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HOW TO BE AN OPTIMIST ABOUT AESTHETIC TESTIMONY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 March 2016

Rachel McKinnon
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Abstract

An ongoing debate concerns whether agents can come to know that a particular piece of art is beautiful on the basis of someone's say-so. This debate concerns the epistemology of aesthetic testimony. Pessimists of various stripes claim that testimony-based knowledge of aesthetic propositions is impossible; optimists of various stripes claim that such testimony-based knowledge is possible. In this paper, I defend an optimist position: agents can come to know aesthetic propositions on the basis of testimony. Moreover, agents come to gain this knowledge quite readily. I make my case by considering a parallel debate in epistemology regarding assertions based on a particular kind of testimony, cases of what Jennifer Lackey (2011, 2013) has called “isolated second-hand knowledge” (ISHK). I argue that assertions based on isolated second-hand knowledge are appropriate, and hearers can come to know aesthetic propositions via testimony.

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Articles
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Episteme , Volume 14 , Issue 2 , June 2017 , pp. 177 - 196
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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