for word follow the Seventh Directive Art. 1 para. 1; cf., Gower/ Davies, supra n. 1, pp. 159 et seq., 162; Prentice, supra n. 12, pp. 93, 94 et seq.

¹¹⁷ Guyon, supra n. 12, Text number 580; ibid., supra n. 34, p. 78; and Storck, , “Définition légale du contrôle d'une société en droit français”, Rev.soc. (1986) p. 385.Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ Vanetti, supra n. 14, p. 137.

¹¹⁹ Rojo, , “Los grupos de sociedades en el derecho español”, in: Balzarini et al., 389Google Scholar; Embid, Irujo, in: Lutter, Konzernrecht im Ausland (1994)Google Scholar, supra n. 1, pp. 247, 254.

¹²⁰ §§ 17 and 18 AktG.

¹²¹ Lutter and Overrath, supra n. 11, p. 230.

¹²² Dutch law uses both concepts: Timmermans and Timmerman, in: Wymeersch, , Groups of Companies in the EEC (1993)Google Scholar, supra n. 1, 242.

¹²³ Cf., the interesting case VW/Niedersachsen in which “dominance” was found to exist on the basis of a holding of 20% where regularly less than 40% attended the annual general meeting: BGHZ 135, 107.

¹²⁴ The strict distinction of these concepts is maintained apparently only in German law.

¹²⁵ Likewise Art. 1 No. 9 of the Second Directive on the Co-ordination of Banking Law (Council Directive 89/646/EEC) of 15.12.1989, OJ(EC) [1989] L 386/1, in Lutter, supra n. 7, 325, 335; and Hopt and Wymeersch, supra n. 1, 62.

¹²⁶ E.g., Art. 24a Second Directive, supra n. 45: “majority of voting rights” or “the dominant influence”.

¹²⁷ E.g., Art. 3 para. 1 of the Directive on European Works Councils, supra n. 102: Definition of the concept “dominant company” and “Company which…can exercise a dominant influence over another company (dependent company)”.

¹²⁸ Cf., supra n. 99.

¹²⁹ Guido Rossi, the principal speaker at the Venice Congress of 1995, argued for the use of the concept of “integrated management”; cf., Rossi, “Il fenomeno die gruppi ed il diritto societario: un nodo da risolvere”, in: Balzarini et al., 17, at pp. 24 et seq.; also Pavone La, Rosa, “La Societa Controllate – i gruppi”, in: Colombo, and Portale, (eds.), Trattato delle società per azioni, Vol. 2/2 (Turin 1991) 579Google Scholar, at pp. 599 et seq.; Rescigno, , “Der Konzern im italienischen Recht”, in: Mestmäcker and BehrensGoogle Scholar, supra n. 1, 347.

¹³⁰ In special cases, it may be necessary that the proposed regulations would apply to instances of de facto control.

¹³¹ Cf., the VW/Niedersachsen case, supra n. 123.

¹³² Unfortunately, the concept of a “group” in Art. 24a of the Second Directive, supra n. 47, differs, not in content but in approach, wording and structure, from that used in the Seventh Directive (Art. 1), while Art. 3 of the Directive on European Works Councils also deviates in content. In contrast, Art. 7 of the Transparency Directive (88/627/EEC) and Art. 4 of the earlier draft 13th Directive (Takeovers) simply reproduce the “control” concept, (in Lutter, supra n. 7, pp. 281,290; Hopt and Wymeersch, supra n. 1, p. 850.

¹³³ Supra section 2.1.

¹³⁴ Cf., supra n. 99.

¹³⁵ Referred to at No. 1 in the Preamble to the Directive (reproduced in Lutter, supra n. 7, p. 211; cf., also Emmerich and Sonnenschein, supra n. 1, p. 470; and Baetge, , Konzernbilanzen, 3rd ed. (Düsseldorf: IDW 1997) pp. 25 et seq.)Google Scholar; contrast No. 3 of the Preamble to the Directive which deals with the interests of others vis-à-vis those of the capital company.

¹³⁶ However, the fundamental importance of the accounting rules for the development of Corporate Group Law in the Member States of the EU is not universally recognised in the literature on Company Law.

¹³⁷ Cf., the reports on individual States in: Balzarini et al., supra n. 1, pp. 134 et seq.; Lutter, supra n. 6; Béjot, “Einige Elemente der Konzernrechtlichen Sonderregeln in Frankreich”, in: Mestmäcker and Behrens, supra n. 1, 169.

¹³⁸ Cf, infra under 9.1.2.3.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Cf., infra under 9.1.3.

¹⁴¹ According to the ECJ Daihatsu Händlerverband judgment, the annual accounts should be widely provided and not limited to shareholders and creditors; cf. case C-97/96 Verband deutscher Daihatsu-Händler eV v. Daihatsu Deutschland GmbH [1997] ECR I-6843. The Court's exposition in this case which concerned one company, applies equally to group annual accounts.

¹⁴² On the problem of legal supervision in German law cf., the review by Schneider, , “Bankenaufsicht im Konzern”, WM (1978) 1250, at pp. 1260 et seq.Google Scholar; on the so-called “risk of infection” within groups.

¹⁴³ Only in relation to individual Profit and Loss statements does the Directive provide for a specific statement on internal group transactions (Art. 9 Current Assets D II 2/Art. 10 D II 2: Amounts owed by affiliated undertakings; Art. 9 Liabilities C 6/Art. 10 HI 6: Debts owed to affiliated undertakings).

¹⁴⁴ Cf., Art. 26 para. 1 Seventh Directive on the discussion of the so-called Unitary theory: Baetge, supra n. 135, pp. 9 et seq., and further references given there; on the effects of this theory: Von, Wysocki and Wohlgemuth, , Konzernrechnungslegung 4th ed. (Düsseldorf: Werner 1996) pp. 4 et seq.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁵ For the effect of the Seventh Directive in the EU Member States cf., the overview in Graefe, and Demming, , International Rechnungslegung (Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel 1994)Google Scholar; Gray, and Coenenberg, and Gordon, , International Group Accounting, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge 1993)Google Scholar; Van, Hulle and Van de, Tas, in: Ordelheide/KPMG, Transnational Accounting (London: Macmillan 2000) pp. 1047 et seq.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁶ Accounting policies IAS 1.5/ 1.7(b) are reproduced in, inter alia: Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer, , Rechnungslegung nach International Accounting Standards (Düsseldorf: IDW 1995)Google Scholar. Cf, IASC homepage: www.iasc.org.uk

¹⁴⁷ The division report was newly introduced on 30 April 1998 (BGB11/1998, S. 786) under § 297 HGB para. 1 sentence 2. Cf., Böcking, and Orth, , “Kann das ‘Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich (KonTraG)’ einen Beitrag zur Vereinigung der Erwartungslücke leisten? – Eine Würdigung auf Basis von Rechnungslegung und Kapitalmarkt”, WPg (Wirtschaftsprüfung) (1998) 351, at p. 362.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁸ On the case of Metallgesellschaft and its American subsidiary MG Corporation, cf., Süddeutsche Zeitung (18/19 December 1993) p. 33; Die Zeit(14 January 1994) p. 24; and Die Zeit (30 September 1994) p. 35.

¹⁴⁹ Art. 36 of the Seventh Directive refers throughout to the “undertakings uncluded in the consolidation as a whole”. Consequently, to meet the requirements of this proposal, it would have to be amended to the effect that the financial position of each individual company in the group would have to be reported.

¹⁵⁰ Cf., supra n. 142.

¹⁵¹ Cf., the contributions in Lutter, , Scheffler, and Schneider, , Handbuch der Konzern-finanzierung (Köln: O. Schmidt 1998).Google Scholar

¹⁵² Stadler/Vetter in: ZGR (2001) (forthcoming).

¹⁵³ On the subsidiary's right to information from the parent in German law: Witte, , Der Prüfungsbericht als Informationsträger im Konzern (Koöln: Heymann 1996) p. 199Google Scholar; on the flow of information within groups under Italian law: Abbadessa, “La circolazione delle informazioni all'interno del gruppo”, in: Balzarini et al., supra n. 1, 567.

¹⁵⁴ Cf., infra section 4.2.

¹⁵⁵ Van Hulle, WPg (1998), supra n. 89, at pp. 149 et seq.

¹⁵⁶ On regional partially consolidated accounts in Switzerland: OR 663 f II (OR = Swiss Federal Law of 30.3.1911 concerning the amendment of the Swiss Civil Code, fifth part: Law of Obligations, Obligationenrecht).

¹⁵⁷ Cf., Schneider, , “Die Fortentwicklung des Handelsregisters zum Konzernregister”, WM (1986) 181.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁸ On the primacy of the group's interests in these group forms cf., Hommelhoff, supra n. 22, pp. 148 et seq., 154; Hüffer, supra n. 26, § 308 AktG, Marginal Note 16 § 323, AktG, Marginal Note 3.

¹⁵⁹ Cf., Antunes, supra n. 11, p. 382; Lutter and Overrath, supra n. 11, p. 231.

¹⁶⁰ Cf., Brus, supra n. 32, B.1. VII.b (1).

¹⁶¹ Contin, in: D (1968), chron., pp. 45, 49 et seq.; De Bermond, de Vaulx, “L'usage de la notion de controle par le conseil d'administration ou le directoire dans les sociétés anonymes”, JCP (1970) ed.gen.Google Scholar, I-Doctrine, 2366; Contin and Hovasse, in: D (1971) chron., p. 197 et seq.; Trochu, Jeantin and Lange, in: D (1975) chron., 8/17; Lutter, , “Zur Privilegierung einheitlicher Leitung im französischen (Konzern-) Recht”, Festschrift KellermannGoogle Scholar, supra n. 1, at p. 259; Falcke, supra n. 1, p. 35 et seq.

