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NO SAFE HAVEN FOR THE VIRTUOUS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 May 2018

Jaakko Hirvelä
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Abstract

In order to deal with the problem caused by environmental luck some proponents of robust virtue epistemology have attempted to argue that in virtue of satisfying the ability condition one will satisfy the safety condition. Call this idea the entailment thesis. In this paper it will be argued that the arguments that have been laid down for the entailment thesis entail a wrong kind of safety condition, one that we do not have in mind when we require our beliefs to be safe from error in order for them to be knowledge.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 17 , Issue 1 , March 2020 , pp. 48 - 63
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018

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