¹ A prominent example being the market of telecommunications: Mestmäcker, (ed.), Kommunikation ohne Monopole (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1980)Google Scholar; Mestmäcker, (ed.), Kommunikation ohne Monopole II (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1995).Google Scholar

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³ Summing up this molecular approach Burk, , “Introduction: A biotechnology primer”, 55 U. Pitt. L. Rev. (1994) 611, 612–621.Google Scholar

⁴ COM (95) 688 final, December 1995, p. 15, 24, Annex 1: p. 16/14; hint at “biotechnology … as one of the most promising and crucial technologies for sustainable development in the next century” in European Commission, White Paper on growth, competitiveness, and employment: The challenges and ways forward into the 21st century, COM (93) 700 final, Brussels, 5 December 1993; for the latest official statement on the status of biotechnology in Europe and the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, see the opinion of the Advocate-General of 14 June 2001 in Case C-377/98 Kingdom of the Netherlands v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union.

⁵ Ernst, & Young, , Aufbruchstimmung 1998. Erster Deutscher Biotechnologie Report (Stuttgart: Schitag Ernst & Young 1998)Google Scholar; this is not changed by the recent growth of the European biotech industry, which leaves the top fifty European biotech firms at a quarter of the size in annual turnover and in stock value in comparison with US firms: Hofmann, , “Europäische Industrie noch im Rückstand” [“European Industry still behind”], Handelsblatt (27 May 2001).Google Scholar

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²⁵ Pisano, ibid.

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³⁶ For documentation of oversight role, see Gompers, , “Optional Investment, Monitoring and the Staging of Venture Capital”, 50 J. Fin. (1995) 1461–1489CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lerner, , “Venture Capital and the Oversight of Private Firms”, 50 J. Fin. (1995) 301–318CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for new forms of off-balance sheet R&D financing in biotechnology to raise large sums of equity without losing independence of flexibility, see Schoemaker, / Shapiro, , “Innovative Financial Strategies for Biotechnology Ventures”, in: Day, / Schoemaker, / Gunther, (eds.), Wharton on Managing Emerging Technologies (New York: Wiley 2000) 307–332.Google Scholar

³⁷ European Commission, European industrial policy for the 1990s (Brussels 1991) 31, 33Google Scholar; European Commission, “Green Paper on Innovation”, COM (1995) 688Google Scholar final (December 1995) p. 6.

³⁸ COM (95) 688 final (December 1995) pp. 6, 10.

³⁹ European Commission, First action plan for innovation in Europe (Brussels 1997)Google Scholar; for download visit <http://www.cordis.lu/innovation/src/action.htm>

⁴⁰ For details on the program and its participants visit <http://www.cordis.lu/finance/home.html> from a German perspective towards these and similar German programs, see Hopt, , “Verbesserter Zugang zu Risikokapital für Existenzgründer sowie kleine und mittlere Unternehmen”, in: Pfeiffer, / Kummer, / Scheuch, (eds.), Festschrift für Hans Erich Brandner (Köln: Schmidt 1996) 541, 543–545.Google Scholar

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⁴³ Murray/ Marriot, supra n. 41, at 957.

⁴⁴ European Commission, “Progress Report on the Risk Capital Allocation Plan”, COM (2000) 658Google Scholar final (Brussels 18.10.2000) p. 4.

⁴⁵ European Commission, “Progress Report on the Risk Capital Allocation Plan”, COM (2000) 658Google Scholar final (Brussels 18.10.2000) p. 7; Murray/Marriott, supra n. 41, at 948.

⁴⁶ Empirically with respect to small fund size Murray/ Marriott, supra n. 41, at 974.

⁴⁷ European Commission, Risk Capital: A Key to Job Creation in the European Union (Brussels 1998).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ European Commission, ibid., p. 10.

