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Intellectual Honesty and Intellectual Transparency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 January 2022

T. Ryan Byerly Open the ORCID record for T. Ryan Byerly [Opens in a new window]
T. Ryan Byerly*
Affiliation:
University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
*
Email: t.r.byerly@sheffield.ac.uk
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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to advance understanding of intellectually virtuous honesty, by examining the relationship between a recent account of intellectual honesty and a recent account of intellectual transparency. The account of intellectual honesty comes from Nathan King, who adapts the work of Christian Miller on moral honesty, while the account of intellectual transparency comes from T. Ryan Byerly. After introducing the respective accounts, I identify four potential differences between intellectual honesty and intellectual transparency as understood by these accounts. I then turn to the question of how to think about the relationship between these traits in light of these potential differences. I make the case that intellectual transparency can either be regarded as an exceptionally strong or ideal variety of intellectual honesty, or it can be regarded as a distinct virtue from intellectual honesty which is a more cardinal virtue than the latter. Along the way, I also note some places where a case can be made that Miller's and King's accounts of honesty and intellectual honesty are in need of refinement or clarification.

Keywords

Honestytransparencyintellectual virtueskilltruthcardinality
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 20 , Issue 2 , June 2023 , pp. 410 - 428
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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