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Good Learning and Epistemic Transformation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 June 2021

Kunimasa Sato Open the ORCID record for Kunimasa Sato [Opens in a new window]
Kunimasa Sato*
Affiliation:
Ibaraki University, Japan
*
Email: kunimasa.sato.np11@vc.ibaraki.ac.jp
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Abstract

This study explores a liberatory epistemic virtue that is suitable for good learning as a form of liberating socially situated epistemic agents toward ideal virtuousness. First, I demonstrate that the weak neutralization of epistemically bad stereotypes is an end of good learning. Second, I argue that weak neutralization represents a liberatory epistemic virtue, the value of which derives from liberating us as socially situated learners from epistemic blindness to epistemic freedom. Third, I explicate two distinct forms of epistemic transformation: constitutive and causal epistemic transformation. I argue that compared with the ideal conception of epistemic virtue, constitutive epistemic transformation that involves good learning has a transcendent value in light of agents constantly renewing their default epistemic status toward ideal virtuousness.

Keywords

Liberatory epistemic virtueepistemic transformationtranscendent valuegood learningfeminist virtue epistemology
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 2023 , pp. 181 - 194
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press.

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