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Humanitarian Intervention: Which Way Forward?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2012

Richard Caplan
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Abstract

States have long taken exception to the notion of humanitarian intervention because it threatens to undermine a bedrock principle of international order: national sovereignty. In the case of Kosovo, however, NATO's nineteen member states chose not only to put aside their concerns for national sovereignty in favor of humanitarian considerations, but also to act without UN authorization. This essay examines the ways in which states – European states in particular – are rethinking historic prohibitions against humanitarian intervention in the wake of the Kosovo war. It focuses on two approaches:

Efforts to reinterpret international law so as to demonstrate the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention and

Efforts to build a political consensus regarding when and how states may use force for humanitarian ends

While efforts to weaken prohibitions may succeed, thereby facilitating future interventions, resolution of the tension between legitimacy and effectiveness in defense of human rights will continue to elude the international community unless a political consensus can be achieved.

Type
The Meaning of Kosovo
Information
Ethics & International Affairs , Volume 14 , March 2000 , pp. 23 - 38
Copyright
Copyright © Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs 2000

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References

1 Press Conference at Palazzo Vecchio, Florence, October 6, 1998, cited in Guicherd, Catherine, “International Law and the War in Kosovo,” Survival 41 (Summer 1999), p. 28Google Scholar.

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10 In his testimony before Parliament on April 14, 1999, British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook explained: “The [Yugoslav] spring offensive was planned; we knew it was coming; we knew it would be accompanied by ethnic cleansing and I am quite sure, if I were here in front of this Committee and we were doing nothing, [you] would be the first to criticize us.” See House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1998–99, Kosovo: Interim Report, HC 188, para. 111.

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13 See the testimony of Aust to the Foreign Affairs Committee on December 2, 1992 (Parliamentary Papers, 1992–93, House of Commons, HC Paper 235–iii, p. 85).

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24 Most notable among these efforts were those of the International Law Association, which between 1970 and 1976 explored the possibility of drafting a protocol of procedure for humanitarian intervention that included criteria for legitimate intervention. The initiative was abandoned when it became apparent that there was little chance of achieving consensus among the members. See International Association, Law, Report of the Fifty-Fifth Conference 1972 (London: ILA, 1974), pp. 608–24Google Scholar; Report of the Fifty-Sixth Conference 1974 (London: ILA, 1976), pp. 217–22Google Scholar; and Report of the Fifty-Seventh Conference 1976 (London: ILA, 1978), pp. 519–23Google Scholar.

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