¹⁶² Leauté, , “La reconnaissance de la notion de groupe en droit pénal des affaires”, JCP (1973), ed.gen.Google Scholar, I, 2551; Sousi, in: JCP (1975) ed. CI, II, 11817; Trochu, Jeantin and Lange, in: D (1975) chron., p. 8 et seq.

¹⁶³ Cf., Antunes, supra n. 11, p. 380.

¹⁶⁴ Cass. crim. 4.2.1985, D (1985) jurisp. 478 with comment by Ohl; Cass. crim. 10.10.1986, 23 BRDA (1986) 11; CA Paris 29.5.1986, Gaz. Pal. (1986) jurisp. 479; Cass. crim. 13.2.1989, Rev. soc. (1989) 692 with comment by Buloc; Cass. crim. 23.4.1991, Bull. crim. Nt., 193; Cass. crim. 24.6.1991,11 RJDA (Revue de jurisprudence de droit affaires) (1991) No. 926; Cass. crim. 9.12.1991, 5 RJDA (1992) No. 463; Cass. crim. 18.1.1993, 6 RJDA (1993) No. 515; Cass. crim. 4.9.1996,1 RJDA (1997) No. 58; supra n. 1, p. 92.

¹⁶⁵ Cass. com. 12.11.1973, Bull. civ. IV, No. 322 (on an internal group loan); Cass. soc. 3.4.1990, Rev. soc. (1990) 625 with comment by Guyon (on the liability of the parent for the debts of the subsidiary); Cour de Rouen 17.3.1970, Dalloz (1970) J, 177; Bouloc, Comment on Cass. crim. 4.2.1985, Rev. soc. (1985) 648; Guyon, Comment on Cass. com., JCP (1973) éd. gen., n, 17337; id., ZGR (1991) 218,225; Hannoun, , Le droit et les groupes de sociétés (1991) 92; Lamy, supra n. 1, Text Number 1938; Lutter, in: Festschrift Kellermann, supra n. 161, at p. 264.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁶ For German readers: this decision is evaluated approvingly in detail by Lutter, in: Festschrift Kellermann, supra n. 161, 257.

¹⁶⁷ Cass. crim. 4.2.1985, D (1985) jurisp. 478; cf., also Pariente, supra n. 1, p. 104 et seq.; Buloc, , “Droit pénal et groupes d'entreprises”, Rev. soc. (1988) p. 181 et seq.; Hannoun, supra n. 165, p. 88; Lutter, in: Festschrift Kellermann, supra n. 161, at pp. 262 et seq.; Falcke, supra n. 1, pp. 41 et seq.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁸ Cass. crim. 18.1.1993, Dr. soc. (1993) No. 101; Ohl, Comment on Cass. crim. 4.2.1985, in: D (1985) jurisp. 480; Bouloc, Rev. soc. (1988), supra n. 167, at p. 188.

¹⁶⁹ Ohl, Comment on Cass. crim. 4.2.1985, in: D (1985) jurisp. 480.

¹⁷⁰ Cass. crim. 4.2.1985, D (1985) jurisp. 480.

¹⁷¹ Hecquard, in: Gaz, Pal. (1986) jurisp. 483.

¹⁷² Cass. crim. 23.4.1991, Rev. soc. (1991) 785 with comment by Buloc; Trib. corr. Lyon, 20.06.1985, Gaz. Pal. (1986) jurisp. 782 with comment by Marchi; Trib. corr. Paris 16.5.1974, D (1975) jurisp. 37.

¹⁷³ Bouloc, Rev. soc. (1988), supra n. 167, at p. 188.

¹⁷⁴ Cass. crim. 4.2.1985, Rev. soc. (1985) 648; Cass. crim. 23.4.1991, Rev. soc. (1991) 785 with comment by Bouloc; Cass. crim. 9.12.1991, Rev. soc. (1992) 358 with comment by Bouloc.

¹⁷⁵ Cass. crim. 9.12.1991, Rev. soc. (1992) 358 with comment by Bouloc.

¹⁷⁶ Jeandidier, Comment on Cass. crim. 04.12.1985, JCP (1986) éd. gen., II, 20585; Bouloc, Rev. soc. (1988), supra n. 167, pp. 181, 189.

¹⁷⁷ Falcke, supra n. 1, p. 47.

¹⁷⁸ Cass. crim. 23.4.1991, Rev. soc. (1991) 785 with comment by Bouloc.

¹⁷⁹ Hecquard, in: Gaz. Pal. (1986) jurisp. 480.

¹⁸⁰ Lutter, in: Festschrift Kellermann, supra n. 161, at p. 264.

¹⁸¹ Hannoun, supra n. 165, p. 92 et seq.; Pariente, supra n. 1, p. 107; Lamy, supra n. 1, Text number 1938.

¹⁸² Cass. crim. 4.12.1985, Rev. soc. (1985) 648, Gaz.Pal. (1986) jurisp. 480; Cass. crim. 13.12.1989, JCP, éd. CI, II, 15784 with comment by Viandier and Caussain; Cass. crim. 24.6.1991, 11 RJDA (Revue de jurisprudence de droit affaires) (1991) No. 926; Cass. crim. 9.12.1991, Rev. soc. (1992) 358 with comment by Bouloc; Cass. crim. 4.9.1996, 1 RJDA (1997) No. 58.

¹⁸³ On the benefits which may be considered in this balance of burdens and benefits cf., Trib. corr. de Lyon 20.6.1985, Gaz. Pal. (1986) jurisp. 782 with comment by Marchi.

¹⁸⁴ Cass. crim. 25.11.1975, Bull, crim., No. 257, p. 680; Cass. crim. 19.10.1978, Bull, crim., No. 282, p. 724.

¹⁸⁵ CA Paris 22.5.1965, JCP (1965) éd. gen., II, 14274; on the declaration of nullity: T. com. 20.6.1981, Gaz. Pal. (1981) jurisp. 687.

¹⁸⁶ For Belgium cf., the decisions Presid. Trib. Commerce Brussels, 27.4.1978, BRH (1978), 354; RPS (1978) No. 5987, 236; Brussels, 16.06.1981, JCB (1981) 624, RPS (1981) No. 6139, 145; 9.10.1984, RPS (1986) No. 6371, 50, with critical comment by Maréchal; Trib. Corr. Brussels, 27.3.1987, RPS (1987) No. 6443, 176; Cour d'appel (Hof van beroep) Brussels, 26.6.1987, RPS (1988) No. 6468,51 (with recission); Trib. Corr. Brussels, 27.3.1987, RPS (1987) No. 6443, 176.

¹⁸⁷ Lutter and Hommelhoff, supra n. 24, App. § 13 GmbHG, Marginal Note 13; Zöllner, supra n. 24, App. Konzernrecht, Marginal Note 33.

¹⁸⁸ Cf., Hommelhoff, supra n. 22, p. 246 et seq.

¹⁸⁹ This is the criterion of the Federal Supreme Court on the qualified de facto group since the revision in BGHZ 122, 123 – TBB; cf., Goette, , “Haftungsvoraussetzungen im qualifiziert faktischen Konzern”, DStR (1993) 568Google Scholar; Krieger, , “Kann die Praxis mit TBB leben?”, ZGR (1994) 375Google Scholar; Schmidt, K., “Konzemhaftung nack dem TBB-Urteil – Versuch einer Orientierung”, ZIP (1993) 549Google Scholar; further in Lutter and Hommelhoff, supra n. 24, App. § 13 GmbHG before Marginal Note 16.

¹⁹⁰ On the regulatory system for the de facto marketable share company group cf., Emmerich and Sonnenschein, supra n. 1, p. 330 et seq.

¹⁹¹ Cf., in detail Hüffer, supra n. 26, § 311 AktG, Marginal Note 29 et seq.; Krieger, , in: Münchener Handbuch des Gesellschaftsrechts, Bd. IV, Aktiengesellschaft (München: Beck 1988) pp. 773 et seq.Google Scholar

¹⁹² Hüffer, supra n. 26, § 311 AktG, Marginal Note 39; Krieger, supra n. 191, p. 775 et seq.

¹⁹³ Cf., Hommelhoff, , “Praktische Erfahrungen mit dem Abhüngigkeitsbericht 156 ZHR (1992) 295Google Scholar, on the one side; Hoffmann-Becking, , in: Ständige Deputation des Deutschen Juristentages, Verhandlungen des 59. Deutschen Juristentages (1992)Google Scholar Sitzungsbericht R 18 et seq., on the other side; further in Emmerich and Sonnenschein, supra n. 1, p. 331, n. 5.

¹⁹⁴ For a report on this in practice cf., Hommelhoff, 156 ZHR (1992), supra n. 193, at p. 313.

¹⁹⁵ BGHZ 124, 111 – “Vereinigte Versicherung” reviewed by Kropff, in: ZGR (1994) 628.

¹⁹⁶ Cf., supra 4.1.1.2.

¹⁹⁷ Cf., the draft directive of the Forum Europaeum infra section 5.

¹⁹⁸ Cf., supra 4.1.1.

¹⁹⁹ BGHZ 122, 123, 130; cf., Hommelhoff, , “Die qualifizierte faktische Unternehmens-verbindung: ihre Tatbestandsmerkmale nach dem TBB-Urteil und deren rechtsdogmatisches Fundament”, ZGR (1994) 395, 402.Google Scholar

²⁰⁰ On this approach cf., Lutter and Hommelhoff, supra n. 24, App. § 13 GmbHG, Marginal Note 24.

