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The Epistemic Value of Understanding-why

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 March 2021

Xingming Hu Open the ORCID record for Xingming Hu [Opens in a new window]
Xingming Hu*
Affiliation:
Nanjing University, China
*
Email: xingminghu@nju.edu.cn
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Abstract

Some philosophers (e.g., Pritchard, Grimm, and Hills) recently have objected that veritism cannot explain the epistemic value of understanding-why. And they have proposed two anti-veritist accounts. In this paper, I first introduce their objection and argue that it fails. Next, I consider a strengthened version of their objection and argue that it also fails. After that, I suggest a new veritist account: Understanding-why entails believing the truth that what is grasped is accurate (or accurate enough), and it is this true belief, along with many other true beliefs understanding-why entails, that makes understanding-why finally epistemically valuable. Then, I explain why the two anti-veritist accounts are both false. Finally, I briefly discuss the idea that understanding involves a kind of know-how and show how veritism can explain the epistemic value of know-how in general.

Keywords

Understandingepistemic valueveritismknow-how
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 2023 , pp. 125 - 141
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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