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GETTIER FOR JUSTIFICATION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 May 2014

Frank Hofmann
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Abstract

I will present a problem for any externalist evidentialism that allows for accidental possession of evidence. There are Gettier cases for justification. I will describe two such cases – cases involving veridical hallucination. An analysis of the cases is given, along the lines of (reliabilist) virtue epistemology (cf. Sosa, Greco). The cases show that certain externalist evidentialist accounts of justification do not provide sufficient conditions. The reason lies in the fact that one can be luckily in possession of evidence, and then one will not have a justified belief. Justified belief requires an anti-luck condition on possession of evidence. This opens up the prospects of a unified virtue-epistemology covering both knowledge and justification.

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Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 11 , Issue 3 , September 2014 , pp. 305 - 318
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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