²⁰¹ For German law cf., BGHZ 135, 244 – ARAG and Garmenbeck; and Hopt, , “Die Haftung von Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat – zugleich ein Beitrag zur corporate governance-Debatte”, in: Festschrift Mestmäcker (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1996) 909, at p. 917Google Scholar; and Abeltshauser, Leitungshaftung im Kapitalgesellschaftsrecht: zu den Sorgfalts- und Loyalitätspflichten von Unternehmensleitern im deutschen und im US-amerikanischen Kapitalgesellschaftsrecht (Köln: Heymann 1998) pp. 49 et seq., 272 et seq.; both on the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.

²⁰² For German law cf., Emmerich and Sonnenschein, supra n. 1, p. 349; Hüffer, supra n. 26, § 311 AktG, Marginal Note 39.

²⁰³ §§ 142 -146 AktG 1965. Special examiners are appointed either by the general meeting by simple majority or on the application of a minority (10% of the nominal capital or shares having a nominal value of DM 2 million, and owned for at least three months) by the court. In the latter case, facts must be present which justify the suspicion that acts of dishonesty or gross breach of the law or the Articles of Association have taken place. The foundation procedures and the management procedures may be examined. On this cf., Hirte, in: ZIP (1988) p. 953; Schedlbauer, , Sonderprüfungen (Stuttgart: Poeschel 1984).Google Scholar

²⁰⁴ Loi du 24 juillet 1966, art. 226; previously also called expert de minorité. Special investigation is possible in the société anonyme and in the SARL, and can be demanded by a minority with 10% of the capital (since 1994 in quoted companies by shareholders together holding 5%) and includes the legality and appropriateness of the actions under investigation. Further Guyon, supra n. 12, no. 447(3); Cozian, and Viandier, , Droitdes Sociétés, 13th ed. (2000) no. 455 et seq.Google Scholar; Barthé1émy, et al., supra n. 1, no. 228 et seq.; Paulze d'lvoy, Expertises et prix de cessions de droit sociaux, Bulletin Joly, Socétés (1995) p. 313; Le, Cannu, “L'expertise de gestions et les filiales”, Bulletin Joly, Sociétés (1994) 147.Google Scholar

²⁰⁵ Art. 191 des Lois consolidées sur les sociétés commerciales (LCSC). Shareholders with 1% of the capital or BEF 50 million nominal value may demand the appointment of a special investigator, if grounds exist which present a serious threat to the interests of the company. Further, Lievens, “De gerechtelijke commissaris (art. 191 venn. W.): onbekend–en ten onrechte–onbemind”, Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Handelsrecht (1982) 191.Google Scholar

²⁰⁶ Sections 431 - 453 of the Companies Act 1985, investigation by inspectors. The Secretary of State can appoint an inspector on his own initiative or comply with a request of the company or an order of the court, inter alia, in cases of fraud or illegal activity vis-à-vis creditors, unfair damage or insufficient information to members. Application by a minority (200 shareholders or l/10th of the issued shares, or l/5th of the registered members) is possible, but rare, due to the possibility of official investigation. The investigation of companies’ documents under section 447 is often a preliminary to other action even without a special investigation. Further cf., Gower/ Davies, supra n. 1, ch. 25.

²⁰⁷ Arts. 344 - 359 Netherlands Code of Civil Procedure. Application by a minority with l/10th of the capital or with shares of 500,000 guilders nominal value, or less if the Articles of Assocition so provide. The object is an investigation of the management and business operation of the company in whole or in part. Under Art. 351 para. 2, the investigation can extend group-wide from parent to subsidiary or vice versa. Further, Slagter, Compendium van het Ondernemingsrecht, 7th ed. (Deventer: Kluwer 1996)Google Scholar § 122 with examples; also § 141 on application to groups; Boukema, , Geschillenregeling en het recht van enquête (Deventer: Kluwer 1988)Google Scholar; van Solinge, , “Uitbreiding van het enqueterecht”, De Naamloze Vennootschap (1992) 26.Google Scholar

²⁰⁸ Art. 697 a - 697 g OR. The objects are only “certain actions”. Application may be filed within 30 days after the refusal of the general administration, also by a minority of 10% of the capital or shares of SF 2 million nominal value. Further, Böckli, Schweizer Aktienrecht, 2nd ed. (Zurich: Schulthess 1996)Google Scholar Marginal Note 1849; Forstmoser, , Meyer-Hayoz, and Nobel, , Schweizerisches Aktienrecht (Bern: Stämpfli 1996) § 35Google Scholar; OR/Weber (Busier Kommentar) (1994) Art. 697(a) et seq.; Casutt, , “Das Institut der Sonderprüfung”, Der Schweizer Treuhänder (1991) 574Google Scholar; Weber, , “Sonderprüfung – Hürdenlauf ohne Ende für den Aktionär?”, in: Festschrift Bar (Bern: Stämpfli 1998) 401Google Scholar; Gabrielli, , Das Verhältnis des Rechts auf Auskunftserteilung zum Recht auf Einleitung einer Sonderprüfung (Zürich: Schulthess 1997).Google Scholar

²⁰⁹ Comparison by Hopt, , “Shareholder rights and remedies: A view from Germany and the Continent”, 2 Company Financial and Insolvency Law Review (1997) 261 at 280 et seq.Google Scholar

²¹⁰ § 315 AktG 1965. cf., Hüffer, supra n. 26, § 315 AktG; Krag, , “Konzepte für die Durchführung von Sonderprüfungen gem. § 315 AktG”, BB (1988) 1850Google Scholar; Noack, , “Die Konzernrechtliche Sonderprüfung nach § 315 AktG”, WPg (1994) 225Google Scholar. For Great Britain s. 433; the affairs of a company, i.e., its business, including its control over its subsidiaries, Gower/ Davies, supra n. 1, pp. 694 n. 19, 696 et seq. For Switzerland: Weber, supra n. 208, Art. 697 d, Marginal Note 8: Parent, Subsidiary. In the Netherlands the Chamber on Enterprise Matters (Ondernemingskamer van het Gerechtshof Amsterdam) of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal granted a group-wide order in the controversial case “Janssen Pers” (controlling company, parent, fellow subsidiary) brought by a trade union under Art. 2:347 Dutch Civil Code. For French decisions see Guyon, supra n. 12, no. 447(3); Cozian and Viandier, supra n. 204, nos. 489, 490; Barthélémy, et al., supra n. 1, no. 7300 et seq.; Couret, Les Petites Affiches 18 avril 1997, no. 47, p. 4 (6); Pariente, supra n. 1, no. 7300 et seq., 7314; Rapport Marini, supra n. 55, no. 84, provides that a minority of a parent holding at least 10% of the basic capital may demand a special investigation of a subsidiary; cf., Barbièri, supra n. 1, no. 12, who sees this as too narrow.

²¹¹ Arts. 97-99 of the Statute. Cf., Lutter, in: Lutter, , Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft (1976) pp. 55, 67 et seq.Google Scholar

²¹² Hüffer, supra n. 26, § 142 AktG, Marginal Note 1; Hefermehl, in: Geßler, Hefermehl, Eckardt and Kropff, Komm. z. AktG (1973 f.) § 142, Marginal Note 1; Cases in Adler, , Düring, and Schmaltz, , Rechnungslegung und Prüfung der Unternehmen, 5th ed. (Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel 2000)Google Scholar, §§ 142-146 AktG, Marginal Note 3. For Great Britain: Gower/ Davies, supra n. 1, p. 696 n. 30.

²¹³ Guyon, supra n. 12, no. 447(3): “l'expertise de gestion reste cependant le procédé de protection le plus souvent utilisé par les minoritaires”; Cozian and Viandier, supra n. 204, no. 488 and list of cases, no. 490.

²¹⁴ For differing views of its future significance in Switzerland see Böckli, supra n. 208, Marginal Note 1895; Forstmoser, Meyer-Hayoz and Nobel, supra n. 208, § 35, Marginal Note 118; Nobel, , “Corporate Governance – Möglichkeiten und Schranken gesellschaftlicher Gestaltung”, Der Schweizer Treuhänder (1995) 1057, at p. 1062Google Scholar; OR/Weber, supra n. 208, Art. 697 a, Marginal Note 13; Forstmoser, , “Informations- und Meinungsäußerungsrechte des Aktionärs”, in: Druey, and Forstmoser, (eds.), Rechtsfragen um die Generalversammlung (Zurich: Schulthess 1997), 85, at pp. 110, 114Google Scholar, refers to a dozen cases since 1992; listing also in Weber, in: Festschrift Bär, supra n. 208, at p. 409. Finally, BGE 123 III 261, 264, 266, according to which the right to demand a special investigation requires a legal interest and can be directed only at investigating internal company matters.

²¹⁵ On the right, based on the duty of trust, of minorites to information in a quoted group company Zöllner, , “Schutz der Aktionärsminderheit bei enfacher Konzernierung”, in: Festschrift Kropff (Düsseldorf: IDW 1997) 334.Google Scholar

²¹⁶ E.g., § 147 AktG 1965,10% of the basic capital; for the appointment of other special investigators under para. 3, 10% or shares of DM 2 million nominal value. The AG reform 1998 (KonTraG of 27.4.1998, BGBl. I/ 1998, p. 786) reduces this quorum to 5% or DM 1 million nominal value. A corresponding reduction in the quorum for the general right to a special investigation is not anticipated, although it is for the group special investigation under § 315 sentence 2 n.F. (new version) AktG.

²¹⁷ Gower/ Davies, supra n. 1, p. 701. For European regulations: Hopt, , “Europäisches Konzernrecht: Thesen und Vorschläge”, in: Festschrift Volhard, supra n. 38, 83.Google Scholar

²¹⁸ Art. 344 of the Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek) goes further.

²¹⁹ The concept of “equal ranking” is a general one in the EU and well established in legal harmonisation cf., e.g., Art. 3 of 13th Directive, which is itself, however, problematic. Whether the Member States wish to grant rights to information to creditors as well, is a matter entirely for them. A corresponding right of application and a right to information for Stock Exchange supervisors is also thinkable.

