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ENTITLEMENT AND MUTUALLY RECOGNIZED REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 November 2013

Allan Hazlett
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Abstract

Most people not only think that it is possible for reasonable people to disagree, but that it is possible for people to recognize that they are parties to a reasonable disagreement. The aim of this paper is to explain how such mutually recognized reasonable disagreements are possible. I appeal to an “entitlement claim” which implies a form of relativism about reasonable belief, based on the idea that whether a belief is reasonable for a person can depend on the fact that she has inherited a particular worldview from her community.

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Articles
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Episteme , Volume 11 , Issue 1 , March 2014 , pp. 1 - 25
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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