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IS EVIDENCE OF EVIDENCE EVIDENCE? SCREENING-OFF VS. NO-DEFEATERS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 May 2017

William Roche
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Abstract

I argue elsewhere (Roche 2014) that evidence of evidence is evidence under screening-off. Tal and Comesaña (2017) argue that my appeal to screening-off is subject to two objections. They then propose an evidence of evidence thesis involving the notion of a defeater. There is much to learn from their very careful discussion. I argue, though, that their objections fail and that their evidence of evidence thesis is open to counterexample.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 15 , Issue 4 , December 2018 , pp. 451 - 462
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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References

REFERENCES

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