²²⁰ For shares without nominal value (Stückaktien) under § 8 AktG i.d.F. Stückaktiengesetz of 25.3.1998, BGBl. (1998) p. 590, the proportional nominal value applies.

²²¹ E.g., in France; list of cases by Bellinghausen, , “Der Mißbrauch von Minderheitsrechten in Kapitalgesellschaften nach französischem Recht”, RIW (1997) 100, 101Google Scholar. For Switzerland, supra n. 208, Marginal Note 1852. Cf., for Germany AG Düsseldorf, WM (1988) 1668 – Feldmühle; otherwise see Hirte, , “Di Nichtbestellung von Sonderprüfen im Feldmühle-Verfahren”, ZIP (1988) 953.Google Scholar

²²² Art. 697 b para. 2 OR provides that simple breach of the law, or of the Articles of Association by the founders or company organs is sufficient for the commencement of an application if the general meeting has already rejected such a request, but demands credible evidence that the company or the shareholders have thereby been prejudiced; for the demands of “credibility”: BGE 129 II 393; cf., Vogel, in: SZW (1996) p. 79; and the decision of the Obergericht, Zürich of 16.7.1996 (BK Vision AG v. Schweizerische Bankgesellschaft), cf., Druey, , “Sonderprüfung/ Contrôle spécial”, SZW (1997) 34Google Scholar. Under Art. 350 para. 1 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure there must be reasonable grounds for doubt about the management of the company. In France the legality and the appropriateness can be examined, cf., supra n. 204. Also Art. 97 of the draft Statute for a European Company (1975 draft): reasonable suspicion of a serious breach of duty by the board of directors or supervisory board or that these organs or one of them is no longer capable of carrying out its legal responsibilities, and as a result, the company could be severely damaged.

²²³ As in France since 1994, Guyon, supra n. 12, no. 447(3); Cozian and Viandier, supra n. 204, nos. 487, 766.

²²⁴ Art. 97 of the draft Statute for a European Company (1975 draft). For a group of employees Art. 347 Dutch Civil Code; under Art. 348 the insurance and banking supervisory authorities are to be informed. For France, the Ministry, the comité d'entreprise and the COB, inter alia, have the right to apply.

²²⁵ For the time-limit for the application, e.g., Art. 697 b para. 1 OR; contrast Art. 697 a para. 2 OR: application for the appointment of special investigator within 30 days after the agreement of the general meeting. On the right to the appointment of a special investigator: Druey, SZW (1997), supra n. 222, at pp. 39 et seq.

²²⁶ Procedure under Art. 25 ff. Of the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments of 27.9.1968. Problems arise in relation to States not party to the EU treaties, cf., Kropholler, , Europäisches Zivilprozeßrecht, 6th ed. (Heidelberg: Recht und Wirtschaft 1998)Google Scholar Art. 25, Marginal Notes 19 et seq.

²²⁷ Cf., infra section 9.

²²⁸ Druey, SZW (1997), supra n. 222, at p. 39.

²²⁹ Cf., supra section 4.

²³⁰ Cf., § 294 para. 3 sentence 2 HGB, according to which, for the purpose of preparing the consolidated group accounts and report, the parent is entitled to demand from each subsidiary any necessary explanation and evidence.

²³¹ E.g., on the right of the special investigator to direct access to other group companies, particularly in relation to confidentiality see infra 5.3.4. The question of what is “necessary” in the meaning of the draft directive is a question of European law, which will ultimately have to be decided by the European Court of Justice.

²³² Cf., supra 5.3.1.

²³³ Similarly to, e.g., the Netherlands and Great Britain: Art. 355 et seq. Dutch Civil Code; Gower/ Davies, supra n. 1, pp. 702 et seq.

²³⁴ Art. 6 Insider-dealing Directive of 13.11.1989, OJ(EC) [1989] L 334/30; cf., Hopt, , “Europäisches und deutsches Insiderrecht”, ZGR (1991) 17Google Scholar. More generally, Everting, and Roth, , Mindestharmonisierung im Europäischen Binnenmarkt (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1997)Google Scholar; Drinkuth, , Die Kapitalrichtlinie – Mindest- oder Höchstnorm? (Köln: O. Schmidt 1998).Google Scholar

²³⁵ Cf, supra 5.3.1 -5.3.3.

²³⁶ Cf. this paragraph (5.3.4) hereunder.

²³⁷ Art. 697 a - 697 g OR discuss the right to initiate a special investigation in various cases according to the following order: 1. with the consent of the general meeting; 2. in the absence of agreement of the general meeting; 3. establishment; 4. effecting the investigation; 5. report; 6. procedure and publication; 7. costs.

²³⁸ Art. 24 et seq. Directive of 10.4.1984, Lutter, supra n. 7, p. 232 et seq.

²³⁹ Cf., Art. 351 Dutch Civil Code.

²⁴⁰ Regarding the controversy on the extent of this right: e.g., Gower/ Davies, supra n. 1, p. 699 et seq.

²⁴¹ § 145 para. 4 sentence 2 AktG; cf., Adler, Düring and Schmaltz, supra n. 12, §§ 142-146 AktG, Marginal Note 44 et seq.

²⁴² Cf., sections 432 (2A) und 437 of the Companies Act, further Gower/ Davies, supra n. 1, pp. 696, 698. Art. 697 e OR with an official assessment procedure, goes too far; Swiss literature uses the phrase “Full investigation – limited report”, OR/Weber, supra n. 208, Art. 697 e, Marginal Note 4 and further references given there.

²⁴³ Expressly Art. 350 para. 2 Dutch Civil Code. More generally, Hopt, , Schadensersatz aus unberechtigter Verfahrenseinleitung (München: Beck 1968).Google Scholar

²⁴⁴ In favour, e.g., Reul, , Die Pflicht zur Gleichbehandlung der Aktionäre bei privaten Kontrolltransaktionen (Tübingen: Mohr 1991)Google Scholar. Against, e.g., Skog, , Does Sweden Need a Mandatory Bid Rule? A Critical Analysis (Stockholm: Juristförlaget 1995)Google Scholar. From Belgium Wymeersch, in: Hopt, and Wymeersch, , European Takeovers: Law and Practice (London: Butterworths 1992) 351Google Scholar. For the best introduction cf., Romano, in: Hopt and Wymeersch, ibid., 3, with comprehensive references and overviews at pp. 46–48; from Germany, e.g., Krause, , Das obligatorische Übemahmeangebot, Eine juristische und ökonomische Analyse (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1996).Google Scholar

²⁴⁵ The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (ed.); The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers and The Rules Governing Substantial Acquisitions of Shares (1996)Google Scholar; only the former is reproduced (with rules but without appendices and notes) in: Schuster, and Zschocke, , Takeover Law: Text of the German takeover code and of the takeover laws of the European Union, of Switzerland and of the United Kingdom, with annotations (Frankfurt a.M: Knapp 1996) 292Google Scholar. Also Gower/ Davies, supra n. 1, ch. 29.

²⁴⁶ Amended draft of 11.11.1997 for a 13th Directive on Takeover bids, OJ(EC) [1997] C 378/10; also in ZIP (1997) 2172, with introduction by Neye. Further, Hopt, “Ökonomische Theorie und rechtsvergleichende Erfahrungen mit der freiwilligen Selbstkontrolle im Finanzbereich”Google Scholar, supra n. 20; id., in: Festschrift Zöllner (1998), supra n. 61; Habersack, and Mayer, , “Der neue Vorschlag 1997 einer Takeover-Richtlinie – Überlegungen zur Umsetzung in das nationale Recht”, ZIP (1997) 2141Google Scholar; Kallmeyer, , “Pflichtangebote nach dem Übernahmekodex und dem neuen Vorschlag 1997 einer Takeover-Richtlinie”, ZIP (1997) 2147.Google Scholar

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²⁴⁸ Belgian Royal Decree Art. 41 of 8.11.1989; Bruyneel, , “Les offres publiques d'acquisition; Réformede 1989”, Journal des tribunaux (1990) pp. 141–160Google Scholar; Wymeersch, , “Cession de contrôle et offres publiques obligatoires”, Rev. prat. soc. (1991) pp. 151–242Google Scholar; Geens, , “Fusie of openbaar bod: over de keuze van het overnameinstrument en de bescherming van de betrokken belangen”, Revue de la banque (1990) 445.Google Scholar

²⁴⁹ Now Art. 106 et seq. Testo unico delle disposizioni in materia di mercati finanziari of 24.2.1998.

²⁵⁰ Ley del mercado de valores of 28.7.1988 Art. 60, and Royal Decree of 26.7.1991. Cf., Zurita y Sáenz, de Navarrete, in: Euroconsorcio Jurídico, y Financiero (ed.), La lucha por el control de las grandes Sociedades. Las Ofertas Públicas de Adquisición (1992) 123.Google Scholar

²⁵¹ Codigo das sociedades comerciais of 2.9.1986, Art. 313. Jùdice, Antas, Ferreira and Pereira, OPA, Ofertas Pùblicas de Acquisicao (1991).

²⁵² Grace, and Earley, , “The Irish Takeover Panel”, JIBL (Journal of International Banking Law) (1998) 146.Google Scholar

²⁵³ Bundesgesetz über die Börsen und den Effektenhandel (BEHG, Börsengesetz) of 24.3.1995, Art. 32, mit Börsenverordnungen des Bundesrates (V-BR) und der Eidgenössischen Bankenkommission (V-EBK), Verordnung and Reglement of the Übemahmekommission über öffentliche Kaufangebote (V-UEK, R-UEK); Textausgabe der EBK und EUK, Stand 1.10.1997. Specifically on Mandatory Offer see Von der Crone, “Angebotspflicht”, SZW, special issue (1997) 44; on the new Ausführungsverordnungen see Meier-Schatz, , “Gedanken zu den neuen Ausführungsverordnungen”, AJP (Allgemeine Juristische Praxis) (1998) 48Google Scholar, at pp. 53 et seq. More generally, Nobel, , Schweizerisches Finanzmarktrecht (Bern: Stampfli 1997) 526.Google Scholar

²⁵⁴ Doralt, , Nowotny, and Schauer, , Takeover-Recht (Wien: Service-Fachverl. 1997)Google Scholar and the Austrian ministerial draft of 1997, p. 207, based on a draft by Doralt. Further, Doralt, “Überlegungen yur Gestaltung der Vorschriften über das Recht des öffentlichen Übernahmeangebotes in Österreich”, in: Festschrift Kropff (Dusseldorf: EDW 1997) 53Google Scholar. Hausmaninger, and Herbst, , “Überlegungen zum Entwurf eines Übernahmegesetzes”, Bank Archiv (1997) 911Google Scholar. The Austrian National Council on 7 July 1998 passed a federal law on Takeover bids; it entered into force, for the most part, on 1 January 1999.

²⁵⁵ On Art. 16: Diekmann, , “Hinweise zur Anwendung Übernahmekodexes der Börsensachverständigenkommission”, WM (1997) 897, 902.Google Scholar

²⁵⁶ 25% in the draft proposed by the SPD on Takeovers, BT-Drucks. 13/8164 of 2.7.1997; as low as 20% in Australian Corporation Law.

²⁵⁷ The old version of 14.7.1995 is reproduced in AG (1995) 572; cf., Assmann, , “Verhaltensregeln für freiwillige öffentliche Übernahmeangebote”, AG (1995) 563.Google Scholar

²⁵⁸ This was then made less onerous by the definition of “control”, i.e., voting majority or alternatively, among other possibilites, a hypothetical ¾ majority of the voting capital present at the last three ordinary general meetings.

²⁵⁹ Most extensively on this, the British example, supra n. 245; for France: Viandier, , OPA, OPE, Garantie de cours, retrait, OPV(droit des offres publiques), é3rd ed. (Pahs: Lefebvre 1999).Google Scholar

²⁶⁰ Cf., Hommelhoff, , Hopt, and Lutter, , Konzernrecht und Kapitalmarktrecht (München: Beck 2000).Google Scholar

²⁶¹ On the right to compensation in cash in this case Zöllner, , “Qualifizierte Konzernierung im Aktienrecht”, in: Geddähtnisschrift Knobbe-Keuk (Köln: O. Schmidt 1997) 369Google Scholar, at pp. 379 et seq.

²⁶² Cf., comparison of both in Schuberth, , Konzemrelevante Regelungen im britischen Recht (München: Beck 1997).Google Scholar

²⁶³ Hopt, , “Ökonomische Theorie und rechtsvergleichende Erfahrungen mit der freiwilligen Selbstkontrolle im Finanzbereich”Google Scholar, supra n. 20, pp. 387 et seq. Also the overwhelming opinion at the ZHR Symposium on Company and Capital Market Law, “Diskussionsbericht”, 161 ZHR (1997) 455Google Scholar; Habersack, and Mayer, , ZIP (1997)Google Scholar, supra n. 246, at pp. 2143 et seq.; Benner-Heinacher, , “Mindeststandards für Übernahmeregeln in Deutschland”, DB (1997) 2521Google Scholar. The “official” opinion in Germany is the opposite.

²⁶⁴ Cf., supra section 5.3.1.

²⁶⁵ Kirchner, in: Schreyogg and Sydow, supra n. 3, at pp. 299 et seq.

²⁶⁶ Cf., supra n. 193.

²⁶⁷ Thus Art. 1 draft 13th Directive.

²⁶⁸ The purpose of the mandatory offer, i.e., protection of investors, implies that the target company could be a capital company of any kind. The structural freedom of the GmbH is, however, inconsistent with this. The mandatory offer will not, in any event, apply to the German GmbH which is not traded on the Stock Exchange and, because of § 15 Para. 3,4 GmbHG, is also not a participant in the capital markets.

²⁶⁹ On this characteristic and its practical difficulties, cf, the comparison in Hopt, , Die Verantwortlichkeit der Banken bei Emissionen (1991) pp. 62 et seqGoogle Scholar. For France, : Granier, “La notion d'appel public à l'épargne”, Rev.soc. (1992) 687Google Scholar. For Van Gerven, Belgium, “De omschrijving van vennootschappen die een publiek beroep op het spaarwezen doen of hebben gedaan”, Tijdschrift vennootschap en rechtspersoon (1993) 397Google Scholar; Tossens, , “La société ayant fait ou faisant publiquement appel à l'épargne: le concept et ses enjeux à l'aube d'une nouvelle réforme des lois coordonnées sur les sociétés commerciales”, Revue pratique des sociétés (1993/1994) 341.Google Scholar

²⁷⁰ For Great Britain: Gower/ Davies, supra n. 1, p. 778.

²⁷¹ Art. 16 Übernahmekodex in Verbindung mit §§ 291 et seq., 319 et seq., AktG, §§ 190 et seq., 2 et seq. UmwG.

²⁷² Gower/ Davies, supra n. 1, pp. 777 et seq.; Viandier, supra n. 247. Cf., also for Great Britain, Rule 5 of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers: Timing restrictions on acquisitions.

²⁷³ The first two cases are dealt with in Art. 3 (2) draft 13th Directive. The Forum Europaeum leaves this matter to the Member States, without expressing an opinion as to whether an explicit provision such as Art. 3 (2) is necessary.

²⁷⁴ Compare the rules in Belgium, Italy and Denmark, Skog, supra n. 244, pp. 27 et seq.

²⁷⁵ The question of a price which treats all shareholders equally is especially unclear. On this, cf., Hopt, , in: Festschrift Zöllner (1998)Google Scholar, supra n. 61, section I.2. b); already de lege lata Grundmann, , Der Treuhandvertrag (München: Beck 1997) pp. 465 et seqGoogle Scholar. A distinction should be made between two basic questions: the treatment of the “control premium”, and, if this remains exclusively with the seller, the procedural and material considerations for determining a price.

²⁷⁶ On this, cf., Krause, , “Der revidierte Vorschlag einer Takeover-Richtlinie (1996)”, AG (1996) 209, at p. 213Google Scholar. On the very restrictive practice in Great Britain cf., Gower/ Davies, supra n. 1, pp. 794 et seq.

²⁷⁷ Cf., supra 5.3.4.

²⁷⁸ Cf., Hopt, , “Aktionärskreis und Vorstandsneutralität”, ZGR (1993) 534Google Scholar; id., ZHR (1997) 368, supra n. 20, at pp. 378, 411.

²⁷⁹ Further, Maeijer and Geens, , Defensive Measures Against Hostile Takeovers in the Common Market (1990)Google Scholar; Hopt, , “Übernahmeangebote im europaischen Recht”, in: Festschrift Rittner (München: Beck 1991) 187Google Scholar. For Germany: Hopt, , “Präventivmaßnahmen zur Abwehr von Übernahme- und Beteiligungsversuchen”, WM-Festgabe für Heinsius, WM-Sonderheft (1991) p. 22Google Scholar; Michalski, , “Abwehrmechanismen gegen unfreundliche Übernahmeangebote (‘unfriendly takeovers’) nach deutschem Aktienrecht”, AG (1997) 152Google Scholar. For the Netherlands: Steins, Bisschop, De beperkte houdbaarheid van de beschermingsmaatregelen bij beursvennootschappen (Deventer: Kluwer 1991)Google Scholar; Voogd, , Statutaire beschermingsmiddelen bij beursvennootschappen (Deventer: Kluwer 1989)Google Scholar; Id., “Statutaire beschermingsmiddelen bij beursvennootschappen”, De Naamloze Vennootschap (1990) 202Google Scholar. For Belgium: Dal, and Keutgen, , “Le droit des sociétés et la protection contre les o.p.a. inamicales”, Rev.prat.soc. (1988/1989) 223Google Scholar; Byttebier, , “Juridische bescherming tegen een (buitenlandse) overname”, Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht (1993) 759.Google Scholar

²⁸⁰ Summary in Merkt, , US-amerikanisches Gesellschaftsrecht (Heidelberg: Recht und Wirtschaft 1991)Google Scholar Marginal Notes 1028 et seq.

²⁸¹ Interestingly, e.g., Art. 190ter des Lois consolidées sur les sociétés commerciales (LCSC), introduced by amendment of 13.4.1995, Moniteur beige (17 June 1995) 17492, T pp. 17526 et seq.; also in Wymeersch, , Belgian Company Law. A Trilingual Edition (Brussels: Bruylant 1996)Google Scholar; also Herring, , “Die neuen belgischen Vorschriften zum Ausschluß und Austritt von Gesellschaftem”, RIW (1996) 644Google Scholar. According to this, shareholders holding together at least 30% in an AG or GmbH which does not invite the public to invest, may require “pour de justes motifs” that the other shareholders transfer all their shares to them at a price fixed by court. The application for dissolution under Art. 736 OR must be on the basis of an important reason, although the result is an opt-out right in the sense discussed here, cf., infra 7.1.3.

