Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-747cfc64b6-65n5b Total loading time: 0.146 Render date: 2021-06-14T04:06:41.496Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "metricsAbstractViews": false, "figures": true, "newCiteModal": false, "newCitedByModal": true, "newEcommerce": true }

Article contents

Recognizing Levels of Justification: To Add or to Subtract

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 October 2019

Richard Fumerton
Affiliation:
University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, USA
Corresponding

Abstract

In this paper I explore the idea of developing something like Sosa's influential distinction between cognitio and scientia (animal knowledge and reflective knowledge) to epistemic justification. On the assumption that we should, I explore the question of whether we should do so by either (1) beginning with a really basic, intellectually undemanding kind of justification, recognizing more sophisticated intellectually rewarding justification by layering more demanding requirements on that basic sort, or (2) beginning with an ideal sort of justification and recognizing less demanding sorts of justification by stripping away conditions from that ideal justification.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below.

References

Bergmann, M. (2006). Justification without Awareness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fales, E. (1996). A Defense of the Given. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.Google Scholar
Foley, R. (1990). ‘Fumerton's Puzzle.’ Journal of Philosophical Research 14, 109–13.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fumerton, R. (1990). Reason and Morality: A Defense of the Egocentric Perspective. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Fumerton, R. (1996). Metaepistemology and Skepticism. Boston: Rowman & Littlefield.Google Scholar
Fumerton, R. (2006). Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Fumerton, R. (2008). ‘Achieving Epistemic Ascent.’ In Greco, J. (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics, pp. 7285. Chichester: Wiley.Google Scholar
Fumerton, R. (2010). ‘Evidentialism and Truth.’ In Dougherty, T. (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 179–92. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Fumerton, R. (2016 a). ‘Prospects for Traditional Internalism.’ In Bergmann, M. and Coppenger, B. (eds), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Fumerton, R. (2016 b). ‘Rising Above the Animals: The Search for Intellectual Assurance.’ In Fernandez, M. (ed.), Performance Epistemology, pp. 151–66. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fumerton, R. (2018). ‘Inferential Internalism and the Problem of Unconscious Inference.’ In McCain, K. and Poston, T. (eds), The Mystery of Skepticism: New Explorations, pp. 176–86. Leiden: Brill.Google Scholar
Goldman, A. (1988) ‘Strong vs Weak Justification.’ In Tomerlin, J. (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives 2: Epistemology, pp. 5169. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing.Google Scholar
Littlejohn, C. (2012). Justification and the Truth-Connection. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Markie, P. (2005). ‘Easy Knowledge.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70, 406–16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moon, A. (2017). ‘Beliefs do not Come in Degrees.’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47, 760–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sosa, E. (2016). ‘How Our Knowledge Squares with Skeptical Intuitions Despite the Circle.’ In Coppenger, B. and Bergmann, M. (eds), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Stroud, B. (1984). The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, T. (Forthcoming). ‘Justifications, Excuses, and Skeptical Scenarios.’ In Dutant, J. and Dorsch, F. (eds), The New Evil Demon. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
1
Cited by

Send article to Kindle

To send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Recognizing Levels of Justification: To Add or to Subtract
Available formats
×

Send article to Dropbox

To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

Recognizing Levels of Justification: To Add or to Subtract
Available formats
×

Send article to Google Drive

To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

Recognizing Levels of Justification: To Add or to Subtract
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response

Please enter your response.

Your details

Please enter a valid email address.

Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *