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Suppose We Know Things

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 August 2021

Matt Duncan Open the ORCID record for Matt Duncan [Opens in a new window]
Matt Duncan*
Affiliation:
Rhode Island College, Providence, RI, USA
*
Email: sduncan@ric.edu
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Abstract

When contemporary philosophers discuss the nature of knowledge, or conduct debates that the nature of knowledge is relevant to, they typically treat all knowledge as propositional. However, recent introductory epistemology texts and encyclopedia entries often mention three kinds of knowledge: (i) propositional knowledge, (ii) abilities knowledge, and (iii) knowledge of things/by acquaintance. This incongruity is striking for a number of reasons, one of which is that what kinds of knowledge there are is relevant to various debates in philosophy. In this paper I focus on this point as it relates to the third kind of knowledge mentioned above – knowledge of things. I start by supposing that we have knowledge of things, and then I show how this supposition reshapes various debates in philosophy.

Keywords

Acquaintanceknowledge of thingsknowledgeconsciousnessawarenessBertrand Russell
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 20 , Issue 2 , June 2023 , pp. 308 - 323
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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