²⁸² Whether withdrawal of a Stock Exchange quotation qualifies as a “fundamental change” is disputed, Schwark, and Geiser, , “Delisting”, ZHR (1997) 739, at pp. 764 et seq.Google Scholar

²⁸³ The prevailing doctrine applies § 305 AktG and usually also § 306 AktG by analogy to the formation of a qualified de facto (not a simple) group: Zöllner, Zöllner, “Qualifizierte Konzernierung im Aktienrecht”, in: Gedächtnisschrift Knobbe-Keuk, supra n. 261, at pp. 379 et seq.; Liebscher, , Konzernbildungskontrolle (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1995) pp. 200 et seq.Google Scholar, in so far as they admit them at all, Emmerich and Sonnenschein, supra n. 1, p. 362 et seq., and further references given there. Others suggest a right of withdrawal expressed generally as available “in case of fundamental decisions”, Wiedemann, , Groβkomm.z. AktG., 4th ed. (1995)Google Scholar § 179 Marginal Note 180.

²⁸⁴ In Germany, e.g., BayObLG AG (1995) 509; OLG Zweibrücken AG (1995) 421; OLG Düsseldorf WM (1995) 756. On distinguishing synergy from stand-alone valuation see Busse, von Colbe, “Berücksichtigung von Synergien versus Stand-alone-Prinzip bei der Unternehmens-berwertung”, ZGR (1994) 595.Google Scholar

²⁸⁵ Arts. 92 a, 201 a Dutch Civil Code since 1988. In the AG and GmbH the majority shareholder with at least 95% of the basic capital can demand and enforce the transfer of the minority shares in return for cash in an amount assessed by three independent experts. This right does require either that a group is involved or that the majoriy has been obtained by means of a public takeover bid. Special rules on jurisdiction and procedure apply (cf., above in the text). Further, De Kam, “Uitkoop en waardering van aandelen”, De naamloze vennootschap (1994) 66Google Scholar; Slagter, , “Vennootschapsrecht – uitkoop – Overzicht van rechtspraak”, TVVS (Maandblad voor ondernemingsrecht en rechtspersonen, since 1999 entitled Ondernemingsrechi) (1994) 215.Google Scholar

²⁸⁶ Art. 190quinquies LCSC, supra n.281 with Royal Decree of 8.11.1989 amended by Royal Decree of 11.6.1997. In the AG (only if listed or shares by public subscription; not in the GmbH) the majority shareholder with at least 96% of the voting rights can exclude the minority. A cash (not share exchange) buy-out offer (public or otherwise, depending on the company) must be made in advance. Non-registered shares pass by operation of the law. The procedure is not regulated in any more detail, a cause of some lack of clarity. Further, Corbisier, in: Droit des sociétés: Les lois des 7 et 13 avril 1995 (Bruxelles: Bruylant 1995) 105Google Scholar, at pp. 238 et seq.; Malherbe, and Gollier, , “La reprise des titres des minoritaires”, Rev.prat.soc. (1995) 155Google Scholar; Herring, , in: RIW (1996) 644Google Scholar, supra n. 281.

²⁸⁷ Loi du 31 déc. 1993, art. 16-1; Règlement général du Conseil des marchés financiers Art. 5-5-1 et seq. According to which a shareholder or a group of shareholders on behalf of shareholders holding at least 95% of the voting rights can, with the approval of the Conseil make an offre de retrait, which is then followed by the removal of the listing and to a retrait obligatoire of the minority in return for compensation. Further Cozian and Viandier, supra n. 204, no. 1116; Viandier, , “Le retrait obligatoire”, RJDA (Revue de jurisprudence de droit affaires) (1994) 783Google Scholar; Leroy, , in: Bulletin Joly (1994) 567Google Scholar; Forschbach, Jurisclasseur (1994), éd. E, 483; Guyon, , Droit des Affaires I, no. 601Google Scholar; Coscas, and Forschbach, , Code de la bourse et des sociétés cotées (Paris: Litec 1995) pp. 567 et seq., 621 et seq.Google Scholar, 771. Marini, supra n. 55, no. 80, suggests that the buy-out right at 95% “pour justes motifs” should be extended to closed (– private, non-quoted –) companies.

²⁸⁸ § 2 para. 2 no. 3 oöUmwG, in force since 1.7.1996. On merger the assets of an AG or GmbH are transferred to the majority shareholder holding at least 90% of the basic or nominal capital. Minority shareholders who are thereby excluded are entitled to be reasonably compensated by the majority shareholder and may have this fixed by a court. The costs may be equitably, in whole or in part, ordered against the “new” company, if significant discrepancies in the valuation of the offer of compensation are found, and the applicant has not been the cause of unnecessary legal expense (§ 2 para. 3 öUmwG and § 225 I para. 1, 2 öAktG). A corresponding buy-out is also possible in case of a group division without protective measures, §§ 8 para. 3, 9 para. 1 öSpaltungsG, in force since 1.7.1996. Further, Reich-Rohrwig, EU-Gesellschaftsrechts-änderungsgesetz (Wien: Manz 1996) pp. 49 et seq., 59 et seq.Google Scholar; Grünwald, , Umwandlung – Verschmelzung – Spaltung (Wien: Überreuter 1996) p. 209.Google Scholar

²⁸⁹ Ss. 429,430 of the Companies Act 1985. An offerer who, by means of a takeover bid, has acquired at least 90% of the share capital can buy out the minority within a certain time period (buy-out right of offeror). Shares which were owned by the offerer prior to the bid are not included in the 90%, Gower/ Davies, supra n. 1, p. 808. Compensation for unidentified shareholders will be held by the company in trust. According to s. 430C the court may fix the compensation terms. Further Gower/ Davies, supra n. 1, p. 807 et seq.; Than, , “Zwangsweises Ausscheiden von Minderheitsaktionären nach Übernahmeangebot”, in: Festschrift Claussen (Köln: Heymann 1997) 405.Google Scholar

²⁹⁰ Art. 161 Testo unico, supra n. 249): The offeror who, after a takeover bid, holds at least 92% of the voting rights, can buy out the minority within a certain period (diritto di acquisto).

²⁹¹ Art. 33,54 BEHG 1995; Art. 55 BEHV. After a public offer, the majority shareholder with more than 98% of the voting rights can, within three months, apply for an order to invalidate the residual rights of less than 2% in return for compensation in the amount of the offer price. The shareholders affected can participate in the proceedings. The court decision operates erga omnes. Further Böckli, supra n. 208, Marginal Note 1661, who urges a general right of exclusion for serious reasons as a quid pro quo for Art. 736 OR (see infra 8.1.3), Marginal Note 1946; Nobel, , Schweizerisches Finanzmarktrecht (Bern: Stämpfli 1997)Google Scholar § 10, Marginal Note 244 et seq.; Köpfli, , “Der Ausschluss der Minderheitsaktionäre nach einem öffentlichen Übernahmeangebot”, SchweizJZ (1998) 53.Google Scholar

²⁹² Art. 33 et seq. of the draft, ZGR (1985) pp. 446 et seq.: by unilateral declaration of the majority shareholder holding at least 90% of the capital. Cf., also Than, in: Festschrift Claussen, supra n. 289, at pp. 416 et seq.

²⁹³ Typically Gower/ Davies, supra n. 1, p. 808 n. 20: “The main aim of s. 429 is to enable and encourage a 100 per cent takeover resulting in the target becoming the offerer's wholly owned subsidiary instead of one in which there is a small minority to the embarrassment of the parent and the attendant risks to the minority.”

²⁹⁴ Supra n. 285. Under Art. 325 of the Dutch Civil Code in case of a merger the minority shareholders with not more than 10% can be offered compensation or other consideration, e.g., debentures in the company, in place of shares.

²⁹⁵ Thus the Netherlands. In Belgium the right to exclude is generally available without the further conditions and limitations imposed in the Netherlands.

²⁹⁶ Ss. 430A, 430B of the Companies Act 1985. An offerer who, by means of a takeover bid, has acquired at least 90% of the share capital (including his previous holdings) must make an offer to buy out the minority on the same conditions (sell-out right of shareholders). According to s. 430C the court may fix the compensation terms. Gower/ Davies, supra n. 1, pp. 809 et seq.; Than, in: Festschrift Claussen, supra n. 289.

²⁹⁷ Loi du 2 avr. 1989, Règlement général du Conseil des marchés financiers Art. 5-5-1 et seq. Every shareholder may request the Conseil des marchés financiers, to oblige a majority shareholder having at least 95% of the voting rights to make an offre publique de retrait for all remaining shares. This applies also to certain fundamental changes. Cf., supra n. 247; further Viandier, supra n. 247, no. 1700 et seq.; Cozian and Viandier, supra n. 204, nn. 1115, 1836; Guyon, supra n. 12, no. 601.1. Marini, supra n. 55, no. 79, suggests that the right to withdraw should apply also to closed, private companies; further Barbièri, supra n. 1, p. 6 no. 13, also on the difficulty of assessing compensation; Couret, supra n. 210.

²⁹⁸ Art. 736 OR since 1992 provides, that the judge, in the case that a minority shareholder with at least 10% of the share capital applies for the dissolution of the company for important reasons, may order, instead of dissolution, a different solution which is appropriate in the circumstances and reasonable for the participants (”auf eine andere sachgemässe und den Beteiligten zumutbare Lösung zu erkennen”). According to the literature, this could include withdrawal in return for compensation. There is no general right of withdrawal otherwise: Forstmoser, et al, supra n. 208, § 44, Marginal Note 61 et seq.

²⁹⁹ Art. 108 Testo unico, supra n. 249: Offerta pubblica di acquisto residuale from 90%.

³⁰⁰ Art. 39 of the draft, ZGR (1985) pp. 446 et seq.: as (so reads the title of the section) “special protection of the outsider shareholders” vis-à-vis a majority shareholder having over 90% of the capital. Cf, also Than, in: Festschrift Claussen, supra n. 289, at pp. 416 et seq.

