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Striking First: A History of Thankfully Lost Opportunities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2012

Richard K. Betts
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Extract

It is unlikely that George W. Bush feels constrained by international law when deciding whether to use military force abroad. Nevertheless, many of the United States' allies are reluctant to cooperate with and participate in military actions that cannot reasonably be justified under international law. And supportive allies, while perhaps not strictly necessary to the United States in its recent and foreseeable military campaigns, do make the military option easier to pursue. A war against Iraq would be difficult without access to bases and airspace in countries as diverse as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Germany, and Canada. For this reason, at least, it would seem to be worth the president's while to adhere to international law where possible and, where this is not possible, to seek to change the rules.

Type
Articles
Information
Ethics & International Affairs , Volume 17 , Issue 1 , March 2003 , pp. 17 - 24
Copyright
Copyright © Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs 2003

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References

1 Of course, corrupt leaders or particularistic groups in poorly institutionalized political systems may effectively substitute their own interests for those of society at large.

2 For a discussion of preventive and preemptive war, see Betts, Richard K., Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982), pp. 141–46Google Scholar; Belts, , “Surprise Attack and Preemption,” in Allison, Graham T., Carnesale, Alberl, and Nye, Joseph S. Jr., eds., Hawks, Doves, and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War (New York: W. W. Norton, 1985), pp. 54–79Google Scholar; and Bells, , “Suicide from Fear of Death?” Foreign Affairs 82 (2003), pp. 34–43Google Scholar.

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6 Henkin, Louis, Constitutionalism, Democracy, and Foreign Affairs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990Google Scholar), ch. 6.