⁴⁹ European Commission, Progress report on the risk capital action plan, Supplement A, Economic trends, No. 8/9 (08/ 09 2000) p. 4.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Case 120/78 Rewe v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, [1979] ECR 649; see for analysis of the developments Barents, , “New Developments in Measures having Equivalent Effect”, 18 C.M.L. Rev. (1981) 271–308Google Scholar; Baron, van Voorst tot Voorst, / van, Dam, “Europe 1992: Free Movement of Goods in the Wider Context of a Changing Europe”, 25 C.M.L. Rev. (1988) 693–709Google Scholar; Mortelsman, , “The Common Market, the Internal Market and the Single Market, What's in a Market?” 35 C.M.L. Rev. (1998) 101–136Google Scholar; Weatherill, , “After Keck: Some Thoughts on How to Clarify the Clarification”, 33 C.M.L. Rev. (1996) 885–906.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Cases C-267 & 268/91 Keck & Mithouard, [1993] ECR I-6097 and the case law which followed; in light of the focus of this article on the cross-border activity of financial service providers it does not matter whether these restrictions equally apply to the freedom of movement of capital (applicability favored by Eilmansberger, , “Zur Reichweite der Kapitalverkehrsfreiheit” [“The Scope of the Freedom of Movement of Capital”], ÖBA [2001] 377, 380–381Google Scholar; disfavored with respect to the freedom to provide services Kulms, , “Rentenversicherung, private Zusatzvorsorge und Europäischer Binnenmarkt für Versicherungsleistungen”, in: Basedow, / Drobnig, / Ellger, / Hopt, / Kötz, / Kulms, / Mestmäcker, [eds.], Aufbruch nach Europa (Tübingen: Mohr 2001) 183, 187.Google Scholar

⁵² European Commission, “Commission Recommendation for the 2001 Broad Guidelines of the Economic policies of the Member States and the Community”, COM (2001) 224Google Scholar final (Brussels 25.4.2001) p. 15; for the applicability of the competition rules to financial services, see Usher, , The Law of Money and Financial Services in the EC, 2nd Ed. (New York: Oxford University Press 2000) 59–88.Google Scholar

⁵³ Case C-148/91 Vereniging Veronica Omroep Organisatie v. Commissariaat voor de Media, [1993] ECR I-487, I-519-I-520; Hatzopoulos, , “Recent Developments of the Case Law of the ECJ in the Field of Services”, 37 C.M.L. Rev. (2000) 43, 72 Fn. 162Google Scholar; Usher, ibid., pp. 105-110.

⁵⁴ European Commission, “Progress Report on the Risk Capital Action Plan” (Brussels 18.10.2000), COM (2000) 658 final, p. 11.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ OJ [1985] L 375/3.

⁵⁶ OJ [1985] L 375/3.

⁵⁷ Directive 89/646/EEC (15.12.1989), OJ [1989] L 386/1.

⁵⁸ Directive 93/22/EEC (10.5.1993), OJ [1993] L 141/27.

⁵⁹ Directive 92/49/EEC (18.6.1992), OJ [1992] L 228/1 (direct insurance); Directive 92/96/ EEC of 10.11.1992, OJ [1992] L 360/1 (direct life assurance).

⁶⁰ European Commission, Communication of the European Commission, “Risk Capital: A Key to Job Creation in the European Union”, SEC (1998) 552, p. 11–12Google Scholar; European Commission, “Progress Report on the Risk Capital Action Plan” (Brussels, 18.10.2000), COM (2000) 658 final, p. 10Google Scholar; The Committee of Wise, Men, Final Report on the Regulation of European Securities Markets (Brussels, 15.2. 2001) pp. 10–13.Google Scholar

⁶¹ European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “Progress Report on the Risk Capital Action Plan” (Brussels, 18.10.2000), COM (2000) 658 final, p. 10Google Scholar; The Committee of Wise, Men, Final Report on the Regulation of European Securities Markets (Brussels, 15.2.2001) p. 13.Google Scholar

⁶² European Commission, “Financial Services Action Plan” (Brussels 11.05.1999), COM (1999) 232, p. 6.Google Scholar

⁶³ Council ECOFIN, 2335th Council meeting, Press Release 6925/01, (Brussels, 12 March 2001), p. 19; European Commission, Financial services: “Commission welcomes political agreement on investment fund management Directive”, 12 March 2001Google Scholar <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/finances/mobil/01-345.htm> visited 27 May 2001.

⁶⁴ European Commission, Amended Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and Council amending Directive 85/61 I/EEC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) with a view to regulating management companies and simplified prospectuses, COM (2000)331 final as amended by document no. [500PC0331] <http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/dat/2000/en_500PC0331.html>

⁶⁵ European Commission, ibid.

⁶⁶ European Commission, ibid.