³⁰¹ Art. 190quater LCSC, supra n. 286; further Herring, RIW (1996) 644, supra n. 281. The right to withdraw applies to AGs and GmbHs which do not invite public subscription. A minimum holding of either the applicant or the respondent is not required. The procedure corresponds to Art. 190ter, ibid.

³⁰² Grunewald, , in: “Das Recht zum Austritt aus der Aktiengesellschaft”, in: Festschrift Claussen (Köln: Heymann 1997) 103Google Scholar, who is in favour of a right to withdraw in AGs for important reasons: pp. 111 et seq., with further references given there; Röhricht, , “Zum Austritt des Gesellschafters aus der GmbH”, in: Festschrift KellermannGoogle Scholar, supra n. 1, 361. The right to withdraw under §§ 29, 125, 207 UmwG should not be applied by analogy, controversial: Grunewald, , in: Lutter, Komm. zum UmwandlungsG (Köln: Schmidt 1996)Google Scholar § 29, Marginal Note 31.

³⁰³ There is no minority sell-out right corresponding to the buy-out right provided for in Arts. 92a, 201a Dutch Code of Civil Procedure.

³⁰⁴ So OR/Böckli, supra n. 208, Art. 736 Ziff. 4, Marginal Notes 1946 et seq., who considers a buy-back of at most 10% as permissible; likewise OR/Stäubli, supra n. 208, Art. 736, Marginal Note 27; Handschin, , “Auflösung der Aktiengesellschaft aus wichtigem Grand und andere sachgemässe Lösungen”, SZW (1993) 43, at pp. 44 et seq.Google Scholar, who considers up to 20% as possible; Kunz, , “Zur Auflösungsklage gemäss Art. 736 Ziff. 4 OR – Garant für ein indirektes Austrittsrecht?”, in: Festschrift BärGoogle Scholar, supra n. 208, 235; more cautiously Forstmoser, et al., supra n. 208, § 55, Marginal Note 106 et seq.

³⁰⁵ Cf., Hopt, in: Festschrift Volhard, supra n. 217.

³⁰⁶ Cf., Arts. 24 und 25 8th Directive (approval of auditors) – OJ(EC) [1984] L 126/20; inter alia, reproduced in: Lutter, supra n. 7, 232.

³⁰⁷ Cf, supra section 7.3.1.

³⁰⁸ Cf., Jaeger, , “Le società del gruppo tra unificazione e autonomia”Google Scholar, in: Balzarini et al., supra n. 1, 1425.

³⁰⁹ Cf., supra under section 4.

³¹⁰ Cf., supra n. 29 et seq.

³¹¹ Cf., Behrens, , “Die Umstrukturierung von Untemehmen durch Sitzverlegung oder Fusion über die Grenze im Lichte der Niederlassungsfreiheit im Europäischen Binnenmarkt (Art. 52 und 58 EWGV)”, ZGR (1994) 1Google Scholar; and Kronke, , “Deutsches Gesellschaftsrecht und grenzüberschreitende Strukturänderungen”, ZGR (1994) 26Google Scholar, with all references; also Kruse, , Sitzverlegung von Kapitalgesellschaften innerhalb der EG (Köln: Heymann 1997)Google Scholar; and Steiger, , Grenzüberschreitende Fusion und Sitzverlegung von Kapitalgesellschaften innerhalb der EU nach spanischem und portugiesischem Recht (Frankfurt a.M: Lang 1997).Google Scholar

³¹² Amended third draft of 16.5.1991, OJ(EC) [1991] C 176/1; cf., Lutter, supra n. 7, 715, 724; and Hopt and Wymeersch, supra n. 1, 828.

³¹³ Draft Tenth Directive of January 1985, OJ(EC) [1985] C 23/11; cf., Lutter, supra n. 7,261; and in: Hopt and Wymeersch, supra n. 1, 809.

³¹⁴ On this as yet unpublished draft cf., the report of Neye, GmbHR (1997) R 181; and the contributions to the 10th Bonner Europa-Symposions zur Sitzverlegung, ZGR (1999) 1. The text is reproduced in ZIP (1997) 1721.

³¹⁵ Koppensteiner, in: Kölner Komm. z. AktG, 2nd ed. (Köln: Heymann 1987)Google Scholar Vorb. § 291, Marginal Notes 94, 95, and § 291, Marginal Note 82 et seq., with all references; Hüffer, supra n. 26, § 291 AktG, Marginal Note 8; Geßler, in: Geßler, , Hefermehl, , Eckardt, and Kropff, , Komm. z. AktG (München: Vahlen 1976)Google Scholar § 291, Marginal Note 58.

³¹⁶ However, the French commission chaired by Marini, supra n. 55, suggested that France should adopt it; cf., the opinion of Barbièri, supra n. 1, no. 20 et seq.

³¹⁷ Barbièri, supra n. 1, no. 27, with further references ibid., n. 64.

³¹⁸ Cf., infra 8.3.4.2 and 8.3.4.3.

³¹⁹ Barbièri, supra n. 1, no. 27 with further references ibid., n. 64.

³²⁰ Criticism in German literature is often misunderstood. Such criticism does not attack the contract-based group as such but rather some technical aspect, namely, that the court proceedings to assess the compensation for minority shareholders under § 306 AktG und §§ 305 et seq. UmwG are unduly protracted.

³²¹ Doralt, in: Lutter, Konzernrecht im Ausland, supra n. 1, 192, at pp. 202 et seq.

³²² Lutter, and Timm, , “Konzernrechtlicher Präventivschutz im GmbH-Recht”, NJW (1982) 409, at pp. 411 et seq.Google Scholar

³²³ Merger requires a “majority sufficient to amend the Articles of Association” in both the parent and the subsidiary (Art. 7 Third Directive of 9.10.1978 (78/855/EEC) OJ(EC) [1978] L 295/36, inter alia, reproduced in: Lutter, supra n. 7, p. 133). These conditions are fulfilled in this case; cf., infra section 8.3.3.1.

³²⁴ Directive 68/151/EEC of 9 March 1968, OJ(EC) [1968] L 65/8., in: Lutter, supra n. 7, 101; and in: Hopt and Wymeersch, supra n. 1, 159.

³²⁵ Supra n. 323.

³²⁶ Supra n. 45.

³²⁷ Supra n. 323.

³²⁸ Directive of 17.12.1982 (82/891/EEC) OJ(EC) [1982] L 378/47 (The Division Directive), reproduced, inter alia, in: Lutter, supra n. 7, 196.

³²⁹ Directive 78/660/EEC of 25.7.1978, OJ(EC) [1978] L 222/11, in: Lutter, supra n. 7, 139; and in Hopt and Wymeersch, supra n. 1, 192.

³³⁰ E.g., Slagter, in: Lutter, Konzemrecht im Ausland, supra n. 1, 171, at pp. 180 et seq.

³³¹ Barbièri, supra n. 1, no. 20 et seq., doubts that a “group interest” can be said to exist and suggests that the “group interest” is identical with the interests of the parent. The parent of course has an interest in the well-being of the whole group. However, the “Rozenblum Concept” discussed above (4.1.1) makes it clear that each individual member of the group shares in this common interest.

³³² Cases of abuse of power in the contractual group context are not, so far, known in Germany, although they are known in the de facto group; cf., the facts in the famous “Autokran” decision of the German Federal Supreme Court, BGHZ 95, 330.

³³³ Supra n. 323.

³³⁴ Cf., Beyerle, , “Erfahrungen mit dem Spruchstellenverfahren nach § 306 AktG”, ZGR (1977) 650Google Scholar; id., “Notwendige Änderungen im Verfahren der Freiwilligen Gerichtsbarkeit nach §306 AktG”, BB (1978) 784.

³³⁵ Cf., Kalss, , Handkommentar zur Verschmelzung, Spaltung, Umwandlung (Wien: Manz 1997)Google Scholar, comments on § 225c and § 225m öAktG.

³³⁶ Cf., Lutter, , “Die Funktion der Gerichte im Binnenstreit von Kapitalgesellschaften – ein rechtsvergleichender Überblick”, ZGR (1998) 191Google Scholar, with references to English cases.

³³⁷ Cf., Hopt, “Ökonomische Theorie und rechtsvergleichende Erfahrungen mit der freiwilligen Selbstkontrolle im Finanzbereich”, supra n. 20, at pp. 386 et seq.

³³⁸ The Third EU Directive, supra n. 323, prescribes only the valuation in advance by an independent expert (Art. 10), without a later reassessment of the share exchange rate after completion of the merger, a measure which is of considerable importance in German law and practice (§§ 15, 305 et seq. UmwG).

³³⁹ Supra n. 323. Cf, supra section 8.3.4.2.

³⁴⁰ Cf., Embid Irujo, supra n. 83, p. 124 et seq.; Guyon, supra n. 83, p. 146 et seq.; Timmermans and Timmerman, supra n. 122, p. 237; Bramwell, , Ivory, and Brannan, , Taxation of Companies, 6th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell 1994)Google Scholar Chapter 13; also references at n. 5 supra.

³⁴¹ The Parent-Subsidiary Directive of 20.08.1990 (90/435/EEC, supra n. 86, assumes the profit of the group to be taxable as a unit at the location where the registered office of the parent is situated, and is then only concerned with the relief against double taxation and a special withholding tax.

³⁴² The new proposals of the EU Commission for the solution of the co-determination problem in the draft Fifth (Structure) Directive make this clear; cf., the third amended draft of 20.11.1991, OJ(EC) [1991] C 321/9, in: Lutter, supra n. 7,171; and Hopt and Wymeersch, supra n. 1,781 – cf., also the amended draft Directive on additions to the SE Statutes on the question of the opinion of the employees of 6.4.1991, OJ(EC) [1991] C 138/8, in: Lutter, supra n. 7, p. 675 et seq.; and note should be taken of the report and proposals of the Davignon-Arbeitsgruppe of May 1997 (cf., Helms, , Die Europdische Privatgesellschaft (1998) pp. 75 et seq.Google Scholar), which, once again, are considered unacceptable by Germany.

³⁴³ Directive 78/855/EEC, supra n. 323.

³⁴⁴ Directive 82/89I/EEC, supra n. 328.

³⁴⁵ Koppensteiner, supra n. 315, cf., § 291 AktG, Marginal Note 89.

³⁴⁶ Lutter, Report H to 48. Deutschen Juristen Tag (1970), in: 2 Verhandlungen des 48. Deutschen Juristen Tages (1970) 42.

³⁴⁷ Most German cases of winding-up are due to “ill-liquidity”; cf., Hachenburg, and Ulmer, , Komm.zGmbHG, 8th ed. (Berlin: de Gruyter 1997)Google Scholar § 63, Marginal Note 14, and further references given there. Skeptical concerning the possibility that companies would avail themsleves of the option to start the insolvency proceedings themselves when faced with only a threat of lack of liquidity (drohende Zahlungsunfähigkeit, § 18 para. 3 InsO) – Schmidt, K., “Insolvenzordnung und Gesellschaftsrecht”, ZGR (1998) 633, at pp. 650 et seq.Google Scholar: This could well develop into an application which, although actually due to over-indebtedness, yet in practice saves the directors from the danger of having to admit that they were in breach of duty.

³⁴⁸ For English law, cf., Prentice, supra n. 12, p. 107 (n. 46); id., “The Law of Corporate Groups in Great Britain”, in: Balzarini et al., supra n. 1, 275; for Germany cf. also Altmeppen, supra n. 24, § 13 GmbHG, Marginal Notes 24 et seq.

³⁴⁹ For a first summary cf., Schuberth, supra n. 1, pp. 191 et seq.; Hadden, , “Die Regelung der Konzerne in Großbritannien: Sonderbehandlung im Rahmen des allgemeinen Gesellschafts-rechts”Google Scholar, in: Mestmäcker and Behrens, supra n. 1, 335.

³⁵⁰ On “delaying of proceedings” under the German Insolvency Law: Häsemeyer, , Insolvenzrecht, 2nd ed. (Köln: Heymann 1998) p. 460.Google Scholar

³⁵¹ A definition of “wrongful trading” is not provided because in the debate on the Insolvency Acts between 1984 and 1986 it was felt that the definiton should be left to the courts. Cf., Fletcher, , “Winding up, Marginal Note 15.459”, in: Palmer's Company Law, 25th ed. (London: Stevens 1992)Google Scholar; Marginal Note 15.460, ibid., describes the conduct which leads to liability as follows: “the essence of the activity consists of the company's continuing to trade, and to incur liabilities, after the time when it was known, or ought to have been realised, by the directors, that an insolvent liquidation was inevitable, or, at least, would appear to be probable [!] to a reasonable person in the place of the director sought to be held liable.”

³⁵² Cf., Schuberth, supra n. 1, p. 198.

³⁵³ The amount of compensation fixed by the court benefits all creditors of the company and not only those who have suffered loss due to “wrongful trading”, cf., Gower/ Davies, supra n. 1, pp. 154 et seq.; Fletcher, supra n. 351, thinks it would be reasonable if the court in assessing the amount of damages took into account the amount attributable to “wrongful trading”, but admits “that there are no restrictive words in the drafting of section 214 itself to preclude the imposition of personal liability for debts of the company whensoever incurred: the court has an unfettered discretion in this matter”.

³⁵⁴ Under BGHZ 29,100,102 et seq.; cf., recently Häsemeyer, supra n. 350, p. 686.

³⁵⁵ BGHZ 126, 181, 192 et seq.; critically, Häsemeyer, supra n. 350, p. 686 et seq., and further references given there, on assent to the decision of the Federal Supreme Court in the literature.

³⁵⁶ Cf., s. 214 para. 1 IA 1986 (”on the application of the liquidator”). The Companies Act 1948, which contained the preceding provision on this issue, did not have this limitation, each creditor was entitled to apply.

³⁵⁷ Precisely in the context of “wrongful trading”. S. 251 IA 1986 does not restrict the definition of “shadow director” to natural persons. S. 741 para. 3 CA 1985 limits the use of this term in certain respects as far as a company as “shadow director” is concerned, but does not mention “wrongful trading”.

³⁵⁸ (1994) B.C.C. 161, 163.

³⁵⁹ However, Re Hydrodan (Corby) Ltd., supra n. 336, did not remove all doubt as to the particular conditions which must apply. Davies, , “Management of the Company, Marginal Note 8.003”, in: Palmer's Company Law, 25th ed. (1992)Google Scholar, interprets Re Hydrodan (Corby) Ltd. as meaning that the influence of the board as an organ of the parent does not, of itself, suffice to render the parent liable, whereas the influence of individual directors of the parent could render them liable. Schuberth, supra n. 1, p. 195, argues for a graduated system in order to determine the relationship between parent and subsidiary: the parent is, in any case, a “shadow director” if the corporate agreement grants the parent the right to instruct the subsidiary. The parent is presumed to be a “shadow director” if it can influence the appointment of members of the organs of the subsidiary without the approval of the general meeting. Finally, the parent may be proved to be a “shadow director” if the directors of the subsidiary in fact regularly follow the instructions of the parent.

³⁶⁰ Table A in the model Articles of Association provided in the Companies Acts does not recognise a right by a shareholder to instruct the management of a company. That does not prevent such a right from being included in the Articles of Association. In either case it is normal that the management of a subsidiary follows the wishes of the parent, cf., Schuberth, supra n. 1, p. 195.

³⁶¹ “Liability of the director in case of liquidation to make up losses (comblement du passif)” (Art. 180 Law of 25.01.1985).

³⁶² Cf., infra 9.1.2.3; on the position in Belgium see Geens, supra n. 115, p. 21.

³⁶³ Cass. com. 14.5.1991, Bull. civ. IV, No. 164; Cass. com. 1.12.1992 and 19.1.1993, Dr. soc. (1993) No. 53; Cass. com. 08.10.1996, JCP, éd E, II, 917; Cass. com. 19.3.1996, Rev. soc. (1996) 840; Guyon, , Droit des Affaires, Volume II, 6th ed. (Paris: Economica, 1997)Google Scholar, Text numbers 1372 et seq.; Saint-Alary-Houin, , Droit des entreprises en difficulté, 2nd ed. (Paris: Mont Chrestien 1996)Google Scholar Text number 1085 et seq.

³⁶⁴ Trib. Commerce Brussels 11.12.1984, Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Handelsrecht (1985)491-494; 19.09.1985, Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Handelsrecht (1987) 523-527; more recent judgements are more reserved: Trib. Commerce Brussels 22.2.1993, Revue pratique des sociétés (1993) 168-185; Trib. Gent 26.03.1993, Tijdschrift Belgisch Handelsrecht (1993) 168-185.

³⁶⁵ Cf., Saint-Alary-Houin, supra n. 363, Text number 1090.

³⁶⁶ Cass. com 17.11.1992, Rev. soc. (1993) 866 with comment by Bouloc; Guyon, supra n. 363, Text number 1375; Saint-Alary-Houin, supra n. 363, Text number 1086.

³⁶⁷ Guyon, supra n. 366, Text number 1378; Saint-Alary-Houin, supra n. 363, Text number 1093.

³⁶⁸ Guyon, supra n. 366, Text number 1389; for Belgium cf., Trib. Commerce Brussels, 8.12.1981, Revue pratique des sociétés (1982) no. 6215, 228-234.

³⁶⁹ Cass. com. 25.10.1977, Rev. soc. (1978) 294 with comment by Randoux; CA Paris 17.03.1978, Bangue (1978) 656 with comment by Martin; CA Paris 11.06.1987, Rev. soc. (1987) 629; Guyon, supra n. 366, Text number 1389; Rives-Lange, in: D (1975) chron., p. 41 et seq.

³⁷⁰ Guyon, supra n. 366, Text number 1389; Daigre, in: Encyclopédie juridique Dalloz, Répertoire des sociétés, BD II, Text number 370.

³⁷¹ See supra section 9.1.1.5.

³⁷² Further cf., Timmermann, “The Law on Corporate Groups in the Netherlands”, in: Balzarini et al., 348; and also Slagter, supra n. 330, pp. 383 et seq.

³⁷³ OGH Juristische Blätter (JBl) (1986) 713; cf., Doralt, supra n. 321, pp. 223 et seq.

³⁷⁴ Supra section 9.1.1.1.

³⁷⁵ Hachenburg and Ulmer, supra n. 347, § 64 GmbHG, Marginal Note 12, and further references given there.

³⁷⁶ Detailed provision on this point is reserved until further discussion with the experts of each Member State.

³⁷⁷ Supra section 4.

³⁷⁸ This is clear from the recent introduction of the “provisional insolvency administrator”: firstly, because such an appointment follows an application to wind-up the company on the grounds of over-indebtedness or (threatened) inability to pay its debts; and secondly, the only duty of the administrator is to protect and preserve the assets pending a decision on the winding-up application (further see Häsemeyer, supra n. 350, pp. 130 et seq.).

³⁷⁹ Cf., Adler, Düring and Schmaltz, supra n. 212, § 252 HGB, Marginal Note 28; Budde, and Geißler, , in: Beck'scher Bilanzkommentar, 3rd ed. (München: Beck 1995)Google Scholar § 252 HGB, Marginal Notes 9 et seq.; Baumbach, and Hopt, , Komm. z. HGB, 30th ed. (2000)Google Scholar § 252, Marginal Note 7.

³⁸⁰ Supra section 4.