⁶⁷ European Commission, ibid.

⁶⁸ For this reason, calling for effective home Member State supervision Hertig, , “Regulatory Competition for EU Financial Services”, 3 J. Int. Econ. L. (2000) 349, 352–354CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for parallel argument in context of freedom of movement of goods, see Kerber, , “Interjurisdictional Competition within the European Union”, 23 Fordham Int'l L.J. (2000) 217, 243Google Scholar; for limits of this principle of mutual recognition because of abuse and resulting dangers for the investors, see Calliess, , “Heimatstaatprinzip und Europa-Paß im Finanzmarktrecht” [“Home country supervision and the European passport in the law of financial services”], EWS (Europäisches Wirtschafis- & Steuer-recht) [2000] 432, 435–439.Google Scholar

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⁷⁰ European Commission, supra n. 64.

⁷¹ For a similar assessment of harmonization in the field of freedom of movement of goods, see Kerber, supra n. 68, at 243.

⁷² See for empirical evidence Jackson, / Pan, , “Regulatory Competition in International Securities Markets: Evidence from Europe in 1999, Part I”, 56 Bus. Law. (2001) 653, 655, 684–687.Google Scholar

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⁷⁴ Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd. v. Erhversog Selskabsstyrelsen, [1999] ECR. I-1459 (ECJ decision of 9.3.1999); on this decision, see, for example, Behrens, , “International Company Law in View of Centros decision of the ECJ”, 2 EBOR (2000) 125–146Google Scholar; but note at the same time the political agreement reached by the EU's Council of Ministers on December 20 on the Regulation to establish a European Company Statute.

⁷⁵ Fundamental in this respect is Winter, , “State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation”, 6 J. Leg. Stud. (1977) 251–292CrossRefGoogle Scholar; under the same assumption concerning the control capacity of the capital market, see Romano, , The Genius of American Corporate Law (Washington D.C.: AEI 1993)Google Scholar; dissenting: Cary, , “Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware”, 83 Yale L.J. (1974) 663–705CrossRefGoogle Scholar; skeptical with regard to Canadian corporate law recently Cumming, / MacIntosh, , “The role of interjurisdictional competition in shaping Canadian corporate law”, 20 Int'L Rev. L & Econ. (2000) 141–186CrossRefGoogle Scholar; on the perspective of jurisdictional competition in this decision, see Freitag, , “Der Wettbewerb der Rechtsordnungen im Internationalen Gesellschaftsrecht” [“Competing Laws in International Company Law”], EuZW [1999] 267–270 (269)Google Scholar; Kieninger, , “Niederlassungsfreiheit als Rechtswahlfreiheit” [“Freedom of establishment as the freedom of choice of law”], ZGR [1999] 724, 747–749Google Scholar; Merkt, , “Das Centros-Urteil des Europäischen Gerichtshofs – Konsequenzen für den nationalen Gesetzgeber” [“The Centros-Decision of the ECJ – Consequences for the National Legislator”], in: Gesellschaftsrechtliche Vereinigung VGR (ed.), Gesellschaftsrecht in der Diskussion 1999 [Corporate Law in the Debate 1999] (Köln: Schmidt 2000) 111, at 120 et seq.Google Scholar

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⁷⁷ For an overview of this development in English and US law, see Mahoney, , “Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems”, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. (1995) 1047, 1054–1077.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷⁸ For examples, see Erlanger v. New Sombrero Phosphate Co., (1878) 3 A.C. 1218, 1218-1223 (HL); Whaley Bridge Calico Printing Co. v. Green, (1879) 5 Q.B.D. 109, 109-110.

⁷⁹ See for example Emma Silver Mining Co. v. Grant, (1879) 11 Ch.D. 918, 918-925.

⁸⁰ Erlanger v. New Sombrero Phosphate Co., (1878) 3 A.C. 1218 (HL), 1229-1230, 1236.

⁸¹ 63 & 64 Viet., ch. 48 (1900).

⁸² 19 & 20 Geo. 5, ch. 23 (1929).

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⁸⁴ With respect to similar principles in the area of the freedom of movement of goods, see Kerber, supra n. 68, at 243.

⁸⁵ European Commission, Risk Capital: A Key to Job Creation in the European Union (April 1998) pp. 10–12.Google